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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis begins with the contemporary political situation, where the extent of political 
thought and activity has been largely reduced to repetitive discussion about how established 
liberal representative systems of governments should best function. In this situation, where the 
State and its institutions have a monopoly on politics, there is almost no scope for the 
consideration of other modes of political thought and activity – in particular, the possibility of 
politics without the State. 
The argument is framed by two different responses to this situation. Firstly, many 
political philosophers (such as Richard Rorty) argue that the monopoly is here to stay, that 
western liberal democracy is as good as it gets, and that the best we can do is attempt to improve 
the system by alleviating the occurrences of injustice that remain. On the other hand (and in their 
own ways) Cornelius Castoriadis and Michel Foucault argue that current political thought is 
fundamentally obsolete and incongruous with our present and call for a shift away from our 
reliance on traditional forms of political organisation. As such, they call for us to „invent new 
modes of being together‟ and „new schemas of politicisation‟. 
In response to Rorty‟s provocation and to the calls of Foucault and Castoriadis, the thesis 
firstly examines traditional anarchist theorisations of „politics without the state‟ and finds them to 
be as contained by the State and its founding concepts as the political liberalism of our present. 
All that remains to be salvaged from anarchist thought is the idea expressed in its name: that is, to 
be „without rulers‟. In order to escape such conceptual containment, Raw politics aims to produce 
a „stripped-down‟ conceptualisation of politics. This politics is the practical activity of people 
being together, talking together, and responding to their time and place together, in ways which 
are not enclosed, limited or monopolised by notions of allegiance to governmental institutions, by 
community or collective identity, or by ideas derived from particular and incongruous historical 
or geographical events (such as the Athenian polis). This is a politics that does not posit an end to 
its activity that is other than its activity. As such, Raw politics is a politics „without the State‟, 
„without rulers‟ – a politics for politics‟ sake. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Without the State? 
 
Looking away shall be my only negation. 
 (Nietzsche, 1974 [1887]: §276, 223) 
 
 The problem is the State and that it subsists without question. This subsistence
1
 has taken 
on the character of a transcendent or even metaphysical existence. And this is so much so that 
politics seems not to happen without it. This subsistence monopolises politics. The State subsists 
through the exclusion of and delegitimation of the activity and imagination of politics without it. 
It subsists through the appropriation of people as „the People‟, to be subservient to the needs of 
its continuing subsistence. In this sense, its subsistence, its presence, is intransigent. Further, even 
in its most benevolent moods the State is never benign; it is never „just there‟. Its subsistence 
orders (demands and organises) people into itself. 
The State subsists in and through theory and thought. It is (a) theory. It is a thought that 
is produced in political thought. And, it subsists on and through the actual obedience and 
allegiance of people to it, primarily as a thought.
2
 In the main, the theory of the social contract 
describes how or why people – all at once – give up and gain freedom, through obedience to 
sovereign authority. So, ever since the modern State emerged and was instituted in a system of 
States around the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, philosophers have tried to respond. Autonomy, 
freedom, liberty
3
 is conceived of and affirmed as either a natural right, or a moral, political or 
philosophical priority. However, authority is required to secure that autonomy and to ensure that 
individuals are not harmed by autonomy let loose. Many claim that the authority and ordering of 
the State is necessary for there to be liberty and peace. Others do not see it as necessary but that a 
balance between autonomy and authority is the least bad way for us to order ourselves. However, 
this answer is not good enough. It is not acceptable (for this thesis anyway) to neglect the 
question of „What else is possible?‟  
Put simply, it is necessary to continue to ask questions about the possibility of the 
absence of the State or about, as it will be described in this thesis, politics without the State. We 
                                                 
1
 The term „subsistence‟ will be used throughout in order to make clear the distinction between an 
ontologically or metaphysically understood necessary being of the State – which this thesis rejects – and an 
existence that has a material sense of endurance or „permanence‟, but one that is nevertheless contingent 
and in need of ongoing maintenance and (life) support. 
2
 The problematic relation of political activity and thought, where in various ways political thought often 
becomes nothing other than the thought of the State, will be examined regularly as this thesis proceeds. On 
this problem, see for example Deleuze & Guattari (1988: 374) and Badiou (2005: 10).  
3
 While there are differences between the notions of freedom, liberty and autonomy, I will predominantly 
use the word „autonomy‟ (i.e. self-rule, self-government, self-legislation). Nevertheless, at times it will be 
necessary to refer to freedom and liberty or to all of them at once. 
 2 
need to ask this because the State is there and because it has not always been there, because it is a 
social creation, because its presence, its dominating, intransigent presence, is problematic. To say 
this, of course, is to take up a position that is in keeping with anarchist and (to some degree) 
socialist and Marxist traditions. However, I do not intend to construct a new anarchist or Marxist 
program here. Anarchist programs have been haunted by contradictions, as they intend to bring 
about a mode of life without the domination of political institutions (such as the State) through 
the use of those very institutions and through the evocation of concepts which are inseparable 
from those institutions. Nevertheless, it is true that anarchists reject the State and have sought to 
abolish it, remove it, undermine it, or organise its disappearance. This aspect of the anarchist 
position – that for various reasons the State is a problem – informs the questions that drive this 
thesis and will serve as a beginning point for the path I will follow here. After that I will deviate 
from the path of traditional anarchist political philosophy and its incongruous tendency to follow 
teleological and programmatic routes. I will not try to posit or describe an anarchist society or the 
methods through which one might be brought about. Of course, a question may then be asked: 
Without a plan or a program or a utopia and without an organisational strategy (even one that 
would be likely to contradict the anarchist position) how can such an approach be meaningful or 
effective? To this question I answer that it is necessary to try to find a way to make such an 
approach conceivable and the possibility of its desired effects plausible. Anarchism is different, 
and it must follow a different, more frustrating path. I will try to avoid using the toolbox of 
political liberalism – which includes in its contents, the notions of Rights, contracts, autonomy 
(liberty, freedom), sovereignty and citizenship. These tools are not separable from and are unable 
to do without the theory and the actual subsistence of the State. Thus, I will not attempt to argue a 
case based on the institution of a „new‟ kind of citizenship. Nor will I, like many contemporary 
approaches, invoke or draw on the polis. I will not toggle between Athens and the liberal 
Enlightenment.  
As I examine and criticise the structures and theories of the State, it will become evident 
that democracy remains relatively unscathed. This is because it has no necessary conceptual 
relation to the modern State and the thought of the State. The idea of democracy, while a fraught 
concept in its own ways and in relation to this thesis, somewhat escapes capture by the political 
concepts of the Enlightenment. As such, some thinkers (such as Derrida, Nancy, Agamben, 
Blanchot and, in his own way, Castoriadis), still see democracy as the key to thinking politics 
differently. Later in the thesis I will explore such possibilities in relation to the figuring of the 
activities of politics without the State. Having said this, the arguments of this thesis will not set 
out to figure or re-shape democracy as a mode of politics without the State. Rather, it is hoped 
that what I will describe as „raw‟ politics will come to be understood as, among other things, 
being involved in an important relation with democratic politics. As the arguments of the thesis 
proceeds, it will become clear that I think that, with democracy, something else still seems 
 3 
possible and that, on the other hand, with rights, freedom and the contract, nothing else seems 
possible. Before proceeding with this inquiry however, it is important to set out some parameters. 
Given that the key questions are around politics without the State, I will provide a definitional 
context around for ideas of „politics‟, „the State‟ and for the political and philosophical tradition 
that has in one way or another desired the absence of the State. Firstly, politics. 
In this inquiry, I begin with an understanding of politics that is drawn from Aristotle. 
Basically, politics – and the thought of politics – begins with a community, a group of people, 
rather than with the individuals of which a community is composed. Aristotle puts it this way: 
 
For even if the end is the same for a single man [sic] and for a state, that of the state seems at all 
events something greater and more complete to attain and to preserve; for though it is worth while 
to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and more godlike to attain it for a nation or for 
city-states (Aristotle, 1995: 1094b5-10). 
 
So, this thesis begins by taking issue with the Enlightenment view of politics, which itself begins 
with the freedom, the responsibilities and the obligations of an individual in relation to the 
stability and endurance of the State. As will become clear however, while I claim that politics 
begins with groups of people I do not then make the leap to agree with Aristotle that a group 
must institute as a State (or city-state). Politics, I argue, also happens without such institution. In 
light of this claim, I will gradually strip conventional modern understandings of politics of those 
concepts that (intransigently) tether it to the State. That is, I will try to strip politics of those 
concepts that allow the State to monopolise it and I will eventually come to define politics with a 
phrase borrowed from Cornelius Castoriadis. That is, politics is a mode of “being together, of 
discussing together, and of deciding together in a political organization” (Castoriadis, 1997d: 
195). I should add that the notion of politics used here is also informed by Deleuze and Guattari‟s 
claim that, “before Being there is politics” (Deleuze & Parnet, 1987: 17).4 I take this to mean that 
politics still happens before, or without, the act of political institution that brings the State into 
being.
5
 
 The State then, like politics, is understood here in a very broad sense. In early chapters I 
will primarily refer to the actual institution of the modern State. As I progress, and as I turn my 
attention to the discussion of the modern concepts of the State, it will be understood more in 
terms of a regime of thought, which closes in on and closes down more and more aspects of daily 
and political life and activity. As these discussions proceed, the problems associated with the 
proposition that politics without the State is possible, become more problematic. The very 
                                                 
4
 In A Thousand Plateaus this notion is rendered as “politics precedes being” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 
203). 
5
 This is not to say however, that everything is political. 
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theories and concepts that have served as foundations for that possibility turn out to actually 
serve the State‟s ongoing and intransigent presence. So, eventually, the understanding of the State 
that we come to in this inquiry resembles that used by Deleuze and Guattari, who speak of the 
„State-form‟.6 In this sense, that State is not just a set of physical structures, institutions, laws, 
territory and the citizens who give their allegiance to it, but a mode of thought and being in which 
life and activity is controlled and channelled into centralised systems of authority. Given this 
understanding of the State (or State-form), the possibility of a mode of being together, discussing 
together and deciding together without the State, becomes more difficult to conceive of than any 
old anarchist or Marxist could have imagined. Nevertheless, this thesis is inspired by old 
anarchists and Marxists. 
As the parameters of this inquiry are set by the questions of the possibility of politics 
without the State and, as such, by those traditions of political philosophy that have as an idea, the 
possible absence of the State, I will use, as a kind of beginning, Cornelius Castoriadis‟ 
description of the „original inspiration‟ of Marxism.7  
 
In its beginnings, Marxism presented an entirely new demand. The union of philosophy, politics 
and the real movement of the exploited class in society was not going to be a mere addition but a 
genuine synthesis, a superior union in which each of the elements would be transformed. 
Philosophy could be something different and something more than philosophy, more than a refuge 
from impotence and a solution to human problems in the realm of ideas, to the extent that it would 
translate its demands into a new politics. Politics could be something other and more than politics, 
technique and manipulation, the use of power for particular ends (Castoriadis, 1987: 62). 
 
I understand this beginning as a kind of pragmatic interpellation. This thesis begins with 
the questions around the possibility of something new happening. All I claim in support of such a 
line of questioning is the fact that „new‟ things have happened and continue to happen. As I noted 
earlier, I do not intend to describe a new political program but to try to understand how people 
might be involved in something new happening. There is nothing determined or teleological 
about any possibilities discussed here. And the „original inspiration‟ is not to be considered as a 
point of origin or birthplace or source for revolutionary politics and philosophy. I begin with the 
fact that some people desire a politics without the State and then, in curiosity, proceed to ask how 
what happens might, sometimes, also coincide with that desire. I chase this possibility by trying 
to understand how things happen and to try to describe a mode of politics that is involved in such 
                                                 
6
 See their „Treatise on Nomadology‟ in A Thousand Plateaus (1988: 351-423). 
7
 Castoriadis‟ description of the „original inspiration‟ is itself inspired and informed by „Thesis XI‟ of  
Marx‟s Theses on Feuerbach, which reads: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various  
ways; the point is to change it” (Marx, 1968 [1845]: 662). 
 5 
happening. I want to try to describe how politics without the State happens and how someone 
interpellated by the original inspiration might join-with such a happening.  
In addition to the original inspiration, which is Castoriadis‟ description of the 
„emergence‟ of the idea of Marxist revolutionary politics and theory, there are other calls and 
interpellations that drive the questions I intend to grapple with here. Firstly, there is Castoriadis‟ 
own call for “the invention of new modes of being together, of discussing together, and of 
deciding together in a political organization” (Castoriadis, 1997d: 195). In a similar fashion, 
Foucault argues that “Political analysis and criticism have in a large measure still to be invented – 
so too have the strategies which will make it possible to modify the relations of force, to co-
ordinate them in such a way that such modification is possible and can be inscribed in reality. 
That is to say, the problem is not so much that of defining a political „position‟ … but to imagine 
and to bring into being new schemas of politicisation” (Foucault, 1980: 190). 
That this thesis is inspired by these calls however, does not mean that I will follow the 
thought of Castoriadis and Foucault as far it, respectively, goes. As we will see, a substantial part 
of Castoriadis‟ work is an analysis and critique of Marxist revolutionary theory, which aims to 
identify the reasons for its failure to respond to the demand of the „original inspiration‟. 
Castoriadis‟ work is his own attempt to learn from and overcome the failures of Marxist 
revolutionary theory and to figure a different way to respond to the original inspiration. I think 
that Castoriadis‟ critique is sound, that his overall project is in many ways very worthwhile, and 
yet, it is not one that is followed here. This thesis‟ approach to political philosophy is rather more 
broadly informed by a particular kind of philosophical questioning that is articulated lucidly by 
Alain Badiou. He writes, “the desire of philosophy implies a dimension of revolt: there is no 
philosophy without the discontent of thinking in its confrontation with the world as it is” 
(Badiou, 2004: 39-40). Badiou here expresses the problem of wanting the world to be different 
but being unable to reconcile thought with „what is‟ and, politically to bring about a desired 
change. This discontent is also expressed in Marx‟s „Thesis XI‟, Castoriadis‟ description of the 
original inspiration, as well as Castoriadis‟ and Foucault‟s calls for new kinds of politics.8 The 
problem here is how we grapple with this discontent. Conventional political philosophical 
thinking aims to resolve and unify the discontent, the disjunctions between political desires, 
thought, activity and life. During the course of this thesis we will encounter some attempts to 
unify these desires, thoughts and activities in the work of Rousseau and Hegel for example. 
However, such unification will not be attempted here. As both Althusser and Foucault have 
argued, such attempts tend only to produce new layers of sophisticated thought, which usually 
                                                 
8
 In The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism, Todd May cites Adorno to make a similar 
point. May writes that “[w]hat Adorno sees … is that without the discordance between the world as it 
exists and the world as it is envisioned … there is no need for (political) philosophy. Political philosophy is 
precisely the articulation of that discordance” (May, 1994: 2). 
 6 
also tends to mask the operation and imperatives of sovereign power and governmental authority, 
and reinforces the intransigent presence of the State. Instead, I will continually refer to and draw 
upon the tensions and discords that are alive in the relation between political desire and the 
political life in my attempt to describe a politics without the State – or what I will call „raw 
politics‟. 
I will add a final note to this „definitional context‟. As I pursue the question of the 
possibility of politics without the State, I do not eventually intend to describe a politics which has 
dispensed with the State or a politics outside the State. Here, without the State means not-with the 
State, or not about or involved with the State. Further, unlike libertarian modes of „non-State‟ 
thought, this inquiry is not informed by the idea of the non-interference of the State in the lives of 
self-interested individuals. And finally, unlike all three of traditional anarchism, Marxism and 
libertarianism, the idea of politics without the State does not imply a politics against the State 
(even though this thesis, as called by the original inspiration, has some affinity with positions 
against the State). Politics without the State is not politics against the State but politics which is 
called by and about particular political situations.
9
 As we follow this line of thinking, I will begin 
to describe what I call a „gathering‟ of „raw politics‟, but before I can begin this pursuit it is 
necessary to explain how I will proceed. 
While I have described the parameters within which I will pursue my inquiry, I also need 
to explain my method of inquiry. Firstly, this method is layered. The first layer, which is stronger 
in the first half of the thesis, is more or less genealogical and more or less follows the example of 
Foucault. I do not attempt to trace origins through the use of this approach. Rather, much of the 
first half of the thesis could be described as a genealogy of philosophical and political attitudes to 
the State. As such, the attitudes discussed are: arguments in favour of the philosophical or 
practical necessity of the State; arguments against the State; arguments about the ways in which 
the problematic aspects of the State can be alleviated or mitigated and; arguments about how the 
brutality of the State is reinforced – and even necessitated – by, in and through its theorisation. 
Into this genealogical survey is interwoven a critique of the State, and particularly a critique of 
the conceptualisation of autonomy and freedom in relation to the State‟s intransigence.  
In the second half of the thesis, a second layer of methodology becomes more prominent. 
There, instead of addressing and examining the various philosophical attitudes to the State, the 
mode of inquiry can be characterised as a pursuit of clues and traces in philosophical works 
which I think have a trajectory towards a politics without the State. This method is in some way 
genealogical because of the tracing of lines of thought which seem to have affinities and relations 
with each other. But this approach is not genealogical in the sense that I am trying to explain an 
existing state of affairs. That is, this approach does not produce a genealogy. Instead, this aspect 
                                                 
9
 „About‟ is used here in two senses; that of „around‟, and that of „in a relation with‟ (particular political 
situations). 
 7 
of the inquiry is oriented to the description of a possible state of affairs: Politics without the State. 
This layer of the methodological approach might be more clearly described through the use of 
metaphor. 
In A Thousand Plateaus (1988) Deleuze and Guattari describe the differences between 
the sedentary roads of the State and the paths and tracks of the nomad (1988: 380-381). In the 
first half of this thesis, the approach is to follow the sedentary roads of the State in order to 
genealogically understand various philosophical attitudes to the State. I want to explore the 
State‟s incongruously theorised „roads to freedom‟ in order to understand how they tend rather 
always lead back to the closure of the State. The phrase, „all roads lead to Rome‟ seems apt in 
this context. This „Roman road‟ of State and Empire however, intersects with the paths and tracks 
of the nomads. In the second half of the thesis, I will begin to follow these tracks as they intersect 
and diverge. Along these paths I will follow the traces of politics without the State. Some of these 
divergences will turn out to be mere byways of the State road. By following others however, we 
might find a politics which is not drawn back into the logic of the State‟s network. Along these 
paths I will try to follow some threads left behind by thinkers such as Castoriadis, Foucault, 
Derrida, Mouffe, Critchley, Laclau, Todd May, Deleuze and Guattari, and by the pragmatism of 
Peirce and Rorty. At times these threads diverge and I must choose which line to follow. At other 
times these threads are untidily entangled and some unpicking work is necessary in order to 
understand the relationships and stresses involved in their intersections. Finally, at other times I 
think these threads – sometimes left by thinkers as „different‟ as Castoriadis and Foucault – are 
tantalisingly interwoven. These weaves often help us to imagine and figure what I will call a „raw 
politics‟. If we stick to this different metaphor of weaving for a moment, this thesis begins with 
the unravelling of the State, through an examination and critique of its conceptual apparatus 
(which I come to refer to as the „contract suite‟). In the second half, we proceed by following 
threads that weave along labyrinthine paths towards the possibility of politics without the State. 
At this point we should revert to the first metaphor. These threads may trace labyrinthine-like 
paths but they are not lost in a subterranean world. I prefer to imagine raw politics in terms of the 
open spaces of the desert, the steppe and the heath than in terms of the closed and dank 
murkiness, the mysterious space of the cave.
10
 
The order of the thesis follows this methodological layering. Thus, in Chapter One we 
discuss the emergence of the modern State and the theorisation of its philosophical necessity 
through the „contract suite‟ from Hobbes to Rousseau, Kant and Hegel. From there we turn to 
                                                 
10
 In his Crossroads in the Labyrinth (1984) Castoriadis imagines the labyrinth as the metaphorical setting 
for his inquiries. Of this he writes: “Obscure galleries lead away on every side, entangled with others 
coming from we know not where, going, perhaps, nowhere. We should never have crossed this threshold, 
we should have stayed outside. But we are no longer even certain that we had not always crossed it already 
… The only choice we still keep is to follow this gallery rather than that other into the darkness, without 
knowing where we shall be led, or whether we shall not be brought back eternally to this same crossroads – 
or to another exactly like it” (Castoriadis, 1984: ix-x). 
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those who argue for is practical necessity, such as Hume and Spinoza, before looking at the 
various, mostly anarchist, philosophical and political positions against both the necessity and the 
actual existence of the State. The chapter closes with a discussion of the impressive endurance of 
the liberal State which, it seems, continually operates to stitch and mend, to cover and mask the 
disjunctures and incongruities between the thought of the State and the governmental 
management of people‟s allegiance and obedience to authority. 
In Chapter Two we inquire into the effects that arguments for both the philosophical and 
pragmatic necessity of the State have on the imagination of the possibility of politics without it. 
The discussion moves from arguments about the teleological necessity of the State to those 
which, sometimes inadvertently, operate to show how the power of social conventions and 
practices provide the State with a normality that entrenches its intransigent presence. In this 
chapter, the work of thinkers such as Hegel, Kojève, Fukuyama, Rorty and Hume is characterised 
as of a school of thought which holds that the existing situation is as good as it gets. The critique 
of this „school‟ draws on Marx, Mouffe, Arendt, Benjamin, Derrida, Agamben and finally, 
Michel Foucault, to show how the power of normality, conventions, and practices is nonetheless 
involved in the State in those situations which can be described as „as bad as it gets‟. 
In Chapter Three, we examine the importance of the individual‟s allegiance in relation to 
the intransigent (and apparently transcendent) presence and subsistence of the State. Here, we 
shift focus slightly from the „genealogy of philosophical attitudes to the State‟ to a more detailed 
genealogy, analysis and critique of the theorisation of political allegiance of citizens to the State. 
This inquiry begins with Rousseau‟s transformation of the social contract from an explanatory 
framework for the political conventions that operate around allegiance, into an ideology, a move 
which is built on by Hegel. The critique of this transition is elucidated with the help of Louis 
Althusser and Marx. In the latter half of the chapter we look at the relation between the political 
alienation of a citizen to the State and the various theorisations of alienation, following Marx, and 
the anomie, following Durkheim and other sociological thinkers. All of this serves as an 
introductory context for a discussion of how the rational ideology of the contract suite bolsters 
and entrenches political practices and conventions, ultimately as such practices are instituted as 
bureaucracy and, as Foucault describes it, governmentality. In Chapter Four we discuss the 
notions of autonomy, liberty and freedom in relation to the ideas and ideology of the contract 
suite and engage in a critique of the ways in which the theorisation of autonomy and freedom is 
inseparable from the theorisation of a People‟s allegiance to the State. I will argue here that as 
such, the notion of political autonomy is nothing more than a ruse which only functions to make 
the State more and more intransigent. This critique operates to emphasise the fact that in relation 
to the possibility of a politics without the State, autonomy is a problem. It is a problem 
specifically because traditionally we have turned to it as the most appropriate political concept to 
deploy against the State. The problem is that autonomy operates primarily as a conceptual device 
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to legitimate and justify the individual‟s allegiance and obedience to political authority. This 
undermines the political claims that accompany it. In these terms, autonomy is autonomy for the 
subsistence of the State and freedom is freedom from politics. 
From Chapter Five we begin to follow those tracks and threads that suggest a trajectory 
towards a politics without the State. That is, we begin to investigate the possibility of political 
thought and activity that does not serve the State‟s subsistence, and which possibly refuses that 
subsistence. Firstly, we look to Castoriadis and Foucault. This is because their particular notions 
of autonomy are not drawn according to the concepts of political liberalism. Instead they invoke 
the idea of the refusal of „closure‟ and of „what we are‟ to characterise autonomy. Thus before 
completely rejecting any notion of autonomy, it is necessary to understand theirs. This inquiry 
though only presents us with different problems and questions. Namely, is refusal enough for the 
activity of politics without the State? These questions lead us into Chapter Six, where we draw on 
the thoughts of Derrida and Deleuze (and Nietzsche) in order to figure a mode of politics that is 
affirmative rather than negative (i.e. that comes from an act of refusal). In the second half of 
Chapter Six I will begin to sketch in some detail the characteristics of „raw politics‟, or „politics 
without the State‟. In Chapter Seven, we will turn to some contemporary expressions and 
descriptions of „non-State‟ politics to see if they can be drawn upon to elucidate the activity of 
raw politics. In this exercise we will examine the work of Hardt and Negri, Todd May and Simon 
Critchley. In Chapter Eight we will revisit the political thought of Deleuze and Guattari in order 
to gather together the various threads I have pulled during the course of this thesis. Then, finally, 
I will try to describe raw politics, its contemporary relevance and some possible implications. 
 By the end of this thesis, if I am successful, we will have begun to imagine the possibility 
of a politics without the State. Further, I think this possibility can operate as a kind of 
interpellation of its own. As I have stated above, I do not intend to produce a new program here 
but to understand if it is (still) possible to describe a mode of activity that is not involved with the 
State and to then ask how this may be possible. If we understand how such politics happens or 
may happen, then we may also be able to carry this idea as we join-with particular political 
situations. Carrying this idea means that it must always be remembered that the thought of the 
State is strong and that some acts of political „sending‟, deployment or institution may be 
„inevitable‟ (depending upon the situation) or even desirable. As such, my claims around raw 
politics turn around its place as a small but crucial idea. This appeal to smallness may seem 
strange given the tendency of philosophical and political thinkers to conceive of grand ideas and 
systems for our being together, discussing together and deciding together. And it may seem 
strange given the „bigness‟ of the problem I have taken on. That is, the monopoly of the State 
over politics and the possibility of politics without the State. As we reach the conclusions of this 
thesis however, I hope to argue that it is now time for small ideas. Now, this small idea will not 
bring down the State, but it may operate as a tactic or a ploy which is suited to particular political 
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situations. Not every political situation needs a big idea or the application of a (State-form) model 
of organisation – at least not at first, before we even try to get something done. Sometimes what 
is needed is simply for something to be done. Sometimes, what is desired by those interpellated 
by the original inspiration, might actually happen. Instead of trying to plan or program a grand 
society or project, we might simply need to involve ourselves in situations and to try to remain 
involved for as long as possible without turning to the conventional strategy of political 
institution. Arguably, what results from our involvement will be no less „unforeseeable‟ as the 
results of a big project. And if things turn out badly, at least it will be in a small way, and in such 
a way that it cannot be defended or masked through doctrines or as an aberration. And, finally 
while I will not claim a necessary relationship or equivalence with democracy, I think that the 
idea – or the adulteration – of raw politics might help to invigorate our engagement with 
democracy and in democratic institutions. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
THE STATE 
Necessity and its discontents  
 
 
In the Introduction, I called the State
1
, its presence, intransigent and suggested that no 
matter how benevolent „it‟ tries to be, it is never benign. Additionally, in its intransigence, it has 
become almost impossible to imagine life in modern society without it. And some say, or imply, 
that it is ridiculous, or actually impossible, to think such things. This position has its roots deep in 
the theoretical tradition of modern political philosophy. So, before discussing examples of 
discontentment about the State as well as some of the responses that stem from that discontent, it 
is necessary to define the modern State and to examine the roots of its intransigence. 
 
 
The modern State 
 
States have changed considerably since the times of Hobbes and Rousseau. They have 
evolved from a relatively simple set of governing institutions and bureaucracies responsible for 
maintaining the unity of a people under a sovereign to a complex organisational mesh which, as 
well as including the original elements, encompasses management of markets, exploitation of the 
environment, scientific research, and oversight of the provision of the basic necessities of life for 
billions of people. In this regard, states have been very successful and an important factor in the 
flourishing of many societies, and Empires, especially in the west. It is not surprising then that 
states are seen as „indispensable‟. From Hobbes to Rousseau, to Locke, Hume, Kant and Mill, 
from Hegel to the present day, for various reasons, the State is considered a necessity.
2
 
Those thinkers who have written at length to explain or justify the necessity of the State 
(Hobbes, 1979 [1651]; Rousseau, 2004 [1762]) have not always had it all their own way. 
                                                 
1
 Where I refer to the philosophical concept, a capital „S‟ will be used. Where I refer to the actual 
occurrence of the state and/or states, I will use the lower case. It is also worth noting here that the notion of 
the State being discussed in this chapter is the modern State, rather than the Classical city-state or polis. 
2
 While I will focus on philosophical arguments here, it is worth noting that only three years before Hobbes 
published Leviathan (1979 [1651]), the Treaty of Munster and Westphalia was signed. As Karl Polanyi 
contends, the balance of power that this Treaty instituted maintained the sovereignty of nations in the 
European state system for over two hundred years (Polanyi, 1975: 6, 261-2). The „necessity‟ involved here 
can be understood as of a practical kind, given that after long periods of war the states recognised the 
„need‟ to maintain peaceful status quo. While it would be too bold to base any large claims on this 
observation, it is worth considering that the long period of stability with regard to the sovereignty of states 
encompasses the period in which thinkers made arguments about the philosophical necessity of the State. 
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Anarchists and Marxist socialists have either advocated its abolition (Bakunin, 1972 [1871a]: 
270) or theorised its „withering‟ (Marx & Engels, 1992 [1848]: 26; Marx, 1972 [1875]: 168-69; 
Engels, 1975 [1878]: 322; Lenin, 1973 [1917]: 17-25). This kind of thought, however, now 
appears to be a thing of the past and most political thinkers understand states “as an ineluctable 
feature of modernity, part of the landscape of all societies other than those based on kinship or 
feudal patronage ... [and] ... as indispensable to complex societies” (Dunleavy & O‟Leary, 1991: 
6). This kind of contention, that the State is „indispensable‟ and „necessary‟, is the foundation of 
not only theories of the State but of the states themselves. 
In this context, the State is understood as the general, sovereign, constitutional form 
under which most of the world now lives. That is, the modern nation-State. To describe it as a 
general form however, is not to ignore its complexity and variation across history and geography 
(and as we proceed, Deleuze and Guattari‟s descriptions of the „State-form‟ will become more 
apt). Nevertheless, regardless of particular systemic and ideological variation among the world‟s 
modern states, the basic legislative structures, and the idea of spatial and national sovereignty, 
emerged from a gradual process which began in Europe in the mid-1600s.
3
 In addition, it is worth 
adding that the modern State system is currently (as it always is) undergoing a rather radical 
transformation. The emergence of a global order under the sway of neo-liberal late-capitalism has 
begun to dissolve the once solid sovereign boundaries between nations. (In this regard, Hardt and 
Negri‟s analyses of „Empire‟ (2001) will be examined later in this thesis.) 
It is important to emphasise here that this thesis is not about arguing for any particular 
theory of the State or about which argument about the rise of states has more validity than 
another. This thesis begins with the idea – acknowledged to some degree by theorists of the State 
– that the State is, in many aspects, oppressive. The State invariably involves controlling people, 
not always by force or outright trickery a la Machiavelli (1950 [1514]), but always in ways that 
are considered undesirable but, unfortunately, „necessary‟. This thesis is not about trying to 
theorise the best possible state (considering its oppressiveness) but about theorising the 
possibility of politics without it, firstly because of its oppressiveness and, secondly, because the 
idea of its „absence‟ is itself intriguing and should not be left alone. So, while the work of 
Polanyi, Wallerstein, Braudel, Benedict Anderson, Arrighi and Braudel, for example, is 
considered as important and valuable in understanding the functioning and historical 
                                                 
3
 Quentin Skinner‟s investigation of the development of political theory from medieval to modern times, 
through his discussion of the works of Machiavelli, Erasmus, More, Luther and Bodin (to name a few), 
shows that the conceptualisation of the modern State began well before Hobbes‟ Leviathan (1979 [1651]) 
(see Skinner, 1978). Nevertheless, in this thesis I will begin the „genealogy of philosophical and political 
attitudes to the State‟ with Hobbes both because of the limits of space and because of the historical 
proximity of Hobbes‟ work to the Treaty of Westphalia, which can itself be seen to mark the beginning of 
the institution of the modern State within a system of States – a system with which we are most familiar 
with today. 
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development of the modern state,
4
 for the purposes of this work, a synopsis derived mainly from 
Jürgen Habermas will be used.  
In his book, The Inclusion of the Other (2005), Habermas traces the trajectory of the 
European Nation-State, from its beginnings around the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, to the 
present. He first makes a distinction between two different paths to nation-state formation. The 
first, the path „from state to nation‟, includes those nation-states which “evolved within the 
boundaries of existing territorial states” (Habermas, 2005: 105). The second path, „from nation to 
state‟, includes those „belated‟ nations (e.g. Italy and Germany) whose formation “followed the 
trail blazed by an anticipatory national consciousness disseminated by propaganda” (105). 
Habermas then explains that a “third generation of ... nation-states emerged from the process of 
decolonisation ... which [often] were founded within the frontiers established by the former 
colonial regimes” (105-106). Regardless of its path to formation, however, for Habermas,  
 
[t]he “state” on the modern conception is a legally defined term which refers, at the level of 
substance, to a state power that possesses both internal and external sovereignty, at the spatial 
level over a clearly delimited terrain (the state territory) and at the social level over the totality of 
members (the body of citizens or the people) (Habermas, 2005: 107). 
 
Descriptions of the modern State vary.
5
 In a sense, these definitions matter little to the 
aims of this thesis. As I have already emphasised, this thesis is not concerned with various, or 
contested definitions. With regard to states, the primary concern is the question of its possible 
absence, or, a question around a politics that can take place without the State. Perhaps this is not 
so much a question about the withering away of the State, but one about a withering of the State‟s 
monopoly on the places in which politics can happen. But first we will look at the philosophical 
ideas that support the modern State in its intransigence.  
 
 
The ‘necessary’ State 
  
Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men [sic] live without a common power to keep them 
all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man 
against every man (Hobbes 1979 [1651]: 64). 
                                                 
4
 See Polanyi, The Great Transformation (1975); Anderson, Imagined Communities (1991); Braudel, On 
History (1980); Wallerstein, The Modern World System (1974) and Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century  
(1994). Arrighi uses the “interpretative scheme” (1994: ix) of Braudel‟s work (1984; 1982; 1981 and 1976) 
as a basis for his own. 
5
 For example, “The state means, essentially, the whole fixed political system, the set-up of authoritative 
and legitimately powerful roles by which we are finally controlled, ordered, and organised.” (Robertson, 
1993: 444). 
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The emergence of the philosophy of the necessity of the State happens in the context of 
the end of the acceptance of the authority of the Church and the divine right of Kings. This made 
it necessary to provide an explanation of the existing circumstances, in which authority is held by 
one or a few, and exercised absolutely over the many. C. E. Vaughan argues that the work of 
Hobbes and all of modern political philosophy would be „inexplicable‟ and „impossible‟ without 
“the assumptions imposed by the Protestant revolution” (Vaughan, 1925: 17). He writes,   
 
So long as the medieval Church held sway over men‟s [sic] minds, it was possible, and even 
natural, that the State should leave the control of conduct for the most part in her hands … But the 
moment the ancient Church was either swept away or transformed out of all recognition, the 
question was bound to present itself: How are we to fill the gap which is left by the removal of the 
disciplinary powers of the Church? Is the State to step into the breach? (Vaughan, 1925: 17-18).
6
 
 
Hobbes clearly responds to this question in the affirmative.   
For Hobbes, the State (as the Sovereign) is necessary because without it society will 
revert to a „state of nature‟ as a war of all against all. Only while subjects agree with one another 
to submit themselves to the authority of the Sovereign, can they enjoy the security and protection 
of laws and rights against all other (naturally) self-interested competitors (Hobbes, 1979 [1651]). 
John Locke‟s conception of the state of nature is not as brutal. It is rather one of perfect freedom 
and equality, where people act as they see fit as long as they do not impose upon, depend upon, 
obstruct or harm others (Locke, 1887 [1690]: 192-3). This state of nature holds except in cases of 
self defence or in defence of property. So, ultimately Locke also argues for the need for an 
authority to make laws and for an independent judiciary to impartially settle disputes and 
conflicts when they arise (234-6). For Rousseau, the condition of pre-civil society is one of 
harmony, compassion and friendship (Rousseau, 1979b [1755]: 64-68). It is the coming together 
of people into larger „civilised‟ communities from which a Hobbesian „state of nature‟ emerges 
and which necessitates the Sovereign State and the Social Contract (Rousseau, 2004 [1762]). For 
John Stuart Mill the need for a state is not so much necessitated by a competitive or brutal state 
of nature but by the principle of ensuring individual liberty. The emphasis is no longer on a state 
whose function is to prevent people from exterminating each other but on the prevention of any 
interference by any individual or body (such as a state) in the exercise of individual liberty. As 
                                                 
6
 Carl Schmitt‟s work examines this problematic in detail. In Political Theology (1985 [1922]) he writes 
that “[a]ll significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts not 
only because of their historical development – in which they were transferred from theology to the theory 
of the state, whereby, for example the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver – but also because 
of their systematic structure” (36). Schmitt refers to many writers in his elucidation of this argument, in 
particular Rousseau‟s emblematic statement that secular laws “imitate … the unchangeable decrees of the 
Deity” (Rousseau, 1979a [1755]:124). 
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such, the State‟s only function is in the service of the principle of the “prevention of harm to 
others” (1971c [1859]: 73). From a different perspective, Kant and Hegel also saw the State as 
necessary. However, the necessity they invoke is not of a kind which functions to legitimise the 
State. Rather, this necessity is theorised in terms of the rational and historical inevitability of the 
State. 
Immanuel Kant grappled with the possibilities of political organisation in a number of 
short essays. These writings are smattered with most (if not all) of the concepts associated with 
modern political philosophy. He writes of the notion of the social contract
7
 and applies the „state 
of nature‟ to the relations between nation-states.8 Although the path to his conclusions is 
somewhat idiosyncratic, they tend to accord with those typical of liberal political philosophy. 
Basically, a competitive and hostile „natural‟ state of man creates the need for rational laws and 
authority, and the obedience of rational people to such laws, in order to guarantee individual 
freedom and peace. In one of his political texts, his Idea for a Universal History from a 
Cosmopolitan Point of View (1980b [1784]), Kant speculates on the perfectibility of human 
society, as the end of human progress. For example, he writes that a class of rational beings such 
as the human race “should develop their capacities to perfection” (1980b: 15). This perfection, 
however, can only be achieved by the human race as a species because human individuals are 
essentially imperfect. While the nature of human individuals is to be intolerant of others, 
antagonistic, heartlessly vain and avaricious, these qualities operate in such a way as to bring out 
other excellent natural capacities such as reason, art and culture (16-17). This „unsocial 
sociability‟ (15) is seen as Nature‟s way of pushing the human race to higher and higher 
achievements. While „man‟ requires a master (and such a master must be a man), any master, as a 
man, is imperfect. So it is required that such a man must be of sufficient good will and experience 
to accept a perfect, lawful constitution (18) which would allow a master to force „men‟ to “obey a 
will that is universally valid, under which each can be free” (17). So, the race achieves perfection 
through the “realization of Nature‟s secret plan to bring forth a perfectly constituted state as the 
only condition in which the capacities of mankind can be fully developed, and also bring forth 
that external relation among states which is perfectly adequate to this end” (21). Kant suggests 
that the development of his Idea would be a worthy task for someone else to take on, but 
“leave[s] it to Nature to produce a man capable of composing it” (12). Whether or not he saw 
himself as „nature‟s choice‟ or as accepting Kant‟s suggested project, it is generally understood 
that G.W.F. Hegel picked up on the idea of a universal history and of a perfect, or „Ideal‟ State. 
                                                 
7
 See On the Common Saying: „This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice‟ (1987 
[1793]). 
8
 See Perpetual Peace (1980c [1795]) and Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View 
(1980b [1784]). 
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Where Kant attributes the impetus for the perfection of human society to Nature and its 
secret plan, Hegel attributes this movement to Reason as the Idea, which is realised through 
Spirit.
9
 This realisation is understood by Hegel also as the concretisation of the Idea. In the 
Hegelian (Ideal) state, Freedom is realised as people suppress their subjective wills to their 
rational wills, which happen to be identical with the State as the concretisation of Idea. So, 
Hegel, in a Rousseauian move, eliminates the opposition of subjection to authority and freedom, 
through his own version of the „general will‟. All laws and duties become synonymous with the 
rational will of the people, even though, like all of his colleagues, Hegel effectively excludes most 
people from participating in the making of such laws
10
 – and even though on the way to these 
laws, they may find themselves sacrificed on the „slaughterbench of history‟ (Hegel, 1953 
[1837]: 27) and progress. So, ultimately, the progress of Reason is towards “the union of the 
subjective with the rational will [as] the moral whole, the State” (49). And further, this situation 
is attained, as a dialectical progression “through a necessary progression of stages [which] are 
only moments of one universal Spirit which through them elevates and completes itself into a 
self-comprehending totality” (95).11 This is the end of the progress of Reason. Hegel, like Kant, 
distances himself and any individual from having a conscious role in this progression when he 
explains that the role of philosophy in relation to these matters is one of striving to comprehend 
Reason‟s plan, to recognise the content and reality of the divine Idea in order to achieve the 
insight that “the actual world is as it ought to be” (47).12 For Hegel, the necessity of the State is 
simply an aspect of the fact that it exists, is present and this presence-as-necessity is exulted. For 
others, the presence of the State and the philosophical implications of that presence is not always 
understood in this way. As such, its presence is neither exulted nor lamented. The fact that the 
State is there is simply that, a fact. Things have just turned out this way and could not have 
otherwise done so. 
 
 
                                                 
9
 The emphases here follow Hegel‟s practice. Generally, unless otherwise noted, italics used in quotes are 
the authors‟ own. 
10
 I hold that Hegel „effectively excludes most people‟ because even though the system of Estates and 
Deputies is intended to include all, a significant distance is set up between the people and the making of 
laws through the insistence on the various qualifications required for more direct participation (see Hegel, 
1952 [1821]: 195-208). In relation to this, Hegel asserts that “it is a dangerous and false presupposition that 
the people alone has reason and insight and knows what is right … What constitutes the state is a matter of 
trained intelligence, not a matter of „the people‟” (Hegel, 1953 [1837]: 57). 
11
 In Chapter Three, this „union‟ and „totality‟ will be discussed in more detail and in relation to the unity 
of self-consciousness and the Absolute Idea, as developed by Hegel in the Phenomenology of Spirit (1977 
[1807]). 
12
 As such, Hegel writes that “in dealing with the idea of Spirit only and in considering the whole of world 
history as nothing but its manifestation, we are dealing only with the present – however long the past may 
be which we survey” (95). Hegel also made this point in Philosophy of Right (1952 [1821]) when he wrote 
that “it is only when actuality is mature that the idea first appears over against the real and that the ideal 
apprehends this same real world in its substance and builds it up for itself into the shape of an intellectual 
realm” (Hegel, 1952: 13). 
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The ‘default’ State 
 
If the reason be asked of that obedience, which we are bound to pay to government, I readily 
 answer, because society could not otherwise subsist (Hume, 1987 [1752]: 481). 
 
The weight of the apparent unanimity on the necessity of the State is considerable. So 
much so that it is easy to overlook the work of those who deviate from this line. While Rousseau 
and others maintain that the social contract, while not actual, is a real agreement, based on tacit 
acceptance, Spinoza and Hume argue that such a notion is dubious. They cast doubt on the 
contract as anything other than something which is invoked as a means of maintaining the 
political order – a pragmatic myth. Hume for example, argues that there is no good reason to 
believe that societies are based upon a contract, either tacitly or substantially. Contracts and 
promises, for Hume, are nothing more than “artificial contrivances for the convenience and 
advantage of society” (1952 [1740]: 227). There is no natural or moral obligation for people to 
adhere to promises or contracts. Rather, they do so because it is their interests
13
 and is a received 
convention of society (235-39; 1963 [1777]: 306). People submit to a Sovereign because it is 
practical, because it is all they have ever known, or through force or coercion (Hume, 1987a 
[1752]: 471, 474-475). Hume also contends that the „state of nature‟, which is given as a reason 
for the necessity of a contract, is a “philosophical fiction”14 (1963: 189). While Spinoza differs on 
the state of nature, arguing that “men [sic] are naturally enemies” (2004 [1677]: 296), he too 
suggests that they are also naturally led to live in society out of their interest in „preserving their 
existence‟ (294). He also observes that contracts and promises bind no one15 and offer no 
guarantee at all to individual citizens or subjects. As the State (which Spinoza refers to as 
„Dominion‟) also conforms to the law of nature in terms of the need for self-preservation, the 
contract can be broken at any time with impunity if this is reasoned to be in the „general welfare‟, 
by “he who holds dominion” (311-12). „Private persons‟, on the other hand, cannot do so because 
in asserting such independence, they take up a position as an enemy of the dominion, in the same 
way that in a state of nature (i.e. for Spinoza, a situation in which individuals have not 
combined), all are naturally enemies (312, 296-97). 
While Spinoza and Hume do not accept that there is either a tacit or actual social contract 
– but rather practical conventions which have developed and exist because they are in the 
                                                 
13
 “[T]wo men pull the oars of a boat by a common convention for common interest, without any promise 
or contract” (Hume, 1963 [1777]: 306). 
14
 Hume writes, “Whether such a condition of human nature could ever exist, or if it did, could continue so 
long as to merit the appellation of a state, may justly be doubted. Men are necessarily born in a family-
society, at least; and are trained up by their parents to some rule of conduct and behaviour.” (1963: 190) 
15
 Spinoza writes that if one “comes to the conclusion, rightly or wrongly (for „to err is human‟), that more 
harm than profit will come of his promise, by the judgement of his own mind he decides that the promise 
should be broken, and by natural right he will break the same” (Spinoza, 2004: 296). 
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interests of all – they still see the State as necessary. Hume argues that people submit to a 
sovereign not as contractors but simply because “society could not otherwise subsist” (Hume, 
1987: 481). Spinoza argues that the coming together of people under a „Dominion‟ is simply their 
acting in the interest of „self-preservation‟ which is “in accordance with the laws and rules of 
nature” (Spinoza, 2004: 292). Both philosophers see the existence of the State as an 
incontrovertible fact. For them, human society could not be any other way. We find in their work 
a clear-sighted understanding of the reasons that people submit to sovereign rule. Whether or not 
a state of nature is admitted, the State is viewed as necessary because its absence is worse, or 
because its presence is evidence enough for its necessity.
16
 While the State is not exulted as the 
height of Reason or as the ultimate achievement of Nature, its oppressiveness is brushed over or 
justified by the implication or assertion that to leave people to rule themselves and their relations 
with each other would be either chaotic (Hobbes, Rousseau, Spinoza) or ridiculously ineffectual 
and shambolic (Hume). Additionally, whether or not these thinkers admit that different societies 
(including stateless ones) have existed or could still exist, they seem to believe that, once 
established, the State will – must – persist indefinitely, or eternally. Their enquiries cease at the 
frontiers of the sovereign State.
17
 
Hume and Spinoza‟s work also dismisses the idea, regardless of the necessity (or not) of 
the existence of the State, that it must be in any way benevolent. Hume is blunt about the State‟s 
use of force
18
 and Spinoza clearly recognises the State‟s absolute right to treat subjects in 
whatever way it will, and that there is nothing, no act of resistance, or moral invocation, that 
could possibly or legitimately curb such actions, as long as actions taken are in accordance with 
maxims of self-protection of the authority (Spinoza, 2004: 210-11). So, Hume and Spinoza write 
of the forceful, arbitrary, or unfounded, nature of the State, its presence, and accept this presence 
as „necessary‟ anyway. As such, they see no need to examine this arbitrariness too deeply. Others 
have, however, and it is appropriate for us to understand the actual roots of the State, as Hume 
and Spinoza intimate, in force and violence. 
 
 
 
                                                 
16
 While Hume and Spinoza do not find that the State is logically necessary (which follows from the 
traditional starting point of a „state of nature‟), their acceptance of the State (with all its oppressiveness) as 
„pragmatically‟ necessary nevertheless still accords with their understandings of Nature and „human 
nature‟. 
17
 It should be noted here that both Locke (1887) and Mill (1971b) allow the absolute right of the sovereign 
to be challenged in certain circumstances. 
18
 “Time, by degrees … accustoms the nation to regard, as their lawful or native princes, that family which 
at first they considered as usurpers or foreign conquerers … [T]hey have no recourse to any notion of 
voluntary consent or promise, which, they know, never was, in this case, either expected or demanded. The 
original establishment was formed by violence, and submitted to from necessity” (Hume, 1987: 474-75; 
see also Hume, 1952: 471). 
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The absence of the (natural) State 
 
There is no such thing as natural law; this term is merely an ancient piece of tommy-rot ... There 
is no law, save when some particular law exists forbidding a man [sic] to commit a certain act on 
pain of punishment. Before law comes into being, there is nothing natural, except a lion‟s strength 
(Stendhal, 1953 [1830]: 500). 
 
We began by looking at the historical explanations (which often come to serve as 
justifications) of the State – for example Hobbes‟ „state of nature‟, Rousseau‟s fractious state of 
civilisation and the Social Contract. In these explanations, the State or Sovereign is seen as 
necessary because of either our natural or our civilised animosity to each other. The contract is 
offered as a means of containing this animosity, or as an explanation of how animosity has been 
contained. As such it is regarded as actually, as tacitly, existing regardless of the existence of a 
physical document or the actual occurrence of negotiation and subsequent agreement on its terms. 
However, as Hume and Spinoza show, arguments about just what is natural, and about the actual 
existence of devices like the contract, are rather easily dismissed. Nevertheless, it is argued that 
the notion of the contract works reasonably well, and/or is a good metaphorical explanation of the 
reciprocal relationships that operate in large societies. Its “phraseology” (Cole, 1979: xxiv) helps 
us to understand political obligation and the possible implications of our rejection of such 
obligation. But, what if we come to recognise the fictions and contradictions in the thought on 
which these notions are founded? Is it enough to accept that they work reasonably well? While it 
is probably too much to expect absolute rational proof of a political theory, it is fair to examine 
what fictions and contradictions exist, to consider their implications and to think again about 
what, in the current circumstances, is worth clinging to. Ultimately, it is a matter of refusing to 
accept arguments which contend, that despite a lack of foundation and legitimacy, liberal 
political institutions are the best possible arrangement of the political that can be hoped for. As 
Carl Schmitt puts it, “[c]ertainly no one would be so undemanding that he [sic] regarded an 
intellectual foundation or moral truth as proven by the question, What else?” (Schmitt, 1988: 3).19 
Surely the task should be to understand just what does „found‟ the State. What best explains its 
presence? 
While Hume and Spinoza scoffed at notions of the contract as having an actual existence 
or a rational philosophical foundation, and left it at that, Carl Schmitt drills deeply into the 
contract and reveals significant problems. He is not merely concerned about questions of its 
actual existence, but about its relationship with the notion of democracy that has accompanied it 
                                                 
19
 I cite Schmitt here for the fact that he raises what I think is a pertinent question. As we shall see 
however, while Schmitt‟s critiques of liberal democracy are useful, his political theory of the authoritarian 
State (and his actual association with National Socialism) renders his thought to be an anathema to any 
figuring of a politics without the State. 
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since Rousseau. Schmitt argues that the modern democracy cannot be based on a contract, which 
is the common reading of Rousseau, but on the unanimity of the general will. He notes that 
contracts “assume differences and opposition” (1988: 14). As such it is believed that contracts 
alleviate the brutal potentialities of a war of all against all. If, however, the unanimity and 
homogeneity of the general will is present, a contract is unnecessary. “Unanimity is either there 
or it is not ... Where it exists a contract is meaningless. Where it does not exist, a contract does 
not help” (14). Schmitt then concludes that as liberal parliamentary democracy has been rendered 
ineffectual and meaningless by the fact that its conceptual contradictions have caught up with it, 
and as it has no „natural‟ philosophical foundations, the way is opened up for a new order of 
“discipline and hierarchy” (76), in which democratic unanimity is established, represented and 
conserved by the power of myth. In Political Theology (1985 [1922]), Schmitt goes beyond a 
critique of the contract and parliamentary democracy to examine the concept of sovereignty. Here 
he shows how sovereign authority lacks any actual logical or rational foundation, and that 
ultimately, “Sovereign is he [sic] who decides on the exception” (1985: 5)20 and that “every legal 
order is based on a decision … and not a norm” (10). For Schmitt, the State, and its sovereign 
authority, rests on nothing more than its capacity to decide on any matter, whether or not that 
decision is derived from a constitution or its laws. Ultimately, “[s]overeignty is the highest, 
legally independent, underived power” (17).21 Schmitt‟s discussion of this lack of foundation for 
the sovereign authority of the State leads him towards support for an authoritarian state. For him, 
the stability of modern states could best be guaranteed if the power of the decision resided in a 
sovereign leader rather than in the „talking shops‟ of parliaments. Schmitt is not the only theorist, 
however, to have discussed the arbitrariness of the authority of the State. Walter Benjamin‟s 
analysis similarly exposes the façade of sovereign authority and law, but without then drawing 
such strong totalitarian conclusions about what political position is preferable in response. 
Benjamin discusses the absence of foundation for authority in natural law in his famous 
essay „Critique of Violence‟ (1996 [1921]). Benjamin here examines the question of the 
legitimacy of violence (as force, authority and law
22
) and ultimately finds that there is none. The 
de jure violence exercised by pre-contractual, „state of nature‟ individuals is not legitimate, or 
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 “The exception, which is not codified in the existing legal order, can at best be characterized as a case of 
extreme peril, a danger to the existence of the state, or the like” (Schmitt, 1985: 6) in which normal laws 
and civil rights can be suspended in order to protect the state and stabilise a „dangerous‟ situation. For 
Schmitt, what is important about the concept of sovereignty is “its concrete application, and that means 
who decides in a situation of conflict what constitutes the public interest or the interest of the state, public 
safety and order” (6). 
21
 For Schmitt‟s translator, George Schwab, this amounts to the State‟s possession of a “monopoly on 
politics” (Schwab, 1985: xxiv). 
22
 In „Force of Law‟ (1992), Jacques Derrida reminds English readers of Benjamin‟s “Zur Kritik der 
Gewalt” that the word “Gewalt also signifies, for Germans, legitimate power, authority, public force. 
Gesetzgebende Gewalt is legislative power, geistliche Gewalt the spiritual power of the church, 
Staatsgewalt the authority or power of the state. Gewalt, then, is both violence and legitimate power, 
justified authority” (6). 
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legal, by definition because it is before, or prior to, „positive‟ law.23 Philosophically, according to 
the theory of natural law, violence, as a “product of nature ... is in no way problematical unless 
force is misused for unjust ends” (236-237). On the other hand, “positive law demands of all 
violence a proof of its historical origin, which under certain conditions, is declared legal, 
sanctioned” (238). The problem for positive law, or a legal system, is that there is no such 
„historical origin‟ of legitimate violence. All authority, as a state, a legal system, is established by 
an originary act of illegitimate or, more accurately, an a-legitimate force (of „natural‟ law). These 
tensions fuel Benjamin‟s discussion of the problem for authority in establishing the extent and 
application of legitimate violence and the prohibition on its use by individuals. As such, 
Benjamin suggests that “the law‟s interest in a monopoly of violence24 vis-à-vis individuals is 
explained not by the intention of preserving legal ends but, rather, by the intention of preserving 
the law itself” (239), for, if individuals are allowed access to an originary, „lawmaking‟ violence, 
the legal system and authority itself is threatened (241). There is no originary legitimacy in 
authority or State, only originary a-legitimacy and perpetual self-legitimation as self-
preservation. Benjamin goes on to discuss the role of the police and militarism as aspects of 
lawmaking violence which, while occurring „outside‟ the law, preserves and conserves the power 
and legitimacy of the established authority. In the final section of the essay, Benjamin elaborates 
on the difference between „mythical‟ and „divine‟ violence. He sets up mythical violence as akin 
to the lawmaking and law-preserving nature of all legal violence (250). On the other hand is 
divine violence. This violence is, unlike mythical, legal or legitimated, legitimating violence, 
“outside the law, as pure immediate violence” (252) and is unalloyed by „pernicious‟ lawmaking 
or law-preserving ends. Benjamin writes,  
 
[i]f mythic violence is lawmaking, divine violence is law-destroying; if the former sets 
 boundaries, the latter boundlessly destroys them; if mythic violence brings at once guilt and 
 retribution, divine power only expiates; if the former threatens, the latter strikes; if the former is 
 bloody, the latter is lethal without spilling blood (249-250). 
 
In this divine violence, says Benjamin, is the possibility of “revolutionary violence, the highest 
form of unalloyed violence by man” (252) on which the „abolition of state power‟ and a „new 
historical epoch‟ may be founded (252). He describes this divine power as “„sovereign‟ violence” 
(252). This final elaboration by Benjamin is perplexing. For all its incisiveness and profundity, 
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 “Since the origin of authority, the foundation or ground, the position of the law can‟t by definition rest 
on anything but themselves, they are a violence without ground. Which is not to say that they are in 
themselves unjust, in the sense of „illegal.‟ They are neither legal nor illegal in their founding moment” 
(Derrida, 1992: 14). 
24
 We should not forget Max Weber here, who wrote that “the state is a human community that 
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber, 
1970: 78). 
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Benjamin‟s critique seems, ultimately, to offer little more than a different justification of power. 
Or a different possible assertion of power. A justice-making power
25
 (it could not be, by 
definition, justice-preserving) rather than law-making and law-preserving. It is difficult to 
imagine how this could possibly result in anything like the revolutionary abolition of state power. 
Arguably, Benjamin‟s critique reveals more about the possibility of the absence of the State when 
it refers to the characteristics of nonviolent resolution of human conflicts (243-245).
26
 These, 
such as courtesy, sympathy, peaceableness, trust and the absence of a sanction for lying (244), it 
seems to me, can be more plausibly be described as lawless, than can divine, sovereign violence. 
Further, the ideas contained in Benjamin‟s concluding elaboration of divine violence have 
further, more menacing implications. These are elucidated by Jacques Derrida. 
In „Force of Law‟ (1992), Derrida plays out many of the themes in Critique of Violence. 
His reading draws out the function of repetition, or iteration, in the law-preserving violence 
exercised by the police and in militarism (38-44) and elucidates the incalculability (16, 28) and 
undecideability (24-29) in the notion of justice that can be drawn from Benjamin‟s text. Derrida 
also notes the common insights of the critiques of Benjamin and Schmitt with regard to 
parliamentarism and the common historical conditions from which the critiques are launched 
(30). This informs Derrida‟s problematisation of Benjamin‟s concluding elaboration on divine, or 
„sovereign‟ violence, which ominously anticipates the chaotic events of European history that 
were soon to manifest themselves. Derrida chillingly observes, that in characterising divine 
violence as „bloodless‟, „expiating‟ and „purifying‟, Benjamin (unintentionally) anticipates the  
logic of the Nazis and the final solution (57-62). While Benjamin would not proceed to make 
Schmittian conclusions, the divine, „sovereign‟ violence he discusses is similar to the 
philosophical justifications of a Schmittian mythical, dictatorial state.
27
 
While Schmitt and Benjamin take the analysis of the arbitrary foundation of sovereignty, 
authority and the State to a level not attempted by Hume and Spinoza, their conclusions do 
nothing to affect the intransigence of the State. Schmitt effectively reverses the aforementioned 
„What else?‟ to accept and support authoritarianism (rather than liberal democracy), and the 
arrival of Benjamin‟s analysis in the chilling possibilities of „divine‟ violence does little or 
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 The distinction between „law‟ and „justice‟ is one between the calculation, the vengeance, the 
restitutionism, the economic quality, and the theoretical equality of law, and the incalculable, an-economic 
nature of justice (see Derrida, 2006: 25-27). In relation to Benjamin, a justice-making divine violence is the 
annihilation of law, the act of sending law back to where it came from, nowhere. This then, intriguingly, 
does seem to be an act of revenge against law, and thus, also economic, equal, and restitutive. 
26
 Simon Critchley addresses the possibilities around these aspects of Benjamin‟s essay in his „Violent 
thoughts about Slavoj Žižek‟ (2008). 
27
 A lively conversation has ensued in recent times around Benjamin‟s Critique of Violence. See, for 
example, Simon Critchley‟s „Violent Thoughts about Slavoj Žižek‟ (2008); Slavoj Žižek‟s Violence, 
(2008); Judith Butler‟s „Critique, Coercion, and Sacred Life in Benjamin‟s “Critique of Violence”‟ (2006) 
and; Marc de Wilde‟s „Violence in the State of Exception: Reflections on Theologico-Political Motifs in 
Benjamin and Schmitt‟ (2006). Much of this discussion revolves around interpretations of Benjamin‟s 
notion of „divine violence‟. 
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nothing to suggest a position in which a politics without the State is conceivable. We are left with 
nothing but a choice between different kinds of states which are all founded upon force and 
violence.
28
  
Political theorists have tended to accept this situation, in which the State is internally 
founded on force and violence, and in which its relationship with other States cannot be 
understood as much other than, at best, polite hostility. Politics is a field of thought and action 
which takes place on a continuum between relatively benevolent states in which rights and 
liberties philosophically and constitutionally prevail, and totalitarianism. This field, for most 
theorists is settled and closed to change. It is stable. This acceptance though has not always 
prevailed and to some extent, it is still subject to regular challenge. For there is one other position 
that it is possible to take. That is, outright hostility to the State. From this position, the State‟s 
paradoxical, a-legitimate sovereignty (which is no less vexing than mere illegitimacy) and its 
arbitrariness is not considered as merely problematic, or a quirk. Its arbitrariness is rather the 
proverbial red rag to the bull. For the intransigence of the State is founded on nothing! Nothing 
but the will to take power, the power to make decisions solely in the interest of power itself, and 
the tendency for this power to be exercised in such a way that it deprives people of their 
autonomy and humanity. This position is, of course, that of anarchism, the political and 
philosophical desire to send the State back to the nothingness from which it sprang.  
 
 
Against necessity (and sometimes nature): Anarchism and the anarchists 
 
It may be to a certain degree doubtful whether the human species will ever be emancipated from 
their present subjection and pupilage, but let it not be forgotten that this is their condition. 
(Godwin, 1976: 248) 
 
Historically, the anarchist – and anarchism as a political philosophy – contends that any 
rule, government domination or law is arbitrary and contrary to „human nature‟. As makers of 
laws and as seats of rule and (arbitrary, coercive) authority, the states and their suppressive power 
are regarded as the main impediment to human freedom, and their removal or absence is 
desirable and a priority. The positions of anarchism (and Marxism, to some considerable extent)
29
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 Apart from the arbitrary, constitutive violence of the State, States are also only able to maintain 
relationships with other States through conceptualisations that assume an essential, mutual hostility. Unlike 
people, I would argue that States simply cannot be friends. 
29
 While anarchists mostly argued for the immediate end of the State, Marx, Engels and Lenin argued for 
the need for its continued existence, until such a time as society had become free of class antagonisms 
(which the apparatus of the State historically kept in place), and the State was then to „wither away‟. While 
the Marxists did not see the state as permanently necessary for their purposes, only the anarchist position 
maintains a consistent front against the intransigent presence of the State. 
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in relation to the State include an assertion that it is inherently oppressive. For the anarchists 
(unlike Spinoza and Hume, who in their own ways also recognise this oppressiveness) the State 
is not necessary to the peaceful coexistence of people. So, the aim of the anarchist position is that 
of fundamental change to the structure of society. As such, this position usually includes an 
attitude of „social condemnation‟ (Woodcock, 1963: 7) and an unflinching, uncompromising 
critique of society. While anarchism is sometimes described as little more than a movement 
because of the very broad and often contradictory range of ideas held by its proponents, there are 
some basic themes which have allowed it to be described as a philosophy. 
Generally, the philosophical and political anthropology of the anarchist position rejects 
any notion that people are „naturally‟ self-interested (Woodcock: 19). If anything is regarded as 
„natural‟ it is the idea that humans are “naturally social” (19) and thus capable of living 
peacefully in concord with others without the need for arbitrary laws and rigid organisation such 
as the State. From this though, it is implied (if not always claimed) that people are essentially 
„good‟. It is the removal of State power that allows people‟s essential goodness to flourish.30 The 
(Rousseauian) social contract is usually rejected (20). Further, anarchism generally understands 
and affirms people as cooperative and, being part of the world, subject to what Proudhon calls 
„progress‟. That is,  
 
an affirmation of universal movement and thus ... the denial of all forms and formulae of 
immutability, all doctrines of eternity, irremovability and impeccability, etc., applied to any being 
whatsoever. [Progress] denies the permanence of any order, including that of the universe itself, 
and the changelessness of any subject or object, be it empirical or transcendental. (Proudhon, 1970 
[1853]: 247)  
 
What Proudhon describes is not the traditional western notion of teleological progress (though he 
does not dismiss this notion [246-7]), but rather an understanding of the world and everything in 
it as process, as flux. For Proudhon (at least) this metaphysical foundation justifies the anarchist 
position against theories which aim to set, or constitute a „permanent‟ political order. 
 While the attitude of social condemnation, critique and revolution is often demonstrated 
rather unambiguously by anarchists, as a philosophy, anarchism is largely consistent with the 
Enlightenment ideas of reason, including Kant‟s call for maturity and the challenge to „dare to 
know‟ (Kant, 1980a). This „consistency‟ extends to the importance of the concepts of the social 
contract and the state of nature in the works of anarchist thinkers, and in debates within the 
anarchist tradition. 
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 Todd May elaborates this aspect of traditional anarchist philosophy in The Political Theory of 
Poststructuralist Anarchism (1994). 
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William Godwin and his work are examples of the common heritage of anarchism with 
other Enlightenment thinkers on the main concerns of political philosophy. In his Enquiry 
Concerning Political Justice (1976 [1798]), Godwin follows Hume in rejecting the social 
contract as a basis for government when he writes that the “Compact is ... an expedient to which 
we are sometimes obliged to resort ... It is not the principle on which our common happiness 
reposes” (Godwin, 1976 [1798]: 227). Unlike Hume, who, with a shrug of the shoulders accepts 
that the State is without legitimate foundation but something that cannot be done without, 
Godwin then asks, 
 
 why should I promise that I will do everything that a ... government, should imagine it 
 convenient, or decide that it is fitting for me to do? Is there in this either morality, or justice, or 
 common sense? Does brute force alone communicate to its possessor a sufficient claim upon my 
 veneration? ... There is but one power to which I can yield a heart-felt obedience, the decision of 
 my own understanding, the dictate of my own conscience. The decrees of any other power ... I 
 shall obey with reluctance and aversion. My obedience is purely an affair of composition: I 
 choose to do that which, in itself considered, my judgement disapproves, rather than incur the 
 greater evil which the power from whom the mandate issues annexes to my disobedience (229). 
 
Godwin does not simply accept this situation as a „fact of life‟ as do Hume and Spinoza, but 
continues on to question the legitimacy of government. Godwin contends that as government is 
based not on consent or contract but on nothing but brute force (238-39), it can only last for as 
long as the confidence in it (based on the „weakness and ignorance‟ of its subjects) lasts. So, as 
this weakness and ignorance diminishes, “the basis of government will also decay ... the true 
euthanasia of government” (247-48). Here, in Godwin, we find an early expression of the idea of 
the withering away of the State. Finally, he notes that while it is „doubtful‟ that people “will ever 
be emancipated from ... subjection and pupilage,
31
 ... let it not be forgotten that this is their 
condition” (248). A shrug of resignation is never acceptable for the anarchists. 
 Anarchists following Godwin took similar positions in relation to the social contract. 
Proudhon, while arguing for „free contractual association‟ between individuals for specific and 
practical, „day to day‟ purposes, rejected the idea that a contract exists between the people and a 
State (Proudhon, [1851] 1970: 96-99).
32
 Bakunin, in his characteristic style, regards the contract 
as a “revolting nonsense! An absurd fiction ... a wicked fiction!” (Bakunin, 1964 [1867]: 165) 
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 Kant uses the word „tutelage‟ in his What is Enlightenment? which was published only nine years 
earlier. 
32
 For Proudhon, a Rousseauian social contract, of the kind between the individual and the State, would 
have to “include the whole body of citizens, their interests and relations. If even one man [sic] were 
excluded from the contract, if even one problem ... were omitted, the contract would be more or less partial 
and exclusive. It could not be called social ... Furthermore ... the contracting party alienates some of his 
liberty and submits to a solidarity of a burdensome and often hazardous kind in the somewhat dubiously 
grounded hope of gain” (Proudhon, 1970 [1851]: 98). 
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which leads to “absolute domination by the State.” (ibid). For this and other reasons,33 Bakunin 
argues for the “absolute need of destroying the state” (1972 [1867]: 136). 
While Godwin, Proudhon and Bakunin attend to the fiction of the social contract, the 
Russian geographer and anarchist philosopher Petr Kropotkin addresses its philosophical 
foundation (and justification), the Hobbesian state of nature. Kropotkin argues that the natural 
state of living for humans (and all species), contrary to Hobbes and his followers, and Rousseau, 
was not one of competition and war but one of cooperation. In Mutual Aid (1939 [1902]) he 
outlines the theory that groups exist and flourish through the intimate cooperation of their 
members. He writes,  
 
Two aspects of animal life impressed me most during the journeys which I made in my youth to 
 Eastern Siberia and Northern Manchuria. One of them was the extreme severity of the struggle 
 for existence which most species of animals have to carry on against inclement Nature ... And the 
 other was, that even in those few spots where animal life teemed in abundance, I failed to find – 
 although I was eagerly looking for it – that bitter struggle for the means of existence, among 
 animals belonging to the same species, which was considered by most Darwinians (though not 
 always by Darwin himself) as the dominant characteristic of struggle for life, and the main factor 
 of evolution (Kropotkin, 1939 [1902]: 12).  
 
Mutual Aid was in part a response to Malthusian interpretations and appropriations of Darwin‟s 
theory of evolution (Kropotkin, 1939: 13-14, 22; Woodcock, 1962: 199-202; Malthus, 1970 
[1798]). In his counter-argument, Kropotkin drew upon Darwin‟s theory, on his own experience 
of animal behaviour, and on studies of mutual cooperation in human societies. As such, he claims 
that it is laws and government that prevents people from practicing „mutual aid‟, from 
cooperating with each other according to the „laws of nature‟. Laws, governments and property 
make people dependent and accustomed to being told what to do, and thus prevent people from 
realising their creative selves and human societies from progressing and flourishing (Kropotkin, 
1939: 14; 1910: 108-9; 1886: 27-43). 
 With regard to other aspects of the Enlightenment tradition, the various positions of the 
anarchists are quite inconsistent. Godwin rejects the notion of rights as a means of determining 
human action, contending that justice, reason and morality all take precedence over them 
(Godwin, 1976: 191-199). Bakunin‟s disdain for liberalism lies in its “adherence to the State, 
which flatly contradicts ... liberal maxims” (Bakunin, 1972 [1871]: 234). Despite such criticism, 
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 For example, “[No] state could exist without committing crimes, or at least without contemplating and 
planning them, even when its impotence should prevent it from perpetrating crimes” (Bakunin, 1972 
[1867]: 136). 
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the anarchists are unable to completely reject the notion of rights. Bakunin embraces them
34
 and 
Godwin accepts a very liberal understanding of passive rights when he writes that we all have “a 
certain sphere of discretion which [we have] a right to expect shall not be infringed by ... 
neighbours” (Godwin: 198).35  
For all the condemnation of government, authority, laws and the State, anarchist 
philosophy is as much a product of the ideas of the Enlightenment
36
 as any that have been, and 
will be, addressed in this thesis. With this, come the same problems. Anarchism, like all (or at 
least most) political theory since the Enlightenment, is stretched between freedom and 
determinism, autonomy and heteronomy, negative and positive autonomy, and collectivism and 
individualism (Kramnick, 1976: 53-54). In addition, the anarchist position is stretched between 
rational enlightenment ideas and Romanticism.
37
 As such, from this point, anarchist thought has 
tended to lean one way or another. For example, from the individualism of Max Stirner to the 
collectivism of Bakunin. With no consistent position from which to develop a more coherent or 
unified political theory (which would seem antithetical anyway), anarchists historically have 
turned their attention to action, activism, propaganda and organisation. As such, most twentieth 
century anarchism (especially up to and for two decades after the Spanish Civil war) tended to be 
Bakuninist (collectivist) and syndicalist forms, usually based on workers‟ movements. Later in 
the twentieth century, groups that have advocated anarchist ideas and practices are the Provos 
and Kabouters from Holland and the Situationists. The modes of action taken by these groups – 
such as theatre, parody, stunt, and sabotage – are often intended to subvert taken for granted 
social and political conventions.
38
 Despite the differences in practices, philosophically anarchists 
have generally been occupied not only with bringing about the end of the State but also with 
critiquing either the authoritarian bureaucratic approaches or reformism in Marxist workers‟ 
movements.
39
 
 In the second half of the twentieth century, there has been a renewed effort to theorise 
the anarchist position. For example, thinkers such as Takis Fotopoulos and Murray Bookchin 
have focussed on continuing the project of developing new visions for an alternative, stateless, 
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 For example, Bakunin claims that “Freedom is the absolute right of every adult man and woman to seek 
no other sanction for their acts than their own conscience and their own reason” (1972 [1866]: 76). 
35
 Godwin also expresses an almost Rawlsian version of liberalism: “Remove from me and my fellows all 
arbitrary hindrances; let us start fair; render all the advantages and honours of social institution accessible 
to every man [sic], in proportion to his talents and exertions” (1976: 472). 
36
 In the Introduction to Political Justice, Kramnick notes that “Godwin‟s ... writings exemplified the 
characteristic intellectualism of the Enlightenment.” (Kramnick, 1976: 53). See also May (1994). 
37
 On the romantic tendency in the anarchist movement, see Carr‟s The Romantic Exiles (1968: 25-42), 
Joll‟s The Anarchists (1969: 28-31) and Kelly‟s Mikhail Bakunin: A Study in the Psychology and Politics 
of Utopianism (1987: 7-22). 
38
 For more on these groups see Marshall‟s Demanding the Impossible (2008) and Apter and Joll‟s 
Anarchism Today (1971). 
39
 For more on this tendency see Marshall (2008), Apter and Joll (1971), Bookchin (1971), Guérin (1970), 
Joll (1969), and Cohn-Bendit (1969) and Woodcock (1963). 
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society. For these thinkers, the intransigence of the modern State is just as frustrating as for those 
who have addressed it since the time of the Enlightenment. Both claim, however, that their work 
is an attempt to develop alternative theories which address the modern State and modern life. 
Murray Bookchin has worked through ideas of „post-scarcity anarchism‟ (1971), urban 
agrarianism, the „ecological society‟ (1995b) and libertarian municipalism and has come to 
address the problems of society (essentially the same problems as those identified by early 
anarchists) via a form of communalism which he calls „Confederal Municipalism‟. Bookchin 
understands confederal municipalism as a “Community of communities” (1995a: 263) which, 
structurally, is based on familiar notions such as local decision-making by citizens in their 
municipalities and broader „administrative‟ decisions made by recallable deputies in confederal 
councils (262-3). Bookchin though, claims that this familiar structure must be underpinned by a 
“humanistic ethics of complementarity” (9)40 and a grassroots education (paideia) in „authentic‟ 
citizenship (9, 260). He argues that in the representative democracies of modern liberal states, the 
notion of citizenship has been stripped of democratic participatory meaning. He then draws on 
the Athenian polis, not as a model, but as a way of understanding the „ideal‟ of citizenship which 
allows its contemporary redefinition as situated in a localised, civic „direct popular democracy‟ 
(3, 62-86). In this context, Bookchin also argues for a distinction between politics (of the 
confederal municipalist kind) and the „statecraft‟ which is practiced by those in “parliaments, 
ministries and republics, not to speak of overtly authoritarian forms of coercive rule” (3). As 
such, the grass-roots, face-to-face municipal assemblies and confederal councils must be set up in 
direct opposition to state power (3). Bookchin also argues strongly against any suggestion that his 
confederal municipalism can be used as an instrument to reform the current capitalist state 
system. Instead, he argues, it can only work if it operates as an alternative and opposing realm of 
power to that of the state, and can succeed “only after confederal municipalism forms the new 
politics of a popular movement and ultimately captures the imagination of millions” (264). 
In one of his earlier works, Post-Scarcity Anarchism (1971), Bookchin writes that   
 
[w]hen the time has arrived in history that the state, the city, the bureaucracy, the centralized 
economy, the patriarchal family and the marketplace have reached their historic limits, what is 
posed is not a change in form but the absolute negation of all hierarchical forms as such. The 
absolute negation of the state is anarchism (1971: 40-41). 
 
Through all the change and development within Bookchin‟s work, he retains this basic 
understanding of how a stateless society will come about. The rationality of human societies 
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 This ethics is “an unfolding rational process elicited or derived eductively from the objective 
potentialities of humanity to develop purposively, self-consciously, and innovatively the world around 
itself … [and] … in which humanity, living in harmony with itself, will become natural evolution rendered 
self-conscious” (Bookchin, 1995a: 9). 
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develops as an evolutionary process, driven by a non-teleological dialectic.
41
 Bookchin does not 
go so far as to claim historical inevitability for his confederal and libertarian municipalism, but he 
clearly holds the view that if given the best conditions, and the best efforts of enough people – 
that is, „authentic‟ citizens living according to an ethics of complementarity – „History‟ will find 
its way to the „absolute negation of the state‟.42  
 Takis Fotopoulos also advocates a society in which people participate in politics and 
decision-making in small local assemblies which are in turn linked confederally and, like 
Bookchin, he invokes the Athenian polis as a way of conceiving of a modern demos. The 
similarity ends there however. Fotopoulos‟ strategy for getting to an „Inclusive Democracy‟ is 
quite different. He rejects Bookchin‟s evolutionary „dialectical naturalism‟ as undesirable 
because “it may easily lead to inadvertent affinities with intrinsically anti-democratic eco-
philosophies” (Fotopoulos, 1999: 562-563) and as untenable because “history does not justify the 
view of a process of progress towards a free society” (562). Instead, in keeping with Cornelius 
Castoriadis‟43 understanding of the Athenian democracy as a social creation, Fotopoulos sees any 
possible “autonomous society as a rupture, a break in the historical continuity that heteronomous 
society has established” (1997: 334).  
Fotopoulos‟ approach leaves far less to the „chance‟ of anything like a dialectical 
process. He instead focusses on a critique of the market system (particularly its „growth 
ideology‟), an analysis of the exhaustion of traditional „anti-systemic‟44 movements, and a 
comprehensive strategy for a transition from the capitalist market system to his „Inclusive 
Democracy‟. Fotopoulos‟ focus on the market economy and its „grow-or-die dynamic‟ is based 
on his rejection of utopian models and on his attempt to ground his own project on „today‟s 
reality‟ in such a way that “expresses the discontent of significant social sectors and their explicit 
or implicit contesting of existing society” (x). The main cause of any such resistance and 
discontent, for Fotopoulos, is the growth economy and the ideology underlying it. Citing 
Castoriadis, Fotopoulos describes the growth ideology as that “founded on the social imaginary 
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 “No one who reads the chronicles of Western humanity can ignore the rational dialectic that underlies 
the accumulation of mere events and that reveals an unfolding of human potentiality for universality, 
rationality, secularity, and freedom in an eductive relationship that alone should be called History. This 
History, to the extent that it has culminations at given moments of development, on which later 
civilizations built, is anchored in the evolution of a secular public sphere, in politics, in the emergence of 
the rational city – the city that is rational institutionally, creatively, and communally” (Bookchin, 1997). 
42
 Bookchin‟s thought went through a final change towards the end of his life when he renounced the 
possibility of an anarchist society. See Marshall (2008: 692). 
43
 Castoriadis‟ work, particularly his notion of autonomy, is a strong influence on Fotopoulos‟ thought. I 
will discuss Castoriadis in more detail in Chapters Four and Five. 
44
 An anti-systemic movement as defined by Fotopoulos, has historically included anarchists and 
communists, and is one that “aims at the replacement of the main socio-economic institutions and 
corresponding values with new institutions and values” (Fotopoulos, 2001: 417). The state is included in 
such existing main institutions. An anti-systemic movement, according to Fotopoulos, “differs radically” 
from reformist (or „non-systemic‟) movements which aim at “simply changing the existing institutions” 
(2001: 417). 
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signification that „the unlimited growth of production and of productive forces is in fact the 
central objective of human existence‟” (65).45 This ideology, informed by Enlightenment notions 
of progress, underpins the idea that only economic growth can support the improvement of 
human societies. However, Fotopoulos points out that the push for growth and efficiency depends 
on “further division of labour, specialization and the expansion of the size of the market” (68) 
which in turn requires the “concentration of economic power in the hands of the elites that 
control the economic process” (68). This concentration is contrary to the assumptions of the 
„growth ideology‟. He writes, 
 
it is no wonder that the growing concentration of economic power has been accompanied by a 
corresponding concentration of political power. Therefore, as all conceptions of democracy imply 
the dispersion of power, to the extent that … historical versions of the growth economy imply a 
high degree of concentration of power, they are incompatible with democracy (172). 
 
For this reason, Fotopoulos, like many anarchists and socialists before him, proposes an 
alternative to the existing society. While the existing system has improved the lives of some, 
especially large proportions of the populations of western countries, it cannot do so for the vast 
majority of the world‟s populations. Further, the growth economy, with its dynamics of 
concentration of power which imply domination, include the domination of the environment 
which has led to the existing environmental crisis (129-131). So, Fotopoulos intensively details 
transitional strategies and the structure of an „inclusive democracy‟. Such a democracy would, for 
Fotopoulos (again following Castoriadis) come about as the result of a conscious, creative break 
with heteronomous systems like the representative „democracies‟ of the liberal nation-state.46 I do 
not intend to outline Fotopoulos‟ strategies here, or to go into detail about the structure of an 
„inclusive democracy‟. For the most part, it seems as good as, or even better than, any other such 
project of its kind. However, Fotopoulos‟ adoption of Castoriadian autonomy as the basis of his 
„inclusive democracy‟ project seems to be open to the same traps of earlier anarchist or anti-
systemic movements. As we shall see later, this autonomy, no matter how conceived, cannot be 
defined, cannot exist, without the conventions, concepts and the institutionalised heteronomy of 
the State. What is of interest to this thesis is the elaboration of the possibilities around a politics 
that pays no attention to and that happens without the State. 
The anarchism of Bookchin and Fotopoulos, for example, tends to follow most twentieth 
century anarchism, as scaffolded by the strategies, the concepts and the analytical focus of 
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 Cited from Castoriadis‟ essay „Reflections on “Rationality” and “Development”‟ (1991h: 184). 
46
 Fotopoulos rejects representative democracy as an “American invention whose real aim was the dilution 
of popular power” (Fotopoulos, 2002: 55). 
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Marxist political philosophy,
 47
 whether that be via Hegel (as with Bookchin) or in its focus on 
political economy (as with Fotopoulos). As such, anarchism has endured something of a 
philosophical slump, due more, I think, to its effacement by Marxist philosophy than to a „defeat‟ 
by capitalism and the State. Contemporary anarchism though, is not limited to the work of 
Bookchin and Fotopoulos. Much contemporary political thought turns around, at least as a 
reference point, the notion of the absence of the State.
48
 The anarchist movements that have 
emerged in resistance to neo-liberal capitalist globalisation (some of which are quickly dismissed 
by Fotopoulos and Castoriadis) have at the same time inspired a resurgence of „new‟ anarchist 
thinking.
49
 I will return to these thinkers later. When I do, however, it will be as part of a 
discussion of the kinds of relations that any „new‟ thought about politics without the State has 
with the key ideological pillars of the modern state, which, not coincidentally, are also key pillars 
of liberalism. 
 
 
The endurance of the liberal State 
 
It seems clear that a large chunk of the credit for the perseverance of the liberal state (at 
least philosophically) is due to the thought of John Stuart Mill.
50
 His principles have functioned 
as a pillar of strength while other Enlightenment political principles and groundings, such as 
those from within the socialist tradition, have been more or less under constant attack, and 
somewhat worse for wear as a result. If the State is intransigent, it is the liberal one. Despite all of 
the critiques and exposures of the modern State – of its lack of philosophical foundations and its 
violent self-legitimation – it persists, it endures. It is an amazing success – at least in terms of its 
survival and in terms of the concomitant improvement of material conditions for millions of 
people who have lived „in‟ and under it. In this chapter I have referred to Hobbes, Rousseau, 
Hume, Kant and Hegel, and to various others who have contested their theoretical positions. All 
of this discussion takes place within what we know as the Enlightenment tradition. This tradition 
has both epistemological and political faces. Its political face is largely identified with 
Liberalism. While the metaphysical and epistemological philosophical debates and positions 
developed in the Enlightenment tradition can be characterised as largely happening within 
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 See again, May (1994: 45-66). We will begin to turn to Marx‟s philosophy, particularly with regard to 
his attitudes to the State, in Chapter Two. 
48
 As we shall see, the thought of Agamben, Derrida, Hardt and Negri, Deleuze and Guattari, Nancy, May, 
and Critchley all offer some perspective on the possibilities of politics without the State. 
49
 For example, Critchley‟s Infinitely Demanding (2007), May‟s The Political Philosophy of 
Poststructuralist Anarchism (1994) and Retort‟s Afflicted Powers (2006). 
50
 While the German Rechsstaat, French Republican and the Anglo-European Socialist traditions have 
played a hugely important role in the endurance of the liberal state, it can be argued that the balancing 
principles elaborated by Mill, for better or worse, have come to dominate and set the parameters for much 
of contemporary philosophical practice and discussion. 
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parameters set by the work of Kant, I think it is fair to say that the tradition of Enlightenment 
political thought, as the story of political liberalism, is now largely worked over within a space 
set out by John Stuart Mill. 
In On Liberty (1971c [1859]), Mill sets out the notions of negative liberty, derived from 
Hobbes and Locke in particular, in the form of principles that have functioned as the most 
effective guide to the organisation of the State and its legal and political institutions. His general 
principle of liberty is that the only time anyone can rightly interfere with another is to protect 
onself or to prevent others from harm.
51
 Mill builds on this and argues that the “appropriate 
region of human liberty [is] the inward domain of consciousness” (1971c: 75). This includes 
freedom of opinion, thought, feeling and conscience. Other appropriate regions of liberty are the 
freedom of choice of lifestyle – and freedom of association – as long as such freedoms conform 
to his general principles on non-interference with others.52 With these principles, the problematic 
idea of natural rights do not come into play. Instead, these principles inform the development of  
modern civil and legal rights. Notions such as the state of nature and the social contract hardly 
figure in Mill‟s discussions. When, in On Liberty,  he asserts that the “amount of unlikeness 
between the men of modern and those of ancient [i.e. uncivilised] times” is „greatly overrated‟ 
(1971c: 106), the notion of the state of nature is effectively dismissed. In Utilitarianism (1971a 
[1863]) he rejects the idea of the existence of a contract, referring to it as a contrivance and a 
fiction (1971a: 52). This rejection however, does not render his principles of liberty incompatible 
with the contract,
53
 which is important to the later development of political liberalism by thinkers 
such as John Rawls. The real importance of Mill‟s principle of „no harm‟ and the elaboration of 
the appropriate domains of human freedom lies in their continued use as reference points to 
debates about what the best kind of political system can or should be. 
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 “That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind [sic] are warranted, individually or collectively, 
in interfering in the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for 
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to 
prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant” (Mill, 1971c 
[1859]: 73). 
52
 “[T]he appropriate region of human liberty … comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; 
demanding liberty of conscience in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute 
freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects … The liberty of publishing and expressing opinions may 
seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs  to that part of the conduct of an individual which 
concerns other people; but, being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting 
in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it.” (Mill, 1971c: 75) 
53
 Mill writes: “Though society is not founded on a contract, and though good purpose is answered by 
inventing a contract in order to deduce social obligations from it, everyone who receives the protection of 
society owes a return for the benefit, and the fact of living in society renders it indispensible that each 
should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest. This conduct consists, first, in not 
injuring the interests of one another; or rather certain interests, which, either by express legal provision or 
by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as rights; and secondly, in each person‟s bearing his share 
… of the labours and sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its members from injury and 
molestation” (1971c: 132). 
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Mill‟s Considerations on Representative Government (1971b [1861]) is a detailed 
discussion of the parliamentary system of political representation – a system that the citizens of 
modern liberal democracies are familiar with. The presentation of the problems of this system, 
such as the need to balance and separate powers, the question of the most appropriate voting 
system, the extent of suffrage, the representation of minorities and the need to guard against the 
„tyranny‟ of populist rule, have been and continue to be debated (even if, unfortunately, this 
debate is usually superficial). It seems that the very language we use to talk about politics, which 
at times, it must be acknowledged, includes the social contract, is largely a language that was 
formulated by Mill. 
I think that the reason for the robustness of Mill‟s principles of liberty lies in the 
broadness of their prescription. Unlike the state of nature and the contract, they are not 
explanations, working as justifications, for the philosophical legitimacy of political obligation to 
sovereign authority. They are rather, a moral guide to be used for the balancing of liberty and 
authority in a political society.
54
 As moral principles, they help to alleviate the lack of actual 
legitimacy and to (supposedly) protect citizens from the force and violence that is integral to the 
modern State. And, these principles allow and enable the continuation of philosophical discussion 
that draws on notions such as the contract, Reason and History. The State needs these principles 
to survive. It would be far more difficult to be intransigent without them.  
The breadth and versatility of Mill‟s principles (of negative liberty) has enabled political 
debate to take place on spectrums between „liberal fascism‟ at one end, and „left liberal‟ and 
social democracy at the other, and between free market libertarianism and Keynesian welfare 
states. To a large degree, the State‟s monopoly on politics is synonymous with a liberal 
monopoly, and we will explore the implications of this monopoly in chapters to follow. 
Generally though, the scope of liberal thought allows debate to take place in such a way that the 
perceived and received extremes of the political spectrum are actually only the extremes of 
liberalism. For example, in the libertarianism of Hayek (1982) and Nozick (1974), we see 
attempts at extreme or „pure‟ adaptations of liberal theory. Their figuring of minimalist States of 
rational self-interested individuals seems to ignore Mill‟s thoughts and prescriptions in the realm 
of positive liberty, with regard for self-cultivation and development as part of a rich human life, 
which is in turn important to the well-being of others and the broader community (1971c: 120-
121). (Mill‟s endorsement of free trade was not based on the abstraction of homo economicus55 or 
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 The importance of this shift to the use of moral arguments and principles as grounds for political theories 
will become clearer as we proceed. For now, it is worth noting that this shift also entrenches the individual, 
rather than the group, at the foundational core of  political philosophy. 
55
 Homo economicus is an understanding of human nature assumed in most modern economic theory. Such 
theory “builds on the propensity of individuals to act so as to optimize their own interests, a propensity 
clearly operative in market transactions … Economists typically identify intelligent pursuit of private gain 
with rationality, thus implying that other modes of behaviour are not rational. These modes include other-
regarding behaviour and actions directed to the public good” (Daly & Cobb, 1994: 5). 
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on his principles of individual liberty (150-151)). Additionally, libertarian and free market theory 
largely ignores Mill‟s discussion of the vagaries of representative government. Of course, 
thinkers are allowed to ignore whatever they like in another‟s work. What Hayek‟s and Nozick‟s 
work illustrates though, is that the kind of liberty that Mill‟s principles valued, can always be 
discarded for a „higher‟ sovereignty, whether that sovereignty belongs to a market or an 
authoritarian state. At the other end of this spectrum we have social democratic interpretations 
(and implementations) of liberal principles, which, arguably, stretch Mills principles of no harm 
possibly beyond their plausible limits. For example, that the welfare system increasingly operates 
as an apparatus of social control calls into question any claim that it exists to protect citizens 
from harm
56
 or to enable individual and/or political liberty.  
The versatility of liberalism is a double-edged sword. As it helps to protect citizens from 
unchecked state authority, it also protects the State from a more sustained critique, and maintains 
a situation in which alternative political positions, especially those which might be taken without 
the State, are considered unimaginable. As a result, we live in a world where most thinkers and 
citizens have given up on the idea that another way of being together, without the State, is 
possible. For most, one version or another of the liberal State is as good as it gets. 
 As we have seen, and as we know from our own experience of its continuing presence, 
the State has been largely (if not completely) unaffected by the exposure of its lack of a 
philosophical foundation, and by the recognition of its establishment by force and/or violence. 
Mill‟s liberal principles, contracts, states of nature and other such notions, remain important 
supports for what has developed into a system of modern liberal democratic states. Further, 
despite the energy of anarchists and others who take up a position against it, the State has never 
seemed stronger. Despite all of the reasons and forces that have historically opposed it, its own 
force has prevailed. It is intransigent. As I noted in the Introduction, it is almost impossible to 
imagine the absence of the State – or a political position from which it doesn‟t count. 
The intransigence of the State however, is not only a result of its own powers of self-
preservation. Its presence is supported by the overwhelming majority of contemporary political 
philosophy. Those arguing from an anarchist position have not given up, but while they have 
scribbled and agitated, the State has accreted more and more of modern life to its sphere of 
influence, control and domination. More than ever before, the State has a monopoly on politics. It 
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 In Australia, the entitlement to an unemployment benefit has become more intensively linked to „mutual 
obligation‟ requirements, where claimants must regularly report their „job-seeking‟ activities and the state 
of their domestic arrangements to the government authority, „Centrelink‟. Claimants are also sometimes 
obliged to perform particular „job search training‟ tasks. These obligatory reporting arrangements are not 
unlike those required of former prisoners released on parole. It can be argued that here, the welfare system 
has become less and less a means to prevent poverty and the harm this brings to both individuals and the 
broader community, to a means of monitoring and managing that part of the population for which regular 
employment is not available. As we will see, this view of the liberal state and its instititutions is in keeping 
with Foucault‟s descriptions and analyses of „governmentality‟. 
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is not surprising then, that many (if not most) political philosophers are concerned with questions 
about the modern liberal democratic state. Some, following Kant and Hegel, see it as an ultimate 
achievement of Reason in political organisation. Others, following Hume, see it simply as the 
best we can do given all human tendencies, circumstances, customs and conventions. Most (if not 
all) include or assume Mill‟s principles of liberty. Very few, it seems, give much thought to the 
possibility of even a fleeting moment which is without liberal democracy, let alone a liberal 
democratic, or any, State. As such, the discussion and the actual activity of contemporary politics 
takes place under the assumption that liberal democracy is „as good as it gets‟. Even where and 
when it is recognised that this range of political institutions and positions allows, and even 
contains unavoidably, commonplace exclusion, inequality and atrocity, the best, the most that 
anyone can do, or think, is fiddle and fine tune with the aim of reducing or alleviating such 
eventualities. In Chapter Two, we will attend to these contemporary implications of theories of 
the presence of the State. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE INTRANSIGENT STATE 
As good as it gets 
 
 
 
In Chapter One, this „genealogy of philosophical attitudes to the State‟ focussed 
primarily on those in either support or opposition to the State, and the reasons around those 
positions. By the end of the chapter however, we had begun to delve into the effect of theory on 
the ongoing intransigent presence of the State. The sheer force of the State – its institutions, its 
foundation in force, the managerial, self-preserving violence of its police and armies – really 
have been enough for it to persist (and there is good reason to believe that this state of affairs will 
continue indefinitely). Anarchists and others who take up positions against the State stand little 
chance against this force. Now, in addition, there is a formidable body of thought that gives the 
State the gravity that allows it to present as an immovable weight. We began to feel the weight of 
this thought in relation to the discussion of the theoretical buffer provided by Mill‟s liberalism.  
Still, the very existence of anarchist and other critiques of the State continue to demand 
responses, explanations and justifications on behalf of the State‟s presence. Hence, while the 
presence of the State is largely unthreatened, theorists have found it necessary to devote 
considerable time and energy to discussions of the State‟s presence, its majesty, its pragmatic 
effectiveness, its brutality, its flaws, its normality and its necessity. Much of this discussion 
derives its assumptions from thinkers discussed in Chapter One. As such, these discussions, 
devotions
1
 and critiques – as different philosophical attitudes to the State – revolve around 
explanations of the presence of the State based on either its practical necessity (following Hume, 
for example) or its normality
2
 or on its philosophical necessity in the contract or in „Reason‟ and 
„History‟, or simply on the way it forces itself on people, its violent self-founding and self-
legitimation. All of these perspectives more or less accept the presence of the State as a 
monopoly on politics. In them, there is never a suggestion that a political position is possible 
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 „Devotion‟ seems to be an appropriate description for many theories of the State. This perspective is 
reinforced when we consider the words of Rousseau, Vaughan and Schmitt with regard to the State and 
theories of sovereignty filling the void left as the political authority of the Church and religion waned. As 
such, reading theories of the State often seems like reading devotions to a cult of the state. Interestingly, 
Weber writes of the „devotion‟ required of subjects in order that the legitimacy and stability of the State be 
secured (Weber, 1970: 79-80). As we move through this chapter we will see how this devotion is expressed 
and how it operates, especially in the work of Hegel. 
2
 There is a certain legitimacy that arises for the State out of its normality, out of the integration and 
saturation of culture in its bureaucratic and economic structures and logics. See, for example, Gramsci 
(1971: 257-261) and Weber (1970: 77-78, 212). 
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without the State (except for the annihilation of Law through Walter Benjamin‟s „divine 
violence‟). This however, does not make explanations and critiques of the various modes of the 
State‟s presence irrelevant to the thesis‟ concerns. Each in its own way, after all, contributes to 
and helps to maintain a situation in which the possibility of a politics without the State is almost 
unimaginable. As it is the aim of this thesis to get to a point where politics without the State is 
again considered possible, it is necessary to examine some key contemporary thought on the 
State in relation to its continued intransigence. We will begin with a brief look at the consequent 
development of ideas of historical and rational necessity of the State. 
 
 
The inertia of necessity 
 
 As we noted in Chapter One, Hegel and Kant, while not resorting to the same kind of 
necessity as Hobbes, for instance, work diligently on attributing a different kind. With a 
constitution or state as the perfect or Ideal concretisation of human society, any state or system of 
authority becomes a necessary step on the way to such an ideal. They give what might otherwise 
be seen as random or relatively disorganised developments, a teleological status, as the 
progressive coalescence or concretisation of rational laws. This perspective on the presence of the 
State has been adopted and adapted by many thinkers since. 
 Karl Marx is probably the most influential exponent of the teleological logic of Hegel‟s 
scheme. However Marx disagreed about the kind of society and state that would mark the 
disappearance of contradictions. Marx rejected Hegel‟s elevation of abstract ideals to reality, over 
and above the actual social lives of real people. Indeed he criticised Hegel for this inversion, 
where individuals are treated as predicates to an abstract state. That is, their relation to the State 
is defined according to the general and objective functions they perform as an element of the 
State. So, their private or, as Marx would have it, their „real‟ social lives are understood as 
antithetical to the State.
3
 According to Marx, the “mystical substance” of Hegel‟s State “becomes 
the real subject” (Marx, 1975a [1843]: 80) and Hegel forgets that the essence of an individual is 
not in its “abstract Physis, but in [its] “social quality” (78). Marx‟s early critique of Hegel formed 
the basis of his political philosophy, which is neatly exemplified in The German Ideology (1968 
[1846]) by the phrase, “Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life” 
(1968: 38). Here, instead of history following the progress of reason and thought towards an Ideal 
State, Marx argued that it is the material (economic and productive) conditions of the social 
world that determines its political and ideological nature. From this understanding flows the 
political theory and strategy of the communism of Marx and Engels, which is most famously laid 
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 Marx uses lengthy passages from Hegel‟s Philosophy of Right in his critique. Here he refers to Part 
Three, Section iii, „The State‟, §275-§279 (Hegel, 1956 [1837]: 179-184). 
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out in The Communist Manifesto (1992 [1848]). Here they argued that the material and economic 
conditions of capitalist exploitation had become more onerous on a working class growing 
rapidly in both number and consciousness. According to Marx and Engels, this situation had 
developed into an epic class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the workers, which would 
culminate in a revolution, where the proletariat overthrows bourgeois capitalism, thus bringing 
about a final phase of history in which class conflict and contradictions are resolved. As such the 
end point of Marx‟s materialist teleology is a dictatorship of the proletariat, which would control 
the State and its machine for only as long as it takes the State to wither away, leaving an ideal 
communist society.
4
 
Marx‟s philosophy, via various interpretative guises, has been deployed in many ways. In 
the nineteenth century his thought and political activism inspired a vibrant workers movement 
oriented towards the emancipation of all people from exploitation. In the twentieth century, the 
publication of his early works
5
 inspired a re-reading of his entire oeuvre, which consequently 
influenced attempts to situate Marx‟s work in a humanist context. The key idea for proponents of 
this interpretation is Marx‟s figuring of a human species being which is alienated from its 
essential and spontaneous productive and creative activity by the mind-numbing wage-slavery 
that becomes necessary for survival in the capitalist system.
6
 Of course, Marx‟s work also 
inspired Lenin and the Bolsheviks to such an extent that they were able to overthrow the Russian 
Tsarist regime. In this period, Marx‟s work was appropriated and interpreted in other ways, when 
the „revolution‟ (as expressed in the Soviet State) endeavoured to stabilise and assert itself 
through the exercise of central authority.
7
 Castoriadis (1987) argues that this totalising and 
bureaucratic (mis)appropriation of Marx‟s thought marks the failure of Marxist revolutionary 
theory and a betrayal of Marx‟s „original inspiration‟. For now though, we are interested in 
Marx‟s critique of the idealist teleology of the Hegelian State and its occurrence in modern 
political thought.  
In the second half of twentieth century a struggle developed between the political and 
ideological forces of capital and communism. This struggle became exemplified by the Cold 
War, where the nations of the United States and the Soviet Union were understood to represent a 
                                                 
4
 In the Critique of the Gotha Programme Marx describes this society as follows: “In a higher phase 
communist society, after the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labour has 
vanished … only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety and society 
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160). 
5
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6
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7
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from those works already cited, see Engels (1970 [1884]: 579).  
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reductive capital-communist opposition. As such, the collapse of the Soviet Union was seen by 
some as the end of the political struggle between ideologies, with (liberal democratic) capital as 
the victor. Francis Fukuyama‟s essay „The End of History?‟ (1989)8 is probably the most well 
known example of this ideological victory dance. Fukuyama‟s thesis is largely based on the logic 
of Hegel‟s Philosophy of History (1956 [1837]), in which the progress of Reason through history 
is towards an ideal form of political organisation – the liberal State. As such, Fukuyama accepts 
and asserts the notion that there are no “principles or forms of social and political organization … 
superior to liberalism” and “the principles of liberty and equality underlying the modern liberal 
state” (Fukuyama, 1992: 64). This is because societies organised under such principles are “free 
from the „contradictions‟ that characterized earlier forms of social organization” (64). It is in this 
context that Fukuyama makes his claim that following the end of the cold war, in “the complete 
absence of coherent theoretical alternatives to liberal democracy” (70) we had arrived at the End 
of History.  
In support of his argument, Fukuyama cites many political philosophers, such as 
Voltaire, Condorcet, Kant, Hegel, Marx and Kojève, in relation to their thoughts on „progress‟. 
He notes that Kojève‟s enthusiasm for Hegel‟s philosophy extended beyond history to encompass 
the end of philosophy as well as the end of political goals and struggles, thus leaving societies 
free to occupy themselves with their “economic activity alone” (67).9 Such a society, according 
to Kojève and Fukuyama, is the “universal homogenous state” (Fukuyama, 1989). The belief that 
such a stage had been reached led Kojève to abandon teaching for a life as a bureaucrat for the 
European Community. Fukuyama seems to offer this anecdote (at least in part) as a proof of his 
thesis. While it may demonstrate the commitment of Kojève to his thinking, I think it is more 
revealing as an example of the disturbing intellectual funk produced by this kind of political 
theorising. This is no less true of Fukuyama‟s claims themselves, which have been widely 
discussed, criticised, and even ridiculed.
10
 However, what is important about such work is not the 
possibility that it can be ridiculed but that, in its (ironically unreflective) application of Hegelian 
historical logic, it has had an influential role in perpetuating the notion of the philosophical 
necessity of the State and, consequently, in closing down the idea of thinking about politics 
without it. Implied in all studies and claims about the „end of history‟ or about liberal democracy 
being the ultimate achievement of human progress is the less sophisticated notion that liberal 
democracy is the best that human society can manage. This stance seems to betray the 
Enlightenment spirit (to dare to know) and contradict its own notions of progress. This thesis is, 
among other things, about rejecting this position, not because of assumptions about the 
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 This essay was followed by the book, The End of History and the Last Man (1992). 
9
 Fukuyama draws on Kojève‟s lectures on Hegel‟s Phenomenology, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel 
(1980) and particularly on a very long footnote (See Kojève, 1980: 157-162). 
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 See, for example, Francis Wheen‟s How Mumbo Jumbo Conquered the World (2004). 
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deterministic march of progress or because I think that some of the observations contained within 
arguments about the end of (liberal democratic) history are totally mistaken, but because there is 
always the tantalising scent of something else on the breeze, of other ways for people to live 
together. Such possibilities should not be ignored. Fortunately, not all political thought throws us 
off this scent. Not completely anyway. 
  
 
The conventional State 
 
As we saw in Chapter One, theories about the philosophical necessity of the State, such 
as the social contract, become rather shaky in the face of the work of Spinoza and Hume. The 
same result occurs when teleological necessity is examined from a Humean perspective. Hume‟s 
work, with its refreshing candour, provides compelling reason to reject any argument about the 
necessity of the state, teleological or otherwise. In Book III of his A Treatise of Human Nature 
(1952 [1740]) for instance, he dismantles notions of contracts and allegiance in relation to the 
presence of government.
11
 Firstly, he argues that the origins of civil government and society lie in 
our „natural‟ propensity to act against our long term self interest in pursuit of short term 
advantage, convenience or desires (Hume, 1952: 235-236). In order to protect ourselves from 
ourselves, we appoint objective “civil magistrates, kings and their ministers, our governors and 
rulers” (238), who, appropriately distanced from the matter at hand and their own self-interested 
passions, make decisions in the long term common interest. Now, Hume understands this 
situation as one which has developed simply as a process of people organising things to 
individual and common advantage. This situation has much in common with the conventions and 
rules which obtain in smaller („pre-state‟) societies. For Hume, the „pre-state‟ situation is not a 
state of nature comprised of inherently competitive and hostile individuals, but one in which 
groups of people organise themselves according to interest (240-242). Any development of a 
society from this situation towards state organisation is not a result of the explicit or tacit consent 
of the ruled to be ruled. Just as it is interest, rather than explicit promises, that preserves trust 
among smaller communities, so it is in societies governed by states. For, as Hume observes, 
when people want to make an explicit promise to guarantee the performance of an act, they tend 
to do so consciously and openly.
12
 Further, obligation to authority is maintained by a similar, if 
less immediate, understanding of interest. 
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 While Hume refers to „government‟ rather than the state his discussion of it includes the institutions, 
customs and laws which we have come to understand as aspects of the modern state. 
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 Hume writes, “let us consider that men [sic] will often bind themselves by promise to the performance of 
what it would have been in their interest to perform, independent of these promises; as when they would 
give others a fuller security, by superadding a new obligation of interest to that which they formerly lay 
under” (Hume, 1952: 244). 
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Hume does acknowledge, however, that as societies have grown, the decision or 
decisions to organise to common advantage through the appointment of magistrates and 
governors, are no longer made by the society at large, or by anyone. Instead, the situation endures 
as accumulating sets of conventions. Here, Hume elaborates on the nature, as convention, of 
society‟s allegiance to authority, in that it rests not on consent or contracts, but upon the 
recognition that the situation is as it „always‟ has been and that people understand both morally 
and practically that a breach of allegiance would be punished by the government (1987a: 471, 
474-475) 
Unlike the contract theorists, Hume rejects the idea that the state is necessary in all 
situations. He writes that “[t]hough government be an invention very advantageous, and even in 
some circumstances absolutely necessary, it is not necessary in all circumstances; nor is it 
impossible for men [sic] to preserve society for some time, without having recourse to such an 
invention” (1952: 240). However, this admission of the possibility of “society without 
government” is limited to “small uncultivated” ones (241). Further, although Hume sees the 
contract as a fiction, his own views on authority and the state are little different than those who 
see it as real. From Hume, then, we receive the „conventional‟ state, the state that we simply 
cannot help having. Hume does not attempt to gild the lily. He acknowledges its flaws and the 
(disinterested) self-interested workings of power, surveillance and domination. But we have to 
take the good with the bad. For Hume, it could not be any other way. 
In Kant and Hegel, conversely, that which is seen by Hume as the disorganised 
aggregation of conventions over time has a teleological status, as the progressive coalescence or 
concretisation of rational laws towards the realisation of the Ideal (and always already existing) 
State.
13
 The distinction between aggregation and concretisation is important. Hume‟s position, 
while offering no comfort to those looking for reasons to reject the State, plainly rejects the idea 
that it is anything other than a product of commonplace human interaction. Hume sees no reason 
at all to read anything teleological into this situation. Still, many thinkers have persisted in trying 
to establish a philosophical foundation, or a ground, for their political theories. One in particular 
though, continues to see such persistence as futile and ultimately irrelevant to the activity of 
working out what the best possible political system should be. 
 
 
The consequences of convention (as pragmatism) 
 
 
 As we have seen, thinkers like Fukuyama and Bookchin, who follow the Hegelian and 
Marxist versions of the dialectic, continue to explain the presence of the State and ground their 
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 For Hegel, the State is always already there, as Idea and/or Spirit, and society develops within it. See the 
„Introduction‟ to his Philosophy of History (1956 [1837]: 1-102).  
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subsequent political philosophy on the teleological or quasi-teleological necessity of progress. 
Others, like John Rawls, prefer to ground a theory on adaptations of the social contract and the 
state of nature, and on a Kantian rational subject (as we will discuss in more detail later).
14
 Jürgen 
Habermas‟ comprehensive project is devoted to theorising Kantian rationality in the context of 
modern democratic decision-making and community building.
15
 All of these attempts to give a 
political position a logical, rational philosophical ground mark an inheritance from the 
Enlightenment and we could be forgiven for believing that to work in the Enlightenment tradition 
means that the attempt at such grounding is a mandatory first step in any political position. But 
we need not take such a first step. After all, one of the Enlightenment‟s stars, David Hume found 
no good reason to seek out such a grounding and it seems to have caused him little anxiety. 
Further, given the popularity of his political essays, the lack of a grounding has not caused people 
to see his positions as so illegitimate or invalid as to render them irrelevant. As such – as with the 
works of Rousseau, Kant and Hegel – there are thinkers whose work takes off from Hume‟s 
positions. 
 Richard Rorty, for example, sees criticism about lack of foundation as irrelevant to 
working out what political arrangements a community is best served by. He is just as ardently in 
favour of constitutional liberal social democracy as thinkers such as Rawls and Habermas (for 
example), but he sees no need to establish a philosophical ground for it. As well as accepting 
Hume‟s assessment of philosophical foundations, he draws on the pragmatism of Dewey and 
James. As such, he takes the view that the “Cartesian quest for certainty” is “neurotic” (Rorty, 
1982: 161) and argues that giving up this quest would actually be liberating for a culture. For 
Rorty, the most important thing is the activity of asking and answering the question of “whether 
our present view of the world is, roughly, the one we should hold” (162). Rather than laying a 
philosophical ground for this activity, Rorty argues that we should accept the contingency of 
starting points and rely on the inherited, commonly held beliefs, political institutions, morals and 
values of a given community as the guide to a conversation within which the question of „what 
view a community should hold‟ takes place (1982: 164-73; 1983: 585-86; 1985: 174).16 As an 
advocate of liberal constitutional democracy, Rorty contends that the values of the system itself 
are not only enough, but the most appropriate set of conditions to use as a guide to any future 
deliberations on the shape of political organisation. And it is in this context that Rorty writes that 
he has found nothing to persuade him that “anybody has any better ideas for a legal and political 
system than the liberal, constitutional, social democratic one” (1996a: 78). Rorty sees this 
situation as having essentially come about without any dependence on philosophical grounding or 
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„theoretical backup‟ and largely as the result of the workings of „reformist politics‟ – “things like 
the formation of trade unions, the meritocratization of education, the expansion of the franchise, 
and cheap newspapers” (1985: 169). This story is very much like Hume‟s descriptions of the 
gradual development of conventions. And, ultimately, like Hume, Rorty sees this situation as one 
which could not – and should not – be any other way. 
 Still, it is clear that Rorty‟s approach to working out a political position, or any reformist 
approach, can only result in one or another version of the status quo. In this sense, he goes further 
than Hume, who is content to read the situation as it he sees it and largely leave it at that. Rorty‟s 
position begins with such a „reading‟ before arguing about the means through which the situation 
can be both improved and entrenched. In Rorty‟s case, it is impossible to do anything other than 
fine tune and tinker with the current system. He is candid about this, holding that the politics of 
progressive democratic reform is “the only sort of politics needed in rich constitutional 
democracies such as Britain, France and the US” (1996b: 17). In „Pragmatism, Relativism, and 
Irrationalism‟ (1982), as part of a discussion about why he adopts neither a pragmatist or anti-
pragmatist political position, Rorty characterises pragmatism as a position which says “with 
Hegel, that truth and justice lie in the direction marked by successive stages of European 
thought” (173) and which follows Hegel “in saying that „philosophy is its time grasped in 
thought‟” (174). Rorty does not argue for this pragmatist position but claims to be answering 
certain criticisms of it. However, when we read his conclusions about the liberal democratic state, 
it is difficult to see how his own position disagrees with the kind of philosophical pragmatism he 
outlines. In this regard, Rorty‟s position forms another part of the bulwark against the thinking of 
politics without the State. With Rawls, Habermas and other advocates of state authority, Rorty 
helps to maintain the State‟s monopoly on politics – which, by now, seems to have become a 
liberal state monopoly on politics. 
Like Hume, Rorty is refreshingly practical, candid, and genuinely concerned about the 
actual workings of politics in the community. However, Rorty‟s position is problematic as far as 
this thesis is concerned because regardless of whether the State is deemed philosophically 
necessary or simply the result of conventions arising out of common interest, we are still left with 
the proverbial immovable object. The State is here and, apparently, it is here to stay. 
Furthermore, politics is impossible without it. But is it, really? The problem here is that the 
weight of the necessary and the conventional liberal state, and the arguments behind them, creates 
such inertia that this question is too rarely asked. 
It is clear that I find Rorty‟s liberal reformist conclusions to be unsatisfactory. I am not 
alone in this assessment. In the collection of essays edited by Mouffe, Deconstruction and 
Pragmatism (1996a), she, Critchley and Laclau have raised similar concerns. Mouffe summarises 
their critique of Rorty‟s basic position and his advocacy of a pragmatic reformism by describing 
that position as a “kind of liberal utopia” before then asking: “Can such a reformism do justice to 
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the multiplicity of the radicalisation of the democratic ideal?” (Mouffe, 1996b: 3). I agree with 
Mouffe here. Basically, Rorty‟s perspective effectively refuses to seriously consider political 
possibilities other than those of the existing “rich constitutional democracies” (Rorty, 1996b: 17) 
and, thus, the possibility of a politics without the State.
17
 Still, I think it is fair to accept that what 
currently happens in modern social and liberal democratic states is something akin to Rorty‟s 
descriptions. We can attribute our current institutional political situations to a gradual, 
intermittent and often haphazard process of reform, rather than any teleological notion of 
progress. In other words, I think it is fair to agree with Rorty‟s (Humean) „reading‟ of the 
situation,
18
 if not his claim that this is the only process that we can follow into the future. But, 
what is being reformed?  
The changes and developments that reformists talk about are not often about the basic 
notions of (Mill‟s) liberty but about the liberal democratic system. The aim of reform is (usually) 
said to be about the fair and equitable distribution of material resources and maximising the 
opportunity for citizens to participate in political decision-making, without allowing this 
participation to degenerate into a form of rule that would lead to a breach of the principles of 
negative liberty.
19
 As such, the process of reform (and sometimes regression) takes place in a 
field largely set out by Mill‟s Considerations on Representative Government (1971b [1861]). It is 
in this field that the notions of liberty and democracy often clash. The history of politics since the 
Enlightenment is partly the history of a debate about which of the principles of liberty or 
democracy should take precedence. In the context of the preceding discussion of a Rortian 
reading of the current process of reform, a problem is raised. Pragmatic faith in the process of 
liberal reform not only buffers the State from questioning, but it establishes a mutually dependent 
relation. Liberal philosophy, whether it assumes a teleological or pragmatic approach, needs the 
State to regulate politics and as such it relegates the idea and practice of democratic participation 
to a largely ideological or symbological role. Liberal philosophy seems to exclude „politics‟, that 
is, the practical activity of people being together and organising themselves. We will begin with 
Chantal Mouffe‟s critique of political liberalism as a way of thinking about this problem. 
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 Liberalism and politics 
  
Political liberalism (naturally) prioritises the principles of individual freedom as a means 
of deciding on the shape of the political organisation of society. As such, democratic political 
principles must yield to principles of individual liberty. For some, this is a problem in itself. 
However, the precedence of liberalism over democracy in political life is problematic in other 
important ways. As we noted in Chapter One, Mill‟s “appropriate region of human liberty … [is] 
… the inward domain of consciousness” (Mill, 1971: 75). This includes freedom of opinion, 
thought, feeling and conscience and excludes political action, any action, which interferes with 
Mill‟s principle of no harm.20 Here we find that decisions about the best kind of political 
organisation for a society have become a moral (or individual) problem rather than a political one 
(i.e. a problem for groups of people). Chantal Mouffe is among those who regard this as a major 
problem for political liberalism – as well as for political considerations in general – and thinks 
that democratic principles, as political principles, are a more appropriate guide to our political 
deliberations.
21
 
 Chantal Mouffe‟s critique of political liberalism, in The Return of the Political  (2005a), 
begins from the aforementioned recent historical situation in which it was argued by many (such 
as Fukuyama) that “liberal democracy had won and that history had ended” (Mouffe, 2005a: 1). 
As Mouffe characterises it, this „end of history‟ is also supposed to have heralded the end of the 
„political‟, the dynamic of antagonism in the making of decisions by a political community (an 
end which prompted Kojève to forget about politics and philosophy for life as a bureaucrat). 
Instead, Mouffe argues, the collapse of communism “opened the way to a resurgence in 
nationalism and the emergence of new antagonisms” (ibid). This resurgence is understood by 
„End of History‟ thinkers as the “last desperate cry of the political before it is definitively 
destroyed by the forces of law and universal reason” (1). However, Mouffe holds that agonism, 
the very real contest of political ideas and positions, is inseparable from democracy.
22
 Thus, the 
idea of the end of „the political‟ is seen by Mouffe as a blindness to its constitutional role in the 
idea of democracy and, consequently, as a sign of the “impotence of most political theorists in the 
current situation” (ibid). She then embarks on an examination of political liberalism, its 
assumptions and its opponents, in order to “establish a new political frontier capable of giving a 
real impulse to democracy” (6). 
The key aspects of Mouffe‟s critique are that, with the rise of neo-conservative and neo-
liberal ideas (which, to proponents of these ideas, culminated in the „defeat‟ of communism), the 
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notion of the political and the nature and extent of political participation is interpreted as “a 
compromise between interests whose formulation was exterior to ... political action” (25). Public 
opinion replaces the common good in sustaining “the illusion that harmony could be born from 
the free play of private interests” (25). Mouffe argues that the absence of „the political‟ from 
political liberalism is partly due to the employment of a moral mode of reasoning (rather than a 
political mode) as a means of determining and developing the best form of society possible. In 
this „moral‟ mode, the rule of law and equality support liberty and the fair distribution of 
economic, cultural and social goods (60-63).
23
 The separation of the public and private spheres, 
where political and moral action is excluded from the sphere of political decision-making also 
helps to sustain this tradition. 
In making her arguments, Mouffe addresses and draws upon other critics of liberalism. 
For example, communitarians such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Sandel contend that in 
practice political liberalism – particularly that which posits the kind of constitutive community 
that Rawls aims for, where the abstract rights of an atomistic, unencumbered self are prioritised – 
is impossible because the rational procedures through which justice is to be distributed must be 
decided by rationally independent people, who must not refer to any shared moral conceptions 
(29-30). Mouffe, though, also points out problems associated with the communitarian position, 
such as its blindness regarding the actual and potential oppressiveness of the social and moral 
conventions of traditional forms of society. She writes of the real danger of returning to a 
“premodern view of politics” (62):  
 
Contrary to what some communitarians propose, a modern democratic political community cannot 
be organized around a single substantive idea of the common good ... [and] ... at the cost of 
sacrificing individual liberty. This is the point where the communitarian critique of liberalism 
takes a dangerous conservative turn (62).  
 
We will discuss this debate further in Chapter Four in relation to some of the problems associated 
with liberty, freedom, autonomy and „rational selves‟.24 At this stage however, what is important 
in Mouffe‟s critique are her conclusions about the limits of both liberal and communitarian 
theory. Mouffe accepts the communitarian criticism of liberalism with regard to the 
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„unencumbered self‟ and she agrees with critics of the communitarians who reject a return to a 
pre-modern and/or unequal hierarchical society, no matter the level of civic participation.
25
  
In the reduction of political thought to a debate between communitarianism and 
liberalism – without the traditional robust opposition of Marxist emancipatory politics – Mouffe 
sees a danger for democracy. For Mouffe, what is required is a reinvigoration of the political 
theory of the (Marxist) left by offering a critique (with Laclau) of its essentialising tendencies 
(Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). While liberals see citizens as nothing more than rights-bearing 
subjects, Marxists have understood individuals according to rigid class categories (the most 
obvious example being „the worker‟). Mouffe rejects the class essentialism of the traditional left 
and the identity essentialism of some recent feminist, gay and black political movements.
26
 This 
essentialism is problematic because it not only reduces the people involved to closed and unitary 
representations but the separation of these groups from each other keeps them from addressing 
the common sources of the subordination, oppression and discrimination that they encounter. In 
The Return of the Political, Mouffe argues (as she did earlier with Laclau) that  
 
[i]t is only when we discard the view of the subject as an agent both rational and transparent to 
itself, and discard as well the supposed unity and homogeneity of the ensemble of its positions, 
that we are in a position to theorize the multiplicity of relations of subordination. A single 
individual can be the bearer of this multiplicity and be dominant in one relation while 
subordinated in another … (Mouffe, 2005a: 77). 
 
So, Mouffe understands the individual as occupying many subject positions and that a person‟s 
participation in politics involves much more than voting for one party or another every few years. 
People participate in many ways, taking different positions in different debates, inside and 
outside the formal institutional political structures. The democracy and politics that Mouffe 
envisages then still needs to retain the ideas of individual liberty and equality in order for such 
participation to take place. Mouffe builds her conception of democracy, at least in part, on a 
critique of Carl Schmitt‟s political ideas.27 
In The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (1988 [1926]), Schmitt argues that, contrary 
to the common assumptions of the time, there is no necessary, let alone complementary, 
relationship between liberalism and democracy. Rather, the individualism which is championed 
by liberalism conflicts with the homogeneity required within a democracy. For Schmitt, modern 
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democracy is based on Rousseau‟s conception of the General Will, that is, “the theory that all 
governmental authority derives from the governed” (Schmitt, 1988 [1926]: 19). So, in 
democracy, “there is only the equality of equals, and the will of those who belong to the equals” 
(Schmitt, 1988: 16). This equality depends upon the exclusion of those deemed unequal and the 
dismissal or conceptual assimilation of minority disagreement
28
 in order to achieve absolute 
unanimity (26). The contradictions deriving from the historical coupling of liberalism and 
democracy are what, for Schmitt, lead to the crisis of parliamentarism. This crisis is characterised 
by the increasing meaninglessness of the open public discussion on which parliamentarism is 
premised. With the emergence of the modern mass democracy, governments have increasingly 
bypassed parliamentary debate to use techniques of secrecy, in camera negotiation and 
compromise to resolve disputes and decide policy. With this, governments have resorted to 
suspension of parliamentary principles and laws and the use of emergency powers, or states of 
exception, to guarantee the conceptual unanimity
29
 required to maintain stability in a democratic 
state. For Schmitt, the crisis of parliamentary democracy leads to a rejection of liberal democracy 
and, ultimately, an advocacy for „mystical‟, authoritarian or dictatorial „democracy‟. While 
Mouffe sees value in Schmitt‟s critique, she disagrees with his rejection of liberal democracy, 
which would also mean the rejection of the liberty, pluralism and equality that has been so 
important to the development of modern democracy (Mouffe, 2005a: 109-115). 
 Mouffe‟s critiques of political liberalism, communitarianism, parliamentarism and 
essentialism all support an argument for a new radical democracy, one which maintains and 
upholds the liberal values of liberty and equality. Ultimately though, Mouffe supports the 
existence of the State, of a kind which organises an agonistic political system and culture 
(Mouffe, 2000; 2005b), which does not attempt to eliminate difference in the name of the 
homogeneity and unity but sees the abstract unity of a „common good‟ as a “vanishing point, 
something to which we must constantly refer when we are acting as citizens, but that can never 
be reached” (85). For Mouffe the differences of „we‟ and „them‟, the „constitutive outside‟, 
conflict and division are elements of the political that will not disappear and, actually, the 
existence of a radical democracy depends on this difference (85). In order to endure, it needs to 
ensure that difference does not turn into antagonism (for “antagonism is the failure of difference” 
(Laclau & Mouffe, 1987: 125)). What is important about Mouffe‟s critique of liberalism for this 
thesis is the assertion that politics should not be derived from ethical or moral theory, and that 
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 “[W]hoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the whole body, which 
means nothing other than that he [sic] shall be forced to be free” (Rousseau, 2004: 19). 
29
 Schmitt points out that conceptually, the will of one (Dictator or Absolute Sovereign or Monarch) can 
pass for the will of the people. “For an abstract logic it really makes no difference whether one identifies 
the will of the majority or the will of the minority with the will of the people if it can never be the 
absolutely unanimous will of all citizens” (Schmitt, 1988: 26). 
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politics is about more than the relationship of an individual to an Other (Mouffe, 2000: 129-140). 
Politics is about the complicated, agonistic sets of relations that happen in a group. 
Mouffe‟s arguments thus show how a pragmatic satisfaction with the current processes of 
reform, such as that endorsed by Rorty, is dangerous. Further, Mouffe‟s radical agonistic 
democracy seems to me to be a far more ambitious and suitable approach than Rortian 
pragmatism to addressing the injustices, contradictions and the participatory shortfalls of modern 
parliamentary democracies. What remains untouched in this situation, however, is the assumption 
of the necessity of the state – and the assumption that the liberal (and/or social) democratic state 
is as good as it gets. The State is there not because it is agreed or natural or morally justifiable, 
but simply because it could not not be there.  
The presence of the State, regardless of whether or not its presence is „necessary‟, is 
reason enough to try to reform it of its flaws. Given the scope of this task, it is not surprising that 
so much of political philosophy is devoted to the „fine-tuning‟ of the State system. And of course, 
doing this work is far better than doing nothing at all. As we have seen so far, this fine-tuning has 
drawn on the principles of liberalism (insofar as these principles have been designed to alleviate 
the potentially brutal consequences of sovereign power). To this end, liberalism has been quite 
successful. Only a miserly and cynical thinker (such as Schmitt) could find only inevitably self 
annihilating contradiction in the logic and actual workings of liberal democracy. However, what I 
call the „liberal democracy is as good as it gets‟ view of politics and the State contains problems 
which cannot be ignored. Despite its undeniable success and presence it is difficult to point to 
examples of the (liberal) State‟s facilitation of just, equal and free societies, societies of the kind 
that political thinkers continue to theorise, posit and predict. In other words, although States exist, 
without doubt, they do not do, and arguably never have done, what they are supposed to do. That 
is, it is doubtful that, especially as they have grown in size and complexity, States have lived up 
to their end of the bargain. The contract is supposed to guarantee freedom and equality, unity and 
peace, and modern theorists argue that the State is an essential foundation for the institutions of 
democracy, but even the least oppressive states regularly exercise authority in such ways that 
democratic principles are ignored, political activity quashed, freedoms violated and undeniable 
harm caused.
30
 In relation to this, it has been clear for nearly one hundred years now, that the 
philosophical principles on which the modern State is founded – sovereignty, liberty, citizenship, 
the social contract and rights – as concepts, have been inadequate in terms of coping with the 
horrors of the twentieth century. Further, the intransigence of the State makes it impossible to 
gain an insight into what life would have been like (or would be like) had states not developed in 
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 For example, in Australia and many other of the „rich constitutional democracies‟ the introduction of so-
called „Anti-Terror‟ laws and the increasing use of „states of exception‟ in relation to the treatment of 
asylum seekers are examples of these causes of harm. For discussions of these and other associated issues, 
see Burke (2008), Burnside (2007), Kelly (2007), Hughes and Costar (2006) and Ong (2006). I have 
discussed these issues in more detail in my „Democracy of the Civil Dead‟ (2008). 
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the way they have. This ignorance, of course, cannot be used as an argument against the State. 
Neither however, can it be argued that states have provided a freer, more equal, more secure life 
for people had they not developed in the way they have. Despite this, many arguments for the 
State include the assumption that in its absence, conditions would be necessarily and 
catastrophically worse. So, it is important to leave such ignorance behind, and to view the State 
in all its gory glory and to ask if „as good as it gets‟, is good enough. 
  
 
As good – and as bad – as it gets 
  
The desire for peace, the serenity of compromise, and the tacit acceptance of law, far from 
representing a major moral conversion or a utilitarian calculation that gave rise to the law, are but 
its result and, in point of fact, its perversion … Humanity does not gradually progress from 
combat to combat until it arrives at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces 
warfare; humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rule and thus proceeds from 
domination to domination (Foucault, 1984 [1971]: 85). 
 
 Up until this point, this thesis has focussed on a discussion of arguments for, and 
explanations of, the State. So far we have been able to dismiss arguments for and explanations of 
its necessity. While I have found that the most plausible explanations of its presence, and of its 
development come from a Humean beginning point – that is, the emergence and „settling in‟ of 
moral, political and social conventions – these are not of much help if we find the State and the 
way it weighs on people to be a problem. The actual presence and weight of the State cannot be 
dismissed. Regardless of the power of any theoretical critique of the State‟s presence, it is still 
there, integrated and ingrained in everyday life. Further, it is this integration of the State into 
everyday life that gives its presence and effects a normality which functions as a more powerful 
form of legitimation than any theory. Hence it is necessary now to examine the theoretical 
underpinnings of the modern sovereign State and their relationship to the everyday practices of 
the actual social lives of it subjects. While from this relationship we find a potential for violence 
that has played out too often during the past century, mostly the effects of the State on everyday 
life take place in ways that do not demand the condemnation that is appropriately directed 
towards the unjust treatment of refugees, for example.
31
 The everyday effects of the State have 
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 In the previous footnote I noted the use of „states of exception‟ in relation to the treatment of asylum 
seekers. In Australia, islands have been „excised‟ from the Australian mainland for immigration purposes 
in order that refugees are deprived of access to the Australian courts with regard to the processing of their 
claims for asylum. This state of affairs has been the subject of intense debate in Australia. See, for instance, 
Bagaric et al (2007), Burnside (2007), Marr and Wilkinson (2003) and Mares (2002).  
 51 
assumed the status of „normality‟. By subjecting this normality to some further examination it 
may be possible to begin to think about politics without it. 
  
 
Violence and the State 
  
We are currently very accustomed to hearing claims about certain countries being failed 
States.
32
 This is understood as a situation in which the institutions of a State have disintegrated 
and become ineffective and when the taken for granted legal protections have ceased to function. 
It is usually applied to small (non-Western) nations. But can it be claimed that the very ideas that 
found and ground the State have failed, that it is these ideas themselves that bear the seeds of 
institutional failure? We are unaccustomed to hearing that the State in general, as both an idea 
and as a political social reality, has failed. The very idea that the State is open to such a claim is 
anathema to „common sense‟ political thinking. States, after all, continue to be the default 
position for any new political grouping. As recently as early 2008, the new state of Kosovo was 
declared. This declaration was accompanied by disturbingly familiar nationalist celebration, by 
diplomatic, peaceful and violent protest from those opposed to the new state, and by fear among a 
new ethnic minority within the freshly sovereign Kosovan borders. Such events have become an 
irrevocable supplement to the idea and the actuality of the State.  
 A number of thinkers, not all addressing the situation of the States from the same 
position, began to note very similar problems with it in the early decades of the twentieth century, 
and it is through such perspectives that claims about the failure of the State – with regard to the 
explicit and implicit ideals of the contract suite – can be made. As we have seen, Carl Schmitt 
wrote extensively on the contradictions of democracy and liberalism (as the main supports for the 
philosophy of the State). Walter Benjamin, in his „Critique of Violence‟ (1996 [1921]) noted the 
dependence of the State on force and law, its monopoly on violence (and in the context of this 
thesis, on politics „itself‟). Hannah Arendt, in her discussion of the movements of peoples 
between geographical places and within a complex of national identities, did so under the 
heading of  the „Decline of the Nation-State and the Rights of Man‟ (1994 [1951]: 267-302). In 
more recent times, Giorgio Agamben has drawn extensively on these thinkers to reveal further 
ruptures in the logic of the State and in the figure of the citizen.
33
 All of these critiques discuss 
the founding philosophical concepts of the modern State – the social contract, individual liberty, 
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 The Solomon Islands had been seen in this way in 2003. Australia and other Pacific nations responded 
with a rebuilding force called the Regional Assistance Mission for the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). For a 
discussion of failed states see Rotberg‟s When States Fail (2010).  
33
 See particularly Agamben‟s State of Exception (2005) and Homo Sacer (1998).  
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equality and democracy – in terms of the role they play in the most serious state malfunctions of 
the twentieth century. 
 Carl Schmitt‟s critique of parliamentarism and particularly his collection of essays on 
sovereignty, Political Theology (1985 [1922]), includes a discussion, as noted earlier, of the 
increased use by parliamentary democracies of the state of exception (i.e. the temporary 
suspension of the normal constitutional laws, rights and freedoms – usually considered to be 
guaranteed by the contract suite – under the banner of state of emergency, siege, or other 
circumstances deemed threatening to the state). With regard to this, Schmitt observes that it “will 
always be necessary to make exceptions to the general rule in concrete circumstances, and that 
the sovereign is whoever decides what constitutes an exception” (Schmitt, 1985; 1988: 43). In 
essence, what Schmitt argues here is that there are concrete situations with which our abstract 
founding political concepts cannot cope. As such they can, and should, be decreed out of 
existence by an individual sovereign decision. In his discussion of the roles of the legislature and 
the executive Schmitt draws upon the work of Bodin, Condorcet, Montesquieu and the essays 
collected under the name The Federalist
34
 and argues that while the parliament is appropriate for 
the discussion of general policy, the executive must “be in the hands of one man because its 
energy and activity depend upon that” (45). Further, “[d]ifferent opinions are useful and 
necessary in the executive, where especially in times of war and disturbance action must be 
energetic; to this belongs a unity of decision” (45). It is in this context that Schmitt, writing in 
1921, observed what he saw as a crisis of parliamentary democracy, where the contradictions of 
liberalism and democracy rendered parliamentary discussion and compromise ineffectual, thus 
forcing governments to declare states of exception with increasing frequency in order to deal with 
disruptions to the stability of the state. By 1940, the regularity with which states of exception 
were decreed led Walter Benjamin to observe that “„the state of emergency‟ in which we live is 
not the exception but the rule” (Benjamin, 2003: 392). This situation marked not just a crisis for 
parliamentary democracy but, as Hannah Arendt argues, a threat to the Nation-State.  
In the early decades of the twentieth century, especially in the fragile peace following the 
First World War, a brace of newly declared nation-states struggled to cope with decisions about 
the various local definitions of „citizen‟ and with the implications of decisions about whether or 
not to include ethnic minorities in such definitions. The state of exception became here more than 
a temporary suspension of normal laws for the whole citizenry. Permanent legal inequality 
(within a system based on the concept of equality) became a reality for large numbers of people. 
In The Origins of Totalitarianism (1994 [1951]), Arendt shows how the creation of new nation-
states, the constant rearranging of borders and the concomitant creation of stateless people and 
refugees marked the emergence of a situation with which the modern state could not cope. The 
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 Most of these essays were written by Alexander Hamilton, with others by James Madison and John Jay 
(1961 [1787-88]). 
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denaturalisation of minorities created a situation in which millions of people found themselves as 
nationals without a nation, deprived of citizenship, the right to legal representation and, most 
importantly, deprived of homes. States tried to expel those deemed stateless but found that no 
other country would accept people who could not be eventually repatriated (Arendt, 1994: 279-
285). The presence of so many people who did not „fit‟, who could not be included in the 
necessarily homogeneous structure of the nation-state, highlighted its fragility. Arendt writes that, 
 
the nation-state cannot exist once its principle of equality before the law has broken down. 
Without this legal equality … the nation dissolves into an anarchic mass of over- and 
underprivileged individuals. Laws that are not equal for all revert to rights and privileges, 
something contradictory to the very nature of nation-states. The clearer the proof of their inability 
to treat stateless people as legal persons and the greater the extension of arbitrary rule by police 
decree, the more difficult it is for states to resist the temptation to deprive all citizens of legal 
status and rule them with an omnipotent police (Arendt, 1994: 290). 
 
While a few individuals found their statelessness an advantage, for most this arbitrary rule meant 
persecution, deportation, internment or extermination. With no desire to include minorities as 
equal citizens and nowhere to send them, the states built camps – places where the normal 
constitutional laws and rights were deemed inoperable. According to Arendt, the people within, 
lacking the legal identity and distinctive political qualities of citizens, “begin to belong to the 
human race in much the same way as animals belong to a specific animal species … [They] … 
become human beings and nothing else” (302). The camps, ranging from simple places of 
internment to factories of extermination, functioned primarily as spaces within which those 
deemed rightless, unequal and stateless, could be placed safely beyond the coverage of the 
normal laws. This legal and spatial segregation of inequalities ensured that the rightless (and, 
importantly, lawless) people within
35
 posed no threat to the (homogeneous) integrity of the state. 
 The problems identified by Schmitt, Benjamin and Arendt have not been resolved. 
Giorgio Agamben continues to examine the roots and implications of concepts such as the state 
of exception, the fragility of the State in the face of the relationally anathemic circumstances of 
millions of refugees and otherwise stateless people, and the notion of „bare life‟, the kind of life 
in which we are, as Arendt puts it, “human beings and nothing else” (302).36 I will return to the 
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 It is problematic to describe a state of exception as either within or outside the normal juridical order. 
For Giorgio Agamben, the state of exception, including that of the Camp, is a „zone of indistinction‟, a 
„juridical void‟, “a space devoid of law, a zone of anomie in which all legal determinations are deactivated” 
(Agamben, 2005: 50). I will return to Agamben‟s analysis of the state of exception in Chapter Three. 
36
 Again, this failure is most notably exemplified by the use by governments of the state of exception, 
whether that be for „immigration purposes‟ and with regard to the expansion of police powers for the 
purposes of the security or the „wars on terror‟. And occasionally, ethnic violence still takes place with the 
(sometimes implicit, sometime explicit) sanction of the State. In 2010, for example, this was the case in 
Kyrgystan. 
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work of Agamben in Chapter Three. For now it will suffice to observe that the State, at least in 
terms of its inability to prevent, and its actual ability to facilitate, violence against both citizens 
and non-citizens (i.e. according to its contract suite „obligations‟), is to a large degree, a failure. 
This failure though has not led to the State‟s downfall. Neither has it much tarnished its claims to 
legitimacy or its reputation. As we shall see, this failure, to a large extent can be seen to have 
served the State well. In terms of the State‟s capacity to reinforce and preserve its existence, 
failure is functional. 
For most of this thesis, when I have discussed the State in negative terms, in terms of its 
failure, it has been in relation to „its‟ capacity to oppress people, or to organise violence and other 
forms of force against them.
37
 Nonetheless, the „failure‟ that the existence of such force and 
violence represents is not simply the result of the conceptual limits of founding philosophical 
principles, it is also the result of an increase in the rationalisation and efficiency of the state 
machine. In The Nation-State and Violence (1985), for instance, Anthony Giddens has noted that 
the twentieth century was a time in which the development of the industrialised military machine 
drove not just a frightening increase in military violence, but also influenced the development of 
administrative systems of power, which keep nation-states both externally secure and internally 
docile. For Giddens the State is understood as an apparatus from which various forms of violence 
are directed towards citizens and against other states. Included in the repertoire of violence held 
by states is military force, directed both internally and externally, administrative control of 
citizens through bureaucracies, and the normalising power of surveillance (Giddens, 1985: 22- 31 
& 41-49). In other words, while we can understand the blatant, military style violence of armies 
and police forces in terms of Benjamin‟s critique, where the State‟s monopoly on violence 
functions both at a legitimising and managerial, perpetuating level, Giddens reminds us that the 
State forces itself on us in other, less blatant ways. 
 
 
Coercion by convention  
  
The inversion of the relation between means and ends – an inversion which is to a certain extent 
the law of every oppressive society – here becomes total or nearly so, and extends to nearly 
everything. The scientist does not use science in order to manage to see more clearly into his [sic] 
own thinking, but aims at discovering results that will go to swell the present volume of scientific 
knowledge. Machines do not run in order to enable men to live, but we resign ourselves to feeding 
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 A shortlist of the worst examples of this „capacity‟ would obviously include Germany under National 
Socialism, the USSR under Stalin, Mao‟s China and also the more common twentieth century „tinpot‟ 
dictatorships – which may not be as coldly rational in their brutality, but are brutal nonetheless – such as 
Idi Amin‟s Uganda, Franco‟s Spain, and Pinochet‟s Chile. The totalitarian dictatorship, however, does not 
have a monopoly on oppression. At various times, the U.S. and other liberal democracies have, more 
selectively, but quite freely, exercised brutal force on their citizens. 
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men in order that they may serve the machines … [and] … organization is not a means for 
exercising a collective activity, but the activity of a group, whatever it may be, is a means for 
strengthening organization (Weil, 1934: 105). 
 
The rationalised violence of states, as an ongoing possibility flowing from an „irrational‟, 
a-legitimate foundation, is just one aspect of the State‟s self-legitimation, self-protection and self-
perpetuation. We have seen how Arendt, Benjamin, Schmitt and Agamben shed a rather chilling 
light on the State‟s most brutal responses to the contradictions and myths of its modern 
foundational concepts – such as the contract and rights and the very real day-to-day tensions 
between individual liberty, unity and democracy. However, these horrors, despite the lingering, 
ominous potential of a new emergence, are not ever-present. Most states, luckily, do not hurtle 
towards a genocidal disaster. More often than not, universal physical force is not required to 
maintain the stability and integrity of the State and obedience to sovereign authority. In this 
regard, we could arguably give some credit to liberal democratic principles in their role of 
keeping state terrors to a „minimum‟ and can therefore understand why Rorty, Rawls, Habermas 
and others continue to place great faith in those principles. However, while it is understandable 
that some hold the faith – that liberal democratic institutions can keep the State „tame‟ – the 
domestication of the State leaves intact less brutal, more subtle forms of oppression, force and 
domination. 
The State, once established, is so much a part of everyday life that it cannot be reduced to 
a part as such. The logic of State organisation, the relation of the State and the social, is not such 
that we could simply see it as something that can be opposed by citizens, or as something that 
does things to civilians. Citizens themselves not only make up the body, the basic material, the 
matter, of the Sovereign (as illustrated by Leviathan‟s famous frontispiece, for example) but also 
are inseparable from whatever the State does. If we follow Hume‟s descriptions, the conventions 
that arise out of the need for people to ensure that their long-term common interests are 
considered (over the short-term demands of self-interested passions) eventually lead to the 
appointment of magistrates and other officials. Of course, these magistrates and officials are 
actual people as are their administrative subordinates. Not only can this be understood (via 
Hume) as the beginnings of sovereign authority and obedience to it, but also as the beginnings of 
systems of detached, „objective‟ administration – bureaucracy. 
 There have been many critiques of bureaucracy. In the classical liberal (and neo-liberal) 
tradition, Hayek starts from an analysis of the notion of social or distributive justice. Hayek 
asserts that the tragedies and triumphs of our lives, where they are not the direct result of another 
individual‟s actions and instead are simply part of the complex processes of the „spontaneous 
order‟, cannot be deemed either just or unjust (Hayek, 1982: 62-70). Therefore, we can have no 
moral basis for the deliberate organisation of the distribution of justice, and there is therefore no 
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justification for governments and their bureaucracies to “coordinate the efforts of the members of 
society with the aim of achieving a particular pattern of distribution regarded as just” (64). Hayek 
thus regards government planning, and the bureaucracy such planning depends upon, as a 
primitive folly. Any effort to plan requires the ability to accurately predict possible future 
situations, and society is, for Hayek, inherently unpredictable. So much so that Hayek claims that 
attempts to organise society are deluded, arrogant, and potentially disastrous (82-85). Even if 
disaster is avoided, Hayek still argues that state and bureaucratic planning are obstructive to the 
individual liberty of homo economicus, Hayek‟s „natural‟ human.38 Later neo-liberal theorists, 
such as Milton Friedman, also criticise „big government‟ and its bureaucracies for the obstruction 
of the free play of individuals in a free market. Here, arguments are directed against bureaucracy 
on the basis that in its parasitic inefficiency it serves society badly (Friedman, M. & Friedman, 
R.,1981: 335, 344-347). The perspectives of the classical and neo-liberal traditions are limited by 
the view that bureaucracy is simply a monolithic apparatus that tramples on and stifles individual 
liberty and entrepreneurialism. Bureaucracy is not addressed as an organisational or social 
phenomenon, or examined in terms of how the associated dynamics affect its operation and 
behaviour. This view then, like that of Nozick (1974) for example, is not part of an argument for 
politics without the State but for a minimal State, one which performs only those functions which 
maintain a monopoly on legitimate violence. This then is a State reduced to what we might call 
its essential being. Ultimately, as the critique lacks an interest in the possibility of politics 
without the State, it also lacks the kind of insight that could help us understand bureaucracy in 
relation to the intransigent presence of the State. Fortunately, discussions of bureaucacy are not 
limited to the kind articulated by the Friedmans, for example. There is a far richer body of work 
ready to hand. 
 Karl Marx‟s attitude to bureaucracy is articulated in the Critique of Hegel‟s Doctrine of 
the State (1975a [1843]).
39
 In this work, Marx describes in great detail Hegel‟s conception of 
bureaucracy and builds his critique on that description. However, while Marx appears to accept 
that Hegel‟s conception is a reasonable description of the qualities and tendencies of the real 
thing, unlike Hegel he does not see this „real‟ thing as a good thing. Marx regards bureaucracy as 
a „formalisation‟ of the (Hegelian) idea of the State (Marx, 1975a [1843]: 106-107). As such, the 
bureaucracy – as the „executive‟40 of the State and as the instrument of sovereign authority – 
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 Hayek‟s understanding of „human nature‟ is in keeping with the homo economicus of the neo-liberal 
economic tradition; i.e. as one of rational self-interest. For a definition of homo economicus and a critique 
of its use in economic theory, see Daly and Cobb, For the Common Good (1994: 85-96). 
39
 This work has also been translated under the title of a Contribution to the Critique of Hegel‟s Philosophy 
of Law (1975b [1843]). 
40
 “There is a distinction between the monarch‟s decisions and their execution and application, or in 
general between his decisions and the continued execution or maintenance of past decisions, existing laws, 
regulations, organizations for the securing of common ends, and so forth. This task of merely subsuming 
the particular under the universal is comprised in the executive power, which also includes the powers of 
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tends to oppose itself to citizens. Unlike the aristocratic State however, where only aristocrats 
have access to bureaucratic roles, all citizens have the opportunity to devote themselves to the 
State through such work.
41
 Further, just as Hegel‟s abstract Idea of the State takes precedence (as 
real) over the real social lives of people (75-78), the objective, rational guiding principles of the 
bureaucracy leads to an inversion, where “[r]eal knowledge appears lacking in content, just as 
real life appears dead, for this imaginary knowledge and imaginary life pass for the substance” 
(47).
42
 Of course, the bureaucracy is a servant to the dominant class, and ultimately (if one 
follows Hegel) to the arbitrary decision of the absolute monarch (101-104). As an organisation, 
the bureaucracy comes to identify the purpose of the State as secondary to, or as derivative, from 
the purposes and prerogatives of the bureaucracy itself (107). The bureaucracy is a „secret 
society‟ and admission to its ranks is controlled by the “Masonic initiation” of examinations 
(112). Of these examinations, the mode of (rational, objective) knowledge required to pass them 
is crucial to the bureaucracy‟s authority. In summary, the bureaucracy, with its secrecy (108), its 
hierarchical structure and specialised knowledge (as “fixed bureaucratic minds, bound together 
by passive obedience and their subordinate position in a hierarchy” (108)) entrenches its own and 
the state‟s continued existence. 
 Later, in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1971 [1852]), Marx lifts his gaze 
from the bureaucracy itself to its political effects on society. Here, the bureaucracy is still the 
servant of the dominant class and an “appalling parasitic body, which enmeshes … society like a 
net and chokes all its pores … [with its] … regulated plan of a state authority whose work is 
divided and centralised as in a factory” (Marx, 1971 [1852]: 169). At this later stage, the 
bureaucracy has become so politically important that each new regime tries to perfect it “instead 
of smashing it” and regards “the possession of this huge state edifice as the principal spoils of the 
victor” (169). Marx also argues that after the second Bonaparte, the State machine – with its 
bureaucracy – has become independent, is no longer a servant of the dominant class and has 
finally subordinated society to itself (170-171). For Marx, for all these reasons, the bureaucracy 
should be targeted for liquidation. In keeping with his overall political strategy, its disappearance, 
along with the eventual abolition of the State, marks the end of the dominant class and class 
conflict. This strategy nevertheless, like those of other regimes he refers to, includes the strategy 
of taking possession of the State and its machine, the bureaucracy. It is not surprising then that, in 
                                                                                                                                                 
the judiciary and the police. The latter have a more immediate bearing on the particular concerns of civil 
society and they make the universal interest authoritative over its particular aims” (Hegel, 1952: 188-189). 
41
 From Lenin‟s perspective, this aspect of bureaucracy‟s functioning – in which it recruits members of the 
peasantry, the trades and artisans – allows the State to capture the loyalties of some of oppressed classes, 
and thus merely serves to strengthen its parasitic power. See The State and Revolution (1973: 34-35). 
42
 This observation – of the theological tendency to invert spiritual/rational, and the real – is part of the 
Feuerbachian critique of German Philosophy that was taken up and extended by Marx and Engels. See 
Feuerbach‟s The Essence of Christianity (1957), Marx‟s The German Ideology (1968) and Engels‟ Ludwig 
Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy (1970b). 
 58 
keeping with the logic of his analysis of the State and bureaucracy, no withering of the State or 
bureaucracy has occurred thus far.  
At this point we are finding that the purpose of the State actually is becoming blurred. 
Does its purpose follow from the founding philosophical principles of the contract, or from the 
„necessities‟ of its own self-legitimation and self-preservation? In these analyses of bureaucracy, 
we see how the rationalisation of the functions of individuals in the interests of the maintenance 
of the institution comes to be regarded as more important than the various rights and freedoms 
that the State is supposedly instituted to protect. This theme will be important to the development 
of this thesis‟ critique of the State and its theorisation. For now however, we will continue our 
discussion of bureaucracy. 
In a famously comprehensive and insightful analysis, „Bureaucracy‟ (1948), Max Weber 
describes an ideal form of rational organisation. Unlike Marx, who is clearly hostile to the 
bureaucracy, Weber is stretched by an admiration for its rational efficiency and a wariness about 
the effects of that efficiency on a society subject to rational management and control. Firstly, 
Weber sees “the characteristic principle of bureaucracy [as] the abstract regularity of the 
execution of authority” (1948: 224). He is impressed by the bureaucracy‟s “purely technical 
superiority over any other form of organization” and it compares with them “as does the machine 
with the non-mechanical modes of production” (214).43 He also notes that the expansion of 
bureaucracy in the State comes into conflict with democratic principles but he is ambivalent 
about this conflict. Bureaucracy (unlike democracy) is integrated with the economic order and 
immersed in the operations of power and, regardless of political or moral principles, it seems it 
must have its rationalising way (1948: 230-242). In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism (1992 [1930]) however, he sounds a note of caution. There he worries about the 
possibility that the increasing rationalisation of society would see its members trapped within an 
„iron cage‟ of social conformism (1992: 181-183). Overall, Weber‟s studies describe bureaucracy 
as a distinct kind of rational organisation within society, which has common features – regardless 
of the kind of political, social and economic rule of that society – and which, for better or worse, 
has become intensively integrated into everyday life. There is something reminiscent of Hume in 
Weber‟s analysis of bureaucracy, in that it is matter-of-factly descriptive. But there is also 
something of Hegel, as the account conveys a sense of inevitability and necessity about the ways 
in which the State, the bureaucracy and their rational principles come to dominate and saturate 
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 Weber‟s enthusiasm is palpable when he writes, “Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, 
continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of material and personal costs – 
these are raised to an optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic administration … As compared with all 
collegiate, honorific, and avocational forms of administration, trained bureaucracy is superior on all these 
points” (Weber, 1948: 214). 
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the „real social lives‟ of people.44 The work of Claude Lefort allows us to understand this 
domination from a more critical perspective. 
Claude Lefort, in his essay „What is Bureaucracy?‟ (1986), adds more to the analyses of 
Marx and Weber.
45
 He acknowledges their insights into the bureaucracy as an organisation and in 
terms of its functions in relation to the State. However, he argues that their analyses are limited 
by a strictly organisational perspective. Lefort is interested in “the mode of being of this 
phenomenon” of bureaucracy (Lefort, 1986: 89) and in its “social nature” (110). In this regard he 
contends that Marx‟s description is “smothered by a theory” as soon as it is sketched (95-96). In 
the work of Marx bureaucracy is “treated as a general category and no attempt is made to explain 
its functioning” (96). As such, Lefort claims, Marx does not ask questions about how the actions, 
beliefs and behaviours of bureaucrats contribute to the general organisational tendencies he 
describes (96). As for Weber, Lefort finds his contribution “exemplary” (96). He agrees with 
Weber that the parallel growth of economic rationalisation, capitalism and bureaucratisation is 
not simply coincidental (98, 119), but does not accept the Weberian position that because “state 
bureaucracy accommodates itself to different regimes” it does not “affect the nature of the 
political and economic system” (98). Lefort‟s critique of Weber follows a discussion of the 
regime following the Russian Revolution, in relation to its clear involvement with political power 
and to the ways that that particular bureaucracy does not conform to Weber‟s criteria. Lefort also 
looks at how a party bureaucracy, while still clearly a bureaucracy, deviates from many of 
Weber‟s general features (109-110).46 What Lefort finds is that regardless of the initial design of 
rational rules and systems, they eventually become socialised to the extent that they are 
continually followed and performed whether or not they bring about the originally intended 
results. Where Weber sees rational, functional justification for hierarchy and prestige, 
organisational sovereignty and autonomy, secrecy, self-legitimating systems of knowledge and 
the strong identification of bureaucrats with the bureaucracy, Lefort observes a social world 
which often fails in its mandate, but succeeds magnificently in its capacity to preserve and 
expand itself. 
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 This sense is of a practical, rather than a philosophical inevitability or necessity. Bureaucracy develops 
from the (now predominating) “social and economic presuppositions … [of the] … development of the 
money economy” (Weber, 1948: 204).  Weber writes that then, “where the bureaucratization of 
administration is completely carried through, a form of power relation is established that is practically 
unshatterable … The individual functionary is … forged to the community of all the functionaries who are 
integrated into the mechanism. They have a common interest in seeing that the mechansism continues its 
functions and that the societally exercised authority carries on. The ruled, for their part, cannot dispense 
with or replace the bureaucratic apparatus of authority once it exists” (228-229). 
45
 In his early life, Cornelius Castoriadis also worked extensively with Weber‟s theory and later produced a 
comprehensive critique of bureaucracy and the associated rationalisation of society. This is not surprising 
given that Lefort and Castoriadis worked together on the journal Socialisme ou Barbarie (which operated 
between 1949 and 1965). We will discuss Castoriadis‟ critique, particularly in relation to the failure of the 
Marxist revolutionary project, in Chapter Five. 
46
 For detail on this analysis see Weber‟s „Bureaucracy‟ (1948: 196-198) and Lefort‟s „What is 
Bureaucracy?‟ (1986: 96-114).  
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Lefort‟s critique of Weber‟s analysis goes into much more detail than I intend to here. 
What is most noteworthy for our purposes is the way he lays out bureaucracy as a social milieu 
and as a “milieu of power … [which] … uses the circumstances in order to extend and 
consolidate it[self]” (Lefort, 1986: 115). Lefort‟s analysis is not limited by a set of (Weberian) 
features, which are used to determine how a bureaucracy (more or less) approximates to an ideal 
of rational, technical organisation. Rather, Lefort shows how a bureaucracy, regardless of its 
deviance from a given set of features, tends to socialise its members into itself (as an institution) 
so that they become unified and obedient and as focussed on the organisation‟s continued 
existence at least as much as (if not more than) the rational performance of the tasks that the 
bureaucracy supposedly exists for. What Lefort shows is that bureaucracy need not be defined 
and understood simply by applying criteria, which in themselves are limited to application to a 
few particular types of rational organisation. Instead, it can be viewed as a particular kind of 
social life, where what begins as a practical institutional instrument becomes a social milieu 
guided by conventions, which themselves become so integrated that they achieve a normality 
akin to many other aspects of social life. Further, the social bureaucratic milieu can be seen to 
operate in worlds beyond that of the State or the firm. Given Lefort‟s understanding of the 
functions of privileged knowledge and the associated prestige, sovereignty and self-
legitimisation, the allegiance and identification of members to the entity, the function of 
domination and deviation from original purposes, we could even possibly apply his 
understanding of bureaucracy to the modern financial market system and to the functionalisation 
of its failure (probably to the horror of its loyal subjects).
47
 
Overall, what all of these analyses bring out, regardless of their differences, is how the 
behaviour of people in bureaucracies (and similar institutions) becomes largely directed towards 
the preservation of the organisation and how, whatever the initial purpose of the organisation, the 
self-legitimation and survival of the organisation soon becomes the primary function. These 
primary functions then assume a legitimising normality and all other purposes and functions 
become secondary, almost incidental, to the „higher‟ purpose of the organisation‟s continued 
existence. Additionally, if we turn again to Hume‟s understanding of the development of 
conventions as both rational and social, we may be able to understand bureaucracy and the 
rational organisation of the State as intensely elaborated sets of (Humean) conventions. If so, we 
can trace back to Hume the „source‟ of the tendency in rational organisation to remove purpose 
and intent from the people who have the purpose and intention, and then install it in (not instil it) 
and entrust it to a rational detached, objective structure, which make rules which become norms 
                                                 
47
 It could be argued that the near catastrophic failure of financial markets during the so-called Global 
Financial Crisis has ultimately served to more strongly entrench the system – all with the help of 
governments and taxpayers. 
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and conventions. Nevertheless, I doubt that Hume would have believed that the „Hegelian 
inversion‟ of the rational to the real needed to eventuate.  
 With Lefort‟s analysis of bureaucracy we can leave behind abstract understandings of 
particularly types of organisation. Hume‟s conventional world is undoubtedly a social one and 
just is the way it is. His work does not delve deeper than is necessary for him to provide his own 
explanations for political obligation and allegiance. What Lefort‟s analysis does is to help us to 
understand more than just what is happening in social milieus, but also how the behaviours and 
practices of people in such situations happen. This understanding, I think, will eventually allow 
us to move towards a figuring of politics without the State, but first it is necessary to focus more 
on the way practices operate in a social regime or milieu.  
 
 
Conventions and power 
 
Like Hume, Michel Foucault is sceptical about the reality of concepts such as the social 
contract as explanations for obedience and allegiance to authority (or as Foucault understands it, 
“domination and subjugation” (Foucault, 1980: 96)). For Hume, as we  have discussed, the 
promise or the contract has some actuality and function in „pre-state‟ societies with regard to the 
performance of individual and community obligation, but it has no such actuality in a large state 
with regard to political obligation. Here, people accept obligation through conformity to 
convention. On the other hand, for Foucault, conformity to social norms would not necessarily be 
described by people in terms of obligation and convention, even if such norms and conventions 
emerge in a similar way. 
For Foucault, authority and power is not simply applied to people, and they are not 
simply obedient to it. The idea that power emanates from a central or single source to operate 
simply as a force of negative oppression upon the people is rejected.
48
 He argues that power is a 
positive, productive relation, where those who are subjugated by it, are also involved in making it 
work. As such, “individuals are the vehicles of power” (Foucault, 1980: 98). He does not deny 
that there are central governments, their bureaucracies and their legitimised, exclusive access to 
violence as a means of controlling the population. However, he sees power as a more complex set 
of relations. And describes it as “synaptic”, as having a “capillary form of existence … [where it] 
… reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their 
actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives” (39). 
Foucault‟s body of work looks at medical science, psychiatry, prisons, schools, families 
and other institutions – and into the function of surveillance and self-surveillance with regard to 
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 Foucault discusses this in many works, but most accessibly and lucidly in „The Subject and Power‟ 
(1982), Volume I of The History of Sexuality (1981) and Power/Knowledge (1980). 
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normalising individual behaviour, the way people talk and think and what they believe is right 
and wrong. It occurs to me that what Foucault examines is the fine detail of Humean conventions. 
After all, Hume himself understands this as people being “trained up … to some rule of conduct 
and behaviour” (Hume, 1963: 190). The difference between Hume and Foucault is that Hume 
still understands conventions as an explanation for basic obedience to authority – a one way 
relationship – sovereign to subject. For Foucault, relations of power flow in all directions. 
The study of institutions in Foucault‟s work also allows us to build on some of Lefort‟s 
observations about bureaucracy. Where Lefort‟s analysis ends at the „borders‟ of bureaucracy 
(even though he recognises that its influence extends further), Foucault examines the effect of 
institutional rationality, practices and knowledge in terms of their extension into the everyday 
lives of people. The development of psychiatry and the institution of the asylum, for example, 
play a role in the creation of social norms of behaviour for all members of society (not only the 
lives of those in asylums).
49
 In Discipline and Punish (1991) and Power/Knowledge (1980) 
Foucault discusses how strategies and technologies of control in prisons (such as the panopticon) 
extend to become strategies and technologies of control over entire populations. Here, strategies, 
rational procedures and technologies begin with clearly articulated purposes, but procedures and 
rules become norms (and conventions). The population itself monitors behaviour and adherence 
to social norms and circulates the chastisement of the transgression of others.  
A second thread that can be drawn out from our discussion of bureaucracy and the State 
with the help of Foucault is the self-legitimisation and self-preservation of the State. In his 
lectures, „Governmentality‟ (1978) and „The Political Technology of Individuals‟ (1988), 
Foucault discusses the purposes, or „reasons of state‟.50 Through a reading of Machiavelli‟s The 
Prince and other sixteenth and seventeenth century texts, Foucault argues that rather than the 
State‟s existence being explainable through reference to the founding philosophical principles of 
the contract suite, the State‟s reason, or purpose for existence is simply its own self-preservation 
and expansion (1988: 406). Further, rather than the State having a contractual responsibility for 
the well-being of its subjects and citizens in terms of their own individual interests or as ends in 
themselves, the State‟s interest in its subject populations is figured in terms of their usefulness to 
the preservation and consolidation of the State. As such, the State‟s attention to the interests of 
subject populations and the flows of power in which populations are involved (for example with 
regard to health or education) is largely self-interested. Foucault writes, 
 
it is the population itself on which government will act either directly, through large scale 
campaigns, or indirectly, through techniques that will make possible … the stimulation of birth 
                                                 
49
 See Foucault‟s Madness and Civilisation: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (1967) and the 
recently published unabridged English translation, History of Madness (2006). 
50
 These aspects of Foucault‟s thinking are further elaborated in The Birth of Biopolitics (2008), Security, 
Territory, Population (2007) and Society Must Be Defended (2004).  
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rates, the directing of the flow of population into certain regions or activities, and so on … Interest 
as the consciousness of each individual who makes up the population, and interest considered as 
the interest of the population regardless of what the particular interests and aspirations may be of 
the individuals who compose it: this is the new target and the fundamental instrument of the 
government of population. (Foucault, 1978: 217) 
 
Foucault argues that this “governmentalisation of the state is … what has permitted the state to 
survive” (221). The subsumption of populations into the service of the State in this analysis 
however, is not comparable to the trajectory of individual subjects towards the abstract ideal of a 
Hegelian State. For Foucault, the State‟s „treatment‟ of population – as the attempt to manage, or 
take some degree of control of, capillary flows of power – is understood as an aspect of bio-
power, as the disposal and dispersal of bodies to locations and activities most useful to the State. 
This is clearly unlike the understanding of the citizenry of Hegel‟s decidedly unbiological Ideal 
State. On Foucault‟s analysis the State more closely approximates to Marx‟s parasitical state 
machine. 
 A final thread that can be picked up with the help of Foucault is the notion of the failure 
of the State. Again, in Discipline and Punish (1991) and Power/Knowledge (1980), Foucault 
describes how the prison, intended as a new humane form of rehabilitation (rather than as brutal 
uncivilised, vengeful punishment), produced the unintended figure (and new social category) of 
the delinquent. Instead of producing better human beings, prisons tended (as they still do) to 
educate and turn out a more expert criminal. This is a failure in terms of the original aims of the 
prison. However, Foucault argues, such drawbacks are „strategically utilised‟ by power. As such, 
the figure of the delinquent came to serve a useful purpose for the State (1980: 40). Delinquency 
fuels fear and suspicion among the general community, prompting law and order campaigns 
which in turn consolidate the authority of the State. This also leads to more prisons of the very 
same kind that produces delinquency. Criminality, prisons and delinquency also serve a purpose 
against those who would threaten an incumbent regime. Prison labour threatened the livelihoods 
of workers and their movements and delinquents could be used by governments as strike-
breakers and spies (1980: 40-41). This is additionally functional in that it splits those who would 
potentially ally themselves against the State. All of these consequences are initially unintended 
but are deftly turned to the advantage of power. Failure, for example, in terms of the prison‟s 
initial rational purposes becomes functional, is „strategically utilised‟ towards the consolidation 
of the State.
51
 The State, in its rational, bureaucratic and strategic „governmentality‟ can also be 
seen to functionalise its failures. But then, that is only if we hold that the State‟s purposes are 
actually based on the contract and individual freedom and rights. If we accept Foucault‟s 
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 Jacques Donzelot studies the modern family from this perspective in The Policing of Families (1979). 
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analysis, the State, from its subtle, governmental domination, to its genocidal horrors, has not 
failed at all. 
 In this chapter we have looked at the State, its philosophical justifications and 
explanations and the problems associated with them. We have also looked at convention and 
bureaucracy in terms of their function in instilling the (sometimes rationalising) imperatives and 
practices of the State as normal. Arguably, this „normality‟ has more successfully legitimised the 
State‟s intransigent presence than any theory. The implications of all of these perspectives on the 
presence of the state are that people are a secondary consideration. Whether people are 
considered, as rights-bearing individuals, as mere fodder for the march of progress or for the 
preservation of the State, their position is, to say the least, marginal to the coherence of a theory 
of the presence of the State. History, progress, sovereignty, survival and endurance all take 
precedence. 
If we can attribute the endurance of the liberal state in part to the broad ethical scope of 
Mill‟s principles and/or to voluntary participation and acceptance of obligation, we must not 
overlook the role of force, violence, surveillance and normalisation in ensuring the obedience and 
allegiance of citizens to the state. Tellingly, of all the philosophical arguments which explain 
allegiance, there is not one, from Hobbes to Schmitt, from Rousseau to Hume and Mill, to 
Foucault, that denies the fact that the state needs that allegiance. We have covered the more 
brutal and insidious means of securing that acceptance, obedience and allegiance in the second 
half of this chapter, but have not yet examined the philosophical aspects of allegiance and – its 
„brother in arms‟ – alienation. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
ALLEGIANCE AND ALIENATION 
The State needs us 
 
 
God needs men, the great Subject, needs subjects (Althusser, 1969: 179). 
 
 In the previous chapter we looked at the intransigence of the State. We looked at how, 
despite the lack of any actual philosophical foundation, the State preserves itself through 
conventions and through practices which integrate subjects as secondary and subservient to it. 
These practices also furnish the State with a normality that both legitimises it, and gives it a kind 
of (empirically) transcendent presence. By the end of Chapter Two, the suggestion (or 
accusation) that the State is a failure – due to the sometimes brutal consequences that have 
become associated with the contradictions in the relationship of the contract suite and democratic 
parliamentarism – came to seem less and less plausible. The State can only be judged to have 
failed if we accept that its founding purposes (if not principles) are to secure freedom and rights 
for citizens.  
Now, it is quite difficult to maintain that the rights and freedoms of citizens are 
guaranteed by the State‟s suite of founding, contractual fictions. Defenders, advocates and critics 
of the State alike, all recognise the fictional character of this „contract suite‟. At best, the concept 
of the contract is understood as a powerfully descriptive “phraseology” (Cole, 1979 [1913]: xxiv) 
about what happens between citizens and the State – about why people generally behave 
themselves and obey authority. On this basis, claims about the failure of the State that are made 
in relation to the absence of operative rights and freedoms are problematic. As such efforts to 
remedy the faults of the State through reference to the contract suite may be doomed from the 
start. On the other hand, if we try to understand „what happens‟ from the Humean and 
Foucauldian perspectives, we have what I think is a more plausible description.
1
 The State is not 
created or „founded‟ for the purpose of securing freedoms and rights, but develops through sets of 
conventions which, as states grow larger and more complex, include principles, practices and 
procedures around the State‟s self-legitimisation, preservation and expansion. In this picture, 
citizens (or, as Foucault has it, „populations‟) are merely instruments for the State to control and 
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 To prefer a Humean perspective is not to deny the power and endurance of the concept of the contract. As 
G.D.H. Cole wrote in 1913, “Though no one, for a hundred years or so, has thought of regarding it as 
historical, it has been difficult to find any other phrase explaining as well or better the basis of political 
union that, to this day, the phraseology of the contract theory largely persists. A conception so vital cannot 
have been barren” (Cole, 1979 [1913]: xxiv). We can acknowledge Cole‟s point and still maintain that, 
while Hume‟s conventions may not be neatly encapsulated by a powerful „phraseology‟, they do explain 
better the „the basis of political union‟. 
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manipulate towards these purposes. From this perspective, it is far less plausible to mount an 
argument about the failure of the State. Given that the State is ubiquitous and its legitimacy has 
probably never been less under question, it is a resounding success. This view, if true, has many 
implications. One such implication is that liberal reformist politics – as a progressive politics – is 
ultimately futile because its gains are tenuous, very possibly temporary, and only the result of 
vigorous and sustained political action on the part of movements, institutions and individuals.
2
 
Any gains that a particular state decides to grant or accommodate come about because they also 
serve to domesticate perceived or actual threats to the State and to consolidate its (monopolistic 
political) position in a given situation.
3
 In contending that the „governmentalist‟ perspective is the 
                                                 
2
 For example, as Rorty argues, change comes about through, “things like the formation of trade unions, the 
meritocratization of education, the expansion of the franchise and cheap newspapers” (1985: 169). Rorty 
though does not use this observation to support a claim that this will continue to happen, necessarily. But 
he argues that the kind of process of change that we know from experience that can and  has happened in 
liberal democracies provides the evidence, and reason enough, to continue to support liberal democracy. In 
the absence of anything better, Rorty holds, liberal democracy is still the best political arrangement that can 
be hoped for. He is actually quite pessimistic though, about the prospect of this kind of politics‟ existence 
in a hundred years from now. See his Philosophy and Social Hope (1999). This is a pessimism that is 
probably well founded. For, as we have seen, the influence of these very institutions and formations can be 
subject to counter-attack from the State when it somehow decides that they do not serve its purposes of 
self-legitimation and preservation. Perhaps this is reason enough to try and think about different kinds of 
politics – even politics without the State. 
3
 It is this capacity (on the part of the State to „accommodate‟ certain reform for its own purposes) that is an 
important element of many Marxist critiques of reformism. An example of this process is described by 
Alex Callinicos in relation to the taming of revolutionary movements in the late 1960s and early 1970s. He 
writes, “the euphoria of  „68 and after was followed in the late 1970s by the widespread collapse of 
revolutionary hopes, arising from a variety of factors – the success of various reformist parties in 
containing … working-class radicalization … [and, among other things] … the rapid expansion of posts in 
the „new middle-class‟ of highly paid professional, managerial, and administrative employees … has 
offered the disillusioned children of „68 the prospect of social mobility and constantly increased 
consumption” (Callinicos, 1990: 113-114). This excerpt comes from an article in which Callinicos heaps 
criticism on the role of „postmodernism‟ in the depoliticisation and „aestheticisation‟ of the politics of 
resistance under late capitalism. While in this article his main target is Lyotard, elsewhere (Callinicos, 
1989: 63-91) he also includes Foucault in his critique. This is interesting, given the apparent affinities 
between Marx‟s critique of the (parasitic) state machine and Foucault‟s work on „governmentality‟. Maybe 
the frustration expressed by some Marxists towards Foucault can be explained by Foucault himself: 
“[T]here is … a sort of game that I play with this. I often quote concepts, texts and phrases from Marx, but 
without feeling obliged to add the authenticating label of a footnote with a laudatory phrase to accompany 
the quotation. As long as one does that, one is regarded as someone who knows and reveres Marx, and will 
be suitably honoured in the so-called Marxist journals. But I quote Marx without saying so, without 
quotation marks, and because people are incapable of recognizing Marx‟s texts I am thought to be someone 
who doesn‟t quote Marx” (Foucault, 1980: 52). 
 If we take a step back from the heat of the debate between Marxists and „post-„68‟ theorists 
(loaded with barbs and accusations as it often is) we find that Edward W. Said provides a more plausible  
explanation for a „depoliticised‟ and State-affiliated academy – and one in keeping with my arguments 
about the place of conventions with regard to the maintenance of obedience to political authority. Said 
argues that „culture‟ (in which literary criticism, for example, finds its place and raison d‟etre) is part of an 
„affiliative‟ system which serves to provide institutional, generational, continuity to traditional – but in 
modern times, no longer filial – modes of authority (1991: 16-24). Said writes that, “it is supposed that 
literature and the humanities exist generally within the culture … that the culture is enobled and validated 
by them, and yet that in the version of culture inculcated by professional humanists and literary critics, the 
approved practice of high culture is marginal to the political concerns of society” (1991: 2). Further, “[f]or 
the intellectual class, expertise has usually been a service rendered, and sold, to the central authority of 
society” (ibid). In this light, Marxist critiques of poststructuralist literary theory ignore the historically and 
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most apt description of what happens between a population and a state, it is then necessary to 
examine processes through which the State secures the obedience of its population. The question 
raised then is: What operates (underneath or alongside the Humean reasons explaining obedience 
to authority) to secure the obedience of the population towards the State‟s purposes of self-
legitimation, preservation and expansion? How could it have „a kind of transcendent presence‟? 
In response to this question, we will inquire into the relation of the notions of alienation and 
allegiance with regard to the ongoing subsistence of the State. To begin, we will turn again to the 
early thinkers of modern political philosophy. 
 
 
Necessity again: The necessities of the State 
 
If the state, or the nation, is nothing other than an artificial person the life of which consists in the 
union of its members and if the most important of its cares is its preservation, it needs to have a 
universal and compelling power to move and dispose each part in whatever manner is beneficial 
to the whole (Rousseau, 2004 [1762]: 32). 
 
Meet the new boss. Same as the old boss (Townshend, 1971). 
 
In Chapter One, and at various other places, I have referred to the emergence of the 
„contract suite‟ as due in part to the need to find new explanations and justifications for 
obedience to authority as Church and religious authority waned.
4
 Where once, submission to 
ruling power could be explained and justified through reference to the divine authority of god 
manifested in kings, queens and emperors, it became necessary to explain and justify such 
obedience while preserving the freedom of the freshly founded rational, thinking individual. 
What was needed was an explanation of political sovereignty that respected, incorporated and 
enshrined the newly minted rational foundation of human being – the cogito.5 Effectively, it was 
necessary to provide a theory of how an individual‟s autonomy can be exercised as obedience. 
Or, to put it another way, it was necessary to explain how an individual freely surrenders 
freedom. As is clear by now, I contend that Humean conventions are adequate to begin to 
describe and explain what happens between a State and a population (because, for a start, this 
explanation is not one that springs from a need to accommodate the cogito). And, in an aside, 
Rousseau himself accepts that all other laws of the State ultimately depend upon the gradual 
                                                                                                                                                 
conventionally depoliticised nature of such work (poststructuralist or not), and thus appear to miss the 
mark. The Marxist critique and the ensuing debate then seems rather like the traditional criticism and 
counter-criticism that occurs after an ideological split. For more on Said‟s understandings of „Culture‟ in 
this context, see The World, the Text, and The Critic (1991) and Culture and Imperialism (1994). 
4
 See Chapter One, page 14, footnote 5. 
5
 This development will be discussed in detail in Chapter Four. 
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development of customs, morals and beliefs.
6
 However, he quickly returns to his main concerns – 
the familiar suite of secular (or secularised) political concepts which serve to maintain the already 
established sets of conventions related to obedience to authority. Now, to be clear, I contend that 
this suite emerged in response to a need of the State, of established authority, in the face of the 
theoretical counter-authority of the free, sovereign individual and the devaluation of the authority 
of the Church. The State needed new concepts which preserved its existing authority in 
accordance with its existing (as Schmitt describes it) “systematic structure” (1985: 36).7 
Rousseau‟s arguments for a civil religion further illustrate this view.8 For now though, I will 
focus on Rousseau‟s version of the social contract. 
We are familiar enough already with the basic idea of social contract, under which we 
surrender „natural‟ rights and freedoms to the sovereign in exchange for security in the protection 
of the sovereign‟s force and laws. What is most interesting in Rousseau‟s theory is the contention 
that the contract is not between a sovereign and its subjects (i.e. between two entities) but 
between a citizen and him or herself, as the people as sovereign. The contract is to submit to the 
General Will of the people (as sovereign) – to which a citizen belongs. It is in relation to this 
strange transaction that Rousseau discusses the idea of alienation. 
In The Social Contract, Rousseau provides his simple definition of alienation as “to give 
or sell” (2004: 7). He then critiques the idea of alienation used by Grotius in which people give 
themselves to a king for nothing in return (2004: 7-8).
9
 For Rousseau, this is impossible 
(according to the concept of a contract) as well as madness because “[t]o renounce freedom is to 
renounce one‟s humanity … there is no possible quid pro quo for one who renounces everything 
… [and] … any covenant which stipulated absolute dominion for one party and absolute 
obedience for the other would be illogical and nugatory” (8). Now, this understanding simply 
describes the relation of master to slave and, of course, Rousseau rejects such a relationship. He 
is instead interested in finding a “form of association” in which each person is protected by and 
united with the “collective force of all” while remaining free and obeying “no one but himself 
[sic]” (14). Rousseau describes this association as  
 
                                                 
6
 Rousseau writes that “morals, customs and … belief” found the most important law of all, “a law which 
gathers strength every day and which, when other laws age or wither away, reanimates or replaces them; … 
: this feature … is one on which the success of all other laws depends” (Rousseau, 2004: 62). This follows 
his statement in his Discourse on Political Economy (1979 [1755]) in which he writes that “political 
authority, being purely arbitrary as far as its institution is concerned, can be founded only on conventions” 
(1979: 117). 
7
 See again Chapter One, page 14, footnote 5. This „conceptual transfer‟ of political authority from a god to 
a „secular‟ sovereign is discussed in detail in Schmitt‟s Political Theology (1985 [1922]: 36-52). 
8
 See Book IV, Chapter VIII of The Social Contract (Rousseau, 2004: 154-168). 
9
 Hobbes also argues that the people must give themselves absolutely to the Sovereign – but by contracting 
among themselves rather than with the Sovereign. For Grotius‟ own elaboration of alienation see his On the 
Law of War and Peace (2001 [1625]). 
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the total alienation by each associate of himself [sic] and all his rights to the whole community. 
Thus in the first place, as every individual gives himself absolutely, the conditions are the same 
for all, and precisely because they are the same for all, it is in no one‟s interest to make the 
conditions onerous for others. 
Secondly, since the alienation is unconditional, the union is as perfect as it can be, and no 
individual associate has any longer any rights to claim …  
Finally, since each man gives himself to all, he gives himself to no one (15). 
 
Rousseau‟s idea that a citizen alienates herself to herself (as the sovereign, the people, the State) 
nevertheless still requires the citizen, in that alienation, to set aside her everyday, particular 
interests in preference to the interests of the collective general interest. Rousseau makes 
distinctions between the will of all, the majority will and the General Will (26-32).
10
 Majority 
will is sullied by its tyrannical potential and the will of all may be ignorant, ill informed and 
simply wrong. In this case it is the task of the „lawgiver‟ to steer the will of all to concurrence 
with the General Will. The preservation of the State comes first. Where Rousseau does differ 
from other contract thinkers is that the State needs people to become the State so that the State‟s 
interests can be equated with the individual‟s obedience. Obedience then becomes obedience to 
oneself, rather than to a King. The laws of the sovereign, or General Will, are laws made by the 
citizen herself. These laws go to underpin civil society. With this, the citizen acquires “moral 
freedom, which alone makes man [sic] the master of himself, for to be governed by appetite alone 
is slavery, while obedience to a law one prescribes to oneself is freedom” (21). Here, Rousseau 
anticipates Kant‟s idea of autonomy (which, it seems to me, is better suited to moral than to 
political philosophy, for it is far more difficult to view the laws of legislators as my own than my 
„rational, autonomous‟ everyday decisions). 
 But I digress again. There is no need to embark on another critique of plausibility of the 
social contract. I have already set out a position in which I claim that, regardless of the contract‟s 
status as real, or as simply explanatory, and regardless of how powerful or successful that 
explanation has been, Hume‟s conventions do a better job in any case.11 I am interested here in 
the State‟s need for the obedience and allegiance of the population and the role the idea of 
alienation plays in that regard. Rousseau‟s thought, I think, marks a change in the theory of the 
State. The contract changes from being simply about obedience to authority (where, as Rousseau 
has it, one sells oneself into slavery) to being about being theoretically split and reunited. The 
private individual contracts with and submits to her civil self and is reunited with her civil self, or 
subsumed into it, in that act of submission. This theory of sovereignty preserves the idea of 
freedom in order that the State preserve itself. The State needs us to be free. 
                                                 
10
 These distinctions are specifically drawn in Book II, Chapter III, Whether the General Will Can Err 
(Rousseau, 2004: 30-32). 
11
 See Chapter One, pages 17-18 and Chapter Two, pages 39-40. 
 70 
 What makes Rousseau‟s contract substantially different from those of his predecessors 
(rather than it being simply a stage in its development) is his determination to preserve and 
enshrine the individual liberty of citizens. Rousseau is not content to set up his contract as a 
means of explaining or justifying obedience to sovereign authority. In such a contract, people 
give themselves as slaves, which to Rousseau, is mad and illogical. Rousseau rather has the 
contract perform more than a transaction in which sovereign and people exchange obedience for 
rights and freedoms. It also is an act of constitution – the constitution of the people as the People 
and as the Sovereign and as the State. Louis Althusser (1972) describes this contract as 
constitution, and other related theoretical moves as dependent on „discrepancies‟ which are made 
possible by theoretical „plays‟ on words (and with phraseology). 
While it seems that Rousseau is happy for the people to submit to a sovereign, he is less 
sanguine about that submission being to an absolute monarch (as Hobbes would have it). So, 
instead of total alienation to a monarch, Rousseau‟s articles of association prescribe total 
alienation of associates to the whole community (of which the associate is a part). The 
„discrepancy‟ (which Althusser designates „Discrepancy I‟ (1972: 126-134)) is in the fact that the 
act of the contract also brings „the People‟ into existence.12 This is because the contract is what 
„associates‟ (or a group of small „p‟ people) utilise when they “reach a point where the obstacles 
to their preservation in a state of nature prove greater than the strength that each man [sic] has to 
preserve himself in that state” (Rousseau, 2004: 14). As Althusser points out, each individual 
associate, to begin with, has no sovereign to submit to. According to the normal conditions of a 
contract, there needs to be two parties in existence before it is enacted, in order for agreement to 
be possible. Given that individual associates are the only existing parties prior to this enactment, 
the sovereign escapes its conditions. The sovereign “does not exist before the contract … : it is 
itself the product of the contract itself, or better: its object, its end” (Althusser, 1972: 129). 
Althusser thus argues that Rousseau‟s contract is not a contract at all and that Rousseau‟s 
importation of the concept of the contract into his theory serves “to give it a cover” (131). 
Rousseau‟s contract is actually “an act of constitution of the [sovereign] for a possible contract, 
which is thus no longer a primordial contract” (131). Rousseau‟s „contract‟ is also a juridical 
contract as – in terms of property and ownership of land by the „first occupant‟ – “it changes 
usurpation into a valid right and mere enjoyment into legal ownership” (Rousseau, 2004: 24). It 
is with this juridical act of constitution that we recall the thoughts of Benjamin in his Critique of 
Violence (1996 [1921]) and Derrida in his Force of Law (1992). This contract as constitution is 
the force of law, and the founding violence of the State.
13
 And in Rousseau‟s explanation, where 
                                                 
12
 G.D.H. Cole also refers to this discrepancy. “This, to be sure, involves a superficial illogicality, in that 
the State exists as a corporate person only by virtue of the Contract and can therefore hardly be a party to 
its making” (Cole, 1979: xxiv). 
13
 See Chapter One, pages 20-23. 
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any associate who dissents from the contract will be “forced to be free” (Rousseau, 2004: 19), we 
see an early expression of the State‟s monopoly on violence – and politics in general.  
 
 
From phraseology to ideology 
 
Althusser‟s persistent stripping away of the „covers‟ of Rousseau‟s contract is a 
stimulating exercise and there is more to the essay than I have the space to discuss here. In the 
context of this thesis however, Althusser‟s reading helps to bring out the affinities between 
Rousseau‟s understanding of the State and that of Hegel. In relation to „Discrepancy I‟ (i.e. the 
contract bringing into existence one of the parties to the contract), Althusser writes that “the 
theoretical space of the „play‟ it opens … authorizes different „readings‟ of Rousseau” (Althusser, 
1972: 132). These, in particular, are the Kantian and Hegelian readings. I have already mentioned 
Rousseau‟s „anticipation‟ of Kantian morality, in which “obedience to a law one prescribes 
oneself is freedom” (Rousseau, 2004: 21) and we will explore this notion of freedom (or 
autonomy) further in Chapter Four. With regard to an Hegelian reading, the contract is “an 
anticipation of a theory of the Nation as a totality, a moment of the Objective Spirit” (Althusser, 
1972: 132-133).  
All of the discrepancies Althusser describes have to do with the (sacrificial) 
transformation of an individual particular will, and/or interest, and/or freedom into the general 
will, interest and/or freedom of the People as constituted by the contract that is not a contract. In 
what Althusser describes as „Discrepancy II‟, we can further understand the place of alienation in 
the constitution and conservation of the State. „Discrepancy II‟ is the incongruity of the idea that 
in total alienation, an exchange takes place, and, what‟s more, that the exchange is advantageous 
to those who give everything away (for nothing in return). In „Discrepancy IV‟, we see the 
„plays‟ which shore up political obligation in the absence of a god, religious authority and of an 
actual contract. These plays work to eliminate the factional particular interests that exist between 
that of the individual particular interest and the general interest. According to Althusser, this 
problem is addressed, firstly, in “economic reality” (157) in the stipulation that the people need to 
exist in relative material equality in order that those factional interests remain suppressed (or 
dormant) (157-159) and, secondly, ideologically, in the need for a civil religion – an ideology 
that maintains the unity of individual particular interests and the general interest (155-157). The 
broader context of „Discrepancy IV‟ is set by Rousseau‟s statement that the State “needs to have 
a universal and compelling power to move and dispose each part in whatever manner is 
beneficial to the whole” (Rousseau, 2004: 32) and by his recognition of the importance of 
customs, manners and morals (or conventions) to the maintenance and preservation of the State. 
Althusser describes the resort to civil religion as the “Flight forward into ideology” (1972: 155-
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157). This flight forward is for the maintenance of the particular will as the general will, which is 
ultimately dependent on adherence to conventions. These conventions of the particular as general 
will are secured by the Laws, by public opinion and by manners and morals. However, as “the 
Legislator only intervenes at the beginning of the historical existence of the social body” (156) 
(in the „founding violence‟ of the „force of law‟) and, as “censors can only preserve good 
manners and morals, not reform bad ones” (ibid), 
 
[i]t is thus at the level of public opinion that action can and must be constant and effective. Hence 
the importance of the education of the citizens by public means (festivals) or private means 
(Émile): but education cannot be enough without recourse to religion, i.e. to religious ideology, 
but conceived as a civil religion, i.e. in its function as a moral and political ideology. 
 Flight forward into ideology, as the sole means of protecting the particular will from the 
contagion … of the famous „intermediary‟ groups. A flight forward: for it has no end. The 
ideological solution, that „keystone‟ which holds up to heaven the whole political arc, needs 
heaven (Althusser, 1972: 156-157). 
 
On one hand, the theoretical flourishes of this flight forward into ideology (one aspect of what 
Althusser designates Discrepancy IV) could be understood as adding to or consolidating the 
conceptual repertoire of the contract suite. On the other hand (especially in the context of 
understanding the Rousseauian contract as not actually being a contract) we could read this as the 
beginning of the theoretical obsolescence of the phraseology
14
 of the contract (if not the entire 
„suite‟) and of the subsequent recourse to the (arguably disingenuous) elaboration of the theory of 
the People as State – which of course depends on the (conceptual split and) sacrifice of individual 
subjects – the alienation of people from themselves. In this thesis, this transition from 
„phraseology‟ to ideology is understood simply as a transition from one politico-philosophical 
strategy to another. Where the theory of the social contract served to preserve and protect 
authority and obedience to it against the relative contingency and arbitrariness of conventions 
(and the perception, or assertion, that a chaotic return to a „state of nature‟ might erupt from a 
mass realisation of this), the ideology of the People as State, with its concomitant practical, 
instrumental appropriation of responsibility for the morals, customs, manners, education and 
(civil) religion of the People, instead of theoretically effacing conventions, takes control of them. 
The ideology of the People as State serves to minimise, suppress and keep dormant, the relative 
contingency and arbitrariness of convention. Again, this ideology furnishes the actual 
governmental operations of the State with a cover, a „kind of transcendence‟. This „flight forward 
into ideology‟ (to use Althusser‟s phraseology) is a trajectory opened and enabled by Rousseau‟s 
                                                 
14
 This obsolesence, as we read Althusser‟s essay, comes from the contract‟s elucidation as nothing more 
than the „phraseology‟ referred to by G.D.H. Cole in the footnote above (Chapter Three, footnote 1), and as 
reliant on a theoretical „play‟ on words and concepts (Althusser, 1972: 113-115,132). 
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theoretical word play (especially that of the contract as the constitution of the people as State) 
and is one in which Hegel finds his own (ultimately inevitable) way and end. We shall see that, 
regardless of the more complex theoretical elaboration, Hegel simply continues the tradition of 
shoring up and legitimising the State and allegiance to it – for after all, it‟s all about what the 
state needs. 
 
 
Flight forward into Hegel 
 
In both Chapters One and Two, I referred to Hegel in the context of his philosophy of the 
State, the State‟s necessity through the progress of Reason, as the institution at the centre and end 
of the Absolute Idea. I did not refer, however, to the place or status of the individual in this 
teleological scheme. As we have seen, Rousseau‟s individual occupies different modes of social 
life – from a primitive idyll, through a „civilised‟ state of nature, to the social organisation 
constituted by the contract. Not a lot changes in this picture however, to the existence or being of 
the individual, regardless of the stage of social organisation she lives in – until, that is, the 
contract and constitution of the People as State. In this act of constitution, a person alienates 
herself to herself, is split and reunited (unlike the straightforward giving of oneself to a distinctly 
other sovereign as in other contract theories). As Althusser noted, this theory can be read in a 
Hegelian way. So, now we need to turn to Hegel in order to understand the theoretical 
relationships that allow such a reading. 
While Rousseau often uses the notion of alienation, it could not be said that he elaborates 
a „theory‟ of alienation (apart from the time he spends distinguishing his own understanding of 
alienation from that of Grotius along the way to elucidating his „contract as constitution‟). Hegel, 
however, does theorise about alienation, and in a different way to Rousseau. Hegel is not 
concerned with a possible process in which alienation plays a role in understanding political 
obligation, he is rather addressing the philosophical „discovery‟ of „man‟s‟ alienation from 
„himself‟ and nature in rational thought (i.e. the kind of thought that finds itself separate from the 
material physical world, the cogito). This alienation has not „happened‟ as a result of the 
conscious or unconscious need of people to become a People, but simply as the result of rational 
thinking itself. Hegel, in the Phenomenology of Spirit, begins a task of reconciling, reuniting man 
with himself and/as Spirit, in and through Reason.  
When one picks up Hegel‟s Phenomenology of Spirit (1977 [1807]) and reads of 
alienation, the notion of the State and allegiance to it is not something that presses from the text 
or from the experience of reading it. Hegel‟s intention in the Phenomenology is to describe the 
development of consciousness, from basic sense experience to the realisation of a 
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consciousness‟s unity with Spirit (Geist) in the Absolute Idea.15 Along the way of this 
development, the consciousness becomes self-consciousness, by recognising an other‟s becoming 
self-conscious. Consciousness of self comes through an other‟s recognition of another other self. 
In this process, self-consciousness recognises its dependence on an other self-consciousness, and 
thus, a threat to its independence. This dialectic, the process of recognition, of self-consciousness 
through other self-consciousnesses, of the presence of Subject and Object in each other, of the 
presence of Thought and Nature in each other, continually follows the process of the alienation of 
supposedly independent entities, of identities, to other identities, as a process on which any 
identity depends for its existence.
16
 For Hegel, the beginnings of rational thought mark the 
beginnings of this alienation, as a stage on the way to an ultimate reunification. This reunification 
comes when a consciousness‟s struggle with its being as self-negation culminates, or, as Hegel 
puts it, when it has 
 
successfully struggled to divest itself of its being-for-self and has turned it into [mere] being. In 
this movement it has also become aware of its unity with this universal, a unity which, for us, no 
longer falls outside of it since the superseded single individual is the universal, and which, since 
consciousness maintains itself in this its negativity, is present in consciousness as such as its 
essence (Hegel, 1977 [1807]: 139). 
 
When a consciousness becomes one with the Absolute Idea, it ceases to be alienated – from itself, 
from nature, from others – while still maintaining independent identity. Here, humanity becomes 
the vehicle, the embodiment of Spirit.
17
 Humanity is that special aspect of Spirit through and in 
which Spirit realises itself.
18
  
While one can understand Hegel‟s philosophical desire to overcome rational splits 
without abandoning reason, problems arise when Hegel turns to history and political institutions 
such as the State. Hegel makes the State the key institution in the unfolding dialectic of world 
history. As consciousness becomes one with Spirit, as it finally embodies Spirit embodying itself, 
it does so through the ethical institutions of the State. A consciousness‟s divestiture of its being-
for-itself in the unity of the Absolute Idea is also its divestiture, or alienation, of itself to the 
State. It should be noted here that Hegel would not agree with this characterisation and would 
argue that in the unity of the ultimate divestiture, any opposition (and therefore the possibility of 
                                                 
15
 The emphasis on the words Spirit and Idea here follows Hegel‟s practice. 
16
 This process is elaborated in Part B of the Phenomenology, „Self-Consciousness‟ which is made up of 
the sections on „Lordship and Bondage‟ and „Freedom of self-consciousness‟ (Hegel, 1977: 104-138). 
17
 Charles Taylor, in particular, uses the term „vehicle‟ to describe the relationship of humanity and Spirit. 
See Chapter I of his Hegel and Modern Society (1979). 
18
 The notion of Spirit is not easy to pin down and has been glossed in different ways. Charles Taylor 
(1979), for example, practically identifies Spirit as „God‟. On the other hand, Marcuse follows the 
translation of Geist as „Mind‟ and describes the process as the “self-certainty of philosophy comprehending 
the world” as “pure thought” and “absolute knowledge … enthroned” above history (Marcuse, 1969: 120).  
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the submission of one entity to another) ends.
19
 However, as we have seen, Hegel‟s philosophy of 
the State clearly requires the submission of citizens to authority.
20
 For the purposes of this thesis, 
citizens giving themselves to the State accords to a Rousseauian understanding of alienation to it 
– no matter how it is phrased. The problem here is the conflation of alienation and allegiance. In 
Hegel‟s political philosophy, he loads his understanding of consciousness – of the possibilities of 
thought and thought of the self – with the ideology of political obligation. This is the „flight 
forward‟ that Althusser talks about. Further, in Hegel‟s State, which is clearly not dependent on 
the fiction of the contract, the means of ensuring the allegiance of citizens is through the 
ideological „training‟ of citizens (or the sophisticated formation of customs and conventions) via 
ethical institutions. It is in this sense that Hegel is one of Rousseau‟s most avid disciples. Hegel‟s 
State and its ethical institutions and their role in harnessing the allegiance of citizens is further 
elucidated by Althusser‟s understanding of „Ideological State Apparatuses‟, through which 
ideology operates to represent “the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions 
of existence” (Althusser, 1969: 162). Althusser‟s investigation of ideology, however, both 
follows on from Marx‟s critique of Hegel‟s „inversion‟ – in which concepts and ideas belong to a 
reality which material conditions (such as the State and its institutions) later come to embody or 
fill out – and contains a critique of Marx‟s work on alienated labour which is important to an 
understanding of allegiance. So, it is to Marx that we will briefly return. 
  
 
 Marx, the State and Alienation 
 
As we noted in Chapter Two, in The German Ideology (1968 [1846]) Marx and Engels 
set out the foundational principles of what has come to be understood as Marxist political 
philosophy. Material conditions create the conditions of social existence and the institutions 
which develop from such conditions (including the State). This is in opposition to the Hegelian 
notion that the State (as Idea) provides the scaffolding within which social life and institutions 
are shaped and gradually develop towards realisation and completion in the Idea.  
                                                 
19
 Dupré notes this in relation to Marx‟s critique of the Hegelian State. He writes that “Marx … 
[introduces] … a separation of the ideal and the real that Hegel would never admit. He understands reality  
in Hegel‟s philosophy as a substantial product of the Idea. But for Hegel, reality is not a product of the 
Idea; it is the Idea itself. Even as nature opposed to consciousness, reality still retains an ideal character: it 
is the alienation which the notion performs upon itself in order to return to itself as conscious reality 
(Idea)” (Dupré, 1966: 94). 
20
 This was discussed in Chapter One. See page 16, footnote 9. Nevertheless, it is worth quoting Hegel 
again. He asserts that “it is a dangerous and false presupposition that the people alone has reason and 
insight and knows what is right … What constitutes the state is a matter of trained intelligence, not a matter 
of „the people‟” (Hegel, 1953 [1837]: 57). 
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In the Critique of Hegel‟s Doctrine of the State (1975a [1843]),21 Marx painstakingly 
analyses and attacks Hegel‟s political philosophy (as articulated in the Philosophy of Right (1952 
[1821])). Marx‟s main criticism is of what he describes as Hegel‟s inversion, where the 
institutions and material conditions of human social life are seen as formed by a movement 
towards the embodiment of the Idea in the State. Hegel privileges the Idea as „real‟ and the actual 
lives of people as unrealised, unformed (deformed?) aspects of that ideal reality.
22
 For Hegel, as 
with the development of consciousness toward a unification in and with Spirit, the development 
of political institutions is toward unification with this already existing real Idea. For such an 
event to take place, individual consciousnesses, in becoming Spirit, are also citizens becoming 
unified with the State by divesting themselves to it. This is nothing other than Rousseau‟s total 
alienation as constitution. 
 Marx‟s critique of the Hegelian State also provides the reasoning behind his general 
rejection of the modern state. In Hegel‟s political philosophy, in which social life (or society) is 
merely an unrealised aspect of the Idea, Marx saw the general problem of the State. Marx instead 
argued that it is society to which we must turn when we attempt to theorise about its political 
organisation. As such, institutions like the State and their abstract principles develop out of the 
actual conditions of life and the forms of organisation that develop in communities. For the 
members of a society to be required to give themselves to a State, is to strip society and social life 
of meaning. So the idea that one should estrange oneself from social life and submit oneself to 
the State is abhorrent and is the kernel of Marx‟s discussions of alienation only a short time later. 
 In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 (1973), Marx‟s attention shifts 
from a theoretical critique of the abstract Hegelian State to a discussion of the material, socio-
economic conditions and processes in and through which one is alienated.
23
 Marx‟s discussion of 
the alienation of individual social life to the State moves to the background. To the foreground 
comes the discussion of the alienation of a person‟s „species being‟ in the labour process. For 
Marx, species being is our essential human nature. 
 
                                                 
21
 As noted earlier, the title of this early work has also been translated as the Contribution to the Critique of 
Hegel‟s Philosophy of Law (1975b [1843]). 
22
 As noted by Dupré in footnote 19 above, Marx‟s interpretation of Hegel in this way is one “which Hegel 
would never admit” (Dupré, 1966: 94). However, Dupré also notes that Marx‟s misrepresentation does not 
invalidate his main criticism, that the State Hegel idealises, as universalist and individualist, is asocial in 
nature and therefore still a State that alienates people from their actual material social lives (97-108). 
23
 Dupré (1966) tells us that it was shortly after working on his (unfinished) Critique of Hegel‟s Doctrine of 
the State, that Marx came into contact with French Communists and with Friedrich Engels. This contact led 
Marx to conclude that “philosophy is dependent on certain social-economic conditions for its practical 
realization … [and] … that the laws which rule an economic system escape all human control” (Dupré, 
1966: 120). Thus, “[s]ocial reforms cannot be achieved without cutting out the very roots of the social evil, 
the existing political economy” (120) and social revolution “is the only way to achieve social justice” 
(112). From this position, we receive Marx‟s famous thesis, “The philosophers have only interpreted the 
world, in various ways; the point is to change it” (Marx, 1968 [1845]: 662). From this time on, Marx‟s 
focus is on political economy and proletarian revolution. 
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The universality of man [sic] appears in practice precisely in the universality which makes all 
nature his inorganic body – both inasmuch as nature is (1) his direct means of life, and (2) the 
material, the object, and the instrument of his life‟s activity. Nature is man‟s inorganic body – 
nature, that is, in so far as it is not itself the human body. Man lives on nature – means that nature 
is his body, with which he must remain in continuous interchange if he is not to die. That man‟s 
physical and spiritual life is linked to nature means simply that nature is linked to itself, for man is 
part of nature (Marx, 1973 [1844]: 112). 
 
The key to Marx‟s understanding of species being is the interaction, the interactivity, the 
relationality between individuals and other individuals and between individuals and nature,
24
 
particularly a person‟s own creative, productive activity. When we engage in wage labour, in a 
capitalist system of commodity production, the worker, in producing objects which belong to 
another, is alienated from such activity. Where, as species being, we interact with and in nature to 
produce objects for ourselves in which our spontaneous creative activity is invested and realised, 
in wage labour, the objects we produce are for another and thus our activity is no longer our own. 
As such, we are alienated from ourselves, from others, from our own spontaneous, creative, 
productive activity in the objects of our production, and from the world around us. For Marx, to 
be alienated in all of these ways is to be estranged from our essential nature, our species being. 
This process is not simply a description of the mechanics of wage labour. It is also a description 
that reveals an effect. Through the alienation of labour, the worker is stripped of „essential‟ 
species being, and “therefore, he [sic] does affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel 
content but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his 
body and ruins his mind” (Marx, 1973: 110). As such, the worker is reduced to only feeling 
“freely active in … animal functions – eating, drinking, procreating” (111). What compounds the 
effect of a worker‟s mortification is the fact that wage labour is “not voluntary, but coerced; it is 
forced labor” (ibid). This shift in Marx‟s thinking towards a concern for the appalling social and 
economic conditions under which many people lived during the rapid expansion and 
intensification of industrial capitalism displaced his earlier (theoretical?) concern for the State. 
While he seems to have continued to view that State and its problems in terms he expressed 
earlier, they could only be attended to after the State itself was seized in the name of the 
proletariat and transformed in such a way that would bring about its disappearance. Only in that 
way could anyone bring about a situation in which people would be no longer alienated by 
capitalist production or by the abstract bureaucracy and real violence of a bourgeois state. 
 When Marx‟s 1844 Manuscripts came to light in the early twentieth century, they 
initiated intense debates about their validity and about their consistency with Marx‟s later, 
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 Here, the relation of species being to other individuals is understood to be with them as individuals and 
with them as part of nature. 
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„mature‟ economic and „scientific‟ work. Beyond such debates some used Marx‟s theory of 
alienation as a starting or reference point for different kinds of philosophical, political and social 
theory. After the publication of the 1844 Manuscripts, Marx‟s theory was elaborated and 
interpreted, to greater and (often) lesser degrees, along the lines that Marx himself set out. These 
interpretations often used theoretical tools and assumptions that had emerged since Marx wrote 
on the topic.
25
 For example, in Eros and Civilisation (1972), Herbert Marcuse discusses 
alienation from a Freudian perspective, in which the activity of species being is understood in 
terms of the libido (1972: 47-48). Erich Fromm draws on the 1844 Manuscripts to emphasise that 
Marx‟s work is “rooted in the humanist Western philosophical tradition” (Fromm, 1966: v) 
against materialist interpretations.
26
 Others, like Hannah Arendt, have engaged more critically 
with Marx‟s theory of alienation. Against Marx‟s emphasis on productive labour as the essential 
activity of species being, Arendt argues for a broader understanding of the „human condition‟ as 
Vita Activa, which includes labour but also “work, and action” (1958: 7).27 From a different 
perspective again, in History and Class Consciousness (1971 [1922]), Georg Lukács‟ theorisation 
of class consciousness and false consciousness via a (Hegelian) study of Marx‟s concept of 
reification often mirrors Marx‟s theorisation of alienation (the writings of which had not been 
published at the time Lukács was writing). These theories generally follow Marx‟s assumptions 
with regard to economics and the notion of species being. They are primarily concerned with the 
effect on the worker of the material conditions under capitalism, and alienation is considered 
important in relation to the abolition of those conditions. The problems of the State can only be 
addressed, and its ultimate disappearance can only be arranged, after the material conditions of 
capitalism have been attended to. Effectively then, Marx‟s turn towards political economy (and 
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 There has been, for instance, some discussion of alienation in relation to existentialist philosophy but 
Richard Schacht argues that if any link between existentialism and alienation has any justification “it is not 
to be found in the fact that all or most of the principal writers associated with existentialism make 
extensive use of the term; for they do not. It is to be found, if anywhere, in the fact that some influential 
existentialists do speak of it; and in the further fact that certain of the phenomena discussed by others lend 
themselves sufficiently readily to characterization in terms of „alienation‟ to enable such characterizations 
to catch on. Insofar as the term is associated with the separation or isolation of the individual from nature 
(or the world), society, and other people, however, its use is completely unrelated even to the ways in 
which it is used by Heidegger, Sartre, and Tillich” (Schacht, 1970: 200). See also Raymond Aron‟s 
Progress and Disillusion (1972: 167-196) for a slightly different reading of the theoretical association 
between existentialism and thought on alienation. 
26
 Discussions of Marx‟s theory of alienation abound. In addition to those already cited, the following 
works are either dedicated to the concept of alienation or include useful discussion of the topic. See 
Althusser (2005 [1969]), Avineri (1971), Bologh (1979), Kolakowski (1978), Lefebvre (1968), Mandel and 
Novack (1973), Marcuse (1969), Mészáros (1970) and Ollman (1975). 
27
 In The Human Condition (1958), Arendt distinguishes between „labour‟ and „work‟ in her 
characterisation of Vita Activa. She argues against a human condition which is characterised as the “labor 
of … bodies” (136) which must do so purely because they are “enslaved by necessity” (83). Instead she 
favours the creativity of “the work of our hands … [of] … homo faber… which labors and „mixes with‟ – 
fabricates the sheer unending variety of things whose sum total constitutes the human artifice” (136). 
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political activism) and away from the theory of the State,
28
 is also a turn away from a critique of 
the State (particularly with regard to the problem of alienation as allegiance to the State). This 
problem remains one which can be understood within the context of the role of ideology. 
Additionally, what is missing from Marx‟s work on the alienation of labour is the development of 
the theory in terms of the part alienation plays in garnering the cooperation of workers (as 
citizens) to the State. In terms of the capitalist state, this allegiance is not merely transmitted and 
instilled through ideology, and forced. It is also bought, or extorted through debt. The fact 
remains that Marx did not pursue such lines of thought very far. However, if we return to the 
work of Althusser, we can glean some idea of what such a pursuit might have offered. 
In Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (1969), Louis Althusser advances a theory 
of ideology which in many ways continues the work of Marx‟s early critique of the Hegelian 
State. Althusser understands ideology as that which “represents the imaginary relationship of 
individuals to their real conditions of existence” (1969: 162). This imaginary relationship is 
realised in „ideological State apparatuses‟ (such as the church, the law, the arts, social morals and 
mores and political activities and associations allowed by the State) and ideology exists 
materially in these apparatuses in its practice and practices (166). Ideology, via the apparatuses 
interpellates
29
 and constitutes subjects as free, so that they may in good conscience choose their 
subjection. As such “all ideology has the function (which defines it) of „constituting‟ concrete 
individuals as subjects” (171). For Althusser, Marx‟s discussion of alienation is flawed with 
regard to the thesis that alienation is caused by material conditions in which the worker‟s species 
being is denied. Althusser holds rather that, it is not simply the conditions themselves that set up 
the phenomenon of alienation, but the worker‟s imaginary relationship to those conditions which 
is in turn set up through ideology – that is, the “imaginary representation of the real world” 
(164).
30
 As such,  
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 Marx did, however, continue to critique and analyse the State in his political and historical writings on 
existing states. See, for example, his writings on Britain and British India, collected in Surveys from Exile 
(1977).  
29
 In a famous passage, Althusser explains that “ideology „acts‟ or „functions‟  in such a way that it 
„recruits‟ subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or „transforms‟ the individuals into subjects 
(it transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have called interpellation or hailing, and 
which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: „Hey 
you there!‟ Assuming that the theoretical scene I have imagined takes place in the street, the hailed 
individual will turn round. By this mere one-hundred-and-eighty-degree physical conversion, he [sic] 
becomes a subject. Why? Because he has recognized that the hail was „really‟ addressed to him, and that „it 
was really him who was hailed‟ (and not someone else) … And yet it is a strange phenomenon, and one 
which cannot be explained solely by „guilt feelings‟, despite the large numbers who „have something on 
their consciences‟ (Althusser, 1969: 174). Althusser adds a footnote with regard to the hailing of the (state 
apparatus of the) police. “Hailing as an everyday practice subject to a precise ritual takes quite a „special‟ 
form in the policeman‟s [sic] practice of „hailing‟ which concerns the hailing of „suspects‟” (1969: 174). 
30
 As we shall see in Chapter Five (page 117), this understanding of alienation is similar to that of 
Cornelius Castoriadis. See The Imaginary Institution of Society (1987: 101-114). 
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all ideology represents in its imaginary distortion not the existing relations of production (and the 
other relations that derive from them) but above all the (imaginary) relationship of individuals to 
the relations of production and the relations that derive from them. What is represented in 
ideology is therefore not the system of the real relations which govern the existence of individual, 
but the imaginary relation of those individuals to the real relations in which they live (164-165). 
 
The point of Althusser‟s distinction here goes to a discussion of the function of ideology. He 
argues that its function is related to the “existence of a small number of cynical men who base 
their domination and exploitation of the „people‟ on a falsified representation of the world which 
they have imagined in order to enslave other minds by dominating their imaginations” (163). So, 
rather than, like Marx in the 1844 Manuscripts, define the cause of alienation as objective 
material conditions, Althusser sheets home responsibility for this to the “Priests and Despots” 
who control the State (163). Ideology exists because the State needs subjects to give their 
allegiance to it, to subject themselves to its control. It is the Rousseauian/Hegelian strategy 
which, as Judith Butler describes in her comments on Hegel‟s Phenomenology of Spirit, 
culminates in “the resolution of freedom into self-enslavement” (Butler, 1997: 31). As such, we 
must understand the alienation of labour as an aspect of the ongoing strategy of securing the 
obedience and allegiance of the population to the State. 
 
 
 Alienation, anomie and the State 
 
As we have seen – with the exception of Althusser31 – much of the development and 
discussion of alienation following Marx has said little about it in relation to people‟s allegiance to 
the State. Interestingly, however, some sociological discussion covers many of the themes Marx 
raised in relation to alienation as a way of understanding how more or less well certain 
individuals and groups function in society and in relation to the State. In this context, alienation 
is not understood as an estrangement from an essential self through a coerced involvement (out of 
the necessity to survive in a capitalist society) in wage labour. Alienation, as it is figured in 
works of sociology, refers to a disjunction between people‟s activities, practices and expectations 
and the cultural, and functional norms of a society. Associated with this understanding of 
alienation is the concept of anomie. 
Émile Durkheim‟s concept of anomie is formulated in his works The Division of Labor in 
Society (1964 [1893]) and Suicide (1951 [1897]). It is understood by him there as a phenomenon 
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 It should be noted here that Nicos Poulantzas is another who has discussed alienation in relation to 
people‟s allegiance to the State. See his Political Power and Social Classes (1973), particularly the Chapter 
„The Capitalist State and Ideologies‟ (195-224). See also Classes in Contemporary Capitalism (1975) and 
State, Power, Socialism (2000). 
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associated with a disintegration of the norms regulating society and individual behaviour. 
Durkheim‟s thesis was that when the organs of society (individuals and groups) are not regulated 
in such a way as to engender contiguous mutual dependence – organic solidarity – a state of 
anomie arises (Durkheim, 1964: 368).
32
 Durkheim employs the analogy of the human body to 
society to underpin his investigation of how society achieves, to a greater or lesser extent, this 
organic solidarity.
33
 As such Durkheim understands the smooth (or conversely, the anomic) 
functioning of society in terms of the actions of organic groups and individuals according to 
norms. In Suicide, this thesis is elucidated by discussing the increase in suicide rates in societies 
in which individuals are less integrated into the social groups to which they belong, and the 
overall social structure. For Durkheim, the more cohesive a society is – that is, the more 
integrated its people are in terms of norms, values, beliefs and attitudes – the less anomic it is. It 
is in this sense that we note some convergence between Marx‟s theory of alienation and anomie, 
as both are defined with reference to a destructive disjuncture between an individual‟s existence 
and the material conditions of that existence. However where Marx‟s primary concern is for the 
individual‟s exploitation, Durkheim‟s concern is a more detached attempt to understand modern 
society. Ultimately Durkheim‟s work seems oriented towards the question of how the organs of 
society can be harmonised in the interests of the whole, while, on the other hand, Marx‟s is 
oriented towards the transformation of society to one in which the exploitation of workers (for 
example) no longer occurs and thus is no longer a social fact of life, or a function of social life, 
which a worker must learn to cope with. 
Durkheim‟s concept of anomie was later taken up by Robert Merton, who defined it as “a 
breakdown in the cultural structure, occurring particularly between the cultural norms and goals 
and the socially structured capacities of members of the group to act in accord with them” 
(Merton, 1968: 216).
34
 Merton‟s approach came to be closely identified with the sociological 
perspective of functionalism which attempts to explain and understand social activity in relation 
to the effect that activity has on a larger social whole such as an institution (Abercrombie et al, 
1986: 93). An institution in this context is understood as a “plurality of interrelated role patterns” 
(Abraham, 1977: 411). Functionalism, like any perspective, has been contested and criticised 
from both within and without sociology,
35
 with critiques often referring to its teleological 
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 Durkheim writes, “[I]f the division of labor does not produce solidarity … it is because the relations of 
the organs are not regulated, because they are in a state of anomy” (Durkheim, 1964: 368). 
33
 In one place Durkheim writes, “[if] we again borrow biological terminology … we may say that … [the 
rules of administrative law] … determine the way in which the cerebro-spinal system of the social 
organism functions. This system, in current parlance, is designated by the name, State” (1964: 219). 
34
 Giddens describes Merton‟s understanding as follows: “Anomie, specifically, derives from a tension 
between a set of normative values in society and the structure within which agents seek to realize those 
values” (Giddens, 1990: 98). 
35
 For example, Abraham writes that “[f]unctionalism in … dealing with „institutions‟ as socio-
psychological concepts, dispenses with all problems about historical origins and processes of change. In 
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assumptions (Abercrombie et al, 1986: 93; Scruton, 1982: 183-184). As such, and for the 
purposes of this thesis, we can note the affinity of the functionalist perspective with Hegelian 
political philosophy, in which citizens, educated through ethical institutions, develop towards 
unity with the State. Callinicos is enlightening in his examination and critique of the relationship 
of functionalist sociology to Hegel‟s teleology of the State (1989: 32-35, 62-65). In particular, he 
notes the influence of Hegel on the thought of Talcott Parsons.
36
 
The sociological interest in alienation is summarised in Melvin Seeman‟s famous essay 
„On the Meaning of Alienation‟ (1959). In it, he identifies five different (but not unrelated) 
meanings of alienation from a sociological perspective. Briefly, these meanings are: 
powerlessness, which is associated with an individual‟s lack of control over the course of their 
life (784-785); meaninglessness, which is associated with a lack of substantial reference points 
for making decisions, which in turn is the result of a disjunction between the rational instrumental 
orientation of large societies and a more culturally embedded rational orientation (786); 
normlessness, which is associated with the Durkheimian notion of anomie (787-788); isolation, 
which is associated with a “detachment … from popular cultural standards” (788) and; self-
estrangement, which is understood as “the degree of dependence of the given behaviour upon 
anticipated future rewards” (790). This last meaning is an attempt to conceptualise the alienation 
of an individual, for example in the labour process, in a way in which the “critical, polemic 
element” is removed (784).37 This tendency seems to be common to all of the sociological 
perspectives on alienation and anomie surveyed here. These studies only aim to measure 
alienation
38
 and to define and understand the cause and effect of alienation. While this approach 
is unproblematic in itself, its implications should be noted. Generally, this approach, being as it is 
about the coherence and cohesion of the „social structure‟, ultimately works in the service of the 
State.
39
 The social structure and the State comes first and people can avoid anomie by calibrating 
their activities and expectations to the norms of society – and the State. The State‟s stability is 
served by a lack of anomie, by a society in which members of the population happily adopt roles 
                                                                                                                                                 
this respect functionalism represents a distinct conservative trend in thought. Everything which can be 
shown to be „functional‟ is ipso facto essential and therefore good” (Abraham, 1977: 403). 
36
 Callinicos writes that “the theory of modernization in the functionalist and evolutionist form which 
Parsons gave it, is implicitly teleological, treating the most „developed‟ existing society, the United States, 
as the goal towards which, not simply its counterparts elsewhere in the Western bloc, but also the „less 
developed‟ societies of the Third World will increasingly tend” (1989: 35). Callinicos also cites Parsons, 
who “described „German idealism as it passed from Hegel through Marx to Weber‟ as „[p]erhaps the most 
influential‟ source of his view of modernity” (Parsons, 1971: 1, cited in Callinicos, 1989: 183n). 
37
 Seeman particularly associates this critical, polemic approach with the “Marxian tradition” (1959: 784). 
38
 For example, Robert Blauner‟s analysis focusses on the various social, organisational and physical 
conditions of workplaces as a measure of the levels of alienation (Blauner, 1967). 
39
 In relation to this claim, it is worth noting the increase after World War Two in sociological research 
conducted by U.S. Defence Department, and by a post war industry looking to have research that would 
“confirm it in its own good judgement” (Abraham, 1977: 406). This is not put forward here as evidence of 
collusion between sociologists and those in power, but more as an observation about the ready-made utility 
of such research for those interested in maintaining a grip on power. 
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which are functional in the social structure (rather than dysfunctional). The concepts that emerge 
out of Merton‟s work (such as „deviance‟, „delinquency‟, „rebellion‟, „conformity‟, „innovation‟, 
„ritualistic adaptation‟, and „retreatism‟), for example, define the individual‟s cohesion or lack 
thereof with the social structure (Merton, 1968: 175-248). In short, the functionalist sociological 
perspective, in its deployment of the concepts of alienation and anomie, can be understood as an 
aspect of what Foucault calls „governmentality‟. 
 
 
 From convention to governmentality 
 
 At this stage then, we have finally returned to Foucault‟s understanding of modern 
politics as „governmentality‟, under which populations are managed, directed and organised in 
the interests of a state‟s expansion, self-legitimation and self-preservation. At the end of Chapter 
Two, I summarised this element of Foucault‟s work and argued that it offers a far more plausible 
explanation of obedience and allegiance to sovereign „authority‟ than theories associated with the 
contract suite. However, once again, the acceptance of „governmentality‟ as an explanation is all 
well and good – but, so what? How has this helped us to answer the question: What kind of 
politics, or what kind of „being together‟, is possible without the State – which monopolises 
politics? In order to begin to get beyond the discussion of the problem of the State‟s monopoly on 
politics and the explanation of the maintenance of that monopoly, it is appropriate at this point to 
draw together the threads of the ideas of those thinkers which I have found to support a 
governmentalist explanation of allegiance to the State. The idea that underpins governmentality is 
that of convention. As this thesis has progressed, themes eventually have been discussed in terms 
of situating them in relation to the kinds of conventions which Hume refers to in his explanation 
of allegiance.
 40
 
 In Chapter One, as part of a discussion about the problem of the intransigent presence of 
the State, we first examined the development of philosophical explanations of that presence. 
Some of these argue for the necessity of that presence. We found that the emergence of the 
modern state was accompanied by the development of theories which effectively „stood in‟ for 
traditional justifications for the obedience of the many to a sovereign one or few. These 
traditional justifications were religious in nature and based on the notion of the divine right of 
kings. The work of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau is seen in this context, as thought which 
founded the secular „stand in‟ – in the form of what I have referred to as the contract suite. We 
                                                 
40
 At this point it is appropriate to note that the Humean notions of „convention‟ and „government‟ and 
Foucault‟s understanding of „governmentality‟ have been brought together as a way, not just of explaining 
people‟s allegiance to the State, but also as „names‟ and descriptions of the workings of the actual State. In 
later chapters, these ideas will be further elucidated in discussions of and in reference to what Deleuze and 
Guattari call the „State-form‟.  
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then looked at Hume and Spinoza, whose work dismisses the notion of an originary philosophical 
foundation for sovereignty. The work of Schmitt, Benjamin and Derrida then helped to elucidate 
the State‟s actual foundation and ongoing maintenance in force and violence. Anarchist 
philosophy was then discussed in terms of its recognition and response to the State‟s 
philosophical illegitimacy and the effects of its ongoing violence and force on real people. The 
concluding discussion of liberalism and the liberal state gives liberal philosophy (particularly that 
of J. S. Mill) some credit for softening the blows of the State. In that sense, liberalism is included 
in any explanation of the State‟s intransigence. That is, the success of liberalism is also 
responsible for an impasse in political philosophy – particularly with regard to the (liberal) 
contention that the liberal state is the best possible political arrangement that can be managed – 
where the liberal state – as much because of the „normality it has achieved provides it with a 
powerful legitimacy – is as good as it gets. For the purposes of this thesis, the contention is that 
the liberal State, regardless of its relative success, is still not „good enough‟. Or, to put it in a 
different way, regardless of the „goodness‟ or „badness‟ of the liberal State, it entrenches the 
State‟s monopoly on politics and closes down the imagination of different political possibilities, 
such as politics without the State. 
 In Chapter Two, we examined later arguments around the State and its necessity. These 
arguments are not so much about establishing an originary foundation for the State (such as the 
contract) but about its historical and/or teleological necessity. Such reasoning, I contend, has 
added to the dampening effect of liberalism on political theory, particularly on any discussion of 
the possibility of politics without the State. As such, we looked at theories of the state which 
argue, through Kant, Hegel and Marx, that the State is necessary in terms of its place at the apex 
of the teleological scheme of the progress of Reason and History. We then returned to Hume, 
where I argued that his conventions can be seen to underpin a more plausible alternative 
explanation for allegiance to sovereignty and the presence of the State than the teleological 
theories of Kant, Hegel and their followers. 
 At this point though, we encountered what has become a familiar question so far in this 
thesis: So what? That convention better explains the intransigent presence of the State does not 
then mean that it will disappear in a puff of smoke (or that the State will simply surrender its 
Hegelian mirrors). Richard Rorty, for example, provides strong arguments to the point that the 
inherently slow and steady gradualism of conventions (for example) is an ample (if contingent) 
„foundation‟ for the liberal State. As such, the success of the rich constitutional liberal 
democracies (as Rorty describes them) can be partly attributed to the conventional, institutional 
development of the contract suite. The lack of an originary foundation is no reason to throw them 
away. That is, on the basis of our (evidentiary) experience of liberal democratic gradualism, we 
have reason enough to argue for its continuation as the best form of political organisation 
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possible. However, while Rorty‟s arguments are persuasive, they also imply an acceptance of the 
less „successful‟ aspects of the State on people and on politics. This thesis does not.  
 The work of Chantal Mouffe was then drawn upon to discuss the limits of political 
liberalism, as a way of understanding its dampening effect on political thought. In the wake of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellites, the predominance of political liberalism in thought 
and in practice has led some to announce the „end of politics‟. Mouffe puts forward an alternative 
to political liberalism – agonistic radical democracy – which takes into account the contested 
nature of „the political‟ and the contradictions between liberalism and democracy (as elucidated 
by Carl Schmitt). Ultimately, however, Mouffe‟s agonism needs a State as the location of this 
politics. And still, even a stable liberal State struggles to manage these contradictions, for, as 
Benjamin, Arendt and Agamben have shown, they are at the root of many of the worst atrocities 
in history. The final section of Chapter Two discusses more closely the role of conventions in the 
intransigence of the State and its institutions (such as bureaucracy) before introducing the 
Foucauldian notion of governmentality. 
 In this, Chapter Three, we have explored the persistence of the State from this 
governmentalist perspective. A trajectory has been traced from Rousseau to Hegel to Marx and 
Althusser, through which it is argued that populations are called (interpellated) to convene in 
allegiance to the State and through which the State acquires a „kind of‟ transcendence. In 
Rousseau‟s Social Contract we saw how – in the absence of the traditional invocation of the 
divine right – he turned to a civil religion (ideology) to appropriate control over those 
conventions which maintain allegiance to sovereign authority. In Hegel we saw how the 
development of Rousseau‟s total alienation – as the self-consciousness‟s unification with Spirit in 
the Absolute Idea – is deployed in his political philosophy as the means of securing the allegiance 
and obedience of citizens. In Marx, we found a damning analysis of Hegel‟s State, but then that 
his theory of alienated labour seems to be something of a diversion from the trajectory of that 
earlier critique. Nevertheless, while it could be argued that Marx lets the State off the hook, the 
theory of alienated labour still helps us to understand the worker‟s allegiance to the object of her 
domination and the actual mortifying experience of that domination. Finally, this understanding 
of alienation as allegiance is drawn out as Althusser (arguably picking up from where Marx‟s 
critique of Hegel leaves off) lays out his theory of ideology, which I think also completes his 
earlier analysis of Rousseau‟s „flight forward‟.  
 Interestingly, we finally saw how Marx‟s diversion can also be seen to have facilitated a 
„re-inversion‟ by the sociological theorisation of anomie and alienation. Here we can once again 
detect a governmentalist tendency, where an individual‟s deviance from social norms (or 
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conventions),
41
 and the experience of that deviance, is studied in terms of its impact on the 
smooth functioning and ongoing preservation of the social structure (and ultimately, the State). 
 
 
 The State needs ‘us’ to be an ‘I’ 
 
 The story told in the previous section, which is the story so far told in this thesis, has 
been about the intransigent presence of the State and the possibility of politics without it. The 
arguments between proponents and opponents of the State‟s necessity, and ultimately between 
explanations of allegiance to sovereignty based on the contract suite or, based on conventions, 
have so far skirted around close discussion of the place of the individual in the political 
community. That is, I have discussed liberalism, but not liberty. I have often referred to the 
impact of the State upon individuals, but not to what may or may not be possible for an 
individual to do in response. To a large degree, the success of the contract suite is due to the 
contention that an individual can do something in response to the State, that the individual can 
act politically. This is because an individual in a society explained by the contract suite is free, 
and, as such, can both give her allegiance to authority and take action to usurp it. Conversely, to 
describe the relationship between individuals and the State as simply conventional, where an 
individual‟s behaviour is shaped and guided by the irresistible hand of societal conventions, 
which are consolidated and controlled as ideology in today‟s mass societies, does not present a 
pretty picture. It is a picture that is in many ways discordant with a widespread (western) belief in 
individual freedom. We are taught that we are free. Nevertheless, if an explanation of political 
allegiance in terms of conventions turns out to be more plausible, what of this freedom? Does it 
simply become nothing more than an ideological ruse (as Althusser would have it)?
42
  
 Regardless then, of whether or not the notion of freedom, or autonomy, or liberty is 
understood as real, or as a ruse, all of the theories we have encountered so far have been involved 
in grappling with it. It has been practically compulsory for political philosophers to address 
freedom in some way. Even when Althusser writes of subjects being constituted as „free‟ through 
ideology, he is offering an explanation for what could at least be described as the (imaginary) 
experience of it. Whether, like Hegel, we understand freedom as the self-consciousness‟s 
divestiture of itself to Spirit, or, like Butler, as a resolution into self-enslavement, it is addressed. 
As such, freedom is typically discussed in terms of its conceptual opposites, such as freedom and 
slavery, autonomy and heteronomy. Or it is discussed in terms of the physical manifestations in 
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 When Durkheim describes norms, or a „body of rules‟, as “the definite form which spontaneously 
established relations between social functions take in the course of time” (Durkheim, 1964: 368), we 
recognise a similarity to a Humean description of the development of convention. 
42
 See Althusser‟s essay, „The Underground Current of the Materialism of the Encounter‟ (2006: 173). 
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the world, such as the individual and society, the citizen and the State, subject and sovereign. 
Like the State, the concept of freedom and the discussion of it is a modern one. Also, like the 
State, it has a history. So, I too am compelled to attempt a discussion of the notion of freedom, 
or, as I will mainly refer to it, autonomy. This discussion will resemble my discussion of the 
State in that it will identify it as a problem. In later chapters it will become clear that the question 
of the possibility of politics without the State is increasingly problematised by the question about 
the possibility of politics without freedom. It is in this sense that autonomy is a problem. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
FREEDOM FROM POLITICS 
For the subsistence of the State 
 
  
What political reflection tried to achieve was, to a large extent, to find the means of eliminating 
politics, if by the latter we understand a type of practice which puts into question the meaning of 
social structures and institutions and makes it dependent on the outcome of contingent strategic 
moves … For Christianity the communal order is instituted by God, and escapes the contingency 
of any purely human construction. For Hobbes, the covenant that surrenders all sovereignty to the 
ruler sanctions the death of politics. For liberalism … the plurality of the starting point is offset by 
social mechanisms which escape all politico-strategic control (Laclau, 1996: 65-66). 
 
 At the end of the previous chapter, I had come to argue that the intransigent presence of 
the State is largely maintained through the consolidation of conventions by theoretical strategies 
and organisational practices that operate to secure the allegiance of subjects. These strategies and 
practices serve to perpetuate an „Hegelian inversion‟ in which the actual material lives of people 
are subsumed under the abstract and rationalising principles of the State. Bureaucratic rationality 
effectively organises people into either official or unofficial State functionaries. Through this 
functional activity the State takes on a normality that operates as a de facto legitimation of its 
„transcendent‟ presence. Ideology both naturalises and juridically constitutes the State. This 
occurs under the concepts of the contract suite, under the „civil religion‟ of national ideologies 
and under State institutions (such as education systems) which all capture and direct the social 
conventions of a „People‟. These practices and strategies also serve to preserve the notion of 
individual autonomy (or freedom). However, in this thesis‟ understanding, implicit in the story 
told about the State is the suggestion that the idea of individual political autonomy may be 
nothing more than a ruse. Or, at least, it was suggested that given the ideological and 
governmentalist perspectives of Althusser and Foucault, the notion of autonomy is nothing more 
than a phraseological quirk that happens to work well with regard to the State‟s need for the 
allegiance of subjects. As such, the idea that a subject has it within her power to oppose or resist 
the State, its institutions and its reason for being, is cast into serious doubt. So, autonomy is a 
problem. 
It would seem to make simple common sense to say that the State needs us. However, to 
say that the State needs us to be sovereign individuals in order to preserve its intransigent and 
„transcendent‟ presence – that it needs us to be free so that it can more efficiently enslave us – is 
a little more problematic. In this Chapter I will look closely at the theorisation of the individual 
subject and how this theorisation is intertwined with the intransigence of the State. As such, this 
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examination – as part of an inquiry into the possibility of politics without the State – is also about 
beginning to ask about the possibility of politics without the subject. 
Given what we have discussed above, one of the problems with autonomy is that, at least 
in relation to our conventional notions of politics, it simply might not exist. So, autonomy is a 
problem because this politics assumes a relationship between the individual and a community 
(often as a State) in which the individual gives allegiance and obeys. It is a relationship of 
inseparable attachment and engagement with a political community.
1
 Further, according to this 
understanding of politics, the individual and the notion of an individual‟s autonomy has been 
very much a question about degrees of detachment from the world, whether that be the world of 
the senses or of our social and physical worlds. The philosophical theorisation of freedom and 
autonomy has thus produced another suite of stories about finding a balance between rational 
detachment and political, ethical and social engagement. The question for this chapter then is 
about whether our received conceptions of autonomy effectively operate as freedom from 
politics, the freedom – as detachment – from any political engagement or activity? If this is true, 
the traditional idea of freedom is more like a ban, an exclusion from political participation in a 
community. 
 
 
Freedom from the senses 
 
I have been habituated these bygone days to detach my mind from my senses  
(Descartes, 1977 [1641]: 111). 
 
When René Descartes detached his mind from his senses, in his pursuit of clear and 
distinct knowledge, it was in order to ensure that he was not deceived by them. When he arrived 
at the body-less, worldless cogito, he set the parameters for modern individual identity.
2
  
Descartes, of course, was not attempting here to set out a definition or idea of autonomy (for he 
believed that, as a thinking thing, he was dependent on God), but to develop an epistemological 
method. His act of detachment, as an act of „screening out‟ the world, a world which included his 
own body, as well as received beliefs and habits of thought, prepared the ground on which later 
philosophers would build.  
                                                 
1
 It is worth noting here that Merleau-Ponty‟s understanding of political activity and freedom is that they 
are formed and exercised through our inextricable (phenomenological) involvement with the world and 
with our particular social and political „histories‟. See his Phenomenology of Perception (1994: 439-440, 
444-447 & 453-456). This perspective is also somewhat in keeping with the understanding of politics set 
out in the Introduction, which begins as a „mode of being together, discussing together and deciding 
together‟. However, as we will see in a later discussion of Jean-Luc Nancy‟s political thought (see pages 
162-164), the emphasis of phenomenological thought on (either singular or plural) Being (as either Dasein 
or Mitsein) and, as such, on the individual, is problematic for this thesis‟ figuring of „raw politics‟. 
2
 See Descartes‟ Meditations (1977 [1641]), and particularly Meditations I and II (79-94). 
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The philosopher who built the most imposing and influential edifice on this ground was 
Immanuel Kant. His work is a comprehensive and systematic expression of those ideas and ideals 
– so closely associated with the Enlightenment – of reason and rationality, morals, freedom, 
rights, civil society and political peace. This work continues to be a foundation for the 
development of these ideas and ideals and it is almost impossible to find a concept of autonomy 
that is not in some way Kantian. It seems that, even if a theory is not openly or admittedly 
Kantian, Kant so comprehensively covered the ideas and their possible implications and 
development in various fields that even those theories which aim to distance themselves from 
Kant seem somehow dependent, or at least affected by the pull of „Kantian gravity‟. While it is 
not the task here to give a full account of Kant‟s work, a brief survey is appropriate, with a view 
to gaining an understanding of the place of his work in relation to the problem of autonomy, with 
which we are presently concerned.  
For Kant, the idea, the concept of autonomy is especially important in relation to his 
moral theory. Kant recognised the problematic consequences for moral decision-making that are 
implicit in the causal determinism of empiricism. Basically these problems are encapsulated by 
the question: If everything, including our actions and decisions, has natural causes, how can one 
make assertions about what one ought to do? In order to make such assertions, the actual 
existence of autonomy – and a bearer of that autonomy – is necessary. Kant elaborates his moral 
philosophy in the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (1966 [1785]), but his understanding 
of autonomy, or freedom, was developed earlier. 
In the Critique of Pure Reason (1988 [1787]) Kant conducts a “trial whether it be not 
possible safely to conduct reason between [the] two rocks” of Humean scepticism and Cartesian 
rationalism (Kant, 1988: 92).
3
 In the performance of this task, Kant finds that freedom is “a 
faculty of the spontaneous origination of a state; the causality of which, therefore, is not 
subordinated to another cause determining it in time” and that “Freedom, in the practical sense, 
is the independence of the will of coercion by sensuous impulses” (317). Kant makes clear there 
that his intention is not to “prove the actual existence of freedom” (329) but to demonstrate the 
possibility of freedom in harmony with the Universal Law of Natural Necessity, to show how 
freedom and nature are not necessarily opposed (319-330). 
In the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (1966) Kant deploys this notion of 
freedom in his elaboration of the way in which the Autonomy of the Will and the Law of Reason 
operate in the practice of moral decision-making. Autonomy, as he understands it, is primarily a 
characteristic of the will. As such, we are autonomous when we choose only “in such a way that 
                                                 
3
 In his Preface to the First Edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant describes his task as “a critical 
inquiry into the faculty of reason, with reference to the cognitions to which it strives to attain without the 
aid of experience” and “to answer the question how far reason can go, without the material presented and 
the aid furnished by experience” (Kant, 1988: 3, 4). 
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in the same volition the maxims of your choice are also present as universal law” (Kant, 1966: 
101). 
 
By this principle all maxims are repudiated which cannot accord with the will‟s own enactment of 
universal law. The will is therefore not merely subject to the law, but it is so subject that it must 
be considered as also making the law for itself and precisely on this account as first of all subject 
to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author) (Kant, 1966: 93).
4
 
 
The Autonomy of the Will makes possible the rational principle by which we should make moral 
decisions. This is Kant‟s „Categorical Imperative‟, which stipulates that “I ought never to act 
except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law” (67). 
These rational principles are of the intelligible world and are impervious to the influence of 
volitions of the sensible world, such as desires, emotions, other people and social mores. These 
volitions are of the heteronomous will.
5
 So autonomy, in a Kantian sense, is being able to decide 
and act without being influenced by these „external‟ factors. This is clearly similar to his 
definition, cited above, of “Freedom, in the practical sense” in the Critique of Pure Reason 
(1988: 317).  
Kantian autonomy, then, is something that enables moral decision-making. And it is 
something that happens when we, like Descartes, „detach our minds from our senses‟. Although 
Kant gives a place to the senses,
6
 through which we engage with the world, autonomy remains 
firmly in the intellect. This autonomy, which is akin to the conceptualisation of moral 
responsibility and action according to the „golden rule‟7 is, paradoxically, not something that we 
would recognise as our contemporary notion of „freedom‟, which is largely associated with the 
principles of political liberty developed and expressed by John Stuart Mill. Nor, in this context, is 
the question of the relationship between an individual and the political community part of Kant‟s 
inquiry. Here we are confronted with part of the problem of autonomy as conceived by this 
thesis. As we have seen, Kant‟s overall intention was to conduct an inquiry in response to the 
                                                 
4
 We recognise here the moral aspect of Rousseau‟s conceptualisation of total alienation which we 
discussed in Chapter Three. See pages 67-71. 
5
 “If the will seeks the law that is to determine it anywhere else than in the fitness of its maxims for its own 
making of universal law – if therefore in going beyond itself it seeks the law in the character of any of its 
objects – the result is always heteronomy.” (Kant, 1966: 102) 
6
 Kant writes that “if we take away by degrees from our conceptions of a body all that can be referred to 
mere sensuous experience – colour, hardness or softness, weight, even impenetrability – the body will then 
vanish; but the space which it occupied still remains, and this it is utterly impossible to annihilate in 
thought” (Kant, 1988: 27). Wilkerson describes Kant‟s position here in another way: “[K]nowledge claims 
can only be made about objects that could in principle yield intuitions or perceptions” (Wilkerson, 1976: 
137). 
7
 The golden rule “designates a guide to conduct thought fundamental in most major and religious and 
moral traditions. It has been formulated either positively as an injunction to „do unto others as you would 
have them do unto you‟ (Matthew 7: 12); or negatively, urging that you not do to others what you would 
not wish them to do to you” (Honderich, 1995:  321).  
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epistemological impasse between rationalism and empiricism. In the context of that inquiry, he 
also aimed to steer morals to the safe haven of reason (or, to make reason a safe haven for 
morals). Although our received ideas of rational action are at least partly derived from Kant‟s, his 
notion of autonomy is derived from the asking of different questions. Thus autonomy has been 
conceived as a state, an intellectual activity, disembodied, still, timeless, uncaused by and 
separate from nature. This conceptualisation, as disengaged from the world, seems to be of little 
help with regard to questions of politics (with or without the State). 
So far we have discussed Kant‟s approach to autonomy from the perspective of his moral 
and epistemological questioning. Despite my characterisation of this autonomy as so detached 
from the world as to be of little use to questions of politics, Kant did attempt to bring his ideas to 
bear on such questions. This attempt came in the form of his essays, What is Enlightenment? 
(1980a [1784]), Perpetual Peace (1980c [1795]) and On the Common Saying: „This May be True 
in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice‟ (1987 [1793]). 
 
 
The Enlightenment context 
 
The men of the Enlightenment united on a vastly ambitious program, a program of secularism, 
humanity, cosmopolitanism, and freedom, above all, freedom in its many forms – freedom from 
arbitrary power, freedom of speech, freedom of trade, freedom to realize one‟s talents, freedom of 
aesthetic response, freedom, in a word, of moral man to make his own way in the world (Gay, 
1977: 3). 
 
The Enlightenment, understood as the advocacy of and movement towards intellectual 
autonomy, is the world in which Kant‟s autonomous rational will had to operate. He could not 
help but be influenced by this spirit and as such, Peter Gay notes that, in the essay, What is 
Enlightenment? (1980a [1784]), Kant “articulated what others had long suggested in their 
polemics” (Gay, 1977: 3). In this essay Kant characterises the Enlightenment as a milieu in which 
individuals can exercise their rational autonomy (if only they dare
8
) thus releasing themselves 
from “self-incurred tutelage” (Kant, 1980a: 3). 
 
Tutelage is man‟s inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. Self-
incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of resolution and 
                                                 
8
 In the text, Kant writes the Latin Sapere aude! (Kant, 1980: 3) which is translated into English as „Dare to 
know!‟ In a footnote, the translator of Kant‟s essay tells us that “[t]his was the motto adopted in 1736 by 
the Society of the Friends of Truth, an important circle in the German Enlightenment.” (Lewis White Beck 
in Kant, 1980: 3ff). 
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courage to use it without direction from another … „Have courage to use your own reason!‟ (Kant, 
1980a: 3). 
 
This courage is to be used as part of being an „enlightened‟ person, with regard to actions and 
opinions. However, just as soon as Kant asserts this rational maturity, he imposes limits on its 
exercise. This activity is to be carried out, for example, as a scholar, who “in the public use of his 
reason enjoys an unlimited freedom” (6). In other circumstances, such as a “civil post or office … 
members of the community must passively conduct themselves with an artificial unanimity, so 
that the government may direct them to public ends
9
 … Here argument is certainly not allowed – 
one must obey” (5). This obedience is given by the citizen on the understanding that over time, 
the laws which must currently be obeyed will progressively change – that the public use of reason 
will modify the laws to which one must submit. Here again we recognise a recurring theme: an 
explanation of the operations of society in terms of convention and a philosophical reading of, 
and attitude towards, convention. As we know, Kant prefers to understand this development as 
part of a teleological schema rather than, as Hume would have it, something rather more 
haphazard. 
Kant‟s recognition of the fact that the laws of society change over time is part of his 
argument that the creation of perpetual laws or compacts is unjustifiable and that “[a]n age 
cannot bind itself and ordain to put the succeeding one into such a condition that it cannot extend 
its … knowledge, purify itself of errors, and progress in general enlightenment. That would be a 
crime against humanity” (7) and is “absolutely forbidden” (8). In support of this position, we find 
arguments similar to those used in the Groundwork. Ultimately, the only law which is acceptable 
under the aegis of the Enlightenment is one which “the people could have imposed … on itself” 
(7). Additionally, “what a people may not decree for itself can even less be decreed for them by a 
monarch, for his law-giving authority rests on his uniting the general public will in his own” 
(8).
10
 Ultimately, while Kant recognises that political change happens and urges citizens to 
exercise their rational autonomy with daring, he thinks that this exercise should be constrained. 
This constraint is that one must exercise political autonomy in the same way one exercises moral 
autonomy. As such, the only place one can be free, is in the mind. It is in this sense that Kant‟s 
political thought comes close to that of John Stuart Mill‟s, who, in designating the “appropriate 
                                                 
9
 This proscription is in keeping with Foucault‟s „governmentalist‟ account of the relationships between 
populations and political authority. See Foucault (2007, 2004, 1988, 1984b, 1982, 1981, 1980 & 1978). 
10
 We find here, and in the essays Perpetual Peace (1980c) and On the Common Saying … (1987) another 
influence on Kant‟s thinking – that of Rousseau and the idea of the social contract. When Kant writes of 
the “general public will” (Kant, 1980: 8) and declares that in certain situations “one must obey” (5) we are 
hearing echoes of Rousseau‟s assertion that “whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained 
to do so by the whole body, which means nothing other than he shall be forced to be free” (Rousseau, 
2004: 19). As Peter Gay observes, by the time Kant wrote What is Enlightenment? in 1784, “the 
Enlightenment had done most of its work” (Gay, 1977: 3). 
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region of human liberty” (1971c: 75), also constrains free action largely to a free consciousness.11 
Kant‟s work thus gives expression to the Enlightenment tendency to reduce both thought and 
subjects to entities separated from the senses and other people, society. Here, with autonomy 
opposed, antithetical or inherently hostile to heteronomy, it must be subordinated to reason and 
law. The project of developing Kant‟s moral principles in the political, or public sphere, 
continues today. 
 
 
From detached minds to detached citizenry 
 
The Kantian approach is not limited to the nuances of individual moral decision-making. 
As we have seen, Kant himself attended to the task of extending it to the broader political sphere 
– into the relations between subjects and states. This approach has become something of a project 
for many contemporary thinkers. The work of Jürgen Habermas, in particular, has been 
concerned to apply the principles of Kantian rational decision-making to the workings of 
parliamentary democracies. 
For Habermas, following Kant,
12
 “[a]n autonomous will is one that is guided by practical 
reason. Freedom in general consists in the capacity to choose in accordance with maxims; but 
autonomy is the self-binding of the will by maxims we adopt on the basis of insight. Because it is 
mediated by reason, autonomy is not just one value alongside others” (Habermas, 2005: 99). The 
autonomy of a citizen for Habermas, however, is not simply of a kind derived directly from 
Kant‟s moral theory. For Habermas, Kant‟s theory does not take into account the fact that in 
autonomous moral deliberation, individuals are immersed in a lifeworld which is characterised by 
a discursive intersubjectivity. For Habermas, it is not possible to completely abstract our moral 
decisions to a rational autonomous will – away from other speaking and acting people. So what 
Habermas sets out to do is to figure a procedure under which participants in a discourse engage 
with each other according to rational autonomous principles. Under the conditions of these 
principles participants in an argumentative or deliberative discourse – simply due to the fact that 
they have entered into it – are compelled to presume that the claims of other participants to truth, 
validity, and intelligibility are made truthfully and according to reason. Further, in order for 
agreement to be reached, it is also assumed that any claim is open to dispute. Agreement would 
mean little without a claim being open and subject to appropriate scrutiny.
13
 In relation to 
                                                 
11
 See Chapter One, pages 31 and 32, footnotes 49 and 50. 
12
 Habermas writes that, in terms of the basis of moral and practical reason … “I cannot see any plausible 
alternative to the straightforward Kantian strategy” (Habermas, 2005: 99). 
13
 For more detail see Habermas‟ On the Pragmatics of Communication (1998), Theory of Communicative 
Action, Volume 1 (1991a) and Volume 2 (1987b), Communication and the Evolution of Society (1991b), 
and Knowledge and Human Interests (1972). 
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political, or civic, or legal autonomy, Habermas writes that “we must not take political autonomy 
as a mere copy of moral autonomy. Rather, norms of action branch out into moral and legal rules 
… [and thus] … moral and civic autonomy are co-original” (1996: 107).14  Further, this 
autonomy does not operate as a moral or legitimising foundation for a constituted civil society. It 
is, rather, part of a theory of discourse which Habermas has developed and advocated for over 
many years as a way of agreeing on mutually acceptable norms that will work for a political 
community.
15
 As such, he could be said to be making a case for sophisticated and rigorous sets of 
conventions with the aim of appropriating and ordering social, ethical and political relations. It is 
not, however, necessary to follow this digression at this stage. 
From his conception of autonomy, Habermas conceives of a deliberative democracy in 
which decisions are reached through the utilisation of the principles and procedures of 
communicative rationality.
16
 Within a deliberative democracy, institutions would exist through 
which autonomous citizens make political laws and decisions through a discursive process of 
“rational opinion- and will-formation” (2005: 72). Further, “the legitimacy of legislation is 
accounted for by a democratic procedure that secures the autonomy of the citizens. Citizens then 
are politically autonomous only if they can view themselves as the joint authors of the laws to 
which they are subject as individual addressees” (71). In this context, Habermas speaks of the 
“social solidarity preserved in legal structures” (1996: xliii). Within this institutionalised 
democratic procedure, citizens openly engage with each other as autonomous subjects who aim to 
come to the most rational political decisions based on the best and most complete information 
available.
17
 The autonomy of citizens is understood as a „co-original‟ public and private 
                                                 
14
 “Unlike the moral autonomy that is equivalent to the capacity for rational self-binding … the autonomy 
of a legal person includes three different components: the jointly exercised autonomy of citizens, and the 
capacities for rational choice and for ethical self-realization” (Habermas, 1996: 451).  
15
 Habermas writes, “Philosophy makes unnecessary work for itself when it seeks to demonstrate that it is 
not simply functionally recommended but also morally required that we organize our common life by 
means of positive law, and thus that we form legal communities. The philosopher should be satisfied with 
the insight that in complex societies, law is the only medium in which it is possible reliably to establish 
morally obligated relationships of mutual respect even among strangers” (460). 
16
 Communicative rationality “is expressed in the unifying force of speech oriented toward reaching 
understanding, which secures for the participating speakers an intersubjectively shared lifeworld, thereby 
securing at the same time the horizon within which everyone can refer to one and the same subjective 
world” (Habermas, 1998: 315). See also Habermas (1998, 1991a, 1991b, 1987b, 1972).  
17
 For the sake of clarity it is worth quoting Habermas at length here: “Read in discourse-theoretic terms, 
the principle of popular sovereignty states that all political power derives from the communicative power 
of citizens. The exercise of public authority is oriented and legitimated by the laws citizens give themselves 
in a discursively structured opinion- and will-formation. If we first view this practice as a problem solving 
process, then it owes its legitimating force to a democratic procedure intended to guarantee a rational 
treatment of political questions. The rational acceptability of results achieved in conformity with procedure 
follows from the institutionalization of interlinked forms of communication that, ideally speaking, ensure 
that all relevant questions, issues, and contributions are brought up and processed in discourses and 
negotiations on the basis of the best available information and arguments. The legal institutionalization of 
specific procedures and conditions of communication is what makes possible the effective utilization of 
equal communicative freedom and at the same time enjoins the pragmatic, ethical, and moral use of 
practical reason or, as the case may be, the fair balance of interests” (Habermas, 1996: 170). 
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autonomy which “reveals itself when we decipher, in discourse-theoretic terms, the motif of self-
legislation according to which addressees of laws are simultaneously the authors of their rights” 
(104). Additionally, Habermas conceives autonomy as intertwined within the relations between 
contract theory and Kantian rationality, between popular sovereignty and human rights, 
republicanism and liberalism and public and private autonomy.
18
 While Habermas rejects notions 
of “atomistic and estranged individuals who are possessively set against one another” for a legal 
order that presupposes “collaboration among subjects who recognise one another in their 
reciprocally related rights and duties, as free and equal citizens” (88), he embraces “human rights 
and the principle of popular sovereignty [as] the sole ideas that can justify modern law” (99). In 
his approach to understanding and describing autonomy, Habermas‟ aim is not to do without the 
autonomy-heteronomy (or freedom-slavery) dichotomy. In his project, he is satisfied to 
understand autonomy in terms which are detached and abstracted from what I understand here as 
the everyday of political existence. That is, from any social or political life which happens to 
have no actual or „necessary‟ reference to law. There is nothing in Habermas‟ work that suggests 
that there is any such thing. The State monopoly on politics is strong in Habermas‟ work and, to 
put it bluntly, his figuring of autonomy is inconceivable as a politics without the State. Despite 
Habermas‟ attempt to conceive of autonomy with reference to social and political relations, rather 
than simply starting from moral autonomy, the actions of the citizens within those relations are 
defined by the kind of detached rational deliberation that we are already familiar with. Further, 
these relations are necessarily institutionalised and structured under state apparatuses such as the 
legislature and require the relevant community to be characterised by a in-common political 
identity and solidarity. Apart from any other problems we might note, this kind of closed political 
community is not one that could be said to be one in which, at any stretch of the imagination, a 
politics without the State might happen. Another kind of deliberative procedure is elaborated by 
John Rawls. 
John Rawls, in his Theory of Justice (1999 [1971]), argues from a liberal moral position 
in order to “present a conception of justice which generalizes and carries to a higher level of 
abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract as found … in Locke, Rousseau and Kant” 
(Rawls, 1999: 10). The „primary subject‟ of this justice is “the basic structure of society, or more 
exactly, the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties 
and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation” (6). So, as with other 
contractarians, Rawls is primarily concerned with the maintenance of a stable society while 
preserving (as much as possible
19) the rights and liberties of subject citizens. Rawls‟ contract is 
different from „traditional theories‟ in that the original state of nature is not understood as an 
                                                 
18
 Habermas writes, “the morally grounded human right to equal liberties is intertwined in the social 
contract with the principle of popular sovereignty” (Habermas, 1996: 94). 
19
 „As much as possible‟ and similar contingent riders pepper Rawls‟ text. 
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actual “primitive condition of culture” (11). Instead, the “original position … is understood as a 
purely hypothetical situation characterized so as to lead to a certain conception of justice” (11).  
 
Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his [sic] place in society, his 
class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural 
assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like … The principles of justice are chosen 
behind a veil of ignorance. This ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice 
of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances (Rawls, 
1999: 11). 
 
Once again, we see here the strategy of detaching thought (as rational deliberation) from the 
everyday world of the senses and society. Rawls also assumes that each „representative man‟ 
participating in this procedure is “free and equal” (12), “free and rational” (10) and that “freedom 
of thought and liberty of conscience” (6) is an essential part of a politically enclosed and legally 
constituted „basic structure‟ of society.20 These characteristics are largely derived from Mill‟s 
principles. In the context of his theory, however, his understanding of freedom is basically 
Kantian, a rational freedom of the intellect that is politically „negative‟.21  
If we are looking to Rawls‟ theory for an insight into the problem of autonomy in relation 
to politics, we will be disappointed. Again, any conception of autonomy in Rawls‟ theory is 
subsidiary to his moral theory of justice and, as he tells us, his aim is limited to generalising “to a 
higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract”(10). In pursuit of this aim, 
Rawls continues the tendency to detach the mind from the body and the world. Social 
embeddedness is something that participants in the procedure of the „original position‟ and the 
„veil of ignorance‟ must shun as unduly influencing rational decisions concerning justice. This 
detachment from social, political and historical situations
22
 extends to the formation of coalitions 
being forbidden (120) – which is reminiscent of Rousseau‟s hostility to factional, particular wills 
(Rousseau, 2004: 30-32). Here, Rawls flirts with a prescription for total alienation. Like 
Rousseau, like Hegel, for Rawls‟ theory, it is „one in, all in‟. So, Rawls perpetuates the tradition 
                                                 
20
 For Rawls, the basic structure includes major institutions such as “the political constitution and the 
principle economic and social arrangements. Thus the legal protection of freedom of thought and liberty of 
conscience, competitive markets, private property in the means of production, and the monogamous family 
are examples of major institutions” (Rawls, 1999: 6). 
21
 Rawls writes that the “basic liberties are given by a list of such liberties. Important among these are 
political liberty (the right to vote and to hold public office) and freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of 
conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person, which includes freedom from psychological 
oppression and physical assault and dismemberment (integrity of the person); the right to hold personal 
property and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of law.” (1999: 
53). 
22
 Parties deciding on the original position, Rawls assumes, “do not know the particular circumstances of 
their own society. That is, they do not know its economic or political situation, or the level of civilization 
and culture it has been able to achieve. The persons in the original position have no information as to 
which generation they belong” (1999: 118). 
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of the detachment of the mind from the senses and the world and the understanding of individuals 
as self-interested atoms.  
In general terms, the procedures and principles elaborated by Habermas and Rawls both 
rely on a type of rational autonomy that is detached from an individual‟s passions and from any 
aspect of social life that could be said to be detrimental to the recommended rational procedures. 
Effectively, this turns out to mean that there is no place for a politics without the State.  
According to the theories of Rawls and Habermas, social and political worlds need to be 
intensively articulated to State institutions (or, to put it another way, organised along the lines of 
the „State-form‟) in order for their procedural systems to function. Both require and assume a 
„People‟ which is formed, in one way or another, through the (self)subordination of individuals to 
the higher imperatives of the constituted political community. In these works, the „freedom‟ or 
„autonomy‟ is figured in such a way as to accommodate the necessary deference to the State, or 
to an effectively closed community. While it can be argued that both of these theoretical edifices 
posit „modes of being together, discussing together and deciding together in a political 
organisation‟ and, to that extent, are in accordance to this thesis‟ understanding of „politics‟, they 
are not new, and they are far from politics without the State.  
 
 
Autonomy and the social world 
 
Given our inquiry so far, one would be forgiven for thinking that the conceptualisation of 
autonomy is only ever done in terms of a rational detachment from our social worlds and senses, 
and only in the context of political relationships figured according to the requirements of a 
unified and obedient political community. Fortunately, this is not completely true, for some 
thinkers have endeavoured to recognise the place of our social embeddedness in the formation of 
autonomous capabilities. 
 Marilyn Friedman, in her essay, „Autonomy, Social Disruption, and Women‟ (2000) 
notes that “[s]ome feminists worry that the very concept of autonomy has been irredeemably 
contaminated by [the] atomistic approach, which neglects the social relationships that are vital for 
developing the character traits required for autonomy competency” (Friedman, 2000: 39), and 
that some “contemporary accounts ... [of autonomy] ... fail to mention how the human capacity 
for autonomy develops in the course of socialization” (Friedman, 2000: 39). Linda Barclay 
echoes this concern about the „atomistic‟ and „abstract individualistic‟ selves that are assumed in 
many conceptions of autonomy as denying “that the self is essentially social” (Barclay, 2000: 
52). Barclay‟s article also addresses the possibility of an alliance between feminists and 
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communitarians.
23
 This is due to the fact that communitarians have made similar criticisms of 
autonomy. Michael Sandel is one of them. 
Rather than a Kantian rational agent or the original position of a Rawlsian subject as the 
ground for moral and political decision-making, Michael Sandel argues for a moral agency that is 
socially constituted. Sandel contends that the „moral character‟ of subjects comes from the 
„constitutive attachments‟ they have as members of a “family, community or nation or people, as 
bearers of that history” (Sandel, 1992: 23). In this context, he writes, “[t]o imagine a person 
incapable of constitutive attachments is not to conceive of an ideally free and rational agent but to 
imagine a person wholly without character, without moral depth” (ibid). In Sandel we see that the 
problems with Kantian autonomy and its offshoots have been noted and addressed before. His 
(communitarian) critique of the idea that any agency must be removed from the world and 
detached from the senses is one I consider valid. However, we shall have to part ways with 
Sandel and other communitarians (such as MacIntyre) if we are to continue to investigate the 
possibility of politics without the State. The communitarians are more concerned with moral 
agency and Sandel‟s position, according to Linda Barclay, “suggests an incompatibility between 
the concept of autonomous agency and the constitutively social self” (Barclay, 2000: 63). The 
implications of this position are elaborated by Barclay in her essay „Autonomy and the Social 
Self‟ (2000). 
Barclay argues for a “suitably nuanced conception of autonomy [that] is compatible with 
plausible versions of the socially determined and motivationally social self, but is incompatible 
with particularly strong versions of socially determined and the constitutively social self” (2000: 
53). Barclay‟s essay responds to calls for an alliance between feminists and communitarians 
against the “numerous moral and political theories promot[ing] a vision of the autonomous self as 
essentially independent and self-sufficient” (52) which as such deny our engagement in the world 
and the social embeddedness of our everyday lives. Barclay rejects this alliance because the 
communitarian valorisation of „traditions‟, „community‟, „tribe‟ and „nation‟ (as a ground for an 
understanding of the good and thus decision-making) “frequently ignores their sexist and racist 
practices and the multifarious ways in which they contribute to gender oppression” and the 
subjugation and exclusion of ethnic groups and gays (67). She adds that the communities 
celebrated by communitarians are those “that women have often rejected because of their 
exploitative or oppressive nature” (67-68). Through Barclay‟s analysis we can see that while a 
communitarian critique of Kantian conceptions and Rawls has merit, the communitarian 
approach – as itself reliant on static and closed traditions and traditional institutions and, as such, 
                                                 
23
 As we shall see, Barclay rejects this possibility. She argues that regardless of the similarities between 
critiques of autonomy, ultimately “feminism and communitarianism pull in different directions over the 
value of autonomy … Some communitarians repudiate the value of autonomy, whereas [Barclay argues] 
feminists should not reject its value” (Barclay, 2000: 66). 
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as an approach that would include governmentalist and ideological strategies to control social 
conventions – is antithetical to the idea of politics without the State. However, while Barclay 
herself argues that a social self is not incompatible with autonomy, her understanding of 
autonomy still has its roots in a Kantian model, where the autonomy of a person is largely 
founded on a subject‟s capacity to make decisions and choices through rational procedures and 
deliberation. As such, like Kant, Habermas, and Rawls, Barclay‟s conceptualisation of autonomy 
remains dependent on a pairing with heteronomy and the degree and manner in which a person‟s 
decisions are separated or alienated from heteronomous influences – and then reassimilated in 
heteronomous relations, as autonomy. Barclay‟s discussion is focussed on the autonomous, social 
self, and is not primarily concerned with politics or possible political communities, but her 
figuring of autonomy, like that of Kant, Habermas and Rawls, retains traces of the Rousseauian 
move, the phraseological quirk that Althusser describes as the „flight forward into ideology‟.   
As we have seen, Kant, in his questioning around the possibilities of reason and morals, 
understands autonomy and freedom in opposition to (or other than) heteronomy. The spontaneous 
free thought of pure speculative reason is other than (and therefore uncaused by) the heteronomy 
of the senses and the natural world. This same thought and the autonomous will make moral 
decisions free from the external causes of our volitions, beliefs and social mores. As enlightened 
citizens, the use of reason is again split between the public, where we should act autonomously, 
and private use, where we should submit to the heteronomous dictates of society and those who 
govern it (Kant, 1980a). This approach continues to shape both morals and politics, where both 
individual and political autonomy is understood to be generated from  processes and procedures 
of rational deliberation which can be somehow conceived as detached from heteronomous 
influences. We have also seen that even in Kantian derived notions of moral and political theory 
(such as that of Habermas), the social contract remains an important element of the various sets 
of relations that ultimately constitute autonomy (Habermas, 1996: 94). And this autonomy is 
conceived as a means of balancing the demands of a stable society against the (non-rational) 
inclinations and desires of self-interested individuals. What has not been mentioned so far are the 
implications of the epistemological roots of this approach to politics. 
 
 
Overcoming detachment: From thinking to doing 
 
Kant‟s work spans what have been described as the two key aspects of the 
Enlightenment, “that of „self-assertion‟ (which can be identified with the political project) and 
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that of „self-foundation‟ (the epistemological project)” (Mouffe, 2005: 10).24 As we saw in 
Chapter Two, Mouffe is writing in the context of her advocacy for a radical, agonistic 
democracy.
25
 Part of her argument is the contention that “[o]nce we acknowledge that there is no 
necessary relation between these two aspects, we are in the position of being able to defend the 
political project while abandoning the notion that it must be based on a specific form of 
rationality” (Mouffe, 2005: 10). However, if the political project is in any way dependent on 
Enlightenment notions of freedom – particularly those of Mill and Kant – then any such 
disengagement may be problematic because of the epistemological roots of the received notion of 
freedom, which are based on a specific form of rationality and which require a degree of 
detachment from the world. The project of self-assertion may be different, but whether there is or 
is not a necessary relation is a more difficult question to answer. After all, this self-assertion is 
inseparable from the figuring of autonomous subjectivity in terms of an individual‟s relations 
with political authority and the State. The political project of self-assertion is brought about by 
the epistemologically derived conceptualisation of self-foundation. That is, the idea of self-
assertion needed to be conceived as possible in order to preserve political authority after the fall 
of divine legitimation. In this context, it is important to follow a little further the development of 
notion of autonomy in the sphere of the political. 
In the political sphere, autonomy has been understood according to both Kantian 
epistemological-ethical theory and liberal contractarian principles derived from Mill. Arguably, 
under these conceptions of autonomy and freedom, little has changed for subjects in their 
relations with society and the State (despite Hegelian attempts to unify them). It is fair to claim 
that in such relations, subjects are assumed to be „atomistic, self-interested individuals‟ (Homo 
Economicus is another designation
26
). Autonomy in the Kantian context is conceived as 
constituted by detached, rational thought. In the liberal context, freedom is understood simply as 
a negative freedom. Of this, Isaiah Berlin writes, “I am normally said to be free to the degree to 
which no man or body of men interferes with my activity. Political liberty in this sense is simply 
the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others. If I am prevented by others from 
doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree” (Berlin, 1958: 122). And, as we 
noted in Chapter One, the exercise of this freedom is constrained to the conscious thought of an 
individual. As such, both liberal and Kantian autonomy is understood to be primarily about 
thinking. However, there are conceptions which describe freedom as extended to „doing‟, as the 
                                                 
24
 For a detailed discussion of this see Chantal Mouffe‟s The Return of the Political (2005) and Rorty‟s 
„Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity‟ (1985) and „Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism‟ (1983). See 
also Mummery (2005: 232). 
25
 See Chapter Two, pages 43-47. 
26
 For a critique of this conception and the assumptions on which it is based, see Daly & Cobb‟s For the 
Common Good (1994: 85-96).        
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actual activity of autonomous individuals. In liberal theory, this autonomy is understood as 
„positive liberty‟ and is described by Berlin.  
 
The „positive‟ sense of the word „liberty‟ derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be 
his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces … I wish 
to be the instrument of my own, not of other men‟s, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an 
object; to be moved by reasons, by conspicuous purposes, which are my own, not by causes which 
affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer. (Berlin, 1958: 131) 
 
In this understanding we recognise the key aspects of Kantian autonomy. However, unlike 
Kantian autonomy, the notion of positive liberty explicitly expands the scope within which 
freedom can be exercised. According to this conception, while conscious, rational thought 
remains a key constitutive aspect of freedom, a person‟s desire to carry out physical action in the 
world comes into play – as something to do, rather than not to do. Here, we have moved, ever so 
gingerly, into the world of society and the senses. From this, we can begin to imagine a more 
lively mode of politics, as being together and doing together, which may also be understood as 
part of the enlightenment‟s political project of self-assertion. Nonetheless, this way of thinking 
about freedom has not arisen out of the asking of a political question, but questions about 
knowledge, reason, and morals.  
If it is possible to tentatively describe the characteristic activities of positive liberty as a 
(yet more) tentative excursion into the social and sensual worlds, they nonetheless remain 
conceptually tethered to epistemological and moral imperatives. To this point, it might seem that 
if one comes to an understanding of autonomy through an investigation into knowledge and 
morals, that understanding would be more or less Kantian or liberal. So, we have come to a point 
where it is necessary to inquire into the figuring of autonomy that precedes those theorisations 
brought about by Cartesian epistemology and the fall of divine legitimation.  
 
 
Autonomy and autarkeia  
 
Long before Kant, Aristotle made his own inquiries into politics and ethics but came to a 
different understanding of autonomy. Aristotle‟s investigation is driven by questions around the 
ways in which the good of society can be brought about and maintained. Aristotle is not primarily 
concerned to develop and express principles by which an individual can come to moral decisions 
and action. Rather, for Aristotle, “[e]very art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and 
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pursuit,
27
 is thought to aim at some good” (Aristotle, 1941: 1094a1-2). This „good‟ at which we 
aim is not simply about being „moral‟ but about a striving towards excellences, or aretē.28 As 
such, ethical questions do not serve as a foundation for politics, but are rather simply an aspect of 
the “master art” of politics (1995: 1094a26). So, while he holds that the ideas and practices set 
out in the Nichomachean Ethics will lead an individual towards the good, and the good life, they 
are chiefly ideas and practices which serve the greater good of the state.
29
 He explains,  
 
For even if the end is the same for a single man [sic] and for a state, that of the state seems at all 
events something greater and more complete to attain and to preserve; for though it is worth while 
to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and more godlike to attain it for a nation or for 
city-states (Aristotle, 1995: 1094b5-10). 
 
Aristotle‟s contention that politics is the „master art‟ is derived from his understanding of human 
nature. According to this view, people are “sociable by nature” (Aristotle, 1995: 1097b11) and 
“by nature …  political animal[s]” (1253a2). So, Aristotle‟s inquiries into politics and ethics carry 
the understanding that we cannot be separated from others and the world. In this context, we 
encounter an important difference between Greek political and ethical thought and that which 
followed Descartes. Specifically, Aristotle‟s references to „freedom‟ are not drawn through the 
use of „sovereign‟ lines. In the Politics, he tells us that the community or the state, in which 
people naturally pursue the good, is “clearly prior … to the individual” (1253a19). Further, any 
individual “who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for 
himself, must be either a beast or a god” (1253a25-30). Aristotle makes this point as part of his 
argument that “man is sociable by nature” (1097b11) and that when conceived of as separate 
from society, is not „man‟ at all. If we interpret the ideas regarding human society in the Politics 
as articulating that self-sufficiency [autarkeia] in the natural world is impossible, and 
undesirable, then autonomy is as well and, as such, must only reside in the intellect, separate 
                                                 
27
 W.D. Ross‟ unrevised translation of the Nichomachean Ethics, from McKeon‟s edition of The Basic 
Works of Aristotle (Aristotle, 1941), is used here. However, as a rule, I will refer to the translations from 
the revised Oxford edition of The Complete Works of Aristotle, edited by Jonathan Barnes (1995), in which 
Ross‟ translation is revised by J.O. Urmson. Urmson‟s revision changes the opening sentence. “Every art 
and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good” (emphasis 
added). J.O. Urmson‟s revision replaces „pursuit‟ with „choice‟. I prefer pursuit in this context, as being 
more in keeping with Aristotle‟s philosophy. This is because, where „choice‟ refers to an instantaneous, 
intellectual, possibly atemporal, decision, „pursuit‟ refers to coherent and purposive action taken over time.  
28
 Aretē is variously understood as goodness, excellence, virtue and efficiency. This excellence or good 
however is not restricted to moral practices. One can also exercise aretē in their musicianship or as a maker 
of shoes. 
29
 In this context, Jonathan Barnes notes that “Aristotle refers to his book as ta ēthika: the title transliterates 
to „The Ethics‟ but translates rather as „Matters to do with Character‟” (Barnes, 1976: 27). These „matters‟ 
are to do with the development in individual citizens of character and excellences which lead toward the 
greater good of the state. As such, as Barnes writes, “Aristotle‟s notion of ethics is not quite the same as 
our present notion of moral philosophy: if we ascribe to Aristotle the aims and interests of Kant or Mill … 
we shall be in danger of misunderstanding him” (ibid).  
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from the natural world. Still, Kantian thinkers have tended to interpret Aristotle in this way, while 
endeavouring to overcome what they see as the negative implications for the possibilities for 
autonomy. 
Thomas May, for example, examines Aristotelian autarkeia in the course of developing a 
conception of autonomy which he finds practical enough to “serve a useful role in applied ethics” 
(May, 1998: 35). May interprets Aristotlelian autarkeia along Kantian lines – as “independence 
from external influences (such as need or utility)” (40) – and argues that it “seems … rather 
austere … lacking many of the things we think to be part of a full rich and robust life” (47). May 
includes our sociality and our connections to loved-ones among those „things lacking‟, and 
concludes that because of its requirement for “complete detachment” (47-48) this notion of 
autonomy (as autarkeia) is “too rigorous for practical application” (47). However, complete 
detachment is not prescribed by Aristotle. It seems that May, by viewing Aristotle through a 
Kantian lens, succumbs to a danger that we have been cautioned against.
30
 There is more to 
Aristotle‟s understanding. For him, autarkeia is neither a characteristic of complete detachment, 
nor of gods or beasts. And it is not impossible within a community. 
 
[B]y self-sufficient we do not mean that which is sufficient for a man by himself, for one who 
lives a solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, and in general for his friends and fellow 
citizens, since man is sociable by nature (Aristotle, 1995: 1097b7-11). 
 
As with autonomy, autarkeia is a „good‟ which can only be pursued within a community. It is a 
characteristic of people living with other people, not that of a hermit. Further, given that these 
relationships are not understood as taking place between Cartesian atomistic individuals, there is 
no need for such relations to be maintained through a contractual mechanism. Autarkeia, in this 
sense, is best understood through a reading of Aristotle on the subject of friendship.
31
 
What characterises Aristotle‟s understanding of „genuine‟ friendship is the non-
reciprocal (non-contractual) nature of its existence. It is true that favours are performed, gifts are 
given, each friend derives pleasure and each truly benefits from the friendship. However, such 
relations are not transactional. Those within such a friendship must be autonomous and self-
sufficient – so much so that they have no actual need of friendship. In this context, autarkeia is 
not a characteristic of a god or a beast but a highly valued (if elusive) aspect of human relations 
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 See footnote 29, above. 
31
 Aristotle describes three kinds of friendship, those based on utility, on pleasure and those based on 
goodness. In the first two kinds of friendship, Aristotle notes that the friend is loved “not in so far as the 
other is the person loved but in so far as he is useful or pleasant” (1995: 1156a16-17). He adds, “[s]uch 
friendships, then, are easily dissolved, if the parties do not remain like themselves; for if the one party is no 
longer pleasant or useful the other ceases to love him” (1156a19-21). Such friendships though, are not 
considered bad or to be avoided, but simply do not qualify as genuine. This „genuine‟ friendship is 
different. Aristotle holds that it can only be or become genuine, if it is entered into freely, in goodwill, and 
without any of the constraints that come with friendships of utility, pleasure, kinship or need (1156b6-33). 
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and which occurs as part of everyday life of the senses, the intellect, and society. It would seem 
then, that this non-reciprocal autarkeia allows us to conceive of politics as something other than a 
simple relation between an autonomous individual and political authority, rather as an 
understanding which takes place within a community and which is lived without people having to 
detach minds from senses. Still, such a conception – where the notion of autonomy within 
political relations is conceived in terms of  non-reciprocal autarkeia – has its own problems.  
Lorraine Code notes that Aristotelian autarkeia valorises male friendship and an 
emphasis on quiet reflection. This is an ideal that is palpably unattainable for billions of others, 
who are excluded on the basis of gender or socio-economic conditions from the possibility of 
living an autonomous life.
32
 Code also notes the tendency of some philosophers to interpret 
Aristotle through a Kantian lens
33
 and goes on to discuss the possibility that Aristotle‟s 
understanding of self-sufficiency (in the context of friendship) “is not a separate or radically 
independent self-sufficiency” (98). Code finds that while “significant reconstructions are required 
if one is to read a less culture-bound, less androcentric and misogynistic moral from Aristotle‟s 
account” (98), a generous reading “articulates possibilities of political association” (104). For us, 
this broadens the possibilities for understanding politics beyond the idealised „Autonomous man‟. 
Regardless of these possibilities, I am not setting out here to develop a new concept of 
autonomy which depends on a socially embedded, non-reciprocal understanding of autarkeia. 
Rather, I would contend that autarkeia is an example of an everyday non-reciprocal relation, one 
which resists the tendency to define philosophical ideas through their placement as one half of a 
dichotomy (e.g. autonomy-heteronomy, liberty-slavery, freedom-obligation, subject-State). Still, 
despite finding in Aristotle and Lorraine Code, the possibility that autonomy as autarkeia is not 
merely an aspect of a project to overcome the dilemmas brought about by Cartesian epistemology 
and the fall of divine legitimation, questions remain. As Code argues, even in Aristotelian 
autarkeia the emphasis of such an understanding falling upon the quiet deliberations of a rational 
individual, there is still a strong sense that this notion, regardless of its being about a relation, is 
still somewhat detached from the world and, as such, politics. While the Aristotelian 
understanding of autarkeia seems to offer an understanding of political activity in relational 
(rather than strictly detached, rational) terms, it seems that it is not sufficient to frame or establish 
                                                 
32
 Code describes this ideal, as „Autonomous man‟, a “self-sufficient, independent, and self-reliant, a self-
realizing individual … [whose] … independence is under constant threat from other (equally self-serving) 
individuals: hence he devises rules to protect himself from intrusion” such as rights and rational self-
interest (Code, 1992: 77-78). Code argues that while this autonomous man is an abstraction (78), “in 
practice, values generated in relationships and community are frequently represented as intrusions on or 
threats to autonomy” (79). This then has the effect of rendering the everyday lives of women, and many 
others, incapable of autonomy. 
33
 “In just one notable example, W.D. Ross finds it „somewhat surprising‟ that Aristotle devotes two whole 
books of the Nichomachean Ethics to friendship … [and that] … he finds the Aristotelian moral system 
„decidedly self-centred‟. It is possible that Ross‟s Kantian orientation accounts for this reading of the 
friendship discussion” (Code, 1992: 95; here, Code cites Ross, 1959: 223). 
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a reference point for a politics without the State. For the purposes of this thesis at least, self-
sufficiency – on either a Kantian or Aristotelian understanding – would appear to be inadequate 
to the task. 
Our inquiry into Aristotle‟s understanding of autarkeia has been both promising and 
frustrating. On one hand, this inquiry has demonstrated that politics need not be conceived of 
only in terms of an individual‟s contractual relationship with political authority. Also, according 
to this understanding of politics, autonomy is not merely conceived of as a quality of a 
(Cartesian) rational sovereign individual. Autonomy is rather the activity of all people in a 
political community. It is doing rather than merely thinking. On the other hand, however, 
Aristotle‟s political philosophy is elaborated according to the principle that the good of the 
singular and closed community of the state is the highest principle. All else is secondary. So, 
even though people are spared the phraseological sleight of hand of the social contract (as a 
justification for and legitimation of their allegiance to political authority), they are not spared 
from the actual demand for or expectation of that allegiance. Despite this frustration, the notion 
that political autonomy is primarily about the activity of people „being together‟ needs further 
investigation. So, for the rest of this Chapter I will discuss the important differences between the 
Greek and the modern liberal conceptions of politics and political autonomy. This discussion, 
which will be focussed on the thought of Hannah Arendt, Cornelius Castoriadis and Michel 
Foucault, will also help to set up some of the questions to be examined in greater detail in 
Chapter Five.  
 
 
Autonomy and freedom in political life 
 
To this point, the notion of modern autonomy has been presented as problematic in the 
context of politics because of its origins in Descartes‟ act of detaching his mind from his senses 
and the material world. As such, we have found that any concept of freedom derived from this act 
is consequently detached and closed off from the possibility of political activity (as opposed to a 
deliberative process of rational decision). This tendency in the ongoing tradition of the 
conceptualisation of freedom and autonomy is also one which is elucidated in the ideological 
interpretations of freedom in the work of Althusser.
34
 However, the modern conceptualisation of 
freedom and autonomy is not the only one we have at hand. There is another way of thinking 
                                                 
34
 Earlier we discussed Althusser‟s examination of the contract and the flight forward into ideology. In a 
similar context, in „Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses‟, he writes that the “ideological 
„conceptual‟ device (dispotif) … set[s] up (a subject endowed with a consciousness in which he freely 
forms or freely recognizes ideas in which he believes), the (material) attitude of the subject concerned ... 
The individual in question behaves in such and such a way, adopts such and such a practical attitude, and 
… participates in certain regular practices which are those of the ideological apparatus on which „depend‟ 
the ideas which he has in all consciousness freely chosen as a subject” (Althusser, 1969: 167). 
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about freedom which remains engaged – and is defined by this engagement – with the senses, the 
world, and politics. 
In contrast to the Enlightenment and liberal understandings of autonomy and freedom (a 
la Kant and Mill), Hannah Arendt and Cornelius Castoriadis draw on the classical Greek polis to 
argue that action, rather than consciousness, is the „appropriate region‟ of freedom. According to 
this understanding, in the polis, activity is interactivity, life is social and, as a citizen, political 
activity is a key aspect of this life (Arendt, 1963: 145-146). Arendt writes that the polis “is not a 
city-state in its physical location” but the activity of people “acting and speaking together” 
(Arendt, 1958: 198). This is a way of life that is exemplified by the words, “Wherever you go, 
you will be a polis” (ibid). Drawing on Aristotle, Arendt describes three ways of life which, 
having a common concern with the beautiful, can be chosen in freedom. These are: the 
philosophical life; the life in which the beautiful is consumed; and political life, i.e. “the life 
devoted to matters of the polis” (12-13).35 Not all action though, has the status of free activity. 
Activities ruled out as „free‟ are “ways of life that are chiefly devoted to keeping oneself alive” 
(12). These are the working lives of the slave and the free craftsman and the acquisitive life of the 
merchant. Ironically, these are the aspects of life that happen to be those nominated by Kant and 
Mill as free. 
 The contrast between the classical Greek and the liberal or Enlightenment citizen is 
striking. In the liberal tradition, the proper domain of freedom is individual consciousness (which 
more or less equates to the Kantian public use of reason) and allowable activities are protected by 
the principle of non-interference. These freedoms, those Arendt describes as being “chiefly 
devoted to keeping oneself alive” (12), are the very things that, for a citizen of the polis, cannot 
be done freely. What is freedom for Mill and Kant, is slavery for the Greeks. Further, Arendt 
takes issue with the liberal tradition (in particular) and its acquiescence to the epistemologically 
driven framing of the question of freedom.  
 While the classic introduction to a discussion of political liberty begins with a caveat 
which delineates political liberty from the problem of free will and determinism,
36
 Arendt 
reminds us of the connection. The foundations of the free will versus determinism problem are 
the same as those which found the theorising of political liberty. As such, the theorisation of 
political liberty begins with the acknowledgement that, if there is free will, it can only reside in a 
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 Cornelius Castoriadis makes similar points. Drawing upon Thucydides (1972) and the Funeral Oration of 
Pericles, he writes, “Pericles does not say we love beautiful things (and put them in a museum), we love 
wisdom (and pay professors or buy books). He says we are in and by the love of beauty and wisdom and 
the activity this love brings forth … The object of the institution of the polis for him is the creation of the 
human being, the Athenian citizen, who exists and lives in and through the unity of these three: the love 
and „practice‟ of beauty, the love and „practice‟ of wisdom, the care and responsibility for the common 
good, the collectivity, the polis” (Castoriadis, 1991a: 122-123). 
36
 In his Introduction to „On Liberty‟, Mill writes: “The subject of this Essay is not the so-called Liberty of 
the Will, so unfortunately opposed to the misnamed doctrine of Philosophical Necessity; but Civil, or 
Social Liberty” (Mill, 1971a: 65). 
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consciousness and is unobservable in the world. From this position, philosophers have set about 
trying to explain the workings of free will and free acts via the now familiar strategy of attaching 
them to rational thought. The problem with this however, Arendt argues, is that “the phenomenon 
of freedom does not appear in … thought at all, that neither freedom nor its opposite is 
experienced in the dialogue between me and myself” (Arendt, 1963: 145). 37  She says that to 
transpose freedom to this internal dialogue from the realm of politics and human affairs is to 
distort it. She argues that freedom is a political thing, not an intellectual thing. So, for Arendt, to 
be free, as it was in the polis, is to be able to participate, to talk, to do, to act. She reminds us of 
the fact that in Classical philosophy the acquisition and performance of skills is often explained 
through reference to how we learn to play a musical instrument or to ride a horse. The point of 
engaging in such activities is not simply to achieve competence, but excellence (152-155) (or 
aretē). These artistic examples are not used to suggest that excellent or virtuous political skills 
lead to societies that are works of art, but to illustrate that the point of learning any kind of 
excellence is to learn it in such a way that you can perform it with virtuosity. Both activities also 
need a public space for their performance. To be able to perform acts of virtuosity is to create 
something new, something unexpected. To play a tune so that it sounds like it never has before. 
To perform an act in such a way as to be able to set things in motion. To change things. To 
interrupt a natural series of events. This, „change‟, Arendt argues, is the point of politics. And this 
change is freedom. 
Cornelius Castoriadis is also concerned to put forward this kind of idea of freedom – one 
which is engaged in the world and politics – in opposition to the Kantian, liberal 
conceptualisation. He goes further than Arendt, however, to describe the possibility of the 
development and emergence of autonomy as necessarily situated in a particular kind of 
community at a particular kind of moment in time. He contends, in a similar way to that of some 
of the thinkers we have already discussed, that the question of autonomy “will remain intractable 
so long as [it] is understood in the Kantian sense, that is, as a fictively autarchic subject‟s 
conformity to a „Law of Reason‟ in complete misrecognition of the social-historical conditions 
for, and the social-historical dimension of, the project of autonomy” (Castoriadis, 1991b: 75). As 
we see, Castoriadis understands the question of autonomy as a project of its own, rather than as 
part of an epistemological or moral project. In the context of this thesis, this is promising. We 
also note Castoriadis‟ insistence, along with some feminist and communitarian thinkers, on the 
social embeddedness of subjects and the formation of their selves in the world. Castoriadis 
though, would reject the communitarian emphasis on the importance of „nations‟, „tribes‟ and 
„tradition‟ as unquestioned arbiters of the good. This is because philosophy (as a crucial aspect of 
the project of autonomy) is “a matter first and foremost of putting into question the instituted 
                                                 
37
 The emphasis here is mine. 
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representation of the world, the idols of the tribe, within the horizon of unlimited interrogation” 
(Castoriadis, 1991c: 124-125). However, despite these differences, other aspects of Castoriadis‟ 
understanding of autonomy are not unlike those we have surveyed so far. 
For Castoriadis, individual autonomy begins with a simple Freudian description. It is 
“consciousness‟s rule over the unconscious” (1987: 102).38  
 
If to autonomy, that is to self-legislation or self-regulation, one opposes heteronomy, that is 
legislation or regulation by another, then autonomy is my law opposed to the regulation of the 
unconscious, which is another law, the law of another, other than myself. (102) 
 
Following Lacan, Castoriadis describes the unconscious as “the discourse of the Other” (102) and 
autonomy as “my discourse [taking] the place of the discourse of the Other, of a foreign 
discourse that is in me, ruling over me: speaking through myself” (102). Castoriadis further 
explains that this is not a simple negation of the discourse of the Other by „my‟ discourse, but 
“the establishment of another relation between the discourse of the Other and the subject‟s 
discourse” (104), „an active situation‟ in which a real person “would be unceasingly involved in 
the movement of taking up again what had been acquired, the discourse of the Other, who is 
capable of uncovering phantasies as phantasies and who, finally, never allows them to rule – 
unless he or she is so willing” (ibid). From this brief summary of Castoriadis‟ conception of 
autonomy, we recognise some familiar and problematic notions. These will be examined in more 
detail in Chapter Five, but for now the actual activity of Castoriadis‟ autonomous subject is of 
interest to us with regard to our understanding of politics. 
From his conception of individual autonomy, Castoriadis moves to the „Social 
Dimension of Autonomy‟.  
 
The conception … shows both that one cannot want autonomy without wanting it for everyone 
and that its realisation cannot be conceived of in its full scope except as a collective enterprise. If 
by this term we no longer mean the inalienable freedom of an abstract subject or the domination 
of a pure consciousness over an undifferentiated material, … ; if the problem of autonomy is that 
the subject meets in itself a sense that is not its own and that it must transform this sense in using 
it; if autonomy is the relation in which others are always present as the otherness and as the self-
ness of the subject, then autonomy can be conceived of, even in philosophical terms, only as a 
social problem and as a social relation (107-108). 
 
                                                 
38
 Castoriadis here also writes of his „Freudian description‟, “Without prejudice to the new depth 
dimension revealed by Freud, this is the programme proposed by philosophical reflection on the individual 
for the past 25 centuries, at once the assumption and the outcome of ethics as it has been viewed by Plato 
and the Stoics, Spinoza or Kant” (Castoriadis, 1987: 102). 
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This conceptualisation of autonomy – i.e. the „refusal‟ of the negation of the discourse of the 
Other – is not a negation of the negation. The discourse of the Other continues to exist. My 
discourse takes its place by recognising it as mine and in proceeding in full consciousness of it as 
Other. The Other, society, is the (heteronomous) realm that the subject is within. Society, as the 
„social-historical‟ imaginary,39 is always there. So, Castoriadis differentiates his conception of 
autonomy from other (Kantian) conceptions by changing autonomy-heteronomy from an 
opposition to a relation. 
In later work, Castoriadis describes autonomy as a project and as the “refusal of closure” 
(1991d: 31). For Castoriadis, democracy and philosophy are social-historical creations (rather 
than outcomes of “natural or spontaneous tendencies of society or history” (36)) which “entail a 
radical break with the previously instituted state of affairs. Both are aspects of the project of 
autonomy” (ibid). 
 
Philosophy and democracy ... both express the refusal of heteronomy – the rejection of claims to 
validity and legitimacy of rules and representations just because they happen to be there, the 
refusal of any external authority (even, and especially, „divine‟), of any extrasocial source of truth 
and justice, in brief, the putting into question of existing institutions and the assertion of the 
capacity of the collectivity and of thought to institute themselves explicitly and reflectively (20). 
 
Castoriadis also refers to this project, as one of “breaking closures” (21) and as a “rupture” (31). 
This understanding of autonomy is persuasive and is important to this thesis in the sense that it is 
a constant attitude to the world. It is the living of the project of autonomy as the constant taking 
up of a position, or positions, in relation to the social-historical, the world. However, Castoriadis‟ 
notion does not escape the autonomy-heteronomy pairing and thus, is not enough on its own. 
Nevertheless, it is in this understanding of autonomy as „the refusal of closure‟ that we detect an 
affinity with Foucault‟s description of a „limit-attitude‟. 
 
  
 
                                                 
39
 For Castoriadis “History is the self-deployment of society in time; but this time is ... a creation of 
society, both once and for all as historical time and in each particular case as the time of this particular 
society with its particular tempo, significant articulations, anchorages, prospects, and promises ... As 
society cannot be without this self-deployment in time ... we would better speak, in philosophical terms, of 
the social-historical.” (Castoriadis, 1991: 34). Further, “[t]he construction of its own world by each and 
every society is ... the creation of a world of meanings, its social imaginary significations, which organise 
the (presocial, „biologically given‟) natural world, instaurate a social world proper to each society (with its 
articulations, rules, purposes, etc.), establish the ways in which socialized and humanized individuals are to 
be fabricated, and institute the motives, values, and hierarchies of social (human) life.” (41). The „social-
historical‟ and the „Imaginary‟ are important elements of Castoriadis‟ philosophy. These ideas, most 
comprehensively developed by Castoriadis in The Imaginary Institution of Society, will be dealt with in 
detail in Chapter Five. 
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Foucault: Autonomy as critique 
 
Earlier we discussed Kant‟s answer to the question What is Enlightenment? (1980a), 
which is in many ways an attempt to elaborate the political implications of his epistemological 
and moral thought. There, apparently paradoxically, we found political activity to be limited to 
the public use of reason – to, effectively, the expression of conscience. Actions which would be 
understood to be part of the encompassing socio-political order, the world, are subject to self-
imposed obedience to a sovereign. In the context of the question of the possibility of politics 
without the State, Kant‟s expression of enlightenment „self-assertion‟ is inadequate. It is also 
inadequate as an answer to the question that Mouffe sets out to answer.
40
 However, in keeping 
with Mouffe‟s suggestion that we use “the theoretical tools elaborated by the different currents of 
what can be called the postmodern in philosophy and of appropriating their critique of 
rationalism and subjectivism” (11), we can look towards a more recent attempt to answer the 
question, What is Enlightenment? 
Foucault wrote his essay, What is Enlightenment? in 1984. In it he also noted that in 
Kant‟s answer, with the separation of the public and private use of reason, “there cannot be ... any 
free use of reason” (Foucault, 1984: 36). What Foucault finds notable in Kant‟s essay is that as a 
reflection on the Enlightenment, it is a questioning of its present and of the place of the subject 
within that present. In this context, Foucault then sees his task as answering the question, “What 
is modern philosophy?” (32). Foucault briefly examines the substance of Kant‟s essay before 
reflecting on its place in history and its status as an example of an expression of the 
Enlightenment as “the age of critique” (38). Foucault expands,  
 
I have been seeking, on the one hand, to emphasize the extent to which a type of philosophical 
interrogation – one that simultaneously problematizes man‟s [sic] relation to the present, man‟s 
historical mode of being, and the constitution of the self as an autonomous subject – is rooted in 
the Enlightenment. On the other hand, I have been seeking to stress that the thread that may 
connect us with the Enlightenment is not faithfulness to doctrinal elements, but rather to the 
permanent reactivation of an attitude – that is, of a philosophical ethos that could be described as a 
permanent critique of our historical era (42). 
 
Such a critique may be (positively) characterised “as a limit-attitude [in which] we have to be at 
the frontiers” (42). While the Kantian question was “that of knowing what limits knowledge has 
to renounce transgressing ... the critical question today has to be turned back into a positive one” 
(42). That is, “to transform the critique conducted in the form of a necessary limitation into a 
                                                 
40
 See pages 100-101. 
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practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression” (42). Finally, this critique, has to 
be conceived as an ethos, as an attitude, and  
 
as a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the 
historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of 
going beyond them (50). 
 
 In Foucault‟s essay we find a rejection of the demand to either balance or choose 
between being inside or outside of Enlightenment rationality (43). Instead, Foucault embraces the 
call, „Dare to know!‟ as the “heraldic device” (35) of a critique of the present as the positive 
possibility of transgression. With regard to Mouffe‟s suggestion to detach the epistemological 
and political projects of the Enlightenment, Foucault‟s essay could be seen as an example of what 
Mouffe calls the „theoretical tools‟ of the „postmodern critique‟ (Mouffe, 2005: 11) at work. If 
this is the case, Foucault can be read to show that there is no need to abandon any particular 
aspect of the Enlightenment project in order for it, as an „attitude‟, as a „permanent critique of our 
historical era‟, to remain powerful. The question remains however, does a critique escape the 
parameters set by Kant? Does the critique that Foucault elucidates amount to just an updated 
version of the public use of reason? I think that, to be fair, the inclusion of the limit-attitude and 
the possibility of transgression allows us to answer that critique is less bound by obedience to a 
sovereign authority. But the question remains, how does this critique become political? The very 
idea of critique, derived as it is from the “heraldic device” (Foucault, 1984: 35), „Dare to know!‟, 
and oriented as it is towards a “historical analysis of … limits” (50), retains an affinity to the 
epistemological idea. As such, it may not be possible to carry out Mouffe‟s project to 
meaningfully detach the political project of self-assertion from the epistemologically inspired call 
for self-assertion. In this context, the call for self-assertion itself calls upon enlightenment notions 
of detached reason. However, in Foucault‟s later analyses of the practices and the care of the self, 
we may be able to see how a limit-attitude might operate as a political, rather than an 
epistemological, activity. 
Arguably, Foucault gives us more of a sense of an everyday living of the limit-attitude 
when he characterises it in terms of exercises and practices. That sense is evident in his lectures 
on parrhesia. Foucault examines the meaning of parrhesia
41
 in terms of „Frankness‟, „Truth‟, 
„Danger‟, „Criticism‟,  and „Duty‟ (Foucault, 2001: 11-20) and analyses it as a practice or 
activity.
42
 In his „problematisation‟ of parrhesia he distinguishes it from the performance of 
                                                 
41
 Parrhesia is variously interpreted as „frankness of speech‟, „free speech‟ and „fearless speech‟. It comes 
to us from the ancient Greeks, where the word, “was used in the political sphere to express the right of free 
speech of anyone who enjoyed full civic status in Athens” (Glad, 1998: 3). 
42
 “The specific „speech activity‟ of the parrhesiastic enunciation … takes the form: „I am the one who 
thinks this or that.‟ [Foucault uses] the phrase „speech activity‟ rather than John Searle‟s „speech act‟ (or 
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isolated utterances to an ongoing taking up of a position, a way of being. So that, to be 
understood as one who lives this way is to be known as a parrhesiastes. A parrhesiastes is “one 
who speaks the truth” (11). Additionally, “[s]omeone is said to use parrhesia and merits 
consideration as a parrhesiastes only if there is a risk or danger for him in telling the truth” (15-
16) and it is in this context that Foucault characterises parrhesia as „fearless speech‟.43 For us, 
Foucault‟s interpretation of parrhesia may be understood as an example of an everyday practice 
that is involved in a „way of being‟ as „limit-attitude‟. In the next chapter, we will explore this 
possibility, especially in terms of Foucault‟s work on the „care of the self‟. 
With regard to Foucault‟s answer to the question of what Enlightenment is, what is of 
interest to this thesis are the ideas of the limit-attitude and transgression. These ideas evoke the 
idea that the closure and limitation of actual institutions or „doctrinal elements‟ can be resisted, 
transformed or possibly broken. It is in this sense that the thought of Castoriadis and Foucault 
shares some common ground.  
 
 
 The refusal of the limits of the State? 
 
 In Castoriadis‟ „refusal of closure‟ and Foucault‟s „limit-attitude‟ we may have found at 
least a glimpse of an answer to the question of the possibility of politics without the State.  In 
Foucault‟s case, the limit-attitude can be understood to include “an exercise in which extreme 
attention to what is real is confronted with the practice of a liberty that simultaneously respects 
this reality and violates it” (Foucault, 1984: 41). This exercise (described in the context of his 
question about „modern philosophy‟ as „Baudelarian modernity‟) “compels [us] to face the task 
of producing [ourselves]” (42). So, this process describes how a person faces and acts in the 
world. As a „practice of liberty‟ it does not exclude acts of rational deliberation and is not 
reduced to such an act. The subject of this practice does not straddle the great divide of 
autonomy-heteronomy but acts in a world in which such a divide is meaningless and actually 
                                                                                                                                                 
Austin‟s „performative utterance‟) in order to distinguish the parrhesiastic utterance and its commitments 
from the usual sorts of commitment which obtain between someone and what he or she says … [T]he 
commitment involved in parrhesia, is linked to a certain social situation … to the fact that the 
parrhesiastes says something which is dangerous to himself and … involves a risk” (Foucault, 2001: 13). 
43
 This is not the only way in which parrhesia has been understood and practiced. Clarence E. Glad 
explains that, in Classical Greece and early Rome, “liberty of speech was naturally taken for granted as a 
principle obtaining among friends, just as it obtained among fellow-citizens in general, all of whom were 
equally entitled to express themselves without fear of neighbours or of those in power. From the time of 
Isocrates onward, however, frankness came increasingly to be perceived rather as a private virtue, and 
more particularly as an integral element in friendship” (Glad, 1998: 3). Glad adds that this shift in meaning 
from “freedom of speech to personal candor is coordinate with the change from the egalitarian city-state to 
a regime of powerful rulers in a position to dispense patronage” (4). This kind of parrhesia can hardly be 
called „fearless‟ and the shift of meaning anticipates the position Kant expressed in his essay, „What is 
Enlightenment?‟ In this thesis however, parrhesia will not be understood as something which exists only in 
parlours, but as an everyday activity, as fearless speech. 
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misrepresents the experience of social life. Now although Foucault sees these practices and 
exercises taking place within a “critique of our historical era” (42) – or in another context, as 
parrhesia – his emphasis seems to be more upon the critique and production of the self. For 
Castoriadis, the emphasis seems to be on the refusal of closure as a project, though not a project 
which individuals produce themselves for. Rather, this project is one in which subjects see 
themselves as part of a social-historical imaginary of the project of autonomy. However, as noted 
earlier, Castoriadis‟ work includes a concept of autonomy which at least partly retains a 
conceptual dependence on the autonomy-heteronomy dichotomy. For the purposes of this thesis, 
this has implications regarding the questions of allegiance and obedience to the State. Further, the 
subjects engaged in the project of autonomy do not loom as everyday people and autonomy does 
not show itself as something that can be lived through time. Castoriadis‟ autonomy, despite its 
engagement – and, as we shall soon see, its situatedness in an historically open field of 
revolutionary praxis – still seems rather abstract.  
While I will not attempt to synthesise Foucault and Castoriadis with the aim of conjuring 
an alternative conception of autonomy in this thesis, their slightly different emphases allow me to 
illuminate the different way, or ways, we might follow. However, even though I have managed to 
imagine the problem in such a way that does not involve having to choose a „fork in the road‟, I 
cannot yet claim to have found a way to conceive of politics without the State. Our understanding 
is still somewhat static. At this point I will only dare to contend that autonomy, conceived as an 
act of a detached mind, is not autonomy at all and that if there is autonomy at all, it must be 
understood as something that is both intellectually and bodily lived in the world.  
So, so far, I have done little more than elaborate a preference for an Aristotelian, over a 
Kantian, position on autonomy, in the context of the question of politics without the State. As 
such then, we understand our social-historical situation as a limit and, following Castoriadis and 
Foucault, we understand the idea and possibility of refusing that limit, of transgression, of going 
beyond. It could be said that some ground has been prepared for understanding the possibility of 
politics without the State. If we are prepared to go beyond – or more importantly, „go without‟ – 
how does this happen? In terms of Foucault, what is beyond critique, of the self or of the 
historical era? With regard to Castoriadis, what is the refusal of closure? Is it anything more than 
jamming our foot against a slamming door? 
 Autonomy remains a problem. In this chapter, we have seen how the concept(s) of 
freedom and autonomy, as detached from the senses and the world, tends to function in such a 
way as to coincide with the State‟s interests of self-legitimation and self-preservation. However, 
in the work of Arendt, Foucault and Castoriadis, we found conceptualisations of „freedom‟ which 
at least include an aspect of engagement in social and political life. These understandings of life, 
importantly, include the taking up of a position within which the State must be engaged with 
politically. There is no detachment from the world and the politics of the State. In Arendt, 
 115 
Foucault and Castoriadis, we find that, in different ways and to different degrees, freedom is 
politics rather than freedom from politics. In the next chapter, the work of Castoriadis and 
Foucault will be further assessed. 
In Chapters Two and Three, I drew on Foucault‟s understanding of politics as 
governmentality to frame the problem that this thesis is addressing. Governmentality, as an 
explanatory genealogy of modern political allegiance, is set alongside Althusser‟s theoretical 
account of ideology. Both perspectives have been discussed in relation to the State‟s control of 
societal convention, and consequently, the State‟s strategy to ensure the obedience and allegiance 
of a subject population. In Chapter Five I will look at Foucault‟s response to the situation of 
subjects in a State. His later work on the care of the self will be assessed, along with his 
understandings of transgression and limit-attitude, in terms of their capacity to help us to 
understand the possibility of politics without the State. Can the State be refused? This question 
will be addressed by drawing upon the thought of Cornelius Castoriadis and his idea of autonomy 
as the refusal of closure. Finally, there seems to be a convergence between the thought of 
Foucault and Castoriadis. I think that an exploration of this convergence is necessary to take this 
argument to a new stage. Castoriadis and Foucault share some ground in relation to the notions of 
the refusal of closure and the limit-attitude. Foucault‟s theoretical and genealogical perspectives 
on how subjects are made and allegiance is secured shares some ground with Castoriadis‟ social-
historical imaginary perspective on the self-creation of subjects in a society. These perspectives 
will be examined with a view to establishing whether or not they can carry us further with regard 
to the possibility of the State‟s monopoly on politics being broken. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
AGAINST SUBSISTENCE 
Refusing freedom from politics 
 
  
[D]emocracy and philosophy are the twin expressions of a social-historical rupture, creating the 
project of (social and individual) autonomy. The meaning of this project is the refusal of closure 
(Castoriadis, 1991d: 31). 
 
These struggles are not exactly for or against the “individual”; rather, they are struggles against 
the “government of individualization” … Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we 
are but to refuse what we are (Foucault, 1982: 330, 336). 
 
 In Chapter Four, the notions of freedom and autonomy were discussed in relation to their 
conception in response to the development of Enlightenment rationality and to the fall of the 
divine legitimation of political authority. I argue that modern conceptions of autonomy operate 
mainly to establish a new form of legitimation. Allegiance is owed to the State because „freedom‟ 
is granted, or because being autonomous is actually the activity of giving allegiance. Further, this 
freedom as allegiance can be understood to be a form of exclusion from political activity. 
Political liberty, as primarily exercised in the mind and conscience, is a freedom from politics. At 
other times in this thesis we have discussed these problems in relation to the rational justification 
of sovereign power. This observation is not new and is part of what Foucault describes as the 
„banal facts‟ of the potential for political rationality to foster the worst excesses of political 
power.
1
 In this context, it becomes clear that the notions of freedom and autonomy are 
problematic. So, inevitably – possibly even necessarily (and definitely interminably) – the debate 
about where to draw a line which designates the appropriate amount of individual autonomy, 
against the degree of constraint on individuals allowable in order for their autonomy to be 
sufficiently meaningful, continues to bubble away. The grid of constraint is the community in 
which we live, no matter how large or small. Currently, I contend, this grid is monopolised by the 
State via its governmental control of conventions. Even in places where the integrity of the State 
and its logic are weakest, its suite of concepts is the background against which that integrity is 
gauged. Furthermore, that suite is considered to be the only viable means of understanding the 
                                                 
1
 Foucault writes that “since Kant, the role of philosophy is to prevent reason from going beyond the limits 
of what is given in experience. But from the same moment – that is, since the development of the modern 
state and the political management of society – the role of philosophy is also to keep watch over the 
excessive powers of political rationality. This is a rather high expectation … The relationship between 
rationalization and excesses of political power is evident. And we should not need to wait for bureaucracy 
or concentration camps to recognize the existence of such relations” (Foucault, 1982: 328). 
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dynamics of a given political community: about what happens, about what is „failing‟, about the 
appropriate measures to maintain or re-establish „stability‟. Even where the material force of the 
State and its institutions „fail‟, its imaginary, ideological concepts and apparatuses – the freedom, 
law and rights of the contract suite – reign supreme. The State has a monopoly on politics. 
 At the end of Chapter Four, we encountered some persuasive attempts, described in the 
context of this thesis, to theorise „freedom‟ in such a way that it might be possible to refuse, or 
resist, or rupture the closure of the State‟s monopoly on politics. In the work of Hannah Arendt, 
for example, „freedom‟ is understood as an act of virtuosity which takes place within a political 
life. Castoriadis understands autonomy as a project in which the refusal of closure is an important 
aspect of both societal and individual self-creation. For Michel Foucault, the possibility of a 
limit-attitude, the experience of the limit in transgression and the care of the self are inseparable 
from any understanding of freedom. For most of this chapter I will focus on Cornelius 
Castoriadis and Michel Foucault and those aspects of their thought which can be seen to be part 
of an effort to refuse the State monopoly. Their thought will be examined alongside their own 
theorisations of the constitution and creation of subjects by, respectively, „social-historical 
imaginary‟ and the authoritative control of „discursive formations‟. Are their attitudes, or 
positions, able to stand up to the State‟s monopoly? More importantly, in this Chapter we will be 
trying to ascertain if their ideas of autonomy and freedom, as different to the modern liberal and 
Kantian versions, can be important to the possibility of politics without the State. 
 
 
 Castoriadis and the invention of new modes of politics 
  
In Chapter Four I discussed Cornelius Castoriadis in relation to his claim that the socio-
historical creation of autonomy (and democracy) is the „refusal of closure‟. But more needs to be 
said about how this happens, about where and in which socio-political situations it happens, and 
about what kind of subject is capable of this. How does a „refuser‟ refuse, a „creator‟ create? 
What is it that needs to be refused in order for the project of autonomy to happen?  
 Castoriadis‟ work is driven by what he describes as the „original inspiration‟ of Marxist 
revolutionary theory. And it is provoked by what he sees as the theory‟s disastrous failure in the 
twentieth century. Among other things, his work is a response to the totalitarianism of Soviet 
sphere, to the increased bureaucratisation and rationalisation
2
 of organised revolutionary politics 
and of western liberal societies – of modern society in general. His oeuvre stands as an attempt to 
reanimate revolutionary praxis through thinking about the creation of social and individual 
                                                 
2
 It is worth noting here that Castoriadis and Claude Lefort worked together on Socialisme ou Barbarie and 
their critiques of the role of bureaucratic rationalisation share common ground. See pages 59-61. 
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autonomy.
3
 We might characterise his work, which he began in the late 1940s, as an attempt to 
overcome a „flight backwards into ideology‟. This „flight backwards‟, then, is from Marx‟s call, 
in his Theses on Feuerbach, for philosophers to change the world rather than interpret it. Where 
the original inspiration of Marxism saw the material conditions, the actual social lives of people, 
as the real stuff of its work, Marxist theory soon forgot this inspiration, theorised away the notion 
of individual and collective self-management, and retreated into abstraction, ideology and 
bureaucracy.
4
 For Castoriadis, this flight backwards is behind the failure of Marxist revolutionary 
theory. 
 
The transformation of Marxism into a finished theory contained within it the death of its original 
revolutionary inspiration … It contained the seed of the transformation of politics into technique 
and bureaucratic manipulation, since politics was now able to be the application of acquired 
knowledge to a well-defined domain and to precise ends … This allegedly full knowledge can 
only be based on a complete misunderstanding of things historical (Castoriadis, 1987: 70). 
 
 In his central work, The Imaginary Institution of Society (1987), Castoriadis begins with 
his „Provisional Assessment‟ of Marxism. He takes the central tenets of Marxist orthodoxy and 
assesses their success or failure as a response to the „original inspiration‟ of Marxist 
revolutionary theory (on which it is ostensibly founded). Firstly he argues that during the 
twentieth century Marxist theory became more and more abstract and detached from „real‟ (or 
„actual‟) social life and material conditions 5 and, as such, had become nothing more than 
ideology. There are a number of key aspects of what we might call this „flight backwards into 
ideology‟. Firstly, Castoriadis criticises Marxist economic theory as little more than an 
abstraction which ignores innumerably different local economic phenomena in its assumptions. 
This tendency is particularly exemplified in the theorisation of the transition from capitalism to 
communism (Castoriadis, 1987: 11). Tied up with this abstraction is the dependence of Marxist 
economic theory on a dialectical model which claims that capitalism will be destroyed by its own 
contradictions. Castoriadis argues that the theory‟s attachment to the dialectic ignores an actual 
                                                 
3
 For detailed descriptions and critiques of Castoriadis‟ work, see Dick Howard‟s, The Marxian Legacy 
(1988) and Simon Tormey and Jules Townshend‟s Key Thinkers from Critical Theory to Post-Marxism 
(2006). 
4
 As Dick Howard notes, from Castoriadis‟ earliest work, the implicit suggestion is that the key problem 
for analysis “is the stunting of the creative imagination of individuals, due to the existence of a socially 
legitimated collective representation” (Howard, 1988: 227). This stunting is a result of the „Russian 
tonalities‟, the ideology and representative bureaucratism of the Communist Party, through which any 
political thought and action had to pass. The response of Castoriadis to this situation is the theorisation of a 
“revolutionised society … in which the relation of the individual to the institutional is at all levels involved 
in a continual process of self-criticism” (Howard, 1988: 231). 
5
 For the rest of this Chapter, the terms „real‟ and „actual‟ social life or conditions are used in the context of 
Marx‟s discussion of real or actual social life and material conditions in his Critique of Hegel‟s Doctrine 
of the State (1975a) and The German Ideology (1968) (and as discussed in Chapter Two, pages.36 & 55 
and Chapter Three, pages 74-75 of this thesis). 
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history in which capitalism has repeatedly subsumed or appropriated (rather than resolved) so-
called contradictions within itself instead of being shattered by them (18). Further, he states that 
what have been categorised as dialectical contradictions are not so anyway but simply a 
“phraseology that lends a dialectical appearance to what is simply a model of mechanistic 
thinking” (18). Castoriadis then finds the Marxist theory and philosophy of history to be 
untenable. Its rigidly Hegelian reading of all of „History‟ as rational and progressive ignores the 
countless examples of a-rational, irrational and „stable‟ (rather than stagnant) periods of history. 
This theory also poses a Hegelian „total man‟ as the occupant (as both inheritor and as one who 
participates in the realisation) of the end of this history, an animal which is similarly implausible 
in any „real‟ social life (65). Castoriadis acknowledges that while it is possible to interpret and 
understand history with the aid of rationality, to read history as intrinsically rational is simply 
imposing a framework on events that did not and does not exist as events unfold. Human events 
(described by humans as „history‟) in themselves have no progressive or rational characteristics. 
Leaps of innovation, periods of stability and periods of „regression‟ can be understood by 
learning something of the “fabric of [the accompanying] social relations” (20), but to impose a 
totalising explanatory rubric of reason and progress over such relations ignores almost everything 
(19-23) and can lead to (among other things) the monolithic, rationalistic and often totalitarian 
bureaucracies that have become commonplace during the last one hundred and fifty years or so. 
In order to overcome these failures, Castoriadis then conceives of a project. Clearly, this 
project cannot be founded upon the aspects of Marxist political theory that Castoriadis sees as 
dead and untenable. Still, he maintains that some fidelity must be kept with the original 
inspiration of the Marxist revolutionary project. For Castoriadis, this political project was 
different from those that had preceded it. 
 
In its beginnings, Marxism presented an entirely new demand. The union of philosophy, politics 
and the real movement of the exploited class in society was not going to be a mere addition but a 
genuine synthesis, a superior union in which each of the elements would be transformed. 
Philosophy could be something different and something more than philosophy, more than a refuge 
from impotence and a solution to human problems in the realm of ideas, to the extent that it would 
translate its demands into a new politics. Politics could be something other and more than politics, 
technique and manipulation, the use of power for particular ends, to the extent that … the struggle 
of the exploited class could be something other than a defence of particular interests, to the extent 
that this class would aim at the suppression of all exploitation through the suppression of its own 
exploitation, at the liberation of all through its own liberation and the establishment of a human 
community – the highest of abstract ideas to which traditional philosophy had been capable of 
aspiring (1987: 62). 
 
 120 
As it has happened, “the Marxism which indeed claims to provide responses to the problems … 
mentioned, is situated at the furthest remove from this original inspiration” (66) and is nothing 
more than “a pseudo-scientific objectivism to which a rationalist philosophy is appended” (ibid). 
Castoriadis then sets himself the task of beginning again from the revolutionary project‟s original 
inspiration and of responding (this time without error) to its demand. This task, as we have 
touched on earlier, is the project of autonomy.  
 In returning to the original inspiration of the Marxist revolutionary project, Castoriadis is 
also stating that the problems that led to such an inspiration remain. That is, there is still as much 
reason as ever to try and solve the problems of exploitation, domination, dehumanisation, 
injustice and inequality that originally fired Marx‟s thinking. However, as we have seen, 
Castoriadis views these problems differently to the way the philosophy of the Marxist project 
has. For example, while alienation is understood as a real phenomenon – a real experience, this 
alienation is not of the sort in which a species being is alienated from his or her essential self. 
Instead, for Castoriadis, it is of a kind in which individuals are alienated from the reality of their 
society through institutions and their symbolic representation of what is „real‟ (1987: 115).6 In 
addition we see that, for Castoriadis, the key aspect of the revolutionary project‟s original 
inspiration – which Castoriadis preserves in his own work – is derived from Marx‟s arguments in 
the Critique of Hegel (1975a) and in The German Ideology (1968) about the primacy of the 
conditions of „real‟ (or „actual‟) social life in relation to the ideas that, for better or for worse, 
make a society „what it is‟ and which largely function to bind it together, and keep it how it is. 
However, it is from a different kind of explanation of history and of actual social life that 
Castoriadis sets out the foundations, presuppositions and possibilities of the project of autonomy.  
Through this alternative explanation, Castoriadis describes what he sees as the real forces 
that come to make any given, particular, society, what it is. In this context, he discusses the 
symbolic in terms of its place within the social-historical world and the institutions that make up 
this world.
7
 The symbolic is first encountered in language, but in a different way through 
institutions, and each institution “constitutes a particular symbolic network” (1987: 117).  
 
A given economic organization, a system of law, an instituted power structure, a religion – all 
exist as sanctioned symbolic systems. These systems consist in relating symbols (signifiers) to 
signifieds (representations, orders, commands or inducements to do or not to do something, 
                                                 
6
 Castoriadis regularly, and acerbically, criticises thinkers such as Althusser, Foucault and Lacan. 
However, while he might have bristled at the comparison, his figuring of alienation bears similarities to 
that of Althusser‟s descriptions of the operation of ideology as the representation of “the imaginary 
relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” (Althusser, 1969: 162). See Chapter Three, 
page 77 of this thesis.  
7
 “Everything that is presented to us in the social-historical world is inextricably tied to the symbolic. Not 
that it is limited to this. Real acts, whether individual or collective ones … the innumerable material 
products without which no society could live even an instant, are not (not always, not directly) symbols. 
All of these, however, would be impossible outside of a symbolic network” (1987: 117). 
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consequences for actions …) and in validating them as such, that is to say in making this relation 
more or less obligatory for the society or the group concerned (1987: 117).  
 
Castoriadis acknowledges that institutions and the accompanying symbolic order have clear 
functional, economic, logical and rational aspects. These all help to explain the subsistence of the 
„real‟ social world and the practices and acts of individuals and groups within it. However, there 
is always a limit to explanations of society based on these determinate characteristics because 
society and its institutions always include indeterminacies which defy simply functional or 
rational explanations.
8
 Castoriadis argues that we understand what a society is and how it 
institutes itself, largely by understanding its ideas and symbols, through significations, which 
may be „real‟, or representational, or functional, or ideological, and which are carried by those 
who belong to it. These aspects are bound together by what Castoriadis refers to as the 
Imaginary. As an example of this, Castoriadis describes the imaginary „Lord‟ that sits behind – as 
“source and ultimate sanction” – the actual social institution of Mosaic Law (128). In the context 
of this thesis, the ideas that make up the contract suite, „sit behind‟ our modern sovereign Law.9 
Of course, not all ideas within the imaginary have the status of Law. Many no less important 
ideas carry the particular values of a society. Castoriadis writes that the “self-image a society 
gives itself includes as an essential moment the choice of objects and acts, etc., embodying that 
which, for it, has meaning and value” (149).10 A society thus comes to define itself, to refer to 
itself as „we‟ and „us‟, to understand itself as strong, or as under threat, in relation to those things 
and acts that have meaning and value.  
Castoriadis‟ elaboration of the social-historical and the imaginary is an alternative 
conception of history and the material conditions of „actual‟ social life. As such, he is most 
                                                 
8
 “People often pretend to think that … symbolic logic, and the rational order that corresponds to it in part, 
pose no problems for the theory of history … A functionalist may consider it self-evident that, when a 
society provides itself with an institution, it gives itself at the same time … all the symbolical and rational 
relations that this institution carries or produces – or … that there can be no contradiction, no incoherence 
between the functional „ends‟ of the institution and the effects of its actual functioning, that whenever a 
rule is set down, the coherence of each of its innumerable consequences with the set of all the other 
previously existing rules and with the ends that are consciously or „objectively‟ sought is guaranteed” 
(Castoriadis, 1987: 122-123). 
9
 As such, with regard to either imaginary, “[b]eyond the conscious activity of institutionalization, 
institutions have drawn their source from the social imaginary. This imaginary must be interwoven with 
the symbolic, otherwise society could not have „come together‟; and have linked up with the economic-
functional component, otherwise, it could not have survived. It can be placed, and it must be placed in their 
service as well: there is, of course, a function of the institutional imaginary, although here, too, we observe 
that the effect of the imaginary outstrips its function; … without it any determination of both the symbolic 
and the functional, the specificity and the unity of the former, the orientation and the finality of the latter, 
remain incomplete and finally incomprehensible” (Castoriadis, 1987: 131). 
10
 Castoriadis uses the example of the value that certain types of food have in a given society. He writes, 
“One has only to draw up the catalogue of everything that humans can eat, and actually have eaten … 
[safely] … to see that what is edible for humans far exceeds what each culture has taken as its food, and 
that what has determined this choice has not been simply natural availability and technical possibilities” 
(1987: 150). Concomitantly, what each culture takes as its food is often tied up with religious, social and 
legal sanction. 
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concerned to avoid using a rigid, rationalistic explanatory framework as the basis for an 
emancipatory philosophy. Castoriadis‟ project starts through an understanding of the social world 
in which (it is argued) it is not possible to fall into the traps of determinism and totality. For 
Castoriadis, according to the logic of what Marxist philosophy had become, where everything is 
determined and explainable according to a „finished theory‟, revolution was no longer possible. 
As such he argued that “we have arrived at a point where we have to choose between remaining 
Marxist and remaining revolutionaries” (1987: 14). For Castoriadis, revolutionary thought and 
action (long effaced in orthodox Marxist theory) continues to be possible within his theorisation 
of the social-historical. As such, for Castoriadis, it is in the region of the Imaginary that an 
indeterminacy exists (an indeterminacy which some philosophers have called „Freedom‟) but 
which is actually just the presupposition for such an idea. This indeterminacy exists at all times, 
for example, in a society which does nothing more than subsist. Indeterminacy is not itself 
freedom or autonomy, but autonomy presupposes this indeterminacy. Autonomy is not 
determined by this indeterminacy. There is nothing in society which determines autonomy but, 
according to Castoriadis, autonomy can be instituted and created out of it.  
 
 
The refusal of subsistence 
 
It is from, or through, the imaginary that society and the individuals within it (can) 
institute autonomy. It is in what is left over – in what escapes explanation and determination by 
laws, by function, by rationality – that Castoriadis sees the imaginary. In later writings 
Castoriadis broadens his gaze – from his critique of the Marxist revolutionary project – to take in 
philosophy in general.
11
 This broadening of focus need not be understood as a shift, or turn, or 
break in Castoriadis‟ work, but as a continuation of his aim to conceive of the ways in which 
people can make decisions for themselves and manage their society for themselves. Castoriadis‟ 
approach to the world at large is consistent with his critique of Marxist theory. As such, when he 
moves to examine philosophy in general, it is characterised (like Marxist theory) as enclosed by 
its own explanations via determinacies, those explanations through which history and being is a 
result, a culmination and nothing more (1994: 128-130). Castoriadis calls this dominant 
philosophical tendency „The Adoration of the Fait Accompli‟, an intellectual activity of “the 
rationalization of the real” which concomitantly is “the legitimation of the powers that be” 
(1991e: 8). In the face of this, Castoriadis proposes that we ask questions about the world – about 
what is – not by enumerating and examining its parts and their functions, but by beginning by 
looking at the whole thing, where the imaginary is not an inexplicable leftover or overflow, mere 
                                                 
11
 Essays that encapsulate this development are „The Imaginary: Creation in the Social-Historical Domain‟ 
(Castoriadis, 1997a) and „The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy‟ (Castoriadis, 1991a).  
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dregs, but an actual aspect of that whole (1997a: 4-5). Castoriadis introduces the notion of 
„magmas‟12 in order to imagine this whole that cannot be reduced and disaggregated and, as a 
means of attaining knowledge or understanding of that whole.  
In these terms, society, as an instituting imaginary and as an entity that can be understood 
as one thing,
13
 is a „closed‟ institution. As a way of describing this closure, Castoriadis refers to 
Varela‟s use of the term „autonomy‟ in relation to biological systems and entities.14 He notes that 
there is a similarity between biological organisation (as described by Varela) and the social 
world, in that “both social and biological organizations exhibit an organizational, informational 
and cognitive closure. Each society, like each living being or species, establishes, creates its own 
world, within which … it includes „itself‟” (1997a: 8-9). With regard to biological organisation, 
Varela calls this self-containment „autonomy‟. Castoriadis though finds this understanding to be 
misleading and argues that such closure, as “governed by rules, principles, laws and meanings 
that … once posited, are given once and for all” is actually a description of heteronomy. In the 
social-historical domain, such an understanding would necessarily mean that nothing new would 
ever have happened, or could ever be created (17). Of course, we know that things do happen, but 
this is in keeping with the „rules, principles and meanings‟ of a given social-historical. That is, 
within a given social-historical situation, change takes place according to the relations given 
within. It is in this context that the use of the term „magma‟ is most useful. It allows Castoriadis 
to distinguish between the determinate aspects of the social-historical (i.e. the rules, principles 
and meanings) and its indeterminacies. The magma includes the determinacy of social-historical 
closure and the indeterminacy and potential openness of the imaginary. 
As we have seen, while Castoriadis devotes much of his analytical time to describing the 
heteronomous within the social-historical, he is most concerned with the possible emergence, the 
self-institution and self-creation of the autonomous individual within an autonomous society. 
This kind of society, he argues, is characterised not by closure but by openness – an openness 
through which a society calls into question its own institution, its representation of the world and 
its own social imaginary significations (17). The difficulty with this proposition is in 
understanding how such questioning could happen. 
While any society continually institutes itself, this instituting usually does not involve 
opening itself up to question, to rupturing itself, to creating itself as new forms. In contrast to this 
understanding (of most societies as closed), Castoriadis discusses the possibility of autonomy 
(often through a discussion of his exemplary autonomous society, the Athenian polis). Whether a 
society is closed or open, heteronomous or autonomous, whatever takes place does so within the 
                                                 
12
 “A magma is that from which one can extract (or in which one can construct) an indefinite number of 
ensemblist organizations but which can never be reconstituted (ideally) by a (finite or infinite) ensemblist 
composition of these organizations” (Castoriadis, 1987: 343). 
13
 “Society as such is a form, and each given society is a particular, even a singular, form” (1997a: 5). 
14
 Castoriadis is referring to Varela‟s Principles of Biological Autonomy (1979). 
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relations of a social-historical imaginary – a magma. It is from a magma and from those 
indeterminacies we spoke of earlier, that autonomy is possible. The rupture of the closed society, 
the creation of a new set of magmatic relations (on the very rare occasions that it happens
15
) 
occurs, in Castoriadis‟ words, ex nihilo.  By this he means that what is created comes from 
nowhere, but nevertheless out of the contexts and conditions of social-historical situation. This 
creation, however, cannot be explained as a result of, or as determined by, the existing sets of 
relations (1997d: 174; 1997e: 392-393; 1991b: 64).
16
 The possibility of this creation ex nihilo 
initially „surges forth‟ (1997d: 183) out of the psyche as the „radical imagination‟. Castoriadis 
conceives this radical imagination in largely Freudian terms. He begins by describing a pre-
socialised, „pre-subjectivised‟ psychical monad which resists the constant socialising of social-
historical imaginary significations (176-184). The resistance of this monadic psyche to its 
„defunctionalisation‟ by the force of socialisation into the social-historical world of 
representations and significations is generally repressed or sublimated (188-189). This is because 
people cannot exist as actual psychical monads regardless of the „pre-subjective‟ impulse to do 
so. People are part of a social (social-historical) world, regardless of such desires (187). 
However, the social-historical is not merely a world that orders – i.e. as both demanding and 
„organising‟ – the processes of sublimation, but one from which autonomy can be made. It is 
from this place that the radical imagination „surges forth‟ (183), creating, refusing closure, 
instituting itself as a self-reflective subject, potentially rupturing the heteronomous social-
historical world, and instituting that world as autonomous.
17
 In this sense, the subject, or 
„reflective subjectivity‟ is itself a creation of the radical imagination in the same way that 
democracy is.
18
  Further, Castoriadis sees the actual existence of the irreducible social-historical 
                                                 
15
 That is, on two occasions in Castoriadis‟ view. Firstly with the Greek polis (1991a; 1991d) and secondly 
with the emergence of the “emancipatory project [that] has dominated Western European history since the 
end of the Middle Ages, beginning in fact with the new cities founded by a new category of individuals, the 
first „bourgeois,‟ Bürger, the protobourgeoisie which arose out of the feudal order. This protobourgeoisie 
built political communities which tended toward self-government and maneuvered between the feudal 
lords, the Church, and the new monarchies to obtain a degree of independence” (1991g: 221, see also 
1991d: 22-23) 
16
 David Ames-Curtis puts it this way: “Where does this self-implicating human creation that is individual 
and collective autonomy come from? Like all creation, Castoriadis would say, it comes from nowhere (ex 
nihilo); we cannot reduce it to anterior „causes‟ or attribute it to an invariant „human nature.‟ However, 
creation does not occur without any means (cum nihilo) or out of all context (in nihilo)” (Curtis, 1991: vii). 
17
 Of this, Castoriadis writes, “there is a recognition of the fact that I should be autonomous, not so as to 
repress the knowledge of my Unconscious but so as to filter what of my desires, of my impulses, can reach 
expression or be acted out … [This] goes all the way toward the instauration of a new instance of 
subjectivity: a reflective or deliberative subjectivity capable somehow or other of establishing another 
relationship with the Unconscious, which is still its basis … It is a matter of not being a slave to the 
Unconscious, that is to say, it is a matter of being capable of stopping oneself from speaking out or acting 
out, while being conscious of the drives and of the desires that push one in that direction. It is this sort of 
subjectivity that can be autonomous and it is this sort of relation that is autonomy” (Castoriadis, 1997d: 
190).  
18
 Castoriadis‟ notion of subject is not a given of human nature but something that emerges from the radical 
imagination. He writes, “we know that reflective thinking, no more than democracy, was not there all the 
time. It emerges, it is created through human activity at a certain time in a certain place … We therefore 
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phenomenon of the institution as evidence of the capacity of collective, or social autonomy 
(1991b: 63-64). As such, we have both individual and social autonomy surging forth from, and 
self-instituting through, the radical imaginary. 
 It is on the psychical monad and its resistance to its institution as a social(ised) individual 
(which, as we will see, is not dissimilar to Foucault‟s „refusal of what we are‟) that Castoriadis‟ 
project of autonomy rests. From its resistance to its own social-historical induction, comes the 
possibility of calling into question the closed relations of a society – its instituted representations, 
values and idols. The question that remains though is about how this questioning can be 
conceived as a project? For this, Castoriadis depends on the notion of praxis – the activity of 
making and doing. Praxis is described as a „political attitude‟ and is elucidated against the 
„contemplative attitude‟ of abstract political-historical theory. As such, Castoriadis writes that 
praxis “is not speculating on the impossibility of the absolute but transforming the real in order to 
eliminate as much as possible all that is adverse to human beings” (1987: 85). Further, the place 
of praxis in the project of autonomy is related to its orientation to the future.  
 
To do something, to do a book, to make a child, a revolution, or just doing as such, is projecting 
oneself into a future situation which is opened up on all sides to the unknown, which, therefore, 
one cannot possess beforehand in thought, but which one must necessarily assume to be defined in 
its aspects relevant to present decisions. This doing is lucid when it does not alienate itself to an 
already established image of this future situation, but modifies it as it goes along … [and] … does 
not lose itself in conjectures and speculations concerning aspects of the future irrelevant to what is 
to be done now, or beyond our control (1987: 87). 
 
This is a project in terms of its always aiming at autonomy through the transformation of the 
existing sets of relations and conditions within which the activity of praxis takes place.
19
 As such, 
this project, with its „moving image‟ of the future, could be said to resemble a shifting or 
constantly receding utopian horizon
20
 rather than a traditional revolutionary program. This 
                                                                                                                                                 
have to recognize in them human creations; we are thus led to recognize also, beyond that, the otherwise 
obvious fact that human history is creation – of significations and institutions embodying them, of the 
social individual out of the „raw material‟ of the psyche, and of self-reflective subjectivity” (1991d: 31). 
19
 Castoriadis describes praxis as “that lucid activity whose object is human autonomy which can be 
reached only by means of this autonomy” (Castoriadis, 1997f: 129) and as “the activity that aims at 
autonomy … [and] … aims at others as (potentially) autonomous subjects and tries to contribute to their 
efforts to attain full autonomy” (1991b: 76). While Castoriadis‟ work can be arguably split into two phases, 
where he is firstly a thinker of praxis until a later shift to focus on autonomy and the refusal of closure, I 
would argue that the notion of praxis remains strong throughout. In his later work for example, praxis 
remains important in relation to his discussion of the modes of activity of the Greeks. As such his notions 
of praxis, „technique‟ and „making/doing‟ (faire) often appear as part of a constellation of ideas such as 
poeisis, techne, and physis, and in different contexts, paideia and parrhesia. See for example, his essays 
„Technique‟ (1984b) and „The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy (1991a). 
20
 Thanks to Jeremy Smith for this observation. I would add to this that if Castoriadis‟ project is in any way 
utopian, it is not of the kind which posits abstractions or fixed conditions for the (teleological) realisation 
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orientation of the project has been criticised
21
 but it is in keeping with Castoriadis‟ critique of 
Marxist revolutionary theory. That is, the unprogrammatic nature of Castoriadis‟ project is 
necessary to maintain its openness and to avoid repeating the failure of the Marxist revolutionary 
project. Still, in terms of the project‟s aspirations, while we can imagine the possibility of 
autonomous individuals constantly calling into question their own social-historical situation, it is 
far more difficult to imagine how this alone could lead to the kind of autonomous society that 
Castoriadis describes. 
 As mentioned earlier, Castoriadis sees the polis as the original autonomous society.
22
 In 
his later work, the polis stands as the exemplary figure of social and individual autonomy 
(although it is not intended as a model for the project of autonomy). Castoriadis discusses certain 
practices of the polis as examples of the practices which would need to be cultivated in any future 
autonomous society. He also sees the polis in genealogical terms, as the “social-historical locus 
where democracy and philosophy are created” (1991a: 84). Thus, while the polis is not a model 
for any future autonomous society, the “genealogical connection” between the imaginary 
significations of the polis and our society implies that there is “still some active, intrinsic 
relationship” (86) which can aid our understanding of what is required for any society to be 
autonomous. So, keeping in mind this genealogical connection, when Castoriadis describes the 
democratic politics and the philosophy of the polis, he also has in mind his earlier ideas of 
socialist political self-management.
23
 And these ideas are partly inspired by the workers councils 
of the Hungarian uprising, which are themselves an aspect of the social-historical of the 
emancipatory project begun (again) by the protobourgeoisie of the late Middle Ages. So, when he 
describes the parrhesia and paidiea of the polis, it is part of a line of thought from his ideas of 
revolutionary praxis. For example, he says that  paidiea is “not primarily a matter of books and 
                                                                                                                                                 
of an ideal society, but rather of a sort which constantly aims at revolutionary autonomous praxis, 
regardless of the constraints, limitations and/or closure of present conditions or of the real or imagined 
promise of possible future conditions. What is important to Castoriadis in this context is the concerted 
creative and poietike activity of making/doing in and with the present social-historical. 
21
 That there is nothing conventionally „programmatic‟ about this project has been seen as a lack in 
Castoriadis work. Fuyuki Kurasawa notes, “Apart from a latent attachment to revolution, Castoriadis does 
not conceive of the socio-political vehicles through which … a break could take place; the trigger toward 
participatory democracy, equality and liberty is largely absent from his theory” (Kurasawa, 2000: 149). 
22
 In these terms Castoriadis describes the Athenian polis as a society in which we find “the explicit 
questioning of the instituted collective representation of the world – that is, where we find philosophy. 
Further, just as political activity in Greece leads to the question not merely of whether this particular law is 
right or wrong, just or unjust, but of what justice is in general, so philosophical interrogation leads rapidly 
to the question not only of whether this or that representation of the world is true, but of what truth is. Both 
are genuine questions – that is, they must remain open forever” (Castoriadis, 1991a: 102). 
23
 Castoriadis‟ writings on this subject are developed as part of his critique of bureaucracy and of the 
abstractions and representative tendencies of Marxist theory and movements. In relation to political 
organisation and self-management, he writes, “the absurdity of all inherited political thought consists 
precisely in wanting to resolve men‟s [sic] problems for them, whereas the only political problem in fact is 
this: how can people become capable of resolving their problems for themselves” (Castoriadis, 1973: 38, 
cited in Howard, 1988: 231). Many of the essays in Castoriadis‟ Political and Social Writings Volumes 1 
(1988a) and 2 (1988b) provide intensive studies of this subject. 
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academic credits … [but] … involves becoming conscious that the polis is also oneself and that 
its fate depends upon one‟s mind, behaviours and decisions … it is participation in political life” 
(1991a: 113). His descriptions of praxis, in relation to both education and political action are 
largely indistinguishable from those of parrhesia and paideia.
24
 Finally, he sees the direct 
democracy of Athens as an idea and practice which puts the representative practices of both 
Marxist political organisation and modern liberalism to shame.
25
 Overall, the polis is deployed as 
a means of discussing the possibility of remaining revolutionary rather than Marxist (Castoriadis, 
1987: 14). 
 The practices of paideia, parrhesia and revolutionary praxis, all understood as all-day-
every-day political participation, are not the only characteristics that Castoriadis sees as necessary 
to the project of autonomy. He also argues that any autonomous society, as a community of 
citizens, needs to explicitly self-institute and proclaim itself as “absolutely sovereign” (1991a: 
106). This also becomes part of Castoriadis‟ definition of politics when he says that it is a 
“collective activity whose object is the institution of society as such” (102). While Castoriadis 
works to distinguish the Greek notions of institution and sovereignty from any necessary 
relationship to modern states and constitutions, the spectre of the State remains. Thus, while the 
actual historical polis remained unsullied by such institutions, we are not so fortunate. We are as 
„genealogically connected‟ to the modern State as to the polis. In reality, of course, our 
connection is more than genealogical. While it may be possible to conceive of an autonomous 
society by referring to the polis and its practices, in the midst of our own social-historical 
imaginary it is extremely difficult to disentangle the sovereignty of the polis from the sovereignty 
of the modern State.  
So, while it should be acknowledged that when Castoriadis outlines his project he avoids 
positing a teleologically determined ideal society, his thought still includes both a generic and a 
genealogically invoked
26
 thread in which political society is understood as fundamentally closed 
                                                 
24
 Castoriadis writes that “[s]ince 1964 I have called the activity that aims at autonomy praxis: this activity 
aims at others as (potentially) autonomous subjects and tries to contribute to their efforts to attain full 
autonomy … This activity may take on an intersubjective form in the precise sense of unfolding in a 
concrete relation to determinate beings intended as such. Its most obvious cases are then pedagogy (also 
and especially „informal‟ pedagogy, which occurs everywhere and always) and psychoanalysis. But it also 
has to … take a form that goes far beyond all „intersubjectivity‟: politics [la politique], namely, the activity 
that aims at the transformation of society‟s institutions in order to make them conform to the norm of the 
autonomy of the collectivity” (1991b: 76). 
25
 Castoriadis argues that “representation is a principle alien to democracy … Once permanent 
„representatives‟ are present, political authority, activity, and initiative are expropriated from the body of 
citizens and transferred to the restricted body „representatives‟, who also use it to consolidate their 
position” (1991a: 108). 
26
 I think there are important distinctions to make between Castoriadis‟ genealogical invocation of the polis 
and the genealogical method employed by Foucault (which will be discussed later). For Castoriadis, the 
invocation of the polis as genealogically connected to our own social-historical imaginary, is at least partly 
about identifying those aspects of the polis that could be reanimated with the aim of creating social and 
individual autonomy. It is genealogy with a telos. Foucault‟s genealogy is not teleological at all. Foucault 
discusses the haphazard relationships of human events in order to demonstrate the absence of necessity, 
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and singular and as defined by an imaginary identity through which individuals within it 
understand themselves as „us‟. This „us‟ maybe be transformed by autonomy, but it will not lose 
its „us-ness‟. This aspect of Castoriadis‟ thought is repeated in explanations of the Social-
Historical, of magmas, of the radical imagination and, finally, in those instances in which he 
draws on the polis. While he does not suggest a return to the polis, its ideas – of parrhesia, 
paideia, of political activity – work as key social-historical images that inform present praxis (or 
the project). These images, I argue, are a significant force in the containment of Castoriadis‟ 
thought, particularly those aspects of it which pertain to political activity. 
 A further problem with Castoriadis‟ conception of autonomy lies in positing the radical 
imaginary, which emerges from a „pre-subjective‟ psychical monad, as the nowhere from which 
creation and the refusal of closure surge forth. While Castoriadis continually emphasises the 
equal importance of individual and social autonomy, the notion that the primary location of 
autonomy is in an unsocialised (even pre-materialised) individual mind cannot avoid associations 
with a Cartesian logic.
27
 This approach, I argue, is not one that can be associated with the 
possibility of a politics without the State. 
 I think Castoriadis‟ analyses of Marxist revolutionary theory and of philosophy in 
general are greatly convincing. Further, I think that the overall aims of his project should not be 
ignored in terms of the problems that this thesis is considering. Despite the conclusions I have 
drawn here with regard to particular political question, the task that Castoriadis describes is of the 
same ilk. 
 
It is easy to say, and it must be said, that one must escape from the deadly quicksand of traditional 
organization, not only from „democratic centralism‟ but from everything that, in the traditional 
organizations, nourished the tendency toward bureaucratization and hierarchy; that we must 
invent new modes of being together, of discussing together, and of deciding together in a political 
organization (Castoriadis, 1997d: 195). 
 
With regard to inventing „new modes of being together‟, we can accept that Castoriadis‟ 
characterisation of autonomy (as the self-creation of new forms and ideas through the radical 
imaginary) is a persuasive response to the original inspiration of the Marxist revolutionary 
project. Nevertheless, while he rejects any idea of „the political‟ which is completely defined by 
                                                                                                                                                 
progress and telos in „History‟. On the other hand, Castoriadis traces the fragmented, haphazard, bastard 
„family line‟ of autonomy from the polis to the present. This work is not undertaken in order to 
demonstrate the necessity of autonomy. The aim is to persuade us that the relationships and connections to 
the polis are real and exemplary, and thus an appropriate inspiration for the cultivation of a contemporary  
radical imaginary. 
27
 Tormey and Townshend note that Castoriadis‟ position has been characterised (see Žižek, 1999: 24 and; 
Stavrakakis, 2002) as Cartesian in the sense that “the subject is posited as prior to social reality and thus as 
author of her own world” (Tormey & Townshend, 2006: 28). 
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the concepts and conditions of the modern State,
28
 there is not so much reason to conclude that 
any new form could be described as „politics without the state‟. Castoriadis‟ conception of 
individual and social autonomy is, by his own admission, inseparable from the idea and eidos of 
the Athenian polis. Similarly, I would argue that, from the perspective of our own social-
historical situation, the polis is inseparable from the modern state. Further, given Castoriadis‟ 
understanding of the self-instituting and self-creating autonomous individual and society, and 
according to his descriptions of how autonomy surges forth ex nihilo, any autonomous society is 
still one which is autonomous with the same sets of institutions that maintain the heteronomous 
(or closed) realm. As such, it is more than likely that a Castoriadian autonomous society would 
be one that exists, in some way, with and to some extent through the State (as it subsists in 
theory, through its concepts and on the actual social lives of people).
29
 This likelihood is 
especially strengthened by the thrust of the Castoriadian project itself which aims to transform 
the existing society and its institutions.
30
 Castoriadis is bluntly dismissive of approaches which 
do not in some way include an attitude to the State, stating that only “a moron or a charlatan … 
can claim to be interested in freedom and to be disinterested in the question of the „State,‟ in the 
question of politics” (1993b: 317). In this statement Castoriadis implies that politics and the State 
are (at least currently) inextricably intertwined. Or, to put it in a more familiar way, the State has 
a monopoly on politics and there is little any „non-charlatan‟ can or should do about it. He is 
equally dismissive of any thought of the „death of the subject‟ and as such the thought that any 
new mode of politics might be able to do without one. 
For all of its merits, the theory behind Castoriadis‟ call for the „invention of new modes 
of being together‟ is limited by its genealogical and social-historical associations and 
relationships with theories of the State, with both the idea and the actual historical event of the 
polis, and by its ultimate reliance on a „psychically‟ separate individual subject. The „refusal of 
closure‟ that sits at the centre of Castoriadis‟ political theory is ultimately individualistic and 
unified in its identity. Earlier I have referred to the seemingly similar suggestion from Foucault, 
that we can „refuse what we are‟. With his emphasis on the relations of power and games of 
                                                 
28
 “We have to restrict the term and the notion of the State to a specific eidos, the historical creation of 
which can almost be dated and localized. The State is an instance separated from the collectivity and it is 
instituted in a way that constantly ensures this separation … I would insist … that the term „State‟ be 
restricted to the cases where there is an institution of a State Apparatus, which entails a separate civilian, 
military or priestly „bureaucracy‟” (Castoriadis, 1991f: 156-157). 
29
 This is so regardless of the distinctions made by Castoriadis about what he understands the State to be. 
For example, he writes: “The State is, typically, what I call an institution of the second order, belonging to 
a specific class of societies. I would insist … that the term „State‟ be restricted to the cases where there is 
an institution of a State Apparatus, which entails a separate civilian, military of priestly „bureaucracy,‟ 
even if it be rudimentary, that is, a hierarchal organisation with a delimitation of regions of competence” 
(Castoriadis, 1991f: 156-157).  
30
 “What is at issue is … effective, social, concrete freedom, namely … the largest possible space for 
movement and activity the institution of society can ensure for the individual. This freedom can exist only 
as dimension and mode of the institution of society. And the institution of society is what politics in the 
authentic sense of the term intends” (Castoriadis, 1993b: 317). 
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strategy, on practices and transgression, it may be possible to conceive of a politics without 
inextricable relations with the closed institutions of a community and without a dependence on an 
individual subject, and as such, without the State. 
 
 
 Foucault and the subject of discourse 
 
 Earlier I mentioned Foucault‟s investigation of the possibility of a „limit-attitude‟. This 
emerges in response to his earlier work on the constitution of discourses of knowledge, truth and 
subjects (the subjectivisation of subjects). In The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972) Foucault 
attempts to explain the approach and attitude of his earlier detailed studies of particular practices 
and their accompanying discourses. As such, he discusses systems of knowledge as discourses 
which establish the notions of „truth‟ (and a concomitant understanding of normality) for various 
social and institutional settings and practices. For example, Foucault describes his work in 
History of Madness (2006), The Birth of the Clinic (1994 [1973]), and The Order of Things (2002 
[1970]) as, respectively, “studies of madness and the beginnings of psychology, of illness and the 
beginnings of clinical medicine, of the sciences of life, language, and economics” (1972: 16). 
These studies examine the emergence of discourses as systems of knowledge against which any 
social practice or domain of cultural production is accorded the status of „truth‟ and „validity‟. In 
this way, discourses also set up a regime in which people can be studied as objects, an 
objectivisation which in turn forms the ways people become subjects (and particularly, what kind 
of subject they turn out to be). Foucault writes
31
 that “this objectivization and this 
subjectivization are not independent of one another; it is from their mutual development and their 
reciprocal bond that what we might call „truth games‟ arise: not the discovery of true things, but 
the rules according to which, with respect to certain things, what a subject may say stems from 
the question of truth and falsehood” (Foucault/„Florence‟, 1994: 315).32 Foucault further 
describes his studies as the questioning of those „truth games‟ in which “the subject itself is 
posited as an object of knowledge” (315) and calls it “A Critical History of Thought” (314). In 
keeping with this understanding, Foucault‟s focus in The Order of Things is on the biological 
sciences, language and political economy with regard to how these discourses (and the objects 
                                                 
31
 Foucault writes here under the pseudonym of „Maurice Florence‟. For more detail on this see Gary 
Gutting‟s „Preface‟ to The Cambridge Companion to Foucault (1994: viii) and James D. Faubion‟s 
editorial footnote to the piece in Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology (Foucault, 1998a: 459). 
32
 Foucault/„Florence‟ continues that this “critical history of thought is neither a history of the acquisitions 
of truth nor a history of its occultations; it is a history of the emergence of truth games. It is a history of 
„veridictions,‟ understood as the forms according to which discourses capable of being deemed true or false 
are articulated with a domain of things: what the conditions of that emergence have been; what price has 
been paid for it, as it were; what effects it has had on the real; and the way in which, linking a certain type 
of object with certain modalities of the subject, it has constituted for a time, a space, and particular 
individuals, the historical apriori of a possible experience” (Foucault/„Florence‟, 1994: 315). 
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they study) can be understood as a “history of the Same” (Foucault, 2002: xxvi). This is a 
“history of the order imposed on things … of that which, for a given culture, is both dispersed 
and related, therefore to be distinguished by kinds and collected together into identities” (ibid). 
On the other hand, Foucault describes his study of the discursive objectification of some people 
as „mad‟ people, the History of Madness (2006), as a “history of the Other – of that which, for a 
given culture, is at once interior and foreign, therefore to be excluded (so as to exorcize the 
interior danger)” (ibid).33 Later, in Discipline and Punish (1991), the emphasis shifts to societal 
and spatial (as well as discursive) practices, as they relate to the constitution of docile, 
manipulable, controllable bodies, as members of a docile, manipulable, controllable population. 
As such, discourses of knowledge and truth, around the notions of same and other, normal and 
abnormal, come to encompass, distribute and perpetuate those norms, behaviours and practices 
which direct, explicitly or implicitly, people‟s political identifications and activities. In the 
context of this thesis, this can be understood to include, in a governmental sense, the „grid of 
constraints‟ within which people give their allegiance to a state. 
 In relation to this, I have regularly likened, in this thesis, a Foucauldian understanding of 
discourses, practices and norms to Hume‟s conventions. What I have not said much about is the 
ways in which these characterisations of allegiance differ. Or, to be more accurate, I have not 
referred to the differences between the political and philosophical contexts from which Hume and 
Foucault wrote, and the wider implications of those differences.  
 It is fairly easy to describe the political context from which Hume wrote. His description 
of conventions as an explanation for political allegiance is, like all of his work, matter-of-factly 
empirical. When he tells us that people give their allegiance, not because they have entered into a 
contract, but simply because they have (to him, sensibly) submitted to the dominating force of 
political authority – and to an intergenerational or hereditary force of habit – he does so without 
approving of or bemoaning the situation. If he ever expresses an opinion to the effect that the 
allegiance of subjects would be better secured without resort to force, it is only to stress that it is 
only an opinion and that any attempt to express or proscribe it in political theory, is irrelevant and 
ultimately in vain. This is because, for Hume, “society could not otherwise subsist” (Hume, 1987: 
481) than in the ways he has described. When commenting on the politics of his day, Hume 
exercised his usual scepticism about any political theories or systems that would significantly 
alter the system of conservative parliamentary monarchy which he lived in, and strongly 
supported.
34
 As a sceptic with regard to theoretical notions of political freedom or agency, his 
comments on politics and his characterisation of conventions and their political function are 
                                                 
33
 Foucault‟s work on clinical medicine and the prison then, also becomes part of this „history of the 
Other‟. 
34
 For example, he describes republicanism and popular government as a „dangerous novelty‟ (1987b: 35-
36) and as a “danger more terrible” than any posed by monarchy (1987c: 52-53). Ultimately, Hume argued 
that absolute monarchy was the most „peaceable‟ form of government (ibid).  
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relatively unproblematic in the context of his own thought. The work of Foucault, however, as 
similarly calling into question the taken for granted notions around political agency, is 
tremendously problematic. This is because – both for Foucault himself and for those who tend to 
look to radical theory as a revolutionary tool – his studies can be seen to close down the 
possibility of revolution or resistance to power. This becomes more problematic when Foucault‟s 
actual political stances and activism are taken into account.
35
 Before we address these problems, 
however, we must first try to understand the context that Foucault sets up as a background to his 
studies. 
 While the results of Foucault‟s work can be aligned with those of Hume, there is more of 
a sense and thrust to his studies that the exercise of power on individuals and populations is 
something to be less than sanguine about,
36
 and even to be resisted and refused. This thrust can be 
detected in his books on the objectifying practices around „madness‟, medicine and prisons and 
also in his discussion of the relations of thought, history and society in „Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
History‟ (1984b). Here he describes a genealogical approach as one which “rejects the 
metahistorical deployment of ideal significations and indefinite teleologies. [Genealogy] opposes 
itself to the search for „origins‟” (1984b: 77). Instead, a genealogical approach is a study of the 
“details and accidents that accompany every beginning” (80). In adopting a genealogical 
approach, Foucault kicks out the theoretical supports of any political philosophy of necessity, of 
teleology, of totalisation and unification. Unlike Hume, Foucault (accompanied by Nietzsche
37
) 
proceeds from this point to describe these totalising, objective, philosophies and histories as 
masks of demagoguery (91-92), under which occurs the “endlessly repeated play of dominations” 
(85). Further, the “domination of certain men over others leads to the differentiation of values; 
class domination generates the idea of liberty … [and] … [t]his relationship of domination … is 
fixed, throughout its history, in rituals, in meticulous procedures that impose rights and 
                                                 
35
 During his life, Foucault took very public positions on many political issues (e.g. on the Iranian 
revolution and on  prison reform in France). This activism (to generalise) has come to be understood in two 
opposing ways. Walzer and Rorty, for example, describe Foucault‟s political stances as respectively, “self-
indulgent radical chic” (Rorty, 1994: 47) and “infantile leftism” (Walzer, 1994: 51). Walzer reads 
Foucault‟s work as an anarchist advocacy for the abolition of power systems, before arguing that “Foucault 
does not believe, as earlier anarchists did, that the free human subject is a subject of a certain sort, naturally 
good, warmly sociable, kind and loving. Rather, there is for him no such thing as a free human subject … 
Men and women are always social creations, the products of codes and disciplines. And so, Foucault‟s 
radical abolitionism … is not anarchist so much as nihilist” (Walzer, 1994: 61). On the other hand, 
Foucault‟s efforts to live his life according to a philosophical ethos, which included such practices as 
transgression through the limit experience and the care of the self, while open to critique, make sense in 
terms of his genealogical understanding of power and the resistance. See James Miller‟s biography The 
Passion of Michel Foucault (1994) for an account of the relationship of Foucault‟s life to his thought.  
36
 As Agnes Heller writes, “Foucault … has preserved an aloofness, a playful pretension of mere 
descriptive objectivity. But this is not the emotional or intellectual experience of the reader, who reading 
Foucault, forms an opinion of prisons, mental asylums, or the discourse of humankind or sexuality” 
(Heller, 1990: 24). 
37
 In this essay, Foucault (uncharacteristically) quotes liberally from a number of Nietzsche‟s texts, 
particularly from Human, All Too Human (1994), The Gay Science (1974), and On the Genealogy of 
Morals (1989). 
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obligations” (ibid). In the context of this thesis, we recognise the notion that certain political-
philosophical concepts – particularly that of political freedom – function largely to secure the 
allegiance of subjects. In this respect, Foucault – having the benefit of the view from his own 
place in time – notes the intensive development of conventions, practices and procedures in the 
modern governmental state.  
 Maybe Foucault‟s work can be seen to pick up where Hume‟s left off. While Hume was 
a contemporary of Rousseau‟s, his discussion of the contract preceded Rousseau‟s and, 
importantly, what Althusser describes as the „flight forward into ideology‟ (i.e. the theorisation of 
the total alienation of an individual to the State). If Hume finds that society could not subsist 
without allegiance via arbitrary force and convention, Althusser‟s theorisation of the Rousseauian 
contract and ideology and Foucault‟s studies show how this means of subsistence happens to be 
organised through the „haphazard‟38 emergence, through history, of apparatuses, institutions, 
practices, discourses, procedures and norms into a grid of governmental constraint – as power. It 
is interesting to note that when Hume discusses society and the State, he chooses the notion of 
subsistence to think about its existence. For Hume, the State is not an abstract or ideal presence 
but simply one form of organisation that has turned out to be, that people have found to be, 
productive enough and peaceful enough to maintain a society in relative health, relatively free of 
starvation and chaos. Still, it should be remembered that Hume does not see the State as 
necessary or inevitable.
39
 The State (or „government‟, as Hume calls it) is one means of 
maintaining the continued existence of the society. This maintenance involves the officers of the 
government making decisions in what they deem to be the interests of the greater population.
40
 
This characterisation is very close to Foucault‟s. As we saw in the discussion of 
„governmentality‟ in Chapter Two, for Foucault government is the means by which a 
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 “The forces operating in history are not controlled by destiny or regulative mechanisms, but respond to 
haphazard conflicts. They do not manifest the successive forms of a primordial intention and their 
attraction is not that of a conclusion, for they always appear through the singular randomness of events” 
(Foucault, 1984b: 88). Foucault here directly refers us to Nietzsche‟s Genealogy of Morals, Essay II, 
Section 12 (Nietzsche, 1989: 76-79). 
39
 “Though government be an invention very advantageous, and even in some circumstances absolutely 
necessary to mankind [sic], it is not necessary in all circumstances” (Hume, 1952: 240). Hume describes 
the tribe or „the Camp‟ as a circumstance in which government is not „necessary‟. In such circumstances, 
people may “live in concord and amity among themselves, without any established government, and never 
pay submission to any of their fellows” (241). However, in times of war, or when there is “an increase of 
riches and possessions”, the circumstances have changed and government becomes necessary (241-242). 
40
 While Hume‟s work reflects a genuinely held position that the „magistrates‟ of a government will make 
such decisions out of an equally genuine belief that they are to the population‟s benefit, “government 
extends further its beneficial influence; and, not contented to protect men in those conventions they make 
for their mutual interest, it often obliges them to make such conventions, and forces them to seek their own 
advantage, by a concurrence in some common end or purpose … Thus, bridges are built, harbours opened, 
ramparts raised, canals formed, fleets equipped, and armies disciplined, everywhere, by the care of 
government” (Hume, 1952: 238-239). 
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population‟s material subsistence is arranged, in order that the State continues to subsist.41 It is in 
this context that the political differences between Foucault and Hume stand out. Hume‟s claims 
that government is organised for the benefit of the population is in accord with his monarchism. 
Foucault‟s study of the same processes, however, imply that such benevolence is not at play. 
Ultimately, where Hume sees the subsistence of government as the best possible arrangement 
(like Rorty, to some degree, later argues), Foucault‟s critique operates in such a way that the 
multi-faceted operation of such subsistence is characterised as Power, the existence of which 
includes operation of local struggles and resistances, which themselves alter the regime of power 
as “possible subversive recodifications of power relations” (1980: 123). If there is to be an 
everyday possibility of resistance, it is within these practices and places of everyday power. 
 
 
 To refuse subsistence 
 
 While Foucault says little explicitly about whether or not this governmental „subsistence‟ 
of the State is good, the inclusion of Power as a concept under which subsistence happens casts 
doubt on the (Humean) idea that populations are managed solely in their own interests. For 
Hume, governments manage populations „for their own good‟, which allows society to subsist. 
For Foucault, governments manage populations in order that government and the State persists. 
Whether or not this management includes middle-class welfare or an authoritarian state of 
exception, is of no (functional) consequence to that aim. In putting forward this analysis, which 
characterises the theory of modern political sovereignty (with the associated concepts of the 
contract suite) as nothing more than a “mask of demagoguery” (1984b: 91-92), Foucault also 
calls into question the foundations of the emancipatory programs of modern political thought. 
This questioning is not just implicit in Foucault‟s critique. He puts it quite explicitly. 
 By gathering together discursive formations, regimes and practices – firstly under the 
idea of a disciplinary power that is dispersed as if via capillaries (1980: 39), and then under the 
strategic idea of governmentality – Foucault casts the entire theorisation of sovereignty as an 
anachronism. He argues that modern political theory is stuck in the past – a past in which the 
theory was a fitting description of the ways in which power was exercised – when there were 
actual sovereigns who could wield the authority of a decision over life and death (Foucault, 1981: 
135-145). Foucault observes, however, that things have changed. While sovereign monarchs once 
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 There are two different senses of „subsistence‟ used here, but these senses aptly summarise Foucault‟s 
characterisation of governmentality – firstly, as something in the process of organising and maintaining 
itself, and secondly, as something that simply, or theoretically, is there and that has endurance. Again, the 
term „subsistence‟ is used in order to make clear the distinction between an ontologically understood or 
necessary being of the State – which this thesis rejects, and an existence that has a material sense of 
„permanence‟, but one that is nevertheless contingent and in need of ongoing maintenance and (life) 
support. 
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did indeed exercise power over land, labour, goods and wealth, now the dispersed and 
discontinuous forms of disciplinary power operate as governmentality, the power “over bodies 
and what they do” (2004: 35-36). This power, Foucault argues, “cannot be described or justified 
in terms of the theory of sovereignty. It is radically heterogeneous and should logically have led 
to the complete disappearance of the great juridical edifice of the theory of sovereignty” (36). Of 
course, it hasn‟t disappeared. It continues to exist, Foucault says, “as an ideology of right” 
(ibid).
42
 It persists as an incongruous overlay. So Foucault argues that “[i]n political thought and 
analysis, we still have not cut off the head of the king” (1981: 88-89). 
 Foucault‟s work has been widely criticised from many perspectives.43 Most commonly, 
he is accused of providing an insightful analysis into the controls and limits of modern society 
and then following the analysis with no epistemological, ethical or political norm which would 
provide a means to emancipate ourselves from such controls and limits.
44
 I will not address these 
arguments directly here.
45
 I am not looking for norms from Foucault. For the purposes of this 
thesis, I will examine Foucault‟s discussions of local resistances, the modification of power 
relations, the refusal of „what we are‟ (as the refusal of a subjectivised subsistence ordered by 
governmentality and the State) in order to ascertain whether or not such practices can happen as a 
politics without the State.  
I will begin this examination with a question. Why, after claiming that we have not yet 
cut off the king‟s head, does Foucault not then do it himself?46 I think that this question can be 
approached in different ways. Firstly, one of Foucault‟s key points in „Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
History‟ is his description of the rise and fall of different regimes through history as merely the 
passing of control of the “system of rules” of domination from the forces in power to “new forces 
that are sufficiently strong to dominate those in power … The successes of history belong to 
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 Foucault argues that the theory persisted for two reasons. “On the one hand, the theory of sovereignty 
was, in the seventeenth century and even the nineteenth century, a permanent critical instrument to be used 
against the monarchy and all the obstacles that stood in the way of the disciplinary society. On the other 
hand, this theory, and the organization of a juridical code centered upon it, made it possible to superimpose 
on the mechanism of discipline a system of right that concealed its mechanisms and erased the element of 
domination and the techniques of domination involved in discipline, and which finally guaranteed that 
everyone could exercise his or her own sovereign rights thanks to the sovereignty of the State … 
[D]isciplinary constraints had to both function as mechanisms of domination and be concealed to the extent 
that they were the mode in which power was actually exercised [so], the theory of sovereignty had to find 
expression in the juridical apparatus and had to be reactivated or complemented by judicial codes” 
(Foucault, 2004: 37).  
43
 As noted in Chapter Three (footnote 3), Callinicos includes Foucault in his critique of the postmodern 
„aestheticisation of politics‟. See his „Reactionary Postmodernism?‟ (1990) and Against Postmodernism 
(1989). Cornelius Castoriadis makes his own rather caustic observations around the notion of the „Death of 
the Subject‟ or of „Man‟ etc. See Castoriadis 1993a [1977], 1997c, 1997b, 1984a [1977].  
44
 See Nancy Fraser‟s „Foucault on Modern Power‟ (1981) and Jürgen Habermas‟ The Philosophical 
Discourse of Modernity (1987a). 
45
 For more on these critiques and the associated debates, see the collections edited by Hoy (1994) and 
Gutting (1994). 
46
 Thanks to David McInerney from the University of South Australia for this particular framing of the 
question. 
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those who are capable of seizing these rules, to replace those who had used them, to disguise 
themselves so as to pervert them” (1984b: 85-86).  Hence, the sovereign is never removed, just 
replaced by another. Both liberal reformist and socialist revolutionary political movements can 
only take the place of or take over, the system of rules of domination that already exist.
47
 Any 
attempt to depose a sovereign regime is thus rather futile, for that regime‟s mode of subsistence 
continues largely intact. Secondly, if the actual situation is one in which the governmental regime 
of disciplinary power prevails, Foucault‟s critique implies that there is no head to cut off. 
Foucault‟s claim is that “political thought and analysis” (1981: 88-89) is trapped in a sovereign 
past. If this is true, Foucault‟s own political thought and analysis operates to point out the 
absence of the head of the king as an aspect of the regime within which strategies are deployed.
48
 
While Foucault‟s analysis could conceivably be used as a tool with which an emancipatory 
political movement could calibrate a strategy to overthrow a particular regime, this would seem 
to me to miss the point of the critique. If one is to read and use Foucault‟s critique according to 
its own inflection, the ultimate task cannot be to resort to a familiar revolutionary program.  
  
Political analysis and criticism have in a large measure still to be invented – so too have the 
strategies which will make it possible to modify the relations of force, to co-ordinate them in such 
a way that such modification is possible and can be inscribed in reality. That is to say, the problem 
is not so much that of defining a political „position‟ (which is to choose from a pre-existing set of 
possibilities) but to imagine and to bring into being new schemas of politicisation. If 
„politicisation‟ means falling back on ready-made choices and institutions, then the effort of 
analysis involved in uncovering the relations of force and mechanisms of power is not worthwhile 
(Foucault, 1980: 190). 
 
So, the task for political theory must be to look away, to avert one‟s gaze from phantom kings‟ 
phantom heads to where power is actually produced. For Foucault, if emancipatory change is 
possible, it is not as a result of a frontal assault directed at the governmental political institutions 
that subsist through disciplinary power. Instead, change, or at least the experience of it, occurs at 
the locus of such power – the body and the self. Thus, we find Foucault claiming that “the target 
nowadays is not to discover what we are but to refuse what we are” (1982: 336). 
 The refusal of „what we are‟ takes place through the limit experience49 and the care of the 
self. With regard to the limit experience, we have already encountered the „limit attitude‟ as 
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 As discussed on page 56 of this thesis, in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marx makes a 
similar point with regard to the appropriation of the bureacracy and the state apparatus by each new regime 
(Marx 1971: 169). 
48
 Again, thanks to David McInerney, who in a conversation with me, conjured an image of Hobbes‟ 
frontispiece, but with the sovereign body carrying its head under its arm. 
49
 James Miller‟s biography, The Passion of Michel Foucault (1994), provides a rich and comprehensive 
telling of Foucault‟s life in terms of the „limit experience‟. Given the determination of Foucault to live 
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expressed in „What is Enlightenment?‟ (1984a). Here Foucault describes an attitude of perpetual 
critique of the present and the givens of that present.
50
 The idea of a „limit experience‟, however, 
arises in Foucault‟s early studies and is something that takes place within the spaces and key 
„personages‟ of those studies. For example, in Madness and Civilisation (1973), Foucault 
investigates the transformation by European rationality of the “undifferentiated experience” of 
madness into one half of the binary, “Reason and Madness” (1973: ix). While madness and non-
madness, reason and non-reason are “inextricably involved”, there is no longer a “common 
language” between them, only silence, a broken dialogue (x). Instead, the “language of 
psychiatry, which is a monologue about madness, has been established only on the basis of such 
a silence” (x-xi). Foucault then asks, “What then is this confrontation beneath the language of 
reason? Where can an interrogation lead us which does not follow reason in its horizontal 
course?” (xi). He answers, “A realm, no doubt, where what is in question is the limits rather than 
the identity of a culture” (xi). Here, a study of the changes in knowledge about the (limit) 
experience of madness is a vehicle for a study of the limits of reason. This approach continues in 
The Order of Things (2002) and in The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972) and, as an approach, 
remains akin to a limit attitude of constant critique.  
In „A Preface to Transgression‟ (1963) the experience of the limit and of transgression in 
both thought and action is treated more directly. The essay is a discussion that takes place around 
Bataille‟s thought on the experience of eroticism and religious ecstasies as transgressive, limit 
experiences (1963: 29-30)
51
 and, in it, Foucault analyses the „violent denaturing‟ done by modern 
languages to our understanding and experience of sexuality. Here, the limit and transgression are, 
to some extent like reason and madness, a mutually dependent relation (34). This problem of the 
limit though is one of philosophical language, which is “linked beyond all memory … to 
dialectics” (40). Foucault then contemplates the possibility of a “non-dialectical language” (41) 
and of “thought in which the interrogation of the limit replaces the search for totality and the act 
of transgression replaces the movement of contradictions” (50). Foucault grapples with the 
difficulty of putting into words the experience of the limit in the act of transgression, and 
proposes that this difficulty characterises the limit of philosophical discourse itself (51). No 
doubt, this limit is one for interrogation but it remains an interrogation that cannot itself express 
                                                                                                                                                 
according to his philosophies and political positions and thus to engage in limit experiences, this book is 
important for any theoretical understanding of the idea. 
50
 Foucault discusses Kant‟s essay of the same name (Kant, 1980a) and draws on his call to break from 
immaturity and tutelage to elucidate the notion of the limit attitude. 
51
 “[N]ever did sexuality enjoy a more immediately natural understanding and never did it know a greater 
„felicity of expression‟ than in the Christian world of fallen bodies and of sin. The proof is its whole 
tradition of mysticism and spirituality which was incapable of dividing the continuous forms of desire, of 
rapture, of penetration, of ecstasy … What characterises modern sexuality from Sade to Freud is not its 
having found the language of its logic or of its natural process, but rather, through the violence done by 
such languages, its having been „denatured‟ – cast into an empty zone where it achieves whatever meagre 
form is bestowed upon it by the establishment of its limits” (Foucault, 1963: 29-30). Foucault here refers to 
Bataille‟s Eroticism (1987 [1962]). 
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the act of transgression. It is in this context that we might view Foucault‟s activism and sexual 
adventurism (especially that of his later life) in relation to his political positions. What he could 
not find the words to say or write, he had to do and experience.
52
 But, how does this help us to 
understand the place of Foucault‟s work in the context of this thesis? If „A Preface to 
Transgression‟, written in 1963, can be read as a way of understanding Foucault‟s actions 
towards the end of his life and thus his politics, what are we to make of his last published works 
on the „care of the self‟? 
 In the second and third volumes of The History of Sexuality (1992; 1990), Foucault 
studies the ways in which individuals (mostly men) in the Greek and Greco-Roman periods “are 
urged to constitute themselves as subjects of moral conduct” (1992: 29), “the manner in which 
one ought to „conduct oneself‟ – that is, the manner in which one ought to form oneself as an 
ethical subject acting in reference to the prescriptive elements that make up … [a moral system 
or] … code” (26). In these studies Foucault is interested in the ways in which subjects come to 
master themselves – the ways in which self-mastery happens or is achieved. Such mastery is not 
achieved by simply following the rules which designate what behaviours are permitted and 
forbidden but by working on oneself, by practicing the techniques of the self. These practices and 
techniques amount to what Foucault calls „the care of the self‟. 
 These later studies have been characterised by some as Foucault‟s ethical turn.53 This 
however, is not the only way they can be viewed. Foucault, after all, does not set out these 
practices as new or alternative moral principles and he rejects the idea that we should return to 
any kind of Greco-Roman ethical practice (1984c: 294-295). So, while he characterises the 
practices of the self in terms of an ethos, it is more plausible, I think, to read this work as a 
continuation of a long-running line of study and thought. That is, a line of thought about the ways 
in which individuals become objects of knowledge, the ways in which that knowledge comes to 
hold the status of truth and the ways in which the discourses that emerge frame the practices in 
which we become subjects
54
 and (possibly) refuse that subjectivity. This line of thought, in which 
the limit is something that can be transgressed or refused, extends from the early 1960s until the 
                                                 
52
 One example of Foucault‟s fascination with such experiences is recounted by James Miller. He cites 
Foucault talking in an interview about the possibility of death from overdose “I think that the kind of 
pleasure I would consider as the real pleasure … would be so deep, so intense, so overwhelming that I 
couldn‟t survive it” (in Miller, 1994: 306). Foucault also describes the „intense pleasure‟ that accompanied 
his impression of dying after being struck by a car (ibid). Finally, in the same interview, Foucault says “I 
am fascinated by history and the relationship between personal experience and those events of which we 
are a part. I think that is the nucleus of my theoretical desires” (Foucault, 1988b: 7). 
53
 For a representative discussion of Foucault‟s late focus on ethics see the articles by Poster, Davidson and 
Hacking in Hoy (ed.) (1994) Foucault: A Critical Reader. See also Timothy O‟Leary‟s, Foucault and the 
Art of Ethics (2002). 
54
 Arguably, Foucault‟s ideas here can be seen to follow Nietzsche‟s notion of „becoming who we are‟. 
Given the frequency with which variations of this exhortation appear in Nietzsche‟s work, it could be 
considered his own rallying call, in a genre inaugurated by Kant‟s Sapere aude! Alexander Nehamas 
examines the significance of this recurrent theme in his, Nietzsche, Life as Literature (1985: 170-199). 
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time of Foucault‟s death. With this later focus on the care of the self, Foucault has moved from 
the analysis of the emergence of certain regimes of knowledge and the creation of the objects of 
those knowledges, to the ways in which individuals turn forms of knowledge onto themselves. 
Here the limit has shifted from a „ground‟ for transgression to a regime of conditions that can be 
strategically transformed through the practices of the care of the self as an ethos. This trajectory 
from „transgression‟ to the „care of the self‟ raises interesting questions. Is the care of the self a 
transgressive practice? If so, is it the kind of practice that accompanies politics without the State? 
I will turn to this question shortly. 
In later interviews, Foucault entwines this ethos with an idea of freedom. However, his 
invocation of the idea differs from the contractarian notion of political liberty of which we are 
most familiar. He begins to speak of the practices of the care of the self in terms of an ethics 
which is “the conscious practice of freedom” (1984c: 284-285). As a practice, Foucault refers to 
the Greek idea of freedom as that of not being a slave “of another city, of the people around you, 
of those governing you, of your own passions” (ibid). I think that here, Foucault is talking of 
freedom in the terms that Arendt and Castoriadis use, where those aspects of life devoted to 
keeping oneself alive – i.e. those concerned with mere subsistence – are considered to be on a par 
with slavery.
55
 But there is something more to Foucault‟s characterisation of freedom. Now, 
while it cannot be said that Foucault is trying to outline an ethics according to a Kantian model of 
autonomy, there is an inflection. Foucault‟s discussion of freedom across these works is 
evocative of the moral principles of Kant.
56
 As Foucault builds the genealogical story around the 
care of the self, he describes Greek and Greco-Roman practices of self-constitution as precursors 
to a Kantian moral autonomy.
57
 As such, these practices of ethical self-constitution are 
(genealogically) inseparable from Foucault‟s own eventual descriptions of the subject and its 
self-cultivation. Yet, Foucault deviates from a Kantian moral autonomy in at least a couple of 
ways. Firstly, he does not argue for techniques of the self which conform to universal laws. 
Secondly, he argues that the ethos of freedom is one in which a subject is free in relation to 
herself and others rather than „free‟ as a “subject of law” (1984c: 294, 300), whether that be the 
law of sovereignty or of Reason. In this sense, Foucault conceives of the subject according to a 
Nietzschean genealogical approach (as discussed earlier in relation to „History‟).58 For Foucault, 
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 See Chapter Four, pages 105-107. See also Arendt (1958: 12-17; 1963) and Castoriadis (1991a). 
56
 Foucault‟s rendering of freedom here is reminiscent of Kant‟s autonomous will as expressed in the 
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (1968). 
57
 Foucault explains: “Kant says, „I must recognize myself as universal subject, that is, I must constitute 
myself in each of my actions as a universal subject by conforming to universal rules.‟ The old questions 
were reinterpreted: How can I constitute myself as a subject of ethics? Recognize myself as such? Are 
ascetic exercises needed? Or simply this Kantian relationship to the universal which makes me ethical by 
conformity to practical reason? Thus Kant introduces one more way in our tradition whereby the self is not 
merely given but is constituted in relation to itself as subject” (Foucault, 1984e: 372). 
58
 For Foucault, a subject “is not a substance. It is a form, and this form is not primarily or always identical 
to itself. You do not have the same type of relationship to yourself when you constitute yourself as a 
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the subject has no essence or origin and does not become a unity or identity through processes of 
self-realisation. This subject is „free‟ insofar as she governs her (heteronomous) passions and her 
governance resembles the gathering of a multiplicitous self as a tenuous and transient „unity‟59 
rather than the exertion of a singular autonomous will. It is through the practices and techniques 
of this self that Foucault envisages the possibility of resistance to power as a refusal of what we 
are. Nevertheless, I think the framework, or at least the trope, of Kantian autonomy looms over 
Foucault‟s subject. A key question to be addressed is whether or not the emphases on „codes‟ 
over „values‟, on resistance and self-constitution, prevents Foucault‟s subject from uttering the 
„Yes‟ of a Nietzschean affirmation. Foucault‟s emphases on disciplines and practices are less 
open than Nietzsche‟s emphasis on „the deed‟. Given this, it is difficult to see how Foucault‟s 
„refusal‟ is any different, and thus more promising, that Castoriadis‟ refusal. However, there is 
another aspect of Foucault‟s thought that needs to be addressed with regard to these questions. 
This is Foucault‟s description of the relations of power, freedom and strategy.  
It has been argued that Foucault‟s characterisation of power leaves no place for freedom 
(see 1984c: 292). However, in response Foucault explains that he does not discuss „power‟ but 
rather, „relations of power‟.60 As such, power relations, as the attempt to control others within a 
relationship, can only operate if there are people who are free to submit to such control (292-
293).
61
 Foucault makes a distinction between „power‟ and „domination‟, arguing that a state of 
domination is one in which a subject has no option but to submit. On the other hand, power can 
only operate if there is a subject who is “faced with a field of possibilities in which several kinds 
                                                                                                                                                 
political subject who goes to vote or speaks at a meeting and when you are seeking to fulfil your desires in 
a sexual relationship. Undoubtedly there are relationships and interferences between these different forms 
of the subject; but we are not dealing with the same type of subject. In each case, one plays, one establishes 
a different type of relationship to oneself” (Foucault, 1984c: 290-291). 
59
 Insofar as Nietzsche allows a „self‟, it is only in terms of a process of becoming where through the 
disciplined and „stylish‟ exertion of will, one somehow corrals the traits and habits (which are themselves 
very much formed by the physical and social world) and arranges them, performs them in such a way that 
the effect can be understood to be a self. See for example, Nietzsche‟s The Gay Science (1974: [§290] 232-
233; [§335] 263-266) and Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1969: 252). In The Will to Power (1968) however, he 
expresses the idea of a multiplicitous subject quite clearly: “The assumption of a single subject is perhaps 
unnecessary; perhaps it is is just as permissible to assume a multiplicity of subjects, whose interaction and 
struggle is the basis of our thought and consciousness in general? … The only force that exists is of the 
same kind as that of the will: a commanding of other subjects, which thereupon change. The continual 
transitoriness and fleetingness of the subject” (270-271). See also Nehamas (1984:170-199) for his own 
„gathering‟ of these ideas from Nietzsche‟s texts into a comprehensive analysis of the Nietzschean self. 
60
 “I scarcely use the word power, and if I use it on occasion it is simply as shorthand for the expression I 
generally use: relations of power … when one speaks of power, people immediately think of a political 
structure, a government, a dominant social class, the master and the slave, and so on. I am not thinking of 
this at all when I speak of relations of power. I mean that in human relationships, whether they involve 
verbal communication … or amorous, institutional, or economic relationships, power is always present: I 
mean a relationship in which one person tries to control the conduct of the other. So I am speaking of 
relations that exist at different levels, in different forms; these power relations are mobile, they can be 
modified, they are not fixed once and for all” (Foucault, 1984c: 291-292). 
61
 In „The Subject and Power‟ Foucault writes: “Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only 
insofar as they are „free‟ … Where the determining factors are exhaustive, there is no relationship of 
power: slavery is not a power relationship when a man is in chains, only when he has some possible 
mobility, even a chance of escape” (1982: 342). 
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of conduct, several ways of reacting and modes of behaviour are available” (1982: 342). These 
possibilities become what Foucault describes as “games of strategy” within which the practice of 
the self allows us “to play these games of power with as little domination as possible” (1984c: 
298). These games are played within the existing relations of power. As such, Foucault places the 
activity of freedom within the field of governmentality and the (incongruous) law of the State. 
While Foucault sees resistance as possible and effective on a micro and local scale (which may 
be at something of a distance from governmentality and the State) this resistance is nevertheless 
inseparable from governmentality and the State. In light of this, the question is whether or not 
Foucault‟s work can be said to be a politics without the State. It is in relation to this question that 
I will return to the one raised above, with regard to Foucault‟s trajectory from „transgression‟ to 
the „care of the self‟. Is the care of the self a transgressive practice? Or has a Kantian trope closed 
it down? Could the various practices of transgression, when engaged in as games of strategy 
within relations of power open up the possibility of a politics without the state? And how might 
the subject involved in such practices be any different from the Castoriadian subject I have 
already dismissed. These questions will be explored in detail in Chapter Six. For now though we 
will return to the thoughts of Foucault and Castoriadis, to how the threads they have left for us 
tangle and diverge, in order to ascertain if a trajectory towards a politics without the State can be 
followed. 
 
 
 Foucault and Castoriadis: Politics without the State? 
 
 At the beginning of this chapter, traditional theories of freedom had been left behind 
because of their place in maintaining the State‟s monopoly on politics. That is, the traditional 
Kantian rational and liberal political theories were deemed incapable of being used to think about 
the possibility of politics without the State. From this weeding out of political theory however, 
the work of Castoriadis and Foucault survived because it seemed not to depend on the traditional 
political theoretical approaches. So, their works have been examined in order to work out 
whether there is any detectable inflection or trajectory suggesting the possibility of politics 
without the State. While I can maintain that both thinkers offer important critiques of 
conventional political theories and while it is possible to (if only rather tenuously) conceive of 
„non-state situations‟ through thinking about their work, such possibilities I have doubts that their 
work can be used as support for an argument about politics without the State. Interestingly, both 
Castoriadis and Foucault, despite their (apparently, and in Castoriadis‟ case, professed) different 
approaches and stances, end up in some very similar territory, especially in relation to the idea 
that we can „refuse what we are‟ and in the various ways this idea can be talked about as a kind 
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of politics.
62
 These resonances occur in relation to two areas of their thought. Firstly, their 
analyses of History and secondly with regard to the notion that subjects – „created‟ as subjects by 
their social and material conditions (or through conventions or norms) – are passive and 
powerless against the forces that form them and direct them. With regard to this, for example, 
what is striking about the critique offered by Foucault in „Nietzsche, Genealogy, History‟ 
(1984b) is its resonance with aspects of Castoriadis‟ „Provisional Assessment‟ of Marxist 
revolutionary theory. To some degree it is possible to read Castoriadis‟ assessment of Marxism as 
a detailed, particular elaboration of the kind of critique that Foucault applies in his essay to 
totalising, teleological histories and philosophies.
63
 For example, when Foucault writes of history 
in terms of “its moments of intensity, its lapses, its extended periods of feverish agitation, its 
fainting spells” and that “only a metaphysician would seek its soul in the distant ideality of an 
origin” (1984b: 80) we can recognise both the basis of Castoriadis‟ critique of the Marxist theory 
of history and the carefulness he employs when discussing the (genealogical) relationship of the 
polis to his project (Castoriadis, 1991a: 86-87). When Foucault argues that the genealogical 
method on which he bases his critique “does not resemble the evolution of a species and does not 
map the destiny of a people” (Foucault, 1984b: 81), we recognise a problem with which 
Castoriadis also grapples (albeit in a different way). 
Both Foucault and Castoriadis argue that individuals are more or less active participants 
in the relations of power, knowledge and ideology of their given society.
 64
 They carry it out as 
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 The claim that he shares ground with Foucault would probably not please Castoriadis. However, other 
areas of common ground with those he has dismissed have been noted by Simon Tormey and Jules 
Townshend (2006: 31-32). To put it too briefly Tormey and Townshend observe that: the critique of 
Hegelian-Marxism is similar to Lyotard‟s in The Postmodern Condition (1984); the critique of „identitary-
ensemblist thought‟ shares ground with Deleuze‟s Difference and Repetition (1994) and; the abandonment 
of class analysis and representation in favour of diverse social movements and direct political participation 
resonates with Laclau and Mouffe‟s Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (2001). 
63
 It would be fair to conclude that this suggestion would not sit well with Castoriadis himself. As already 
noted, he is bluntly and caustically dismissive of Foucault and others in his articles, „The Diversionists‟ 
(1993 [1977]), „The Movements of the Sixties‟ (1997c), „The Retreat from Autonomy‟ (1997b) and 
„Psychoanalysis: Project and Elucidation‟ (1984a [1977]). For example, Castoriadis describes discussions 
of the „death of the subject‟ as asinine and his critique of such discussion is based on the supposed political 
implications (1997c: 51). He also dismisses the questioning of structuralism by post-„68 thinkers on the 
basis that he himself had already done so (ibid). As we saw with the critique of Foucault (and others) by 
Callinicos earlier, such critiques seem more based on beliefs about appropriate revolutionary positions than 
on a thoroughgoing assessment of a larger body of work. This would possibly explain the absence of 
detailed commentary or critique, for example, of Foucault‟s broader genealogical approach and its 
implications for understanding history and the State. 
64
 “A factory in which the workers were really and totally mere cogs in the machine, blindly executing the 
orders of management, would come to a stop in a quarter of an hour. Capitalism can function only by 
drawing upon the genuinely human activity of those subject to it, while at the same time trying to level and 
dehumanize them as much as possible” (Castoriadis, 1987: 16). 
 “Productive or other kinds of „forces‟ can act in history only through the actions of individuals and to say 
that the same forces play the same determining role everywhere signifies that they correspond to motives 
that are constant and that are found everywhere … It is absurd to want to base history, which by definition 
is different, on the permanence of … [any historically designated] … „instinct‟” (1987: 25) or, Castoriadis 
argues, on any other „universal‟ motivation. 
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much as they are subject to it
65
 and the differences in particular local phenomena offer more to 
our understanding of social and historical situations than do the similarities (Foucault, 1980: 38-
39; 1982: 340-342; Castoriadis, 1987: 16, 23, 25). Further, when Castoriadis discusses the 
difference between actual material processes of the State and the symbolic and/or imaginary 
operations of sovereignty and the Law (Castoriadis, 1987: 22, 122-135)
66
 we find ourselves again 
in those regions discussed by Foucault, where, noting the incongruity between the notions of 
sovereignty and the actual „governmental‟ regime, he claims that we have not yet cut off the 
King‟s head (Foucault, 1981: 88-89). Overall, Castoriadis concludes that the failure of Marxist 
theory is explainable by holding it up against the actualities of history and society. 
 Taking note of the resonances between the work of Castoriadis and Foucault, however, is 
not to argue that the differences are insignificant. Rather, an examination of both the resonances 
and differences helps to shed light both on why these thinkers‟ work actually does offer more 
than traditional modern political theory and, on the other hand, the extent to which the work is 
still contained by modern political concepts – concepts of the State. 
 To summarise: Through showing how society and individuals come to be as they are in 
the particular and different ways that they are, Castoriadis intends also to show how societies and 
individuals can rupture and transform their ways of being and being together. For Castoriadis, 
such a possibility rests upon a praxis informed by a radical imagination oriented towards the 
constant questioning of the given social-historical situation and thus towards individual and 
social autonomy, an autonomy that seeks the autonomy of the other. This praxis, as political 
activity, cannot be oriented according to a program, or be a vehicle which carries history toward a 
determined conclusion. This activity, while described as a project, can only work with what is 
present to it, which is its own social-historical imaginary, and the ideas and images that can be 
created by a radical imagination. For Foucault, after showing how society and individuals come 
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 Castoriadis though, doesn‟t read Foucault this way. In „The Diversionists‟ he writes that Foucault 
“presents all society as caught up entirely in the nets of power, thereby erasing the struggles and internal 
contestation that puts power in check half the time. (According to the latest news reports, [Foucault] too 
has discovered the „plebs‟ – who, however, are „reduced to nothing‟ as soon as they „become fixed in a 
strategy of resistance.‟ Resist if it amuses you – but without strategy, for then you are no longer the plebs 
but power)” (1993a: 274). Of course, apart from the fact that strong claims can be made that Castoriadis 
has misread (or not read) Foucault, or is simply wrong here, it is with the conclusions that Foucault draws 
from seemingly similar beginning points that Castoriadis takes issue with. Given the resonances between 
Castoriadis‟ and Foucault‟s analyses of history (and supposed knowledges of history) it seems that the 
differences between them stem from the question of what kind of (political) action is possible or most 
likely to bring about change, or freedom (or, in Foucault‟s case, whether this is a question that has any 
meaning). As Castoriadis alludes above, the important question is one of strategy. Their most important 
differences begin when it is time to ask: What will we do now, then? How will we do it? What will 
happen? 
66
 Castoriadis writes that “there is in fact no law but the „law of force‟, that is, there is a „law‟ as long as 
matters are not really important – as long as you hardly need a law. The „law of force‟ also rules 
concerning the establishment of a new „legal order‟ within a country: „A victorious revolution crreates 
right‟ is the dictum which almost all teachers of international public law avow, and all countries follow in 
practice” (Castoriadis, 1991a: 116). This observation also echoes Benjamin, Derrida, Agamben and 
Schmitt. 
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to be made into the society and subjects they are, he labours over the possible ways in which 
subjects can transgress limits and modify, or refuse, or resist the objectification and 
subjectivisation of power. According to Foucault, where there is resistance, refusal or 
transgression, it comes from the activities and techniques of the care of the self, from a limit-
attitude and from the lived experience of the limit. 
 Broadly speaking, Foucault and Castoriadis‟ work converges, in a realm of ideas in 
which we – as subjects – can or may be able to refuse what we are, the closure of society, and to 
take up positions, attitudes and activities against subsistence. That is, for both thinkers, the only 
meaningful „freedom‟ is that in which we appropriate given sets of power, governmental and 
social-historical relations in order to take some control over the ways in which we are made what 
we are. For both, to sit back to be buffeted and shaped by those given relations is to settle for 
mere subsistence, the life of a slave. This is an existence which does no more than continue, 
which allows itself to be maintained in whatever way is determined by existing, heteronomous 
relations. Further, for both, the refusal of mere subsistence is taken on through engaging in 
certain kinds of activity. For Foucault, this activity is strategic engagement in and with relations 
of power and, the practices of the self. For Castoriadis, this is a politically engaged praxis. Both 
describe this activity as situated firmly in the present, engaged explicitly with the given sets of 
local relations. Where they differ is in the sense that, for Foucault, the activity is directed onto the 
self continually making (as a practice of refusal) its self. For Castoriadis, while taking place in 
the social-historically informed present, and while its ultimate source is the psyche, praxis is 
oriented towards the transformation of society according to a constantly shifting imaginary future 
(Castoriadis, 1987: 87). In simple terms, Castoriadis‟ focus is on a projected autonomous 
political community composed of autonomous individuals and Foucault is focussed on an 
individual subject‟s self-cultivation within, against and despite the prevailing relations of power. 
Further, for Foucault, if and where change occurs, it is haphazard, as anything recognisable as 
transformative change can only happen through a coincidental convergence of a multitude of 
events. This difference is related to the methodological stances of the two. Foucault rejects out of 
hand any search for or attempt to establish origins, as well as any teleological, totalising theory. 
While Castoriadis‟ critique makes similar arguments, his own project takes the original 
inspiration of Marxist revolutionary theory as a (non-determining) social-historical origin, an 
origin which continues to exist as a response to present social-historical conditions. This social-
historical understanding of the present situation operates as a „foundation‟ for his (non-
teleological) project of autonomy. In this sense (and in the context of this thesis, possibly to its 
detriment), Castoriadis‟ project is „politically instituting‟ in ways that Foucault‟s work is not. 
 What is important about these ideas in the context of this thesis is that they approach 
politics as an activity which is engaged with the constant making and shaping of the conventions 
of a society. Both are particularly alert to the effects of the ossification of conventions into 
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immovable, rational bureaucratic institutions. The work of both considers various practices 
through which people can intervene in ways that circumvent such ossification. Further, this 
activity is supposed to take place without assuming the primacy of liberal political freedoms and 
rights and without (explicit) reference to them. Where the idea of freedom is invoked, it is 
explicitly not the freedom of the self-contained liberal individual.
67
 Both try to work away from 
modern sovereign concepts (as they elucidate the modes of activity through which we can refuse 
what we are). However, while no explicit reference is made about the State, for both thinkers, the 
modern state – as a dominant aspect of the social, historical and political relations – is by default 
involved with the modes of activity discussed.
68
 As such, their work remains influenced by the 
State and its concepts. For Castoriadis, the project of autonomous social and self-institution – an 
instituting which can only be created out of existing social-historical situations and institutions – 
can only happen through the transformation of the State as part of the existing social-historical. 
As such, the creation of social and individual autonomy cannot be done without the State. This 
entwinement of Castoriadian politics with the State is reinforced by the influence of the idea of 
the polis in his work.  
It must also be noted that the polis and the ideas of classical Athens influence both 
thinkers. In Foucault‟s case, the influence of the polis and its ideas is not so much an influence on 
an understanding of politics. Rather, the influence is his elucidation of the practices and 
techniques of the care of the self. His allusions to Athenian freedom are made in relation to those 
practices through which a person works on herself, rather than activities particularly oriented 
towards the decisions a community makes about its ways of being together. This may be, 
ironically, what keeps Foucault in this particular game. On the other hand, I argue that 
Castoriadis‟ work is entwined with the State, its concepts and its logic. This is firstly with regard 
to the influence of the polis, for despite the real differences between it and the concepts of the 
State, the polis cannot be conceptually isolated from modern sovereignty – if only because of the 
name of politics. Secondly, his work is contained with regard to the nature of his project – as a 
project – in general. 
 In this Chapter I have variously dismissed, and been inspired by, elements of the work of 
Michel Foucault and Cornelius Castoriadis. It is appropriate to say that in both cases, this brief 
examination of their work confirms the statements I made at the beginning of the chapter. Their 
                                                 
67
 Castoriadis writes in one place, “Freedom is freedom to make/do – and making/doing is power to 
make/do all alone as well as power to make/do with others. To make/do with others is to participate, to 
become engaged, to connect with others in a shared activity – and to accept an organized coexistence and 
collective undertakings in which decisions are made in common and executed by all those who have 
participated in their formation” (1993b: 318). Foucault understands freedom, as we noted in Chapter Four 
(pages 109-111), as a socially situated activity, and like both Castoriadis and Arendt, refers to the polis in 
order to describe it (Foucault, 1984c: 285; Castoriadis, 1991a: 122-123; Arendt, 1963: 145-146 & 1958: 
12-13). 
68
 This point is not made as a criticism but as a reason for not relying on their work as a „foundational‟ 
means of pursuing this thesis question. 
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work does indeed offer far more than conventional (liberal) political theory with regard to the 
question with which the chapter began – the possibility of breaking the State monopoly on 
politics, of politics without the State. Further, I am in agreement with Castoriadis‟ call to invent 
„new modes of being together‟ and with Foucault‟s description of the key problem as the 
imagination of „new schemas of politicisation‟. While I have found that Castoriadis‟ work cannot 
be said to amount to a politics without the State, it has helped to transform the question again. 
Foucault‟s critique of modern sovereignty provided a model through which to further question, 
and to consider whether to strip politics of some more of its incongruous concepts and ideas. 
Castoriadis‟ comprehensive assessment of Marxist revolutionary theory supplements Foucault‟s 
critique. Further, his focus and explanations (as well as Arendt‟s), on politics as praxis, as 
primarily a locally (and strategically) oriented activity which aims at transforming given sets of 
relations, works to elucidate this thesis‟ understanding of politics. However, while his work has 
been fruitfully inspired by the polis, I think that it is also burdened by it. It is entwined with the 
concepts of sovereignty – largely due to the force of the idea of the polis – with its necessary 
unity, identity, closure and singularity – as a political community. Politics, autonomous or not, 
cannot be so beholden to such a singular historical event. In order to begin to escape this „deadly 
quicksand‟ it is necessary to look for ways of being together that do not depend on this closed, 
singular self-identification.  
Finally, despite the fact that I have come to the position where I think that it is not 
possible to describe a politics without the State by relying primarily on the thought of Castoriadis 
or Foucault, their thought, their critiques, their questions, their starting points and their actual 
assertions that „new‟ modes of politics need to be figured, will continue to inform this study. As 
such, despite his focus on the self (rather than community) Foucault‟s discussion of games of 
strategy may open a way to imagine a politics without the State. We will begin Chapter Six with 
this idea. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
A PLOY 
Strategy, play and gathering 
 
 
If we are to escape what Castoriadis calls the „deadly quicksand‟ of continually 
modifying traditional modes of political organisation, and to possibly figure new modes, it is 
necessary now to discern whether or not Foucault‟s ostensibly Nietzschean subject, and the 
games of strategy this subject plays within the prevailing relations of power, can happen in or as 
a politics without the State. On the surface, keeping the thought of Foucault in a game of which 
Castoriadis sets the rules seems paradoxical. This is so because in the previous chapter I argued 
that despite Castoriadis‟ positing of an (arguably Cartesian) individual psyche as the source of 
autonomy, his understanding of politics as „the activity and the mode of people being together‟ is 
itself the kind of understanding of politics that I am working towards. I also argued that, for all of 
the reasons discussed in the first four chapters, Foucault‟s focus on the individual is problematic 
for an understanding of politics without the state. However, I think that Castoriadis‟ conception 
of social and individual autonomy – associated as it is in his late work with the polis – is 
problematised by the requirement of a singular political identity and a fundamentally 
heteronomous, or closed, community. Further, Castoriadis‟ thought is entwined with the concepts 
of the modern State and the actually existing State, through its engagement with and intended 
transformation of existing institutions and its invocation of the Athenian polis. That is, 
Castoriadis‟ politics takes place or begins within a necessarily heteronomous, homogeneous and 
closed political community and space – which is understood as having been expressly instituted 
as such a community and space. On the other hand, while Foucault does focus on a subject, this 
subject is not understood as a strictly unified or singular identity – i.e. a Cartesian self. In 
addition, this subject moves strategically within the prevailing regime of power relations with the 
potential to change that regime politically, without first needing to be part of an instituted 
collective political identity. In other words, Foucault‟s strategies take place within a 
heterogenous, multiplicitous space and thus a more open field of possibility. So, because of 
Foucault‟s tendency to look away from political community, and towards relations of power, he 
remains in this game. 
For this thesis, the kind of politics that I am working towards – if we stick to the 
metaphor of a game for a moment – is a politics in which the idea of the „game‟ is that of keeping 
the game going, of not seeking its end or institution. This „game‟ of politics, which is not just a 
game, is particular instances of activity in which, for its duration, participation is direct and 
maintained (all-day-every-day) and keeps happening. Having said this, Foucault‟s thought 
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remains in play only tenuously. In the previous chapter I posed the question of whether or not 
Foucault‟s subject is itself stunted by the „trope‟ of Kantian autonomy. In order to finally answer 
this question, we will need to assess three aspects of Foucault‟s thought. They are, his notion of 
the subject, the strategies that subject is engaged in, and the extent to which these strategies can 
be said to occur as a „politics without the State‟. 
 
 
Strategy and play 
 
Foucault‟s analysis of political theory and its failure to separate itself from the 
conceptual traditions of political sovereignty is a vital aspect of his work. His claim that 
“[p]olitical analysis and criticism have in a large measure still to be invented” and that the 
problem with this task is “not so much that of defining a political „position‟ (which is to choose 
from a pre-existing set of possibilities) but to imagine and to bring into being new schemas of 
politicisation” (Foucault, 1980: 190) follows from his critique. As such, Foucault‟s 
characterisation of a subject‟s engagement in games of strategy within power relations is 
understood as just such a new schema. However, it would also follow that these strategies would 
„qualify‟ as a new schema only if they could be said to take place without the State and its 
sovereign baggage. But, are these strategies teleologically oriented to governmentality and the 
State? Can these games of strategy be thought of separately from the State‟s monopoly on 
politics? Can such strategies be understood to take place as politics without the State? In order to 
explore these questions, I will begin by using some of Derrida‟s thoughts on the notion of 
strategy as play.  
The answer to the first question posed above is to some extent provided by Foucault 
himself. Foucault describes games of strategy as an activity through which one refuses what one 
is and one which also changes the regime within which one is „playing‟. By reading his work 
according to its inflection, we can say with relative safety that Foucault understands such activity 
as non-teleological – at least in the sense that it is not premised on ideas of historical progress or 
totality and it is not activity through which one intends to overthrow, replace or appropriate the 
prevailing governmental regime. We noted earlier Foucault‟s call to „bring into being new 
schemas of politicisation‟. We can take Foucault at his word here. The strategies he speaks of are 
not understood to be undertaken as part of the traditional framework of political sovereignty and 
are not teleologically oriented towards the appropriation of an existing regime of power. 
However, as the „conscious practice of freedom‟ takes place within the established regimes of 
power, is this practice thus teleologically oriented either implicitly or explicitly to the 
transformation of those regimes? A problem needs to be addressed. According to Foucault‟s 
thought, are „new schemas of politicisation‟ conceivable? Is the confrontation and analysis of the 
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problem of bringing into being new schemas a teleological activity and if so, how is it relevant to 
this thesis‟ questions? Jacques Derrida‟s discussions of play in various places may help to shed 
some light on these questions. 
In Positions (2004 [1981]), Derrida asks,  
 
Why do we still call strategic an operation that in the last analysis refuses to be governed by a 
teleological horizon? Up to what point is this refusal possible and how does it negotiate its 
effects? Why does strategy refer to the play of the stratagem rather than to the hierarchical 
organization of means and ends? (Derrida, 2004: 60). 
 
Derrida asks these questions as part of a discussion of texts and their capacity to operate as 
rupturing traditional, formalistic and ideological understandings which make up the dominant 
modes of “philosophical conceptuality” (2004: 59). As Alan Schrift notes, the “political 
dimension of Derrida‟s writings … appears in the context of a methodological intervention into 
the practices of reading and interpretation” (Schrift, 1995:255). Given this, I do not claim here 
that Derrida‟s work is intended to directly address or refer to the strategies that Foucault speaks 
of. When Derrida and Foucault speak of „strategies‟, it is in different contexts.1 Still, the 
questions are pertinent to an assessment of Foucault‟s strategies. Do Foucault‟s „games of 
strategy‟ refuse a teleological horizon? 
 Derrida‟s own descriptions of play (as a strategy) provide something of an answer. He 
describes play as “blind tactics” which are “without finality” (1973: 135). (Interestingly, Deleuze 
describes Foucault‟s strategies similarly, as “mute and blind” (Deleuze, 1988: 73).2) For Derrida, 
the “concept of play [jeu] … designates the unity of chance and necessity in an endless calculus” 
(1973: 135) and in Writing and Difference (2001 [1978]) he characterises play as a “Nietzschean 
affirmation” (2001: 369). This is an affirmation which in “absolute chance … also surrenders 
itself to genetic indetermination” (ibid). Play is not to be understood as an absolute 
indeterminacy,
3
 but as characterising the looseness, the actual indeterminacy of an assumed 
totality; that is, of a determined or given or subsisting set of circumstances. Play then can be 
understood as an explanation for the shifting relations between people among the haphazardness 
and the chance events that, for Foucault, are the stuff of human history (Foucault, 1984b). Play 
                                                 
1
 Schrift claims that, unlike Derrida, Foucault (and Deleuze), are “not particularly comfortable with the 
language games of textuality” (Schrift, 1995: 254). 
2
 Deleuze writes that power-relations “are not „localized‟ at any given moment. They constitute a strategy, 
an exercise of the non-stratified, and these „anonymous strategies‟ are almost mute and blind, since they 
evade all forms of the visible and the articulable” (Deleuze, 1988: 73). 
3
 As Niall Lucy points out, “When Derrida writes about „play‟, he doesn‟t mean „freeplay‟ or wanton 
„playfulness‟. He doesn‟t mean, „playing around with – for the heck of it‟ … „[P]lay‟ means something like 
„give‟ or „tolerance‟ … which works against the idea of self-sufficiency and absolute completion. Far from 
being grounded in presence, then, the identity of a thing is grounded without being grounded in this 
possibility of play – the internal play (or plays) of the movement of supplementarity” (Lucy, 2004: 95). 
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might be deployed as an explanatory device around the possibilities associated with an 
individual‟s games of strategy within a given regime of power. As such, an individual engaged in 
games of strategy is in a way giving herself to the chance of any situation. On the other hand, if 
we accept this it seems that we would be saying that an individual might indulge in a kind of 
strategic self-abandonment.
4
 This does not sit well with the „conscious practice of freedom‟ that 
Foucault describes. I think the key to understanding whether or not strategy can be understood as 
play in a way that characterises it as happening „without the State‟ is to introduce the figures and 
thoughts of Friedrich Nietzsche. 
 So far I have mentioned Nietzsche almost only in passing and only in relation to 
explicating Foucault‟s thought. Firstly Nietzsche was noted as the inspiration for Foucault‟s 
genealogical method and analyses
5
 and secondly as part of distinguishing the Foucauldian subject 
from the (arguably Cartesian) Castoriadian one. While Foucault‟s relationship to Nietzschean 
genealogy is fairly unproblematic, his relationship to Nietzschean subjectivity is less so. It seems 
to me that Foucault‟s subject is engaged in a struggle between the trope of Kantian autonomy and 
a Nietzschean affirmation. 
 There are many, many interpretations (and appropriations) of Nietzsche‟s work. 
Readings vary greatly.
6
 It would be dangerous to claim any one reading is the most authentic or 
„true‟, and it is not necessary to embark on yet another elaboration or interpretation of Nietzsche 
here. The reason for discussing Nietzsche here is to assess whether or not Foucault‟s subject 
manages to overcome the trope of Kantian moral autonomy. Does this trope smother any sense of 
the playful affirmation in Foucault‟s strategies? Further, given that the approach to Nietzsche 
adopted by Foucault shares much with the thought of Gilles Deleuze,
7
 it is through Deleuze‟s 
                                                 
4
 As we shall see below, the kind of chance involved in such a strategy is not necessarily a random act of 
self-abandonment, but can also be understood as an affirmation of the necessity of chance. This is 
discussed at length by Deleuze in his Nietzsche and Philosophy (1986), and specifically in the section of 
the book entitled „The Dicethrow‟ (25-27). 
5
 Foucault‟s understandings (and uses) of Nietzsche are discussed by him in „Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
History‟ (1984b), „Nietzsche, Freud, Marx‟ (1986) and „How Much Does It Cost For Reason To Tell The 
Truth?‟ (1989a). 
6
 For example, Kaufmann (1974) argued for an „apolitical‟ Nietzsche after the end of World War Two. 
Before and during the war, Nietzsche‟s thought had been appropriated, with the help of his sister, by 
National Socialism. For a thorough survey and commentary on the various interpretations of Nietzsche, see 
the essays in Magnus and Higgins (1996). These essays exemplify Foucault‟s statement, “There is not just 
one Nietzscheanism. One cannot say there is a true Nietzscheanism and that this one is truer than the other” 
(Foucault, 1989a: 247). 
7
 Both Foucault and Deleuze respond to Nietzsche as a provocation. Foucault: “If one reads „Frohliche 
Wissenschaft‟ [The Gay Science] or „Morgenrote‟ [Daybreak] while one is being formed by the great and 
old university tradition of Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Husserl, then one stumbles on these witty, strange, and 
impudent texts and says to oneself, good, I won‟t do it the way my friends, colleagues, and professors do it, 
peering in arrogance from on high … That for me is the challenge of Nietzsche” (Foucault, 1989a: 249). 
Deleuze: “It was Nietzsche … who extricated me from [traditional philosophy as the „history of 
philosophy‟]. Because you just can‟t deal with him in the same sort of way. He gets up to all sorts of things 
behind your back. He gives you a perverse taste … for saying simple things in your own way, in affects, 
intensities, experiences, experiments. It‟s a strange business, speaking for yourself, in your own name” 
(Deleuze, 1995a: 6). 
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readings and uses of Nietzsche that Foucault‟s work will be assessed.8 In order to do this though, 
it is necessary to understand Deleuze‟s uses and readings of Nietzsche.9 
Deleuze‟s readings emphasise, return to and reiterate the notion of affirmation (which is 
„embodied‟ in the idea of the Ubermensch10) as a process that exceeds any dialectical 
understanding of the self. Deleuze argues that Nietzsche‟s key emphases are exuded in the spirit 
of an affirmation of life. This affirmation is discussed in terms of its radical difference from the 
constraining concepts of traditional western philosophy. It is argued – in a way which we have 
become familiar with – that in traditional philosophy, the principles, imperatives and injunctions 
of truth and reason merely support “forces that aren‟t reasonable at all: the state, religion, all the 
current values. Philosophy becomes nothing more than taking the census of all the reasons man 
[sic] gives himself to obey” (Deleuze, 2001 [1965]: 69).11 For Nietzsche, the task is to transform 
and overcome traditional philosophy‟s negation of life. It is through the consistent elaboration of 
a philosophy of affirmation that Nietzsche (according to Deleuze) conceives of ideas such as „the 
transvaluation of values‟ and the Ubermensch. 
Deleuze is famous for expressing his contempt for the dialecticism of traditional 
philosophy.
12
 As such, the elucidation of the „anti-dialectical‟ aspects of Nietzsche is a focus of 
the book Nietzsche and Philosophy (1986 [1962]) and the essay „Nietzsche‟ (2001 [1965]).13 In 
both of these works Deleuze traces Nietzsche‟s critique of the continual entrapment of western 
thought in what is seen as the resolution of false oppositions and contradictions, through 
negation, into an inevitably contained repetition of negation. For example, we have discussed in 
detail – as the „flight forward into ideology‟ – the move  by Rousseau, by Kant and by Hegel, in 
which a subject becomes free by being resolved into and subjected under a law of the State that is 
purported to be simultaneously the law which one makes for oneself. (This has been neatly 
                                                 
8
 As suggested by the note above, this is not an arbitrary approach. Foucault explains his use of Nietzsche 
as that of a „tool‟, through which he and others of his generation changed their position “in regard to the 
body of philosophical thought ruled by one of phenomenology or Marxism” (Foucault, 1989a: 247). In this 
vein, he continues: “Gilles Deleuze wrote a powerful book about Nietzsche and Nietzsche is present in his 
work in general, but without noisy reference and without the desire to flaunt Nietzsche‟s banner for a 
rhetorical or political effect. It is impressive that … Deleuze simply turned to Nietzsche and took him 
seriously. I also wanted to do that” (ibid). Foucault further explains that his own use of Nietzsche is 
focussed on “his texts of around 1880 in which the question of truth, of the truth of history and the will to 
truth are central for him” (248). These, of course, are the central questions of Foucault‟s essay „Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, History‟ (1984b). 
9
 In the following section any statement or idea which is attributed to Nietzsche should be understood as 
Deleuze‟s reading of Nietzsche‟s thought.  
10
 Nietzsche‟s Ubermensch has been translated as „Superman‟, „Overman‟ and „superhuman being‟. The 
typography of these words and the interpretations beneath all of this also varies. I do not intend to add 
another name or interpretation here. I think an understanding that emerges from Deleuze‟s reading of 
Nietzsche, as an expression of what might be called an „Ubermenschian‟ milieu, will suffice. For more on 
the different names of the Ubermensch, see again the essays in Magnus and Higgins (1996). 
11
 Similar arguments are made by Deleuze and Guattari in relation to the „thought of the State‟ in A 
Thousand Plateaus (1988: 374-377). 
12
 “What I most detested was Hegelianism and dialectics” (Deleuze, 1995a: 6). 
13
 These works might be described as critical histories of philosophical negation. 
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described by Butler as “the resolution of freedom into self-enslavement” (Butler, 1997: 31).14) 
This dominance of thought by the negative is seen by Nietzsche (and Deleuze) as nihilism. With 
regard to the dominance of the negative in philosophy in general, Deleuze describes Nietzsche‟s 
view of the degeneration of philosophy (after Socrates) thus: 
 
If we define metaphysics by the distinction between two worlds, by the opposition between 
essence and appearance, between the true and the false, the intelligible and the sensible, we have 
to say that it was Socrates who invented metaphysics. He made of life something that must be 
judged, measured, restricted, and of thought, a measure, a limit, that is exercised in the name of 
higher values: the divine, the True, the Beautiful, the Good … With Socrates emerges the figure 
of a philosopher who is voluntarily and subtly submissive (Deleuze, 2001: 68, 69-70). 
 
Instead of this “form of thought that trusts in the power of the negative” (Deleuze, 1986: 179), 
instead of this nihilistic limitation, the annihilation of life, we find in Nietzsche the affirmation of 
life. 
 Deleuze elucidates the theme of affirmation in detail in his Nietzsche and Philosophy 
(1986)
15
 in which he draws heavily on Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Nietzsche, 1969 [1883-85]) (and 
especially on Book IV). Here affirmation is characterised as a movement of the activity of 
becoming. Affirmation is an affirmation of itself which does not complete a dialectical 
obliteration or resolution of negation. Negation or negativity remains as a mode of being but it is 
transformed from the dominant autonomous power of the traditional philosophical thought of the 
dialectic, into a moment or a condition of the activity of becoming. Affirmation does not 
annihilate negation but takes its place.
16
 Negation is transformed as a mode of the activity of 
affirmation – in the sense that it is what says „No‟ to the reactive forces of negation and nihilism 
– on the way to the affirmation of affirmation itself. The negative subsists “but as the mode of 
being of one who affirms, as the aggressivity that belongs to affirmation” (Deleuze, 2001: 83).17 
After this, what remains is to affirm affirmation itself. Affirmation is thus doubled. The doubled 
                                                 
14
 This is part of Butler‟s „rereading of Hegel on the Unhappy Consciousness‟. In a similar vein, Deleuze 
writes that “[t]here is no unhappy consciousness which is not also man‟s enslavement, a trap for the will 
and an opportunity for all baseness of thought. The reign of the negative is the reign of powerful beasts, 
Churches and States, which fetter us to their own ends” (Deleuze, 1986: 190). 
15
 See especially Chapter 5, „The Overman: Against the Dialectic‟ and the „Conclusion‟ (Deleuze, 1986: 
147-194, 195-198). 
16
 Deleuze notes that even this form of expression is problematic. He writes that “the expression „in place 
of‟ is still incorrect. It is the place itself which changes, there is no longer any place for another world” 
(Deleuze, 1986: 175). 
17
 Here, negation as the „will to nothingness‟, “is converted and crosses over to the side of affirmation, it is 
related to a power of affirming which destroys the reactive forces themselves … This is the „decisive point‟ 
of Dionysian philosophy: the point at which negation expresses an affirmation of life, destroys reactive 
forces and restores the rights of activity” (Deleuze, 1986: 174-175). Further, this „Dionysian yes‟ that 
“knows how to say no: … has conquered nihilism and divested negation of all autonomous power … it has 
placed the negative at the service of the powers of affirming” (185). 
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aspect of affirmation is that which affirms life itself as difference. Affirmation “is the enjoyment 
and play of its own difference” (1986: 188). This enjoyment is what follows from knowing how 
to say no. As such in affirmation we also know how “to laugh, to play and to dance” (170). 
Deleuze elaborates: 
 
To laugh is to affirm life, even the suffering in life. To play is to affirm chance and the necessity 
of chance. To dance is to affirm becoming and the being of becoming (170). 
 
This elaboration of affirmation is part of Nietzsche‟s consistent expression of life as becoming. 
For Nietzsche, life is the reality of becoming over being. This is stressed over the traditional 
emphasis on the reality of Being,
18
 and following this, of unity, necessity, totality, truth, the 
abstract thought on which the dialectic depends, and the meaning of concepts in their opposites. 
In the reality of Becoming though, multiplicity, chance, interpretation and evaluation 
(perspectivism) are emphasised.  
In affirmation of these modes of being, Nietzsche is emphasising the affirmation of life 
as becoming, over its limitation and annihilation. Again, this affirmation does not negate 
negation, but displaces it, takes its place of dominance. Thus, life is affirmed. According to this 
view, Becoming is also the being of becoming. Multiplicity is also a unity of multiplicity. And 
chance is affirmed as the necessity of chance. It is in light of this affirmative sense of play and of 
chance that Foucault‟s strategies and practices of the self need to be examined. 
Before we embark on this examination it is worth restating the question from which it 
proceeds. The idea that Foucault‟s work might allow us to imagine a politics without the State 
has been premised on a number of related and recurrent themes throughout his work. From the 
earlier works, we have the idea of the experience of the limit in transgression and the problematic 
of the enclosure of such experiences – for example, „Madness‟ – by the discourse of Reason. 
Later, Foucault‟s thought tends towards analyses of the constitution of subjects, through the 
emergence of discourses and regimes of knowledge under which they can be understood as 
objects. The discourses and regimes through which people and populations have become objects 
of knowledge – and subjects – are covered for by theories of sovereignty. Underneath this cover, 
these discourses and regimes guide the techniques with which populations are managed in the 
interests of the self-justification, self-preservation, and self-perpetuation – the subsistence – of 
government. From this, we see the emergence of critiques which conceive of the possibility of 
resisting this mode of subjectivisation, through the practices and techniques of the self. The 
question then is: Does Foucault‟s work, as conceiving of a thought and experience of the limit in 
transgression, overcome the constraints of power which are masked by the political theory of 
                                                 
18
 The capitalisation of „Being‟ and „Becoming‟ here follows Deleuze‟s practice in Nietzsche and 
Philosophy (1986). 
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sovereignty? Can the „refusal of what we are‟, through the „conscious practice of freedom‟ 
happen as a „new schema of politicisation‟? That is, can the activities of a Foucauldian subject 
take place – with others – in such a way that they could be called a politics without the State? 
In Chapter Five I argued that, given that the refusals that an individual might engage in 
are ultimately inseparable from the dominant (and ultimately Statist) regimes, Foucault‟s work 
could not be said to figure a politics without the State. On the other hand I argued that if 
Foucault‟s strategies could be understood as a play which is unteleological, and which could be 
seen as more than a negation of the constraining power of the State, then Foucault might provide 
us with glimpses of a new schema of politicisation – without the State. If this is so, a Foucauldian 
strategy might be understood in terms of a Nietzschean affirmation. That is, as a strategy which 
overcomes the negativity of the power regimes with which it is involved without itself being a 
reactive attempt to negate or resolve itself into them and which affirms itself for itself rather than 
as a dialectically inscribed opposite. But can these strategies be understood this way? The short 
answer, which I have been working towards for some time now, is no. If we understand 
affirmation according the terms elucidated by Deleuze, I think that Foucault‟s strategies and 
practices fall short. Deleuze repeatedly describes affirmation as a moment which exceeds the 
constraints of dialectical opposition and ultimately any constitutive relationship or reference to 
the forces of negation. Affirmation is above all, affirmation of affirmation. A subject acting 
according to Foucault‟s strategies and practices, however, treats itself as an object of knowledge 
in order to make itself against and within the discourses for which it is an object of knowledge. 
Judith Butler describes this process of self-constitution as “marked by a figure of turning, a 
turning back upon oneself, or even a turning on oneself” (Butler, 1997: 3). For Foucault, strategic 
practices of self-subjectification are responses or reactions to prevailing regimes and as such are 
refusals of (and resistances to) those regimes. While I think that Foucault‟s figuring of the forms 
of the subject is more convincing than any Cartesian theorisation, there is not an inflection which 
evokes the sense of affirmation articulated by Deleuze. In Foucault we might well have the 
activity that says „No‟ to the reactive forces of nihilism – that is, as Deleuze puts it, “the 
aggressivity that belongs to affirmation” (Deleuze, 2001: 83) – however, we do not sense the 
affirmation of life itself as difference. It could be argued that in his early work on transgression, 
Foucault was closer to this sense than in his later work on the practices of the self. In the later 
work, where an individual forms herself through making her own practices and laws for herself, 
the idea of exceeding the limit, and transgression, is replaced by the practice of creating limits for 
oneself.
19
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 James Miller notes that Foucault had stopped using the (French) term transgression by the time he wrote 
the first volume of The History of Sexuality (1981), and that in „What is Enlightenment?‟ (1984a) he had 
begun to speak of „freedom‟ in Kantian terms, as “to pass beyond each and every specified limit” (Miller, 
1994: 456). In the same place, Miller then refers us to Kant‟s Critique of Pure Reason A317/B374. (See 
Kant, 1998: 221). 
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This is where Foucault‟s work might arguably be said to be strangely warped (or 
territorialised, to use a Deleuzian term) by dialecticism in the trope of Kantian autonomy. For 
example, Foucault argues that “being free means not being a slave to oneself and one‟s appetites, 
which means that with respect to oneself one establishes a certain relationship of domination, of 
mastery … arkhē, or power, command” (Foucault, 1984c: 286-287). Now, while this command 
does not amount to the autonomous choosing of rational universal laws, it still posits practices (as 
conventions) which are as much about a self-limitation via code as a rational submission to the 
categorical imperative. Having made this claim I must again acknowledge the Nietzschean 
patterns in Foucault‟s figuring of subjectivity. This, for example, is evident when he discusses the 
idea of self-formation in the Greek world, as requiring one “to surpass oneself, to master the 
appetites that threaten to overwhelm one” (285). But, I think that this is where Foucault‟s thought 
holds its position as a „No‟ without then becoming the „Yes‟ of affirmation. This is why it seems 
unable to shake off a dialectical inflection. While this does not lead me to claim that Foucault‟s 
strategies and practices of the self themselves should be seen as dialectical, I think, as I wrote 
earlier, that Foucault‟s thought is constrained by a residual dialecticism as exemplified in Kantian 
autonomy. 
There may be a way of understanding why a Foucauldian subject knows how to say „No‟, 
but not how to say „Yes‟. Earlier I mentioned the similarities between Foucault‟s and Deleuze‟s 
approaches to Nietzsche. There are differences as well. Foucault explains: 
 
[Deleuze‟s] problem was the problem of desire. Probably we will find in the theory of desire the 
effect of a relationship to Nietzsche. While my problem always was truth. Wahr-Sagen and the 
relationship between it and the forms of reflexivity, the reflexivity of self above self. (Foucault, 
1989a: 249). 
 
This, I think, is the key. These different approaches to Nietzsche revolve around different aspects 
of the will to power. Where Deleuze follows the will to power to its transformation as 
affirmation,
 20
 Foucault‟s studies dwell on the will to power as the will to knowledge (and vice 
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 In order to provide a sense of the aspect of the will to power that seems to drive Deleuze‟s thought, I will 
quote a number short passages from Nietzsche‟s The Will to Power (1969 [1883-1888]). Nietzsche writes 
of a “multiplicity of forces, connected by a common mode of nutrition, we call „life‟. To this mode of 
nutrition, as a means of making it possible, belong all so-called feelings, ideas, thoughts; i.e., (1) a 
resistance to all other forces; (2) an adjustment of the same according to form and rhythm; (3) an estimate 
in regard to assimilation or excretion” (1969: 341-342). He writes that the „supreme‟ will to power is to 
“impose upon becoming the character of being” (330) and as such understands becoming as “invention, 
willing, self-denial, overcoming of oneself: no subject but an action, a positing, creative, no „causes and 
effects‟” (331). Additionally, he writes that “[t]here is no such thing as „willing,‟ but only a willing 
something” (353) and that “all doing is an overcoming, a becoming master … all activity enters our 
consciousness as consciousness of a „work‟” (349). He describes creation as “selection and finishing of the 
thing selected. (This is the essential thing in every act of will)” (ibid). He calls for the recognition of “the 
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versa).
21
 In this aspect, the will to power is still a reactive force, one which operates as a 
negation, as the constraining forces of judgement, measurement, truth and essence. The practices 
and the care of the self are, in the end, the will to knowledge turned on oneself. And strategy thus 
cannot be conceived of as laughter, dance, chance and play. 
 A final note on the characterisation of a Foucauldian strategy as play is appropriate here. 
Even if it was possible to understand strategy as the (non-teleological) play of an individual 
within a regime, there would be further problems to address. For example, what bearing would 
this possibility have on politics? Could it happen as a new schema of politicisation? While it is a 
practice that may have political implications, such implications are only accidental. On the other 
hand a Foucauldian strategy understood as the conscious practice of freedom is a teleological 
activity but one which has a self as its object. While this may also have political implications, and 
while such implications would be seen as the haphazard products of chance, they would arguably 
be more a „result‟ of a passive (genealogical) recognition of chance, rather than of its affirmation. 
In either case, a Foucauldian game of strategy is dependent on an individual self in order to have 
meaning. This is again problematic if we are to consider the possibility of politics without the 
State, as politics derives much of its meaning from the activities of groups rather than of 
individuals. Because of this, maybe the most we can say of Foucault‟s strategies (as a new 
schema of politicisation) is inspired by his description of what a “Non-Fascist Life” might be 
(Foucault, 2000: xiii). As inspiring as this description is, it exemplifies the aggressivity of the 
„No‟, without proceeding to the „Yes‟ of affirmation. 
  
[T]he major enemy, the strategic adversary is fascism … And not only historical fascism, the 
fascism of Hitler and Mussolini … but also the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday 
behaviour, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and 
exploits us. 
How does one keep from being fascist, even (especially) when one believes oneself to be 
a revolutionary militant? How do we rid our speech, our acts, our hearts and our pleasures, of 
fascism? How do we ferret out the fascism that is ingrained in our behaviour? (Foucault, 2000: 
xiii). 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
active force, the creative force in the chance event – chance itself is only the clash of creative impulses” 
(355). 
21
 Of this sense of the will to power, Nietzsche writes: “There exists neither „spirit‟ nor reason, not 
thinking, nor consciousness, nor soul, nor will, nor truth: … There is no question of „subject and object,‟ 
but of a particular species of animal that can prosper only through a certain relative rightness; above all, 
regularity of its perceptions (so that it can accumulate experience) – Knowledge works as a tool of power. 
Hence it is plain that it increases with every increase of power … In other words: the measure of the desire 
for knowledge depends on the measure to which the will to power grows in a species: a species grasps a 
certain amount of reality in order to become master of it, in order to press it into service” (Nietzsche, 1969: 
266-267).  
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Foucault‟s work is an attempt to answer this question. However, even while strategies and 
practices of resistance refer to power, governmentality and the State, and even if, despite this, 
those activities could be described as a non-teleological politics, they remain a politics of the self. 
If this activity is teleological, it is a telos with a subject as its object and goal. 
 
 
 Playing out the subject (or playing without the subject) 
 
 It seems that we have got to a place where we can finally say goodbye to a politics which 
is founded on or primarily depends upon the idea of – and the activities and ideas of – an 
individual subject. This is because, even in Foucault‟s rendering, the subject in its self-
subjectification can do nothing but work on itself, turn on itself. For Butler, this turning, this 
“paradox of subjection implies a paradox of referentiality: namely, that we must refer to what 
does not yet exist” (Butler, 1997: 4).22 This „paradox of subjection‟ either undermines or 
displaces – through deferral – the strategies of political activity. Firstly, the activity is 
undermined because it can only begin once we have described a plausible agent. Secondly, if we 
manage to describe this agent, political activity is displaced, deferred, because it can only occur 
once a subject has been constituted by either the contract suite or by power, or by herself. Only 
after this (if indeed, there ever is an „after this‟) is a subject able to attend to the activity of being 
together with others in a community. If we persist in working at politics via subjectivity, we have 
found that we get either a politics of the State (through the contract suite) or a politics of the 
subject (through the practices of a subject and its strategic relation to power) – or both. Further, 
even though I have played Foucauldian subjectivity out of this game – on the grounds that it only 
knows how to say „No‟ to negation – it would not necessarily follow that this subject could stay 
in the game if it knew how to say „Yes‟. If this Yes is produced or expressed or experienced by a 
subject working on and turning on itself, we would still be saddled with a politics of the subject. 
While we might be able to imagine this, in some way, as a politics without the State, it would not 
be a politics without the subject. And so, it would not be a politics for politics‟ sake. Having said 
this, I think that the „Yes‟ of Nietzschean affirmation is important to the question of what a 
politics without the State might happen to be. It is important because it leads to the question: 
Might politics happen in such a way that it happens through the affirmation of a strategic play of 
difference, of chance, of play [jeu] and life – as a „ploy‟? There is a problem though with this 
figuring of politics, for politics is simply an aspect of life. The „Yes‟ is a Yes to everything in 
                                                 
22
 Butler here discusses the paradox of subjection as primarily associated with language and the narrative 
description of the experience of subject and subjectivisation (Butler, 1997: 1-11). In this sense, Butler 
grapples with the limitations of philosophical expression and language in a similar way to that discussed by 
Foucault in „A Preface to Transgression‟ (1963). 
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life, and so, to politics. Why then would there be a need to look at politics alone? Well, I think 
there is a need because without looking closer, the affirmation of play and chance etcetera as 
politics is possibly to say that politics is anything that happens when people come together. But 
our understanding of politics, which I do not intend to jettison, is not „anything that happens‟. It 
is, to cite Castoriadis again, the various “modes of being together, of discussing together, and of 
deciding together in a political organisation” (Castoriadis, 1997d: 195). Now, it is time to try to 
imagine this in terms of the affirmation of strategy and play in being (as Becoming) together, as a 
ploy, as a politics without the subject, a politics without the State, and – as a politics for politics‟ 
sake. 
 
 
 Politics for politics’ sake 
 
 In addition to getting to the point where I need to talk about a politics that is more than 
just anything that happens, I have spent a good deal of time describing what I think politics is 
not. What politics is not are the traditional concepts – the theory of sovereignty and the contract 
suite, and a primary reliance on subjectivity – that have become encrusted around the activity of 
politics. Politics is encased by this. This crust has now been stripped away. What remains is what 
we might call the „raw‟ activity of politics. What needs to be done now is to describe this activity 
– a politics that is not nothing, and not just anything. Now, even though I have found Castoriadis‟ 
work to be „entwined‟ with, and subsequently „encased‟ by the conceptual crust that has been 
stripped away here, the task at hand begins with his basic understanding of politics. I still think 
that in this context his understanding of politics as an activity, or a doing (or as Foucault would 
have it, as a set of practices) is amenable to the trajectory of this thesis‟ figuring of politics 
without the State. Further, Castoriadis‟ own „stripped back‟ description of „political organisation‟ 
describes a „generic‟ milieu that can serve as a place to begin the elucidation of politics that is 
being worked out here. So it is now time to describe in some more detail what a politics for its 
own sake might be. As such, I will try to say how people can „be together‟, „discuss together‟ and 
„decide together‟ in „political organisation‟. Firstly, it is necessary to provide a brief, preliminary 
sketch of „political organisation‟ or, simply, politics. 
 
i. Politics 
And when a name comes, it immediately says more than the name: the other of the name and quite 
simply the other, whose irruption the name announces (Derrida, 1995b: 89). 
 
Rather than repeat or reiterate earlier critiques of what politics is not, I will begin here by 
focussing on the name of politics. Then a preliminary sketch of this thesis‟ understanding of the 
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„content‟ of politics and aspects of a politics without the State will follow. The conventional 
understanding of politics, as the activity of government, of citizens in making decisions about the 
organisation of a society, is largely derived from the actual historical place, from the idea of, and 
from the name of the polis. That the name of politics is derived from this event is not in itself a 
problem, unless, as it is for us, it is important to understand politics without all of the concepts 
and images that (as Foucault points out) are socio-historically and theoretically out-moded but 
which at the same time serve to incongruously „constitute‟ and „legitimate‟ governmental activity 
under the pseudonyms (pseudo-names) – given by philosophy – of politics, sovereignty and 
citizenship.
23
 As such, while we can take inspiration from the historical polis, it might be more 
appropriate to view it without such disguise, according to a perspective derived from Hume and 
Foucault. That is, for us the political activity of the polis is understood as one among many 
possible sets of conventions and ways of being together, in and for one particular place and time. 
As such, it might operate as an inspiration rather than as a foundational definition, for a name or 
concept.
24
 In taking this view of the polis we can begin to draw out a description of the activity of 
a politics without the State. Coming to this understanding requires us to make a distinction 
between the activity of politics and the name and idea (and even the philosophy) of politics that is 
genealogically involved in a particular relation with the polis. There are two aspects to the 
making of this distinction. The first aspect is the problem of the name of politics and the 
totalising power of the act of naming – of the making present of the being of that which is named. 
The next step is to deploy an understanding of political activity that, while genealogically 
associated with the activity of the citizens of the polis, is nonetheless different. That is we need to 
avoid forcing a constitutive act of naming from what is a genealogical association. We need to 
understand politics without making the polis an incongruous model for a conceptual and 
philosophical association with modern sovereignty. To try to put this more simply, we need to 
remember that politics is an activity, not a name. Such activity is not (and cannot be) contained 
or totalised by a name – conceptually or practically. 
                                                 
23
 With regard to this, Alain Badiou provides a caution about the traditional „program‟ of political 
philosophy. This is a program which “holding politics – or … the political – as an objective datum, or even 
invariant, of universal experience, accords philosophy the task of thinking it. Overall, philosophy‟s task 
would be to generate an analysis of the political and … to submit this analysis to ethical norms. The 
philosopher would then have the triple advantage of being, first, the analyst and thinker of this brutal and 
confused objectivity which constitutes the empirical character of real instances of politics; second, the one 
who determines the principles of the good politics, of politics conforming to ethical demands; and, third, in 
order to meet these demands, the one exempt from militant involvement in any genuine political process” 
(Badiou, 2005: 10). 
24
 To view it in this way would to some degree be consistent with Castoriadis‟ approach to praxis, in which 
it is most important to work in and with the existing social-historical situation. As such, the idea of the 
polis could operate as part of a historical legacy without unduly constraining ideas of the activity of 
politics. As we shall see shortly, Jacques Derrida understands the idea of democracy as operating in such a 
way. See his Rogues (2005a: 9). 
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The problem with naming the activity of politics is not dissimilar to the problems 
addressed in Chapter Five. There we saw how both Foucault and Castoriadis critique the notions 
of sovereignty and Progress – in terms of their being understood to possess ontological, absolute, 
totalising and foundational qualities – and how such qualities operate to constitute incongruous 
explanations of what „really‟ is and what really happens in society and „History‟. These ideas, as 
we have found, reduce social and historical activity to that which can be enumerated or to that 
which can be functionally or rationally explained, and fails to acknowledge what is left over, 
what moves or changes, and what resists such explanation. It is largely due to these tendencies 
that politics has come to be reduced to only what takes place within a State. That is to say that the 
default understanding is that politics is of the State (or, as I have asserted repeatedly, the State has 
a monopoly on politics). This aspect of the monopoly – as default meaning – is encapsulated by 
one of Derrida‟s observations on the name. “It is almost as if a name should only be given to 
whom (or what) deserves it and calls for it” (Derrida, 1995b: 91). In our societies, the decision 
around what activity calls for or deserves to be named politics defaults to the State. The State 
claims the right and the authority to name and to say what deserves to be named. 
Politics, for this thesis, is not a name, not a noun, not a presence. Earlier I referred to 
Derrida‟s thinking on differance and play. The key point in the current context is to note that 
“[w]hat is questioned by the thought of differance … is the determination of being in presence, or 
in beingness” (Derrida, 1973: 153). As such, through the recognition of the play of differance, 
politics is not reducible to either the modern concepts of the contract suite or to the particular 
ideas and activities of its place (or „place-name‟) of „origin‟. The meaning of the philosophical 
concept of politics cannot be fixed in an atemporal present because there is always an aspect of 
that meaning which is deferred. And there is always an aspect of the meaning that is other than it 
(Derrida 1973: 129-131). Basically, as a concept and as a linguistic artefact, we should not allow 
our understanding of „politics‟ to be dominated or contained by, or in, any universal, or even 
particular, presence. Thus, nor should we allow it to be reduced to those concepts which it is 
traditionally understood to contain. For us, the word „politics‟ is not a noun, but a verb. It is 
political activity that we are concerned with. 
Now, regardless of the idea that whatever is named as politics is not reducible to a mere 
concept (that is to meaning as being and presence), it is still necessary to make a distinction 
between the aspects of the activity of politics that bear a relation or resemblance to the activity of 
the polis, and our working understanding. Earlier, one of the reasons I gave for finding that 
Castoriadis‟ work cannot be understood as a politics without the State was his attachment to the 
Athenian polis, particularly in relation to the requirement that its community be bound by a 
common identity. Our working understanding of politics does not include this notion or those 
related to sovereignty and the contract suite. The polis though, to some degree in „proto form‟ (at 
least as Castoriadis renders it), does. So, in continuing to use the word politics here, I also 
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unavoidably continue to refer to the polis and, among other things, the political activity of a 
citizen of the polis, her engagement with its institutions, participation in its wars and obedience to 
its decisions. All of this implies identification and unity with the polis. So it is necessary – not to 
separate the polis from politics – but to distinguish between the „generic‟, conventional activity 
of political organisation, and the activity of the historical event, place, community and tradition 
of the polis that a genealogical account will haphazardly trace. That is, we need to distinguish 
between how people get things done things together and how communities have been constituted 
as unified political entities. In distinguishing in this way, we also remember that a genealogical 
account can go further (back) than the polis. It is not oriented to or limited to the location of a 
geographical or conceptual origin. The activity of being together, discussing together and 
deciding together precedes and „outflanks‟ the polis and its name. Nonetheless, this activity is 
better understood „rhizomically‟. That is, for us, it is an activity or form of experience that is 
more aptly appreciated through the “variation, expansion, conquest, capture, offshoots” of the 
rhizome (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 21), rather than through a linear tracing between what are 
regarded as necessarily related points and positions. While the rhizome “connects any point to 
any other point … its traits are not necessarily linked to traits of the same nature … [and] … it 
brings into play very different regimes of signs, and even nonsign states” (ibid). So, with regard 
to the polis, we need to state that its political activity, while genealogically or rhizomically 
linked, has no constitutive or deterministic relation to the concepts that modern sovereign theory 
has derived and developed from it. 
So politics, which is not determined by sovereign concepts or even a genealogically 
traced „origin‟, is an activity without dependence on the identity and unity of those who have 
come together. Politics without the State then, is also without citizens whose activity involves, is 
entwined with, constrained by and limited to the giving of allegiance to an authority under the 
guise of conceptual devices like the social contract. The mode of politics without the State is a 
gathering together, of which the gathering together is the primary effect (and affect). The activity 
of gathering is political activity „in the raw‟. In characterising „raw‟ political activity as 
gathering, I am partly alluding to Hume and his fleeting and vague references to „the Camp‟. 
 In the section of A Treatise of Human Nature (1952) titled „Of the Source of Allegiance‟, 
Hume argues that while government is advantageous and necessary in some circumstances, it is 
not always so (1952: 240). He refers to “American tribes, where men [sic] live in concord and 
amity among themselves, without any established government, and never pay submission to any 
of their fellows, except in time of war, when their captain enjoys a shadow of authority” (241). 
This authority lapses at the end of hostilities. Hume argues that this experience of the „shadow of 
authority‟ is nonetheless instructive and is consequently resorted to when a society reaches a 
point at which its riches give rise to internal competition and the potential for conflict (241). 
Hume then writes that,  
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Camps are the true mothers of cities; and as war cannot be administered, by reason of the 
suddenness of every exigency, without some authority in a single person, the same kind of 
authority naturally takes place in that civil government which succeeds the military (Hume, 1952: 
241). 
 
The story Hume tells here is that of a transition from a society which can subsist without 
government (i.e. the State), to that which, due to the exigencies of war and the accumulation of 
property, requires government.
25
 While the phases of this story resemble those told, in their own 
ways, by Hobbes and Rousseau around the notions of sovereignty, contracts and citizenship, 
there is no implication that these are necessary in social and political activity. I should state here, 
nevertheless, that I do not intend to claim that Hume‟s allusions about „the Camp‟ amount to an 
earlier version of what I am trying to do here. For even though he refuses to exclude the 
possibility of society without government, society with government is the subject of his 
discussion. Further, his tantalising allusions around the Camp seem to be more or less 
synonymous with the idea of the „tribe‟ and imply an „evolutionary progression‟ from primitive 
society to civilised State. This is where Hume‟s discussion closes off any appropriation of his 
camp for my own purposes. This is because it is understood as a mode of being together with a 
self-interested purpose and duration, which itself strongly implies a group of people who have 
self-instituted with a closed identity. 
 My reasons for this allusion to Hume‟s aside about the Camp are to open the idea of the 
possibility of politics without the State. Firstly, Hume‟s statement that “Camps are the true 
mothers of cities” (241), neatly exemplifies the idea that „politics‟, regardless of its name, 
precedes the polis.
26
 The idea of a camp, for this thesis, operates to facilitate the imagination of 
the „gathering‟ I have been working towards. A camp is a temporary, transitory gathering. It can 
come together out of happenstance, without purpose. If we imagine a camp by a river, we can 
understand that this does not necessarily happen because a group of people decided to set up a 
camp there. Rather, such a camp may also happen simply because by the river is a good place to 
camp. That is, such places and situations call for camping. What may begin as a loose collection 
of people, at a given place and time for various and unrelated reasons, may at some stage become 
recognisable as a form of society or community. However, such a community may also be 
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 Interestingly, in this regard, Deleuze and Guattari write that “[p]rimitive, segmentary societies have often 
been defined as societies without a State, in other words, societies in which distinct organs of power do not 
appear. But the conclusion has been that these societies did not reach the degree of economic development, 
or the level of political differentiation, that would make the formation of the State apparatus inevitable” 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 357). They then go on to note that the theories of Pierre Clastres “break with 
this evolutionary postulate” (ibid). 
26
 Even though the term „mother‟ here would seem to imply an origin, the general thrust of Hume‟s work 
denies any actual source or origin to political organisation and allegiance. 
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without an identity. It may remain open, exposed to what is „outside‟. A camp may (and 
admittedly may not) gather in such a way as to be „responsive‟ to the place, time and situation in 
(with) which it happens. As such, a camp may or may not happen in such a way as to 
territorialise the place in, or with, which it happens. A camp may be neither territorial nor 
nomadic. A camp may also phase in and out of the mode of being together of a camp. Later, 
these „camp-like‟ characteristics of a gathering will be discussed in more detail in relation to the 
work of Deleuze and Guattari. 
 At this point, the idea of a camp operates as a way of imagining the character of 
„gathering‟ as the political activity „in the raw‟ – or „raw‟ politics. There are obviously further 
questions to address in relation to this activity of gathering. Not the least are the questions: In 
what way, or when, does a camp become political? And, then, what is this gathering for? I will 
leave these awkward and unavoidably teleological questions for later. Firstly, the various aspects 
of this politics need to be sketched.  
 
ii. Being together: gathering 
Community without community is to come, in the sense that it is always coming, endlessly, at the 
heart of every collectivity (because it never stops coming, it ceaselessly resists collectivity itself as 
much as it resists the individual) (Nancy, 1991: 71). 
 
In describing politics without the State as the activity of gathering together, I am trying to 
avoid the traps and aporias of the subject. To describe a „being together‟ here is not to describe a 
coming together of Being or of beings. Being together as gathering needs to be understood, along 
with Nietzsche and Deleuze, as a becoming. So, the being together of a gathering has no fixed, 
unified identity. There is not a community in the conventionally understood sense. Rather, this 
gathering, as Jean-Luc Nancy put it, is a „community without community‟. In The Inoperative 
Community (1991) Nancy examines the modern desire to recreate a community that is perceived 
to have been ruptured by the emergence of the State. Nancy names Rousseau and Hegel as 
thinkers of community, or more accurately, of a “lost community … to be regained or 
reconstituted” (1991: 9). Nancy warns that we should be suspicious of such a “retrospective 
consciousness of the lost community and its identity” (10) because such a community has never 
happened.
27
 Any such thinking of this community that has never happened, this “thinking of 
community as essence – is in effect the closure of the political” (xxxviii). Nancy continues,  
                                                 
27
 “Community has not taken place, or rather, if it is indeed certain that humanity has known … social ties 
quite different from those familiar to us, community has never taken place along the lines of our 
projections of it according to those different social forms … It would undoubtedly be more accurate to say 
… that … „society‟ … has taken the place of something for which we have no name or concept. Society 
was not built on the ruins of a community. It emerged from the disappearance or the conservation of 
something – tribes or empires – perhaps just as unrelated to what we call „community‟ as to what we call 
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Such a thinking constitutes closure because it assigns to community a common being, whereas 
community is a matter of something quite different, namely, of existence inasmuch as it is in 
common, but without letting itself be absorbed into a common substance. Being in common has 
nothing to do with communion, with a fusion into a body, into a unique and ultimate identity that 
would no longer be exposed. Being in common means … no longer having, in any form, in any 
empirical or ideal place, such a substantial identity, and sharing this (narcissistic) „lack of 
identity‟” (xxxviii). 
 
Against the thinking of community as closure, Nancy envisages Being in common as a mode of 
exposure. He writes: “„To be exposed‟ means to be „posed‟ in exteriority” (xxxvii). In this way, 
Nancy understands „the political‟ as not the place where community is constituted and completed 
but “the place where community … is brought into play” (ibid). Further, Nancy sees this place of 
the political as “the place of a specific existence … of being-in-common which gives rise to the 
existence of being-self” (ibid). This exemplifies one of Nancy‟s main concerns in which he 
consistently argues against the priority of the „I‟ over the „We‟, and of existence over 
coexistence, and that Being is nothing but being-with-one-another.
28
 In Being Singular Plural 
(2000), Nancy further elucidates the idea of Being in common as “Being with-one-another” 
(2000: 32). Here he works directly with Heidegger‟s questions about the „meaning of Being‟29 in 
order to lay out a position in which Being is something that is understood through the thinking of 
Heidegger‟s Mitsein (being-with).30 That is, Nancy‟s essay aims to follow the opening of  
Heidegger‟s questioning to places that Heidegger himself did not go. That is, through to 
understanding Being through the exposure of Mitsein rather than the relative closure of Dasein. 
As such, the exposure involved in this mode of existence is as much about the exposure of 
individuals to other individuals, as a coexistential mutual abandonment, as the exposure (or non-
closure) of a political community. 
Nancy‟s ideas on Being in common and on the „Being Singular Plural‟ of Being with-
one-another describes the existence of people as a co-existence rather than as a singular Being, or 
existence. In these terms it is a conceptual understanding of the existence of all forms of 
gathering, political or otherwise. While the idea of the mutual abandonment and exposure of 
„being-in-common‟ in some ways describes the kind of gathering I have in mind, it remains 
primarily a way of describing Being, and answering Heidegger‟s question of the meaning of 
                                                                                                                                                 
„society.‟ So that community, far from being what society has crushed or lost, is what happens to us … in 
the wake of society” (Nancy, 1991: 11).   
28
 Nancy writes, “Being cannot be anything but being-with-one-another, circulating in the with and as the 
with of this singularly plural coexistence” (Nancy, 2000: 3). 
29
 See the opening (unnamed) section of Heidegger‟s Being and Time (1995 [1927]: 19). 
30
 Nancy writes of Heidegger‟s existential analytic, arguing that “even though Mitsein is coessential with 
Dasein, it remains in a subordinate position” (Nancy, 2000: 93). Nancy sees this as Heidegger closing off 
the very question he opened up at the beginning of Being and Time (1995). 
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Being. Further, it also could be seen to fall into the paradox of subjectivity discussed earlier. 
Nancy argues for the priority of the „we‟ to the „I‟ but in doing so argues for the constitutive 
power of the „we‟ for the „I‟. As such, he reintroduces a quandary that we have found to be 
problematic for a politics without the State. So, while Nancy‟s figuring of the openness and 
exposure of a gathering is useful here, the modes of being together of this political activity will 
be more clearly thought without this attention to Being.  
The activity of a gathering outflanks the question of Being if we draw on the thought of 
Deleuze and Guattari. In their expressions of the concepts of the rhizome, „nomadism‟, and 
nomadic thought, we encounter life as „deterritorialised‟.31 The rhizome is described as assuming 
“very diverse forms, from ramified surface extension in all directions to concretion into bulbs and 
tubers” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 7). Nomadic thought and experience is characterised as “a 
play of forces, a state of forces which are always exterior to one another” (Deleuze, 2004a: 256). 
In this exteriority (or exposure), the mode of being of nomadism is “a perpetual migration of 
intensities designated by proper names” (257) and “the call of the outside” (259). Further, 
Deleuze tells us that the “nomad and his war machine stand opposite the despot and his 
administrative machine, and the extrinsic nomadic unity opposite intrinsic despotic unity” (ibid). 
Thus, nomadism is understood not as the „being-in-common‟ of a group of individuals (as Being 
with-one-another). Deleuze and Guattari prefer to avoid this kind of expression. Instead they talk 
of lived experience as rhizomic multiplicity which harbours intensities.
32
 This multiplicity 
though, “never allows itself to be overcoded” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 9). That is, intensities 
do not become enclosed as „unities‟ by such things as the names and concepts of „subject‟ or 
„Being‟.33 As such, “[t]he lived experience is not subjective, or not necessarily. It is not of the 
individual. It is the flow and the interruption of flow, since each intensity is necessarily in 
relation to another intensity” (Deleuze, 2004a: 257). 
This characterisation of lived experience gives further form to the mode of being together 
of politics being worked out here. Instead of a gathering which is composed of singular plural 
beings in-common, we can imagine a gathering as a multiplicity with intensities and as an 
intensity. And this intensity can be envisaged as a politics. Later I will look more closely at 
Deleuze and Guattari in relation to this thesis‟ concerns, particularly the notion of nomadism. 
                                                 
31
 We will discuss this notion in more detail in Chapter Eight in relation to the deterritorialised nomadic 
„War Machine‟ and the territorialising and sedentary „State-form‟. 
32
 Intensities are also discussed in relation to the assemblage which is itself characterised as an “increase in 
the dimension of a multiplicity that necessarily changes in nature as it expands its connections” (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1988: 8). 
33
 “The notion of unity (unité) appears only when there is a power takeover in the multiplicity by the 
signifier or a corresponding subjectification proceeding: This is the case for a pivot-unity forming the basis 
for a set of biunivocal relationships between objective elements or points, or for the One that divides 
following the law of a binary logic of differentiation in the subject. Unity always operates in an empty 
dimension supplementary to that of the system considered (overcoding).” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 8).  
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However, now it is necessary to inquire further into how a gathering can also be a mode of 
politics, that is, into how a gathering discusses together and decides together. 
 
 
iii. Discussing together: everyday speech, parrhesia and sincerity  
The mode of discussing together of a gathering happens not as a calculation or a 
procedure. As I argued in Chapter Four the rational deliberation of an autonomous will or subject 
does not suffice as a mode of political activity. The situations, positions and systems developed 
by Habermas and Rawls, for example, assume too much around the possibility of a collective or a 
community – as civil society – of equally rational subjects. Instead, the discussion of the 
gathering can be understood from the perspectives of Bakhtin, Michel Foucault, William Godwin 
and the pragmatism of Charles Sanders Peirce.  
Any notion of the discussion that happens in a gathering must begin with an everyday 
speech that is responsive and answerable to an address or an interpellation. Such discussion is 
also open in its own address to the contingency, risk and chance of its sending (Envois), or its 
deployment. In this way, this „discussion‟ is also plural and fearless. Here, following Bakhtin‟s 
thought on speech genres, discussion is understood as the polyphonous play of utterances. These 
utterances are not simply responsive to those other utterances, but to the place and situations 
within which they are uttered (or happen). Discussion in this situation is around the response of a 
gathering to a particular situation and the possibility of then engaging in political activity. As 
such, a gathering is involved in a relation of addressivity with a particular environment and 
(political) situation. Bakhtin writes that the addressivity of an utterance is “its quality of being 
directed to someone” (Bakhtin, 1986: 95). The direction of this utterance however is not 
understood as monological. An utterance is addressed both in response to previous utterances and 
in anticipation of possible responses.
34
 Further, Bakhtin writes of the different ways we may 
respond, depending on the particular person, social group or event in question (95).
35
 Finally, 
when Bakhtin describes addressivity as “the quality of turning to someone” (99) (at least in the 
context of this thesis), Althusser‟s idea of interpellation (or hailing) is invoked. In this context, in 
any discussion, there are instances of calling, of interpellation, both by the utterances of those in 
                                                 
34
 Bakhtin writes that “the utterance is constructed while taking into account possible responsive reactions” 
(Bakhtin, 1986: 94). This, in a nutshell, is the relations gathered by Bakhtin under the name of „dialogism‟. 
This is not to be confused with a dialectical process of dialogue, exemplified by the Socratic dialogue. Nor 
is it to be understood in terms of Hegelian dialectic, in which contradictions are resolved along the way to 
reaching a higher or synthesised new knowledge or understanding. 
35
 In this context, Michael Holquist elucidates the idea of addressivity as being involved in “the event of 
constantly responding to utterances from the different worlds I pass through … At a basic biological level, 
thirst does not just exist in the natural world, it happens to me …; and lack of water means nothing without 
the response of thirst … In other words, addressivity is expressivity; what we usually call life is not a 
mysterious vitalistic force, but an activity, the dialogue between events addressed to me in the particular 
place I occupy … and my expression of a response to such events” (Holquist, 1990: 48). 
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the gathering and by the situation in which those people find themselves. Nonetheless, questions 
remain. How is this „discussing together‟ political? How is it that participants can be discussing 
the performance of an activity that is mutually understood by the gathering as a gathering, a 
political being together?  
Firstly, these utterances themselves approach characterisation as a political activity as a 
mode of parrhesia and of sincerity. Parrhesia (as „fearless speech‟) was briefly discussed in 
Chapter Four in the context of Foucault‟s characterisation of autonomy and freedom as best 
understood as aspects or the expression of a critique and a limit-attitude.
36
 Generally, however, 
Foucault understands parrhesia as a kind of „speech activity‟ which involves a commitment 
“which is linked to a certain social situation … [and] … to the fact that the parrhesiastes says 
something which is dangerous to himself [sic] and thus involves a risk” (Foucault, 2001: 13). 
What the parrhesiates says that is so potentially dangerous is the truth. This notion is clearly 
problematic in the context of this thesis. However, Foucault describes how a parrhesiastic truth is 
not of the sort we moderns traditionally associate with a Cartesian epistemology. Foucault asks,  
 
[D]oes the parrhesiastes say what he [sic] thinks is true, or does he say what is really true? To my 
mind, the parrhesiastes says what is true because he knows that it is true; and he knows that it is 
true because it is really true. The parrhesiastes is not only sincere and says what is his opinion, 
but his opinion is also the truth. He says what he knows to be true … It would be interesting to 
compare Greek parrhesia with the modern (Cartesian) conception of evidence. For since 
Descartes, the coincidence between belief and truth is obtained in a certain (mental) evidential 
experience. For the Greeks, however, the coincidence between belief and truth does not take place 
in a (mental) experience, but in a verbal activity, namely, parrhesia (Foucault, 2001: 14). 
 
Foucault goes on to describe how being able to have possession of this parrhesiastic truth is 
attributable to having certain moral qualities and that the fact that a parrhesiastes has the courage 
enough to take risks is “a kind of „proof‟ of … sincerity” (15). I will not go into detail here about 
the particular moral qualities required to be a parrhesiastes, except to note that moral qualities for 
the Greeks were not attained through simple adherence to doctrines, but through training and 
education, through practice and habituation. As we have discussed earlier, such practices – some 
aspects of which are rendered as the care of the self – are of great interest to Foucault.37 There is 
an important relation here in which the practices of the expression of non-epistemological truth 
and sincerity are entwined. Interestingly, Foucault‟s thought here is involved in its own relation 
with that of William Godwin. 
                                                 
36
 See pages 111-113. 
37
 I have also discussed these sorts of relations as they occur in the work of Castoriadis and Arendt. See 
Chapter Four, pages 104-106. Earlier discussions of the operations of conventions and the processes of 
interpellation and subjectivisation are also relevant in this regard. 
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 In Chapter One I briefly referred to William Godwin with regard to his place as an 
anarchist thinker. In his most comprehensive work, the Enquiry Concerning Political Justice 
(1976 [1798]), he discusses far more than the structural organisation of society. In fact, he spends 
considerable time on the notion of sincerity. In a striking parallel with Foucault‟s characterisation 
of parrhesia, Godwin describes sincerity as “truth in a practical view, as it relates to the incidents 
and commerce of ordinary life” (Godwin, 1976: 311). This truth, like that of the parrhesiastes, is 
of a kind adopted in our speaking with each other and Godwin states that “there is no instance in 
which truth can be communicated absolutely pure” (327). Sincerity for Godwin is primarily about 
speaking with others, not a monologue. It is a mode of open expression and communication that 
takes place among the members of a society and which is characterised by its “generous and 
intrepid frankness” (331). Importantly, it is informed as much by the avoidance of wilful deceit 
and secrecy (318) as it is by the frankness of the actual utterances. In this sense, Godwin sees 
sincerity as important in its utility. This is because the practice of deception is likely to lead to 
worse circumstances than those which, even with the best of intentions, it may be intended to 
prevent (318, 326-327). Godwin is also critical of the sophistry employed in arguments justifying 
and rationalising practices of deceit under the cover of conventional manners and etiquette.
38
  
As a way of demonstrating his arguments in favour of frankness and sincerity, against the 
sophistry of those in favour of deceit, Godwin engagingly discusses the practice of „excluding 
visitors‟. That is, the practice of “a master directing his servant to say he is not at home” (332). 
Godwin recounts the arguments in favour of this practice: “The lie is necessary, and the 
intercourse of human society cannot be carried on without it” (333) because people may visit 
unannounced at inconvenient times or the visitor may be considered to be a boor, a bore or a 
fiend. Asking a servant to lie protects both the feelings of a visitor and the convenience of the 
„master‟ of the house. Godwin counters by asking, “from what cause [it is] that truth, upon the 
simplest occasion, should be so offensive to our delicacy, and falsehood so requisite to soothe 
us?” (ibid). In the long run, he argues, it is of far greater utility (and thus benefit to society) to tell 
the truth, and to „exclude the visitor‟ by speaking frankly and directly. After all, a good friend 
will understand, or possibly be able to correct us in the event of our own error. A bore may 
initially take offence but then at least has the opportunity to understand the perspectives of 
another and to either seek vindication or to correct any of their perceived shortcomings. The 
practice of telling the truth will also eventually result in the end of being pestered by “buzzing 
intruders” (334). Finally, the lying itself is detrimental to society, for it teaches the servant a new 
skill (which may be used in other circumstances) and because any falsehood inevitably involves 
us in others (333-334). Here, as with parrhesia, sincerity is understood to come from practice and 
habituation, rather than from adherence to doctrine or convention. 
                                                 
38
 This kind of rationalising sophistry can be seen to be writ large in the „flight forward in to ideology‟ 
described by Althusser (1972). See also Chapter Three, pages 69-71. 
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It is interesting that the practice of deceit in this circumstance relies on a monological act. 
The servant is given a message to deliver. This allows the „master‟ to avoid an uncomfortable 
conversation. In this respect Foucault‟s lectures on parrhesia are again enlightening. In relation 
to the Socratic-Platonic tradition, he writes that the “continuous long speech is a rhetorical or 
sophistical device, whereas the dialogue through questions and answers is typical for parrhesia; 
i.e., dialogue is a major technique for playing the parrhesiastic game” (Foucault, 2001: 20). This 
reminds us of the relation (and not opposition) between the thought and the activity of politics. 
While it may be relatively „easy‟ (or literally „straightforward‟) to ground and construct a 
political thought or theory in long chains of reasoning in a (monological) tract, the actual 
happening of politics takes place in a situation which is more like a conversation, with 
interruptions, within polyphony, or even cacophony. Politics, in this thesis, is not a monological 
utterance to be delivered only by the errand-boy of a theoretical text. It is also, and I think more 
importantly, an activity. But I digress. We still have to further address the problem of truth within 
these relations. 
So, this mode of speaking to each other is characterised by a kind of „knowledge‟ of a 
(somehow shared) practical, situated and parrhesiastic truth, and by a shared response to this 
knowledge. Now, despite my oft stated intention to avoid describing „grounds‟ for any of the 
aspects of a politics without the State, I nevertheless think that the ground on which this account  
of „discussing together‟ is drawn – with regard to how these kinds of parrhesiastic and sincere 
utterances and discussions can operate as „truths‟ – is a little too vague. So, I think it is necessary 
to describe some way of beginning, of describing the possibility of a gathering having a shared 
perspective in response to a given (political) situation. In the context of this problem, I think that 
the pragmatism of Charles Sanders Peirce is most useful. 
In his essay „What Pragmatism Is‟ (1966 [1905]), Peirce addresses the problem of 
locating a starting point or foundation upon which any proposition or claim to truth can be based. 
In short, he argues that such a foundation is not locatable and in doing so he addresses the 
foundational claims of both Cartesian rationalism and empiricism. He writes: 
 
Philosophers of very diverse stripes propose that philosophy shall take its start from one or 
another state of mind in which no man [sic] … actually is. One proposes that you shall begin by 
doubting everything, and says that there is only one thing that you cannot doubt, as if doubting 
were „as easy as lying.‟ Another proposes that we should begin by observing „the first impressions 
of sense,‟ forgetting that our very percepts are the results of cognitive elaboration. But in truth, 
there is but one state of mind from which you can „set out,‟ namely, the very state of mind in 
which you find yourself at the time you do „set out‟ – a state in which you are laden with an 
immense mass of cognition already formed (Peirce, 1966: 188). 
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Given this state of affairs, Peirce‟s pragmatism (which he elaborates and refines in response to 
criticism and later comes to call „pragmaticism‟) holds that no proposition can attain the status of 
„truth‟ without experimental verification. Among other things he says that experiments should 
not simply be viewed in isolation but that “every connected series of experiments constitutes a 
single collective experiment” (193). The experimenter must be of “flesh and blood” (ibid) and a   
proposition has to be related “to the universe environing the experimenter” (ibid).  Truth is not 
truth because of a rationally articulated and metaphysically proven foundation, but because of the 
(contingent) verification of a proposition through our (experimental) experience of a given 
situation within the flow of life. Peirce argues strongly against claims to truth that are founded 
upon moments frozen in time – or on what have been described as „presences‟.39 The only truth 
worth bothering with is of a kind that comes from the verification of propositions and hypotheses 
through experimentation.  
 In „What Pragmatism Is‟ Peirce articulates an epistemological or scientific approach. He 
argues that the truths attained through this method, although without absolute (or absolutist) 
foundation, are sufficient to allow the pragmaticist to confidently speak of “general objects as 
real, since whatever is true represents a real” (194). It should be noted here that I have not turned 
to Peirce in order to establish this kind of truth (as reality) as an anchor for the discussion of the 
gathering. Rather, Peirce‟s pragmatism, in taking truth to be effectively „unfoundable‟ and 
unfixable and as generally operative as a form of experimentally and experientially derived 
contingent knowledge, serves to provide a way of understanding the shared responses, addresses 
and activity of a gathering.  
Peirce also argues that „thought‟ is not to be “taken in the narrow sense in which silence 
and darkness are favourable to thought” (190). Thus, coming to believe or know that something 
is true is only made possible by conversation and process of persuasion that we conduct both with 
ourselves and, importantly with the „circle of society‟ in which we are involved (191). In this 
respect, Peirce‟s pragmatism has some resonance with the notion of „dialogism‟ expressed by 
Bakhtin, in which any utterance is characterised by its addressivity, by the constant formulation 
of and anticipation of responses by groups of speakers. Peirce‟s pragmatism also resonates with 
Foucault‟s rendering of parrhesia and Godwin‟s understanding of sincerity, where speech and 
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 So, for Peirce, pragmatism “will serve to show that almost every proposition of ontological metaphysics 
is either meaningless gibberish – one word being defined by other words, and they still by others, without 
any real conception ever being reached – or else it is downright absurd; so that all such rubbish being swept 
away, what will remain of philosophy will be a series of problems capable of investigation by the 
observational methods of the true sciences – the truth about which can be reached without those 
interminable misunderstandings and disputes which have made the highest of the positive sciences a mere 
amusement for idle intellects, a sort of chess – idle pleasure its purpose, and reading out of a book its 
method” (Peirce, 1966: 192). Here we are reminded of Derrida‟s equally iconoclastic but far less 
combative essay on „Differance‟ (1973). I should note again that this relationship between pragmatism and 
deconstruction (and poststructuralist thought in general) has been discussed and debated in the collection of 
essays edited by Chantal Mouffe, Deconstruction and Pragmatism (1996). 
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conversation are considered to be important aspects of describing a „practical‟ form of truth. In 
addition, apart from arguing that there is no possible fixed starting point for any form of truth, 
Peirce notes that the „immense mass of cognition‟ with which we (experimenters) are laden, and 
which plays such a part in the formation of any of our thoughts and possible actions, comes from 
having had our minds „molded by life‟ to a degree of which we are not „fully aware‟ (182).40  
So, the discussing together of a gathering, of raw politics, of a politics without the State, 
happens as everyday speech that is responsive and answerable to an address and an interpellation. 
This interpellation comes from both a situation in which the gathering finds itself and from the 
call of the „original inspiration‟. What is more, this discussion (everyday speech) is informed by 
and operates through a shared practice of speaking with parrhesiastic truth and sincerity. The next 
question then is about how this practice can be shared by a gathering. We have already begun to 
answer this question. For when Peirce writes of our being laden with an immense mass of 
cognition which has formed and molded our knowledge and practices within our „circle of 
society‟ and the „universe environing us‟ we can see the traces of the well rehearsed story of, as 
Althusser tells it, our interpellation as subjects. In this sense, the pragmatism of this „discussing 
together‟ is not only about, as Derrida puts it, beginning “wherever we are” (1976: 162) or, as 
Peirce has it, about setting out from where “you find yourself at the time you do „set out‟” 
(Peirce, 1966: 188).
41
 It is also about beginning with, or as, whoever or whatever we happen to 
be, or whatever we have happened to become. So, the discussing together of raw politics happens 
among a gathering that has already responded in some way to the original inspiration and the 
interpellation of a „leftist subjectivity‟. This „discussing together‟ cannot be untangled from the 
activity of life and, thus, of the gathering. This discussion is neither a linguistic play, nor is it 
founded upon an ideal rational procedure. This discussion, like the gathering itself, is adulterated 
by the call of a given situation.  
Before moving on to the mode of deciding for raw politics, it is important to make a final 
note about the practical and pragmatic truth that guides a gathering. This truth is not of a kind 
that is established through continual deliberation by rational subjects towards (either a decisive or 
provisional) agreement or consensus about a possible course of action. It is, rather, a truth in 
relation to the situation with which we join. It is a truth that operates as an in-common and 
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 It is necessary to include Peirce‟s observation in its proper context. He writes that he “has been led by 
much experience to believe that … every master in any department of experimental science, has had his 
mind molded by his life in the laboratory to a degree that is little suspected. The experimentalist himself 
can hardly be fully aware of it, for the reason that the men whose intellects he really knows about are much 
like himself in this respect” (Peirce, 1966: 181-182).  
41
 Derrida writes: “Precisely what is in question … is the requirement that there be a de jure 
commencement, an absolute point of departure, a responsibility arising from a principle” (1973: 135). 
From the beginning point of this question, Jane Mummery writes that given the poststructuralist critique of 
foundational or „context-independent truths‟, we can only “begin in the midst” (Mummery, 2005: 9) of 
things – whether that be with the aim of continuing the critique itself, or outlining a „post-metaphysical 
ethics‟ or, as is the case in this thesis, the figuring of a politics without the State.  
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sincere ongoing acknowledgement and affirmation of an interpellation, as a response to the 
address and call of a particular situation that is already under way. Now, this figuring of the 
„discussing together‟ of the gathering opens up some considerable questions. If the in-common 
affirmation of an interpellation to join-with and do-with a gathering is not derived from a rational 
or epistemologically understood truth: How does a gathering „decide together‟?  
 
iv. Deciding together (or not?): interpellation and doing, sending and deployment 
I will begin by stating that this aspect of raw politics cannot be characterised by an 
initiative moment of decision. How does a gathering decide? It doesn‟t. As I have already argued 
above, the discussion of the gathering does not take place as a form of „truth procedure‟ that 
could possibly result in the kind of political consensus or agreement that is conventionally 
understood to be necessary in order to found a decision. Just as there is no absolute foundation 
for a truth (or for a parrhesiastically truthful or sincere discussion), there is no actual beginning 
point for a gathering. There is no moment in which a „non-politics‟ becomes a (raw) politics. It 
must be said here that discussion is an inseparable aspect of raw politics. So, just as any 
particular utterance of everyday speech, in its addressivity, is both a response and an address, the 
particular political activity of a gathering is possible wherever people come to be in each other‟s 
company. A gathering does not surge forth ex nihilo, but gathers. It collects. It is joined-with. 
Just as a camp may happen simply because a place is a good place for camping, (i.e. that camping 
is called for) and just as it comes to be recognisable as a camp only after enough „campers‟ have 
come together, a gathering happens as different people are called and join-with an activity around 
a situation that is already underway. Of course, this could describe many kinds of group activity, 
such as a game of street cricket or an impromptu party. A gathering of raw politics, however, is 
characterised by a generic or genealogical association with the practices and activities of the so-
called revolutionary politics that is interpellated by the original inspiration – but not by those 
aspects of such politics that tend towards totalisation and closure. In broad terms, raw politics 
may take place, for example, as gatherings around a community garden, industrial action or 
forms of political demonstration. The questions here are around how in some circumstances such 
activities take on the character of gatherings of raw politics (because such activities can also 
undoubtedly be characterised by closure) and around why such a gathering would be joined with 
by more people.   
The answer to this question has been partly sketched in the previous section. In short a 
gathering is interpellated in much the same way as a subject becomes a subject. As such, those 
people who understand themselves as „of the left‟ or who are in some way responsive to the 
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original inspiration may join with a gathering of raw politics that is underway.
42
 To join such a 
gathering of course implies that an individual or group somehow has parrhesiastic (or non-
epistemological) „knowledge‟ that a situation itself has interpellated a gathering. As I have 
argued earlier in this chapter, and will elaborate on in the next, I do not intend to provide an 
individualist or ethical theory as a means to explaining why people think they should join in a 
mode of political activity. In this thesis, we begin with the fact that they sometimes do and, from 
that fact, try to understand how this happens.  
I also think that the interpellation of a gathering by a particular situation is not to be 
understood as an ethical demand.
43
  Rather, this interpellation is associated with an encounter 
with a material situation. This situation is itself understood as a call through the adulteration of 
the gathering by discourses, practices, praxes, by ideologies, imaginaries and ideas. In being 
adulterated in this way, the gathering is also characterised by a desire for its activity to be 
involved in changing the situation. In this way, the interpellation of a gathering is at the same 
time its mode of address, its doing and its sending.
44
 I understand this address and doing and 
„sending‟ neither as a delivery or a transmission, nor as a relation of sequence or order. Rather, 
the relation of raw politics with the world or a situation is one of diffusion. This sending is a 
diffusive and adulterating involvement in an ongoing multiplicity. Sending, then, is a mixing but 
is not an act of infusion or injection. It is not an intervention which (teleologically) aims or 
expects to set off an ever expanding ripple effect. There is no illusion that, through this diffusion, 
raw politics will necessarily or even be likely to bring about a particular state of affairs (for 
instance, revolution). Raw politics sends as adulterated and adulterating – as another trace in the 
diffuse. What will happen? It might be a homeopathic – and thus deluded or fraudulent45 – 
nothingness, or an uncanny change in texture and flavour (which could itself be either a bitter 
poison or a delicious and invigorating novelty).  
A gathering „knows‟ that its sending happens in a world of chance and contingency. A 
gathering understands the aleatory character of any situation or encounter.
46
 It is experimental, a 
dice-throw. Further, a gathering affirms the chance and risk of its interpellation and sending. This 
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 Alain Badiou, for example, argues that revolutionary politics is engaged in fidelity to certain political 
events. In his own case he claims to act in fidelity to the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 (Badiou, 2004: 
126-140). I do not want to use his arguments here as a foundation for revolutionary activity, but prefer to 
understand this fidelity to events as something akin to being interpellated by the original inspiration. 
43
 I will discuss this in detail in Chapter Seven in relation to the Simon Critchley‟s Infinitely Demanding 
(2007). 
44
 I am alluding here to Derrida‟s Envois (1987) and the notion of sending I am trying to describe here is 
significantly inspired (and adulterated) by Derrida‟s work in that essay. However, I am not convinced and, 
thus, do not claim that my characterisation of sending can be plausibly derived from Derrida‟s.  
45
 Interestingly, claims about the effects of homeopathic remedies can be likened to the „scientific‟ or 
„rational‟ claims of many a political teleology and program, in that they range from well-intended delusion 
to outright fraud. 
46
 I will discuss in more detail the aleatory character of raw politics and the gathering in Chapter Eight in 
relation to Althusser‟s essay on the „Materialism of the Encounter‟ (Althusser, 2006). 
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affirmation is also an aspect of the pragmatism of raw politics. Just as it is not possible to fix an 
absolute foundation for this activity, it is also not possible to posit, program, prescribe or 
proscribe an ideal end. The affirmative character of the pragmatism of raw politics comes not 
from an understanding of the limits of political possibilities, but from the (pragmatic) knowledge 
that „new‟ things have happened in the past and are likely to happen again. The sending and 
doing of every gathering is open to this possibility. This pragmatism however, needs to be 
distinguished from other kinds which note, discuss and elaborate on the intertwined threads of 
deconstruction with pragmatism.  
As we do here, Ernesto Laclau recognises “the contingent character of the acts of 
political institution” (Laclau, 1996: 47-48).47 From this contingency, he argues that it is necessary 
to draw on pragmatism in order to overcome the relations that are problematised by the 
deconstructionist critique. These problematic relations are those associated with political 
representation, with the „moment of decision‟, with the question of the subject and the 
fragmentation of political identities. These relations have been problematic for any politics 
understood as “a type of practice which puts into question the meaning of social structures and 
institutions and makes it dependent on the outcome of contingent strategic moves” (65-66) 
(which is, for Laclau, what politics actually is). As such, these problems are especially vexing for 
the politics of the left, which has relied upon organising a representative and identitarian counter-
hegemonic movement in order to bring about change.  
The deconstructionist critique, however, is not merely a kind of act that makes things 
difficult for political thinking and action. Actually, as this thesis has argued repeatedly, things 
have been difficult and problematic in political thinking for quite some time and we have seen 
how poststructuralist and deconstructive approaches have made the problems clearer, or have cast 
them in a light which allows us to think of genuinely fresh ways to deal with them. As such, 
Laclau argues that “[d]econstruction is primarily a political logic in the sense that, by showing 
the structural undecidability of increasingly larger areas of the social, it also expands the area of 
operation of the various moments of political institution” (58). So, for Laclau, deconstruction 
elucidates the fact that no community can be perfectly represented, that subjects lack the being 
required to found a decision and that, in general, no decision can have a context (or structure)-
free foundation. What follows from this is that in order for politics to happen, we are required to 
enter into a „moment of madness‟. This moment is the “jump from the experience of 
undecidability to a creative act” (54).48 As such, Laclau argues that the “highest form of 
rationality that society can reach is that of a regulated madness” (58). This madness then is to be 
                                                 
47
 Given the trajectory of my argument so far, it is clear that I would not say that all politics is 
characterised by its „institution‟. I will say more about this below. For now however, it is important to say 
that I agree with Laclau‟s (1996) recognition of the contingent character of politics. 
48
 Laclau here draws on the discussion of the decision in Derrida‟s „Force of Law‟ (1992). 
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„regulated‟ by a hegemonic relation in which a structure or system that is constituted by an 
“imaginary horizon” (56)49 (self) grounds any decision (60). This decision is also “exclusionary, 
as far as it involves suppression of alternative decisions” (60). In light of these insights and in 
terms of his own political concerns around the possibility of a counter-hegemony, Laclau writes, 
 
We have seen that the absent fullness of the structure (of the community in this case) has to be 
represented/misrepresented by one of its particular contents (a political force, a class, a group). 
This relation by which a particular element assumes the impossible task of a universal 
representation, is what I call a hegemonic relation. It is because of this constitutive split between 
singularity and universality – this tendency of a signifier to evade its strict attachment to a 
signified while keeping a ghostly relation to it – that politics is possible at all. Otherwise, there 
would only be a blind clash between impenetrable social forces (Laclau, 1996: 59). 
 
Laclau here is continuing arguments made in his other work in which he has tried to find ways in 
which the fragmentation of left, revolutionary or Marxist politics into many different political 
identities can be regathered into an effective counter-hegemony to, among other things, neo-
liberal capitalism.
50
 While I agree with Laclau in his claims that ethical principles are inadequate 
to addressing such questions, I think that his argument for the need to suppress and exclude some 
alternative decisions and differences in order to keep the possibility of a hegemonic decision 
alive, still smacks of a post-Marxist vanguardism. While I think this argument is most valuable as 
an explanation of how things happen and that, as such, it could operate quite powerfully as, for 
example, an important supplement to Castoriaidis‟ critique of Marxist revolutionary theory, it is 
not to this necessity that raw politics responds. 
In general terms, what Laclau argues about is the political necessity to decide (to 
hegemonically aggregate and articulate) in the face of radical undecidability. The relation 
between this position and that of the pragmatist‟s argument (i.e. the fact that we have no absolute 
foundation for knowledge claims should not stop us from proceeding to make them) is clear. It is 
a relationship between claims to knowledge and the legitimation and justification of any political 
action. It is important to remember now however, that where Laclau writes about the necessity to 
decide, I have claimed that the gathering does not decide at all. So why have I turned to Laclau? 
                                                 
49
 Laclau writes that “the impossibility of an object does not eliminate its need: it continues, as it were, 
haunting the structure as the presence of its absence. There is something sprectral in it, to use a metaphor 
Derrida is fond of. We can put the matter in a slightly different but equivalent way by saying that if the 
moment of „systematicity‟ is what would close the system within itself, it would constitute the fullness of 
the system. So, it has to be in some way present in the field of representation but, being an impossible 
object, its means of representation are going to be constitutively inadequate. This means that whatever 
assumes that function of representation will be less than a total object and, however (although in a spectral 
way) will embody it” (Laclau, 1996: 56). See also Derrida‟s Specters of Marx (2006). 
50
 See Laclau‟s (with Mouffe), Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (2001), his (with Butler and Žižek) 
Contingency, Hegemony, Universality (2000), his Emancipation(s) (2006) and New Reflections on the 
Revolution of Our Time (1990). 
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Rather than argue that in the face of radical undecidability we must enter into a moment 
of madness to be able to proceed with any politics at all, I argue that the elucidation of the 
undecidability of political relations can be viewed another way. Instead of trying to wrest a 
decision from undecidability, we need to think of how an „undeciding‟ politics happens. People 
do not decide to act out of an ethical or political decision. They are interpellated. Raw politics 
does not proceed or become initiated by a decision, it is joined-with. People remain engaged in a 
gathering of raw politics not because they are being represented/misrepresented in the regulated 
madness of a hegemonic relation, but by having an affirmative sense of the differences and 
tensions involved in joining with anything, by being sanguine about the dangers, risks and 
anxieties involved in being involved, but also by being excited by the tiny possibility that 
something we desire to happen, might actually happen. Becoming involved in raw politics is not 
just about beginning wherever we are. It is also about beginning with and doing with, whoever 
we are interpellated with and have joined-with. Maybe, with Laclau and Derrida, all of this can 
be understood as an association with a „ghostly relation‟.  
In this situation, we know that we are entering into a political activity that can only be 
more or less unrepresentative of us. This „non-representative‟ character of raw politics however, 
is not subsumed or sublimated or aggregated into a vanguardist-representative hegemonic 
relation. In this light, it could be called a-representative. The diffuse character of identities and 
subject positions involved with a gathering is carried for the purposes of the particular activity 
that the gathering has been called into. Representation is not called for. An activity in response to 
a particular situation is. At the level of raw politics, there is no necessity for a decision. A 
gathering is disaggregated and, as such, we know that our involvement carries with it an anxiety 
about being involved at all. To stay involved and joined-with a gathering, despite this anxiety, is 
to affirm the contingency of not just raw politics, but all politics. And it is to affirm the 
question/idea: “What will happen?” Maybe something we want will happen. Just as we join-with 
a gathering, we can drift off. An occasion of raw politics may continue, and it may dissipate, 
collapse, disperse, fade and end. Or, those involved may come to a point of decision or 
deployment which is an act of political institution. Or, a gathering may enter that „moment of 
madness‟ and become hegemonic, or democratic, or whatever.  
At this point, I have stripped politics back to bare bones, but not to a purity or to an 
essence. This politics is adulterated through and through. So much of life remains with it. It 
seems strange that this kind of radical openness renders political activity as so small and limited. 
However, when I think of the history of political thought and its apparent obsession with 
constructing utopias, grand systems and theories, with big ideas that aim to fill up the „total‟ 
space of politics and to thus monopolise politics, I think there is still room for a small idea, a 
small activity. Maybe small ideas are even necessary. So, instead of viewing this small and 
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limited politics as an ineffectual or futile politics, I want to argue for the importance of the small, 
especially with regard to its capacity to infiltrate and adulterate. 
Inevitably, those who for whatever reason cannot continue to be part of a gathering, will 
not do so. This mode of politics is not characterised by disciplined solidarity and organisation 
and/or by splits and ruptures. Rather, it is characterised by coalescence and by drifting, withering, 
by phasing in and out. If a gathering „fails‟, it is because the activity that the gathering was called 
into did not happen. On the other hand, sometimes, sometimes not, raw politics will bring about 
its own „end‟ through deployment. This deployment may be the beginning of the end of any 
particular occasion of raw politics. If the deployment is brought about by a strategy or even a 
decision, I would no longer call it a „gathering of raw politics‟. For even though all politics is in 
some way adulterated, it may not always be adulterated in such a way to be able to say that there 
is any characteristic or operative  degree of „rawness‟.  For example, I think that it would be 
difficult to claim that a deployment towards totalitarianism – a fascist deployment – is in any way 
„raw‟. It is with regard to the possibility of a fascist deployment that I think that the interpellation 
of the original inspiration is important. For those so interpellated – that is, those hailed and made 
into the subjects they are by (among other things) discourses, practices, praxes, ideologies, 
imaginaries and ideas of the original inspiration – would not desire a fascist deployment. On the 
other hand, I think that it may be possible to say that some other modes of politics are adulterated 
by raw politics. Perhaps, for example, democracy. 
 
v.  Is this democracy? 
Much of this thesis has been occupied with discussions and critiques of the „traditional‟ 
political theories and ideas and the concomitant reduction of politics to the politics of the State. 
Until now, the political idea that has escaped similar attention is that of democracy. Any work of 
political philosophy really must address the idea, the ideas and practices of democracy at some 
stage. This address often takes the form of an explanation of how the arguments made in a given 
work help to strengthen, or supplement democracy – how certain ideas can make democracy 
more democratic or how the arguments made actually operate with a certain equivalence to an 
ideal or „real‟ democracy. Sometimes also, arguments are made against democracy. Generally, in 
some way or another, we are all concerned to understand our own arguments in relation to the 
democratic tradition. Here however, I will not argue against democracy. Neither can I claim (not 
that I would want to in any case) that raw politics is a kind of real or pure democracy. For, 
ultimately, democracy is a procedure for making decisions and I have made things difficult for 
myself by trying to think of an „undeciding‟ politics. Still, I think it is important to explore the 
relations, if there are any, between raw politics and democracy. As I have done with the ideas and 
activities or politics, I will try to „strip‟ democracy of those concepts which burden it with an 
incongruous closedness – to its „bare bones‟. 
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The mode of „deciding together‟ or deployment which might seem to be the most 
appropriate to call on in relation to raw politics is that of „democracy‟. This is because, as a 
political idea, democracy evokes and invokes the figure of a group that is not subject to an 
external power in its deciding or deployment. Still, like „politics‟, the idea of democracy also 
holds problems for us in its name. Definitions of democracy can be broadly standardised as 
„government by the people‟. This definition is problematic enough for us, given that it arguably 
includes the mutually dependent sovereign institutions of government (or the State) and „the 
people‟ (as unified identity). Such problems can be partially addressed by beginning with the 
definition used by C. Douglas Lummis. He reads the components of the word democracy – i.e. 
demos and kratia – as „people‟ and „power‟ (Lummis, 1996: 22). From this he defines democracy 
as “the name of a political form in which the people have power” (ibid). Now, while the 
rendering of kratia as „power‟ is not without its own problems,51 given the preceding discussions 
of political activity as taking place within „relations of power‟, it is consistent and appropriate in 
the context of this thesis. But in keeping with that context, we will describe this not as people 
„having‟ power but „people involved in power relations‟.52  
With regard to definitions of demos or „the People‟, Lummis rejects those which exclude 
groups and individuals on the basis of narrow definitions of citizenship (15); which convert „the 
People‟ into an ideological notion which amounts to “those persons who support the party” (15-
16) or; as representing a „correct‟ future political consciousness, in which „the people‟ 
“represents a theoretical abstraction and not flesh-and-blood persons” (16). While Lummis 
himself alludes to forms of society which have been or may be unbound or uncompleted by 
sovereignty,
53
 he goes on to argue for what he says is “the necessary condition for democracy” 
(37). This, he understands as the „political virtue‟ of “democratic patriotism” (ibid). This 
patriotism “is the commitment to, knowledge of, and ability to stand for the whole … It is the 
condition that binds people together into a body by which the power can in principle be held” 
(37-38). It is on this point that we begin to part ways with Lummis because our characterisation 
of political activity is a gathering without identity and without the closure of a „wholeness‟. 
The demos, which, if we follow most accounts (beginning with the Greeks) is a people 
bound together as one. This is obviously an account that does not fit with the being together of a 
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 Kratia is also translated as „rule‟. Reading this as „power‟ is more likely to come from the Latin 
translation of demokratia, i.e. Popularis potentia (see Williams, 1976: 82). Potentia is one of the Latin 
names for power and is defined as “power, force, efficacy … [and] … tyranny” (Kidd, 1980: 254). The 
other, potestas, refers to sovereign power and authority that is politically legitimated (ibid). 
52
 Power, understood in terms of relations of power, is not something to „have‟ or to „hold‟ or to one-
sidedly exercise or apply. Rather, power is a multiplicitous flow which bears intensities, effects and affects.  
53
 Lummis refers to Locke‟s thinking on the „Dissolution of Government‟ and the distinction between a 
State and a society in which government has „dissolved‟. In such a situation, Locke argues, “everyone 
returns the the state he [sic] was in before, with a liberty to shift for himself and provide for his own safety, 
as he thinks fit, in some other society” (Locke, 1887: 302; see also Lummis 1996: 29-30; and Arendt, 
1958: 69-71).  
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gathering. However, given the figuring of the gathering that has been attempted so far, there may 
be another way to view the demos. This can be achieved in the same way in which we addressed 
the problem of (the name of) politics in relation to the polis. The name of democracy, like that of 
politics, comes to us from the particular historical event of the polis. However, the idea (and 
event) of a social or political form in which people can be said to be involved in relations of 
power precedes and outflanks the polis and the State. If we take a camp as the figure of a 
gathering, we can imagine a demos which is not bound in patriotic totality as „a People‟ in which 
any and every member could „stand for the whole‟. As such, the idea of a gathering as a political 
form in which the people are involved in relations of power is not beyond comprehension. 
However, even if this brief excursion into the relations between raw politics and democracy is 
sound (and I must admit that this is far from certain), the most important distinction between raw 
politics and democracy is the decision. Given this, I would argue that the „stripped-down‟ 
democracy that I have sketched here is the most preferable mode of political organisation or 
institution for a gathering to deploy towards. Raw politics is not democracy, but the idea of raw 
politics may help in our thinking of democracy. 
Democracy resists definitive conceptualisation and the idea of democracy is at its most 
inane when it is defined without reference to democratic activity. Lummis‟ discussion clearly 
shows the difficulty and, arguably, the futility of limiting our thought of democracy to its 
definition and conceptualisation. That is all well and good, but the only way to adequately 
understand democracy is “democratic action itself” (Lummis, 1996: 37). Democracy is a practice 
as much as it is an idea. For this thesis, democratic activity can occur as a gathering deploys itself 
into the moment of decision. I think this democracy can still be an affirmation of a raw politics as 
being together and discussing together but the deployment as, or into, democracy changes the 
character of a gathering. This is, as Laclau would call it, a moment of institution. This is a 
decision to institute more closed forms of discussing and deciding, if not of identity. 
Despite the above attempt strip demos and kratia of the baggage of „the People‟ and 
„Rule‟, there really is no getting away from the fact that democracy is still about rule. It is 
possibly also entwined with the Kantian or dialectical trope of self-referentiality that we have 
become all too familiar with. However, as I stated above, I do not want to appropriate the idea of 
democracy, probably the grandest political idea, for the purposes of this thesis. Raw politics is 
not a political, philosophical idea in the same sense that democracy is. It does not stand in for 
democracy. In relation to raw politics, I think the best way to approach democracy, is to approach 
it in deployment. That is to say, if a gathering does decide to institute itself, those involved might 
carry the idea of democracy into that mad moment of institution and they might be called and 
interpellated by it in the same way that raw politics is interpellated by the original inspiration. I 
think that one thing that democracy has in common with raw politics is its adulterated character 
 180 
and its resistance par excellence to conceptual closure. In this regard, I think that Derrida‟s 
description of the legacy of democracy is another kind of inspiration. He writes: 
 
[D]emocracy does not present itself; it has not yet presented itself, but that will come. In the 
meantime let‟s not stop using a word whose heritage is undeniable even if its meaning is still 
obscured, obfuscated, reserved. Neither the word nor the thing „democracy‟ is yet presentable. We 
do not know yet what we have inherited; we are the legatees of this Greek word and of what it 
assigns to us, enjoins us, bequeaths us or leaves us, indeed delegates or leaves over to us … There 
are, to be sure, claims or allegations of democracy everywhere … but we ourselves do not know 
the meaning of this legacy, the mission, emission, or commission of this word or the legitimacy of 
this claim or allegation (Derrida: 2005a: 9). 
 
vi. Anarchism again 
The modes of being together, discussing together and of not deciding together have been 
elaborated in such a way as to envisage a mode of politics which could be imagined as without 
the State. More specifically, raw politics, or a politics without the State, is a being together, a 
gathering without common or singular identity, without a dependence of subjectivity and which 
is unconstrained by the conceptual crust of the contract suite. This politics‟ mode of discussion is 
a polyphonous play of utterances which are unconstrained by the procedures and systems 
associated with Kantian autonomy and rationality. And the mode of (not deciding but) 
interpellation and sending in this politics is also unconstrained by the calculative procedures of 
liberal parliamentarism. While raw politics is adulterated by the anxiety involved in gathering 
without the placating certitudes of representation, it is characterised by a-representation rather 
than misrepresentation. What happens, then, is not a deciding as such, but a joining-with and an 
affirmation of the contingency of the occasion and activity of a gathering. Therefore, what has 
been outlined here is a „stripped-down‟, „raw‟, working understanding of politics. This 
understanding is not one that posits an end to political activity that is other than that activity. 
That is, for example, it does not suggest a project, teleological or not. It does not suggest that 
either bureaucratic or non-bureaucratic institutions are necessary, or entail as necessities, 
obligations or identity. The focus of this understanding of politics is the activity of being 
together. Where conventional political theory enlists political activity into the service of other 
ends, in this thesis I want to think about the activity of politics, for politics‟ sake. After all of this, 
the thesis questions have been reformulated. Where we began by looking at approaches to the 
possibility of the absence of the State, and shifted to asking about the possibility of politics 
without the State, the question now is of the possibility of politics for politics‟ sake, of raw 
politics. This question, like those previous, maintains an interpellative relation to the ideas and 
the name of anarchism – that is, to be „without rulers‟.  
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 Of course though, we have „dealt with‟ anarchism in an earlier Chapter.54 There we saw 
how traditional anarchist thought tends to fall into the same traps as traditional liberal political 
theory. However, by talking about the possibility of politics without the State or „without rulers‟, 
I am (happily) maintaining an association with the anarchist political tradition. Further, the 
conclusions around anarchism in Chapter One are made in relation to an incomplete survey of 
anarchist thought. There are other thoughts and thinkers at play in this field, and our discussions 
of Foucault and Deleuze in particular have served as the groundwork for further discussion and 
analysis of contemporary anarchist thought in Chapter Seven. 
 
 
 A ploy 
 
So, a politics without the State has been sketched in a milieu I am calling a gathering and 
which happens as „raw politics‟. This activity is not constituted, self-constituting or self-
instituting. It phases in and out. It may fizzle out for ever or return, or end in a moment of 
institutional deployment. Raw politics has been sketched as a response to the problematic of 
strategy and play. That is, can a strategic political activity, even as it happens as a kind of play, 
be non-teleological? In relation to the strategic games that Foucault discusses, the answer is no. 
We also discussed the rhizomic and nomadic life that Deleuze and Guattari describe, in which 
chance and risk is affirmed. In relation to this, I think the answer is that what they describe is not 
strategic at all. As we shall see in Chapter Eight, Deleuze and Guattari‟s view of the world and 
life serves as an ontological or metaphysical milieu for the happening of raw politics. And, while 
I think that it is too much to claim that strategy is non-teleological, I remain interested in the 
interplay between the notions and activities of strategy and play. As such, I think that raw politics 
can be understood as a kind of ploy. This idea seems to be suspended in a field of tensions 
between strategy and play. A ploy, in the sense I am trying to express here, is neither teleological 
nor free-play. To join-with a gathering of raw politics is a ploy in its contingency and in its desire 
that something particular happens. In Chapter Eight, we will begin to figure raw politics further, 
as neither territorial nor nomadic, as not against the State, or intended to replace the State. Raw 
politics is not a „No‟, but an activity of affirmation. The question/idea that is carried by raw 
politics is: What will happen? Maybe something will happen that we want to happen.  
 In this chapter we first subjected Foucault‟s „strategies‟ to analysis in order to find out 
whether they could happen as a politics without the State. This analysis was primarily conducted 
in relation to the Derridian, the Nietzschean and the Deleuzian notions of play. From this, I 
argued that Foucault‟s strategies and practices could not happen as a politics without the State 
                                                 
54
 See Chapter One, pages 23-31. 
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because of their reliance or preoccupation with a subject working and turning on itself. As such, 
the activity of a strategy could not be seen as a „Nietzschean affirmation‟. Nevertheless, the idea 
of an affirmative strategy seemed to hold some promise for a politics without the State. Hence, in 
the second part of this chapter, we set out the aspects of such a politics, using Castoriadis‟ 
„stripped back‟ description as a starting point. In thinking through the ways in which people can 
be together, discuss together and (not) decide together in political organisation, we have 
gradually begun to see the form of such a politics. This has been described as a gathering whose 
activity is a kind of „ploy‟. This is a ploy that happens as an affirmation of the undecidability of 
what will eventuate from its activity. In a way, this thesis is itself a ploy and a joining-with a 
rather spectral gathering, in a „ghostly relation‟ with the ideas that have followed the original 
inspiration. As a ploy, its effects and affects remain to come and the question of „what will 
happen?‟ hangs over it. Nonetheless, it also a ploy that is still under way. There are other 
questions to ask before the activity of raw politics can be developed from a sketch to a clearer 
picture. 
 Given that I claim that a gathering happens as a politics without the State, I am also 
embracing a friendship with anarchism (rather than a filiation or an ideological solidarity). As 
mentioned earlier, the survey of anarchism conducted in Chapter One focussed on the traditional 
forms. But there has been other, more recent, thinking that has either called itself or been called 
anarchism. In Chapter Seven, I will look at some of these attempts to think of politics without the 
State in order to give further form to the idea of raw politics. These three attempts will be 
grouped around, firstly, the work of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, secondly, that of Simon 
Critchley and finally that of Deleuze and Guattari.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
FROM WITHERING TO WHATEVER 
Approaches to non-State politics 
 
 
 Subjectivity of multitude – Experience of an ‘ungathered’ ethical subject 
 
„I should see the garden far better,‟ said Alice to herself, „if I could get to the top of that hill … 
Well then, I‟ll try‟ … And so she did: wandering up and down, and trying turn after turn, but 
always coming back to the house, do what she would. Indeed, once, when she turned a corner 
rather more quickly than usual, she ran against it before she could stop herself (Carroll, [1896]: 
156). 
 
  Throughout this thesis it has seemed that every time we encounter a possible trajectory 
towards a politics without the State, we find ourselves approaching, again, the State (State-form) 
itself – and its constitutive unit, the subject. This experience (of theory) resembles in its manner 
and in degrees of frustration, Alice‟s attempts to leave the Looking-Glass House to explore the 
hill (Carroll, [1896]: 157). We have experienced this in our early examinations of anarchism and 
in our more detailed encounters with the work of Castoriadis and Foucault. Their work 
nevertheless – while not addressed particularly to the possibility of politics without the State – 
offers glimpses of what such a gathering might be like. Their critiques of modern political theory, 
sovereignty and liberty have been important for understanding the milieu of raw politics, the 
gathering and the ploy. Still, there is other thought that does address the State as a particular 
problem for political activity and which in various ways figures or imagines or describes the 
possibility of its absence from politics. 
 Many contemporary thinkers continue the work of theorising an absence of the State. 
Sometimes, and sometimes not, these thinkers call their theory „anarchist‟. Generally, these 
approaches have in common the idea of people, groups, communities, societies or multitudes 
somehow organising themselves „without a ruler‟. These thinkers differ in their ideas from those 
of earlier anarchist philosophy in that they focus or dwell on or think about socio-political 
activity as the most important aspect of this politics. That is, they do not begin by plotting or 
theorising the abolition or eventual actual absence of the State as a goal which in turn creates a 
space within which an anarchist society can flourish. Instead, while the State remains a problem, 
contemporary thinkers recognise that even if the State could be got rid of, an anarchist 
community would not necessarily follow, rising, as it were, from the ashes. However, like the 
earlier anarchists (and communists and socialists) they do carry a revolutionary torch. They can 
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be understood to be responding, like Castoriadis, to what originally inspired Marx. That is, the 
possibility of a new and different philosophy and a new and different politics that is not marked 
by the exercise of force, domination and oppressive rule (Castoriadis, 1987: 62-66). As we have 
seen though, to respond to this „inspiration‟ is one thing. To carry out or imagine a different 
politics is another. Castoriadis‟ own critique of Marxist revolutionary theory stands as a signal 
account of such contingency. 
 In this Chapter we will undertake a brief and limited discussion of some recent thought 
that discuss the possibility of the absence of the State. These currents can also be said to be 
responses to the „original inspiration‟, and, in their ways, „revolutionary‟. In addition, these 
currents will be used as examples from both ends of a spectrum of contemporary „non-state‟ 
politics. At one end is the notion of the withering of the modern state that is occurring on a 
planetary scale as a result of changes in global political economy. At the other end is a figuring of 
anarchism in terms of the relationships primarily between and within small groups and 
(in)dividuals.
1
 
Firstly, the ideas of „Empire‟, „Multitude‟ and „Commonwealth‟ from the work of 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri will be examined. This theory has as its subject matter the 
multitudinous population of the planet. While Hardt and Negri call their theory communist rather 
than anarchist,
 2
 they see the withering of the nation-state and modern political sovereignty and 
the possibility of a revolutionarily democratic politics as immanent and desirable. Secondly, we 
will look at the ethically founded anarchisms of Simon Critchley and Todd May. These thinkers 
both draw from poststructuralist thought in order to figure ethical subjectivity and practice as the 
most important aspect of any conception of anarchistic politics. These discussions will lead us to 
the final chapter, in which I will discuss the analyses of Hardt and Negri, Critchley and May, 
Castoriadis and Foucault, and others, in relation to the rhizomes and nomads and „minor politics‟ 
of Deleuze and Guattari. During this analysis, I think that a distinction will become clearer. In 
their own ways, aspects of each of all of these strands of thought can be understood as a „non-
state politics‟ but, I will argue, not a „politics without the State‟. While they all address their 
thought to the notion that the State or sovereignty can be overcome, those addresses are uttered 
from positions of simple opposition or negation. So it is time now to turn to these currents of 
thought as a final, and hopefully instructive, detour on the way to working out my own „politics 
without the State‟. 
 
                                                 
1
 Naturally, there will be thinkers excluded from this survey. This exclusion does not imply that such 
thinkers are irrelevant to this thesis‟ questions but reflects the limits of time and space available here. 
Those included, have been chosen because they seem to broadly cover a range of ideas along a spectrum of 
non-State thought – and for affinities to aspects of this thesis‟ arguments. 
2
 Hardt and Negri strongly reject the suggestion that their work is anarchist (2001: 350). As communist, 
their figuring of the withering away of the State (or of non-state politics) maintains a fidelity to the work of 
Marx, Engels and Lenin. 
 185 
 
 Empire, multitude, the common 
 
 „[A]nd here‟s a path that leads straight to it, at least, no, it doesn‟t do that‟ (Carroll, [1896]: 156). 
 
 No more gods! No more gods! Man is King! (Rimbaud, 2003 [1870]: 13). 
 
 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have been theorising around a kind of „becoming 
absence‟ of the State for at least a decade. However, this becoming absence is not one which can 
be understood to have been brought about by any theoretical or political intervention. Rather, a 
weakening of the State is a symptom of another process, another phase of capitalist expansion. 
Their books, Empire (2001), Multitude (2004) and Commonwealth (2009), describe the decline of 
the nation-state and the emergence, consolidation and convulsions of contemporary global 
political relations as „Empire‟. „Empire‟ for Hardt and Negri is not an Empire. That is, it is not a 
state of affairs that can be likened to, analysed and compared alongside previous historical cases 
– but is a theoretical concept which is “characterized fundamentally by a lack of boundaries … 
No territorial boundaries limit its reign” (Hardt & Negri, 2001: xiv).3 So, Empire is not a 
“historical regime” but one without “temporal boundaries” (xv). The atemporality of this current 
world order operates to “[fix] the existing state of affairs for eternity” (xiv-xv). Finally, 
 
the rule of Empire operates on all registers of the social order extending down to the depths of the 
social world. Empire not only manages a territory and a population but also creates the very world 
it inhabits. It not only regulates human interactions but also seeks directly to rule over human 
nature. The object of its rule is social life in its entirety, and thus Empire presents the paradigmatic 
form of biopower (Hardt & Negri, 2001: xv). 
 
This dire description of Empire, on its own, does nothing to suggest a politics without the State. 
In these basic terms Empire does nothing but impose a totalising logic. This logic is inscribed 
through disciplinary power on the “brains and bodies” (23) of populations. These populations – 
that is, the entire population of the planet – are gathered into a singularity which Hardt and Negri 
call the „multitude‟ (which we will discuss shortly). Despite the grimness of Hardt and Negri‟s 
descriptions of Empire, they envisage the possibility of something more positive, even joyous 
                                                 
3
 For Hardt and Negri, „Empire‟ is used “not as a metaphor, which would require demonstration of the 
resemblances between today‟s world order and the Empires of Rome, China, the Americas, and so forth, 
but rather as a concept” (xiv). When Hardt and Negri talk about empires of the past, they use the terms  
„imperialist‟ and „imperialism‟. When referring to what they see as the new order of „Empire‟ they use the 
term „imperial‟. I will follow this usage in this chapter. 
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(413), for they argue that the multitude is ripe with revolutionary power. The multitude has in its 
being the power to resist and oppose Empire and to revolutionarily transform life on this planet.  
 Hardt and Negri devote most of their first book, Empire, to describing the nature of 
Empire and narrating the historical and politico-philosophical passages towards its current 
position of domination. They begin by arguing that the passage to modern sovereignty is 
characterized by three phases. These are: first, the “revolutionary discovery of the plane of 
immanence” (70); second, the crisis of modernity and the attempt to deal with the crisis through 
resort to a transcendental apparatus which legitimates and naturalises sovereign authority and; 
third, the passage to modern sovereignty in the form elaborated by Hobbes in his Leviathan (1979 
[1651]).  
The first phase of the passage to Empire – the revolutionary discovery of an immanent 
plane – is the „extraordinary‟ declaration by humans that they are “masters over their own lives, 
producers of cities and history, and inventors of heavens” (Hardt & Negri, 2001: 70). This 
declaration springs – with the emergence of the modern science, art, theology and philosophy – 
from the discovery and “affirmation of the powers of this world” (71) over the preceding belief in 
transcendent power and authority. Further, a vital aspect of the power of „this world‟ is its 
activity in the intellect of singular being. In this context, the revolutionary discovery of the 
immanent plane is inseparable from the “historical process of subjectivization” (74).4 Here, Hardt 
and Negri argue that “humanity discovered its power in the world and integrated this dignity into 
a new consciousness of reason and potentiality” (71). Thus, human knowledge shifts from the 
transcendent to the immanent plane to become “a doing, a practice of transforming nature” (72). 
These philosophical developments are revolutionary because the creative powers that had been 
seen to reside in the heavens came to be understood to be of the world (and of a particularly 
special aspect of the world – humanity). This, for Hardt and Negri, “is the discovery of the 
fullness of the plane of immanence” (73). On this plane, then, between the thirteenth to the 
sixteenth centuries, humanity refounded its authority, reappropriating it from the transcendent 
plane. Humanity in this figuring is “the action of a multitude of singularities” (ibid). From the 
immanence of the multitude springs new understandings of power and of liberation. Further, and 
importantly for Hardt and Negri, the idea and horizon of democracy coincides completely with 
the horizon of immanence (ibid). 
There is another side, however, to the „discovery‟ of this revolutionary plane of 
immanence. It is also marked by a crisis which provokes a response – a counterrevolution. As 
movements expressing the liberatory desire of the immanent plane emerged, they entered into 
                                                 
4
 “The constitution of modernity was not about theory in isolation but about theoretical acts indissolubly 
tied to mutations of practice and reality. Bodies and brains were fundamentally transformed. This historical 
process of subjectivization was revolutionary in the sense that it determined a paradigmatic and irreversible 
change in the mode of life of the multitude” (Hardt & Negri, 2001: 74). 
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antagonistic engagements with others. Since there could be no return to the past, or a destruction 
of these new forces, the counterrevolution is an attempt to “dominate and expropriate … the 
emerging movements” (74). This counterrevolution, or „the second mode of modernity‟, sought 
to “transplant the new image of humanity to a transcendent plane … [and to pose] … a 
transcendent constituted power against an immanent constituent power, order against desire” 
(74). In this second mode of modernity (as crisis) “the fires of superstition were lit” (76) and 
religious war and the manipulation of the fears and anxieties of populations ensued. By the end of 
the seventeenth century, monarchic absolutism prevailed with “a new armory of transcendentals” 
(77). In addition to this, the transcendental values of the Enlightenment, in universal reason, 
functioned to mediate and contain any claim to or desire for freedom and thus reinforced the 
counterrevolution. The opening of subjectivity is limited by this new “transcendent rule and 
order” (80).5 Hardt and Negri here tell a familiar story. They emphasise the role of Enlightenment 
reason in the formalisation and containment of notions of freedom and autonomy in relation to 
ethical and political thought.
6
 They too locate Kant at the centre of this story. Further, in relation 
to politics in particular, the transcendent apparatus is a response to the subjectivisation brought 
about by the discovery of the immanent plane. As such, individual subjects are conceived of as 
inherently self-interested and hostile against all others in defence of that self-interest. From this 
conception of (subjectivised) humanity, we get Hobbes‟ brutal state of nature and the contract. 
The transcendent political apparatus is the „God on earth‟ of the Leviathan and subsequent forms 
of political sovereignty, such as those elaborated by Locke and Rousseau (83-85). This 
transcendent order – in which “the single wills of the various individuals converge and are 
represented in the will of the transcendent sovereign” (84) – is legitimised conceptually, 
juridically and ideologically. The concept of the contract prepares a „ground‟ for laws that 
implement and constitute the rule of modern sovereignty. The conceptual discrepancies involved 
in the maintaining the predominance of this order are swathed in the purple robes of state 
ideologies.
7
 
Hardt and Negri‟s descriptions of the emergence of modern sovereignty and what I have 
called the contract suite is similar to the story told in this thesis. Their account of the passage 
from the discovery of the immanent plane to its containment by the transcendent apparatus of 
                                                 
5
 Hardt and Negri argue that this “transcendental apparatus … is the distinctive trademark of European 
Enlightenment thought. In both the empiricist and the idealist currents, transcendentalism was the exclusive 
horizon of ideology, and in the successive centuries nearly all the major currents of philosophy would be 
drawn into this project. The symbiosis between intellectual labor and institutional, political, and scientific 
rhetorics became absolute on this terrain, and every conceptual formation came to be marked by it: the 
formalization of politics, the instrumentalization of science and technique for profit, the pacification of 
social antagonisms. Certainly, in each of these fields we find historically specific developments, but 
everything was always tied up with the line of a grand narrative that European modernity told itself, a tale 
told in a transcendental dialect” (Hardt & Negri, 2001: 80). 
6
 Although Hardt and Negri do not discuss it in any detail, this story also includes the development of the 
theory of Utilitarianism. 
7
 This is the passage from phraseology to ideology that we discussed in Chapter Three. 
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reason and sovereignty has been described here, to again use Butler‟s phrasing, as “the resolution 
of freedom into self-enslavement” (Butler, 1997: 31). However, for Hardt and Negri, there is 
more to this story. They argue that the transcendental apparatus of the modern form of sovereign 
authority is sustained by and inseparable from “capitalist development and the affirmation of the 
market as the foundation of the values of social reproduction” (Hardt & Negri, 2001: 85). They 
describe the synthesis of capital and modernity, in which the idea of the invisible hand, and the 
ideas and practices of an autonomous market and political economy function to subsume 
immanent relations into the ideologies of transcendental apparatus. This synthesis though, does 
not hold without the State. Hardt and Negri write,  
 
What is needed is for the state … to make the well-being of private individuals coincide with the 
public interest, reducing all social functions and laboring activities to one measure of value … 
[and] … to give content to the mediation of interests and represent the axis of rationality of that 
mediation … [Thus] … Modern European sovereignty is capitalist sovereignty, a form of 
command that overdetermines the relationship between individuality and universality as a 
function of the development of capital (2001: 86, 87). 
 
With this synthesis, sovereign authority over the multitude becomes total. Here, Hardt and Negri 
draw on Weber and Foucault to describe the operations of rational bureaucracy, policing, 
biopower and the governmental society of control. These powers, these operations, accomplish 
“the miracle of the subsumption of singularities in the totality, of the will of all into the general 
will” (87-88). For Hardt and Negri, the synthesis of capital and modern sovereignty is built upon 
by the development of nation-states. 
 Rather than repeat any telling of the development of the nation-state here,
8
 I will describe 
those elements of Hardt and Negri‟s analysis that are most relevant to this thesis. The first main 
aspect of this analysis is the passage from patrimonial, monarchical sovereignty to national 
sovereignty. This passage is marked by a change in the population from (passive) subjects of a 
monarch to (active) citizens of a nation-state. In the nation-state, the totalising identity of the 
patrimonial state is reproduced, but in such a way that it is described as emanating from the 
activity of the collective through imaginaries and ideologies. Under this logic, the newly 
discovered active nature of the population is harnessed through the propagation of the idea that 
the identity of the nation is actively produced, created by and originates in the collectivity of the 
People (95, 102). This ideology is an attempt to overcome what Hardt and Negri call “the 
precariousness of modern sovereignty” (ibid). However, historically, the attempt is an 
“ideological nightmare” (97) and conceptually fraught. Hardt and Negri argue that the crisis of 
modernity remains unresolved by the concept – and actual development – of the nation-state. The 
                                                 
8
 See Chapter One of this thesis. See also Benedict Anderson‟s Imagined Communities (1991). 
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nation can only be the ideological mask of the “contradictory co-presence of the multitude and a 
power that wants to reduce it to the rule of one … of a new productive set of free subjectivities 
and a disciplinary power that wants to exploit it” (ibid). Here we recognise Althusser‟s 
commentary on the discrepancies at the heart of the (sovereignty-producing) social contract and, 
again, Foucault‟s analyses of sovereignty (Althusser, 1972; Foucault, 2004; 1981). Further, 
through our discussion of Nancy‟s work, we recognise the argument that in Europe the 
ideological mask of the nation was cast through the creation of homogeneous racial identity 
within a state and absolute racial difference to those without. The national community is 
conceived and defined by its closure and is maintained by a desire to return or reinvigorate a 
(non-existent) originary community.
9
 Where Hardt and Negri‟s analysis again differs is in 
relation to the place of capitalism in the imperialist expansion of modern national sovereignty. 
For them, the inside-outside relation is not simply a notion which elucidates the development of 
the national identities and ideologies. The relation of the inside to the outside is also at play as 
capital expands its global range and is disrupted by that expansion. As such, Hardt and Negri‟s 
discussion of the differences between the development of the nation-state in the European-
Western world and in the places colonised by it, again places capitalism in a position of primary 
importance.  
 The development of European national power into colonial and imperialist power is 
driven by the logic of capitalism. Accordingly, through the processes of the enclosure of common 
lands and primitive accumulation, and through the subsumption of immanent subjectivity into 
labour and consumption, capital first territorialises the space inside the sovereign borders of a 
nation-state. After this space is saturated, there is a need for capital to expand beyond the inside 
of sovereign borders. Capital drives the nation-state‟s need to maintain the internal unity of the 
People and the associated need to sate the multitude‟s immanent desire for freedom. Capital 
pushes the nation-state to subsume the spaces outside and populations other than those of the 
original territory and racial group. Here, the nation‟s relationship to the Other and its outside 
changes. Instead of the „outside‟ being only a key aspect of a nation‟s self-definition and identity, 
it is brought inside. The populations of this outside are subsumed into the nation but remain other 
than the originary People. Importantly for Hardt and Negri, the nationalism, colonialism and 
imperialism that serves as the ideology for the expansion of capital, also serves to inscribe on 
colonial populations, the imaginaries of individual and national freedom, identity and rights. This 
operates to activate the immanent desire of the (local) multitude for such freedoms. This desire 
for freedom manifests in the emergence of anti-colonial and subaltern national movements.
10
 This 
                                                 
9
 The potential destructiveness of this desire is discussed by Jean-Luc Nancy in the essay, „Eulogy for the 
Melee‟ in Being Singular Plural (2000).  
10
 Hardt and Negri argue that in some respects “the function of the concept of nation is inverted when 
deployed among subordinated rather than dominant groups. Stated most boldly, it appears that whereas the 
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liberatory function, however, only lasts as long it takes a subordinated people to oust their 
colonial or imperialist oppressors. Upon independence, the function of a national ideology reverts 
to that of unification, homogenisation of identity and the containment of the multitude under the 
transcendent order of modern sovereignty (Hardt & Negri, 2001: 105-109). Regardless of the 
variations in the development of the nation-state between the European-Western states and those 
that have emerged in the post-colonial era, Hardt and Negri argue that the crisis brought about by 
the „discovery of a revolutionary plane of immanence‟ remains unresolved and open. They cite 
the tumultuous and often barbaric events of the twentieth century as evidence of this claim.
11
 
Further, despite the occurrence of movements for national liberation that are in some cases 
responses to this barbarism, the end of colonialism and imperialism “has not really opened an age 
of unqualified freedom but rather yielded to new forms of rule that operate on a global scale” 
(134). Ultimately, the expansion of the nation-state has functioned primarily to inscribe the order 
and logic of capital on everything. This is, they say, “the first real glimpse of the passage to 
Empire” (ibid).  
 Earlier we encountered what I called Hardt and Negri‟s „dire description‟ of Empire 
(2001: xv). According to this description, Empire appears to leave no space for anything like 
„freedom‟. Hardt and Negri mostly adopt the Foucauldian characterisation of modern societies as 
controlled by and contained within the logic, practices, management and conventions inscribed 
by governmentalist logic. According to this characterisation, Empire is not legitimated 
juridically. It is instead legitimated through and by the symbologically presented codes and 
values of universal morals, peace and human rights.  
The situation in which there is no population on the planet that is not contained within 
the order prescribed by the sovereign state has itself brought about the passage to Empire. A  
system of nation-states itself calls for a means of juridical resolution of disputes and 
discrepancies. In response, a global legal order has come into existence. This order, of which the 
United Nations is the prime representative, while based on the theoretical and actual sovereign 
state models, has turned out quite differently (Hardt & Negri, 2001: 13-15). Unlike the sovereign 
State which is established through the „force of law‟,12 Empire is formed “on the basis of the 
capacity to present force as being in the service of right and peace … Empire is not born of its 
own will but rather it is called into being and constituted on the basis of its capacity to resolve 
conflicts” (15). In this context, force is exercised by Empire, not in the name of national 
sovereignty, but in the name of the maintenance of global peace under the moral and juridical 
                                                                                                                                                 
concept of nation promotes stasis and restoration in the hands of the dominant, it is a weapon for change 
and revolution in the hands of the subordinated” (Hardt & Negri, 2001: 106). 
11
 As we saw in Chapter Two, similar stories and critiques of modern sovereignty are put forward by 
Benjamin, Arendt, Schmitt and Agamben. 
12
 See the discussion of the work of Benjamin, Schmitt, Arendt, Agamben and Derrida in Chapter One, 
pages 19-23. 
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sanction of universal rights and values (2001: 35-37; 2004: 25-32). Although these sanctions are 
instituted at the supra-national level as universal law, they are not enforceable and do not have 
force as universal law. What force they do have resides in their availability as a source of moral 
invocation. As such, imperial interventions often occur not as sovereign exercises of conquest or 
self-defence but as morally „justified‟ police actions. These actions also often occur under, and 
utilise, the conditions of the exception (16-17).
13
  
Generally, while the network of international organisations (such as the United Nations, 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) possess certain legitimacy and power, this 
is only in terms of their “function in the symbology of the imperial order” (31) and they are 
ineffectual outside of that function. This order is actually woven together by the activities of 
transnational corporations which “directly structure and articulate territories and populations … 
directly distribute labor power over various markets, functionally allocate resources, and organize 
hierarchically the various sectors of world production” (31-32). Further, through the increasing 
sophistication of communications technologies, the powers of industry and finance now produce 
subjectivities as well as commodities (32).
14
 The very lives of these subjectivities are intertwined 
with the productive force of capital as the “connective fabric of the biopolitical world” (31). So, 
the legitimation of Empire does not come from the accords and treaties which tenuously 
maintained earlier regimes of the international order, or from the first supranational organisations 
and regimes of international law. Rather, communication technologies in the hands of capital 
serve to legitimate the reign of Empire through the continual integration of the “imaginary and 
the symbolic within the biopolitical fabric” (33). As such, the “imperial machine … is a subject 
that produces its own image of authority” (ibid). Behind this image though, is the actual 
authority, power and control of Empire. This imperial sovereignty is one that has dissolved the 
ideological configuration of base and superstructure as social production and juridical 
legitimation become more and more intertwined and indistinguishable.
15
 
As the imperial order has developed, the characteristic distinctions of modernity, those 
between inside and outside, have become more difficult to discern. In Empire, the nation-state 
                                                 
13
 “The history of imperialist, interimperialist, and anti-imperialist wars is over … [W]e have entered the 
the era of minor and internal conflicts. Every imperial war is a civil war, a police action – from Los 
Angeles and Granada to Mogadishu and Sarajevo. In fact, the separation of tasks between the external and 
the internal arms of power (between the army and the police, the CIA and the FBI) is increasingly vague 
and indeterminate” (Hardt & Negri, 2001: 189). In Part One of Multitude (2004: 1-95), Hardt and Negri 
expand on this theme in the context, and in the wake, of the 2003 U.S. led invasion of Iraq.  
14
 “The great industrial and financial powers … produce agentic subjectivities within the biopolitical 
context: they produce needs, social relations, bodies, and minds – which is to say they produce producers” 
(Hardt & Negri, 2001: 32). 
15
 “Social production and juridical legitimation should not be conceived as primary and secondary forces 
nor as elements of the base and superstructure, but should be understood rather in a state of absolute 
parallelism and intermixture, coextensive throughout biopolitical society. In Empire and its regime of 
biopower, economic production and political constitution tend increasingly to coincide” (Hardt & Negri, 
2001: 41). 
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and the world system of nation-states has broken down and concomitantly, the distinction 
between public and private spheres, between nature and artifice, between the primitive and the 
civilised and between labour and leisure
16
 have been dissolved (186-190). In relation to the 
sovereignty of the self and the State, “[t]he Other that might delimit a modern sovereign Self has 
become fractured and indistinct, and there is no longer an outside that can bound the place of 
sovereignty” (189). For example, in relation to the generation of subjectivity by social institutions 
such as the family, the school or the factory, these institutions have now broken down to such an 
extent that their productive functions are no longer contained within the boundaries of the 
particular institutions but seep into every space of the social world. The logic of various 
disciplinary regimes, now that they have been „deinstitutionalised‟ and released into general 
circulation, function without the old physical and social institutional limits and have become 
more intensive and extensive (196-197). This disciplinary saturation produces the imperial 
subject – one whose mode of life is incorporated into the logic of Empire through the disruption 
of “every determinate ontological relationship” (202) in such a way that the differential relations 
produced and experienced by and between subjects enables biopolitical management at a global 
level. 
While Hardt and Negri adopt Foucault‟s notions of biopower, the disciplinary society 
and the society of control as the descriptive logic of the character of Empire, they nevertheless 
claim that there is more to the overall picture (27-30). Firstly, they note that the simple fact that 
the regime of sovereign nation-states is breaking down cannot be a bad thing – even if it is as a 
result of the onset of the dominant biopower of Empire. Further, even though the world in which 
modern sovereignty has lost stability and coherence is characterised by the saturation of imperial 
biopower, the passage from the (transcendental) subjectivity of citizens and People to the 
(immanent) subjectivity of the multitude opens up the field for other and new modes of life – 
modes of life not considered or figured on the Foucauldian analyses of governmentalist society. 
As Hardt and Negri elaborate on the immanent creativity of biopolitical production, they do so 
against what they see as the short-comings and oversights of the analyses of Foucault, and of 
Deleuze and Guattari. Firstly, they claim that Foucault neglects the creativity of biopolitical 
production because his account remains limited by the functionalism of a structuralist 
epistemology. As such, Foucault‟s analyses are incapable of providing any descriptions of “the 
real dynamics of production in biopolitical society” (28). Secondly, while Deleuze and Guattari‟s 
approach does provide insights into such dynamics,
17
 the account is articulated “only 
                                                 
16
 Hardt and Negri here refer to the work of Guy Debord. See The Society of the Spectacle (1983) and 
Comments of the Society of the Spectacle (1998). I have written on Debord and the dissolution of the 
distinction between labour and what remains of everyday life in my article, „ON|OFF‟ (2007). 
17
 “Deleuze and Guattari present us with a properly poststructuralist understanding of biopower that renews 
materialist thought and grounds itself solidly in the question of the production of social being. Their work 
demystifies structuralism and all the philosophical, sociological, and political conceptions that make the 
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superficially and ephemerally, as a chaotic, indeterminate horizon marked by the ungraspable 
event” (ibid). Because of this Hardt and Negri pronounce Deleuze and Guattari‟s account as 
insubstantial, lacking ontology (specifically a creative ontology or agency) and thus impotent. 
For Hardt and Negri, these analyses of politics and populations leave out the immanent creative 
agency of the multitude. For them, biopolitical production is ontologically, immanently creative. 
From this ontologically immanent creativity, they aim to produce a new theory of subjectivity 
based on the biopolitical production of the multitude, particularly in relation to the 
transformations brought about through the experience of wage labour. As we shall see, Hardt and 
Negri regard wage labour to be an important aspect of capital‟s rupturing of the inside-outside 
relation that constitutes the idea of – and the actual – nation-state. 
 
 
Multitude and revolutionary freedom 
 
The nature of labour has changed as the world order has passed into „Empire‟. Firstly, 
with the expansion of imperial capital and biopower into regions it defines as „developing‟18  – 
even where the transition from feudal labour to wage labour effects no change to (or makes 
worse) the actual conditions of workers – the experience of wage labour begins to infuse people 
with “a new desire for liberation” (Hardt & Negri, 2001: 252). The increasing mobility of the 
„global proletariat‟ also feeds this desire. Further, the experience of labour (particularly in the 
regions in which the imperial order is firmly established) is no longer situated in the milieu of the 
factory, where what is produced is material. Instead, the surplus value produced in Empire comes 
from “intellectual, immaterial and communicative labor power” (29). This kind of labour 
demands increased cooperation and creativity between workers, rather than the simple obedience 
required by the top down command nature of Fordist and Taylorist regimes. Some of Hardt and 
Negri‟s most important claims stem from this idea that contemporary communications 
                                                                                                                                                 
fixity of the epistemological frame an ineluctable point of reference. They focus our attention clearly on the 
ontological substance of social production. Machines produce. The constant functioning of social machines 
in their various apparatuses and assemblages produces the world along with the subjects and objects that 
constitute it” (Hardt & Negri, 2001: 28). 
18
 This problems associated with the use of the notion of „development‟ are summarised by Castoriadis. He 
writes, “[w]hat is „development,‟ why „development,‟ … „development‟ of what and towards what? … 
[T]he term … came into use when it became evident that „progress,‟ „expansion‟ and „growth‟ were not 
intrinsic virtualities, inherent in all human societies, the realization (actualization) of which could be 
considered inevitable, but were specific properties of Western societies possessing a „positive value.‟  … 
So the West thought of itself, and proposed itself, as the model for the entire world. The normal state of a 
society, what one could consider as the state of „maturity‟ and designate with this apparently self-evident 
term, was the capacity for indefinite growth. Other countries or societies were considered to be naturally 
less mature or less developed, and their main problem was defined as the existence of „obstacles to 
development‟” (Castoriadis: 1991h: 180). 
 194 
technologies enable the increasing decentralisation of capital.
19
 This speeds the break-down (or 
withering) of sovereign regimes and institutions and in turn reinforces the spread and dominance 
of Empire. These communication technologies – and the communicative and cooperative nature 
of immaterial labour – also drive an increase in the sociability of labour. So, concomitant with the 
consolidation of Empire, there emerges a labour force which is adept at, and inscribed by, the 
experience of creative cooperation within the multitude (289-294).  
Empire and multitude are two aspects of the same immanent plane, two sides of the same 
coin. One is the juridical structure, the constituted power and the biopower of Empire. This 
aspect is characterised by tensions which are wrought by continual contradiction and crises. 
These tensions cannot be contained by the imperial system and so there is “always a surplus” 
(60). Empire „tries‟20 to make conflicts “commensurate with its project, but they emerge again as 
incommensurable, with all the elements of the new terrain mobile in space and flexible in time” 
(ibid). Each resolution of conflict or contradiction only opens others. It is important to note here 
that for Hardt and Negri capital is no longer a force in the constitutional, juridical structure of 
Empire. Capital has no further use for such a vehicle. The deterritorialising and decentreing logic 
of capital flows on the immanent plane of Empire. As such, Hardt and Negri claim that capital is 
no longer an aspect of the transcendental sovereign apparatus (385-389). I contend that this claim 
is very hard to defend and will say more about this below. 
The other aspect of this world system is 
 
the plural multitude of productive, creative subjectivities of globalization that have learned to sail 
on this enormous sea. They are in perpetual motion and they form constellations of singularities 
and events that impose continual global reconfigurations on the system. This perpetual motion can 
be geographical, but it can refer also to modulations of form and processes of mixture and 
hybridization (Hardt & Negri, 2001: 60). 
 
This „two-headed‟21 system is not characterised simply by the domination of the multitude by 
Empire. While the multitude is subjected to the rule of the imperial „machine‟, that machine is a 
“mere apparatus of capture that lives only off the vitality of the multitude … [which] … is the 
                                                 
19
 Hardt and Negri call this the „process of informatization‟, in which there is a “migration from industry to 
service jobs … [which] … are highly mobile and involve flexible skills” (2001: 285). These jobs are 
themselves characterised “by the central role played by knowledge, information, affect, and 
communication. In this sense many call the postindustrial economy an informational economy” (ibid).  
20
 These references to an „imperial agency‟ occur regularly throughout Empire. While this mode of 
expression is in keeping with Hardt and Negri‟s theory, the notion that the multiplicitous biopower of 
Empire „tries‟ is in itself incongruous enough to prompt further questioning of the total theory of multitude.   
21
 Hardt and Negri describe the twin aspects of Empire and multitude as a „Two-headed imperial Eagle‟ 
(2001: 59-63). 
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real productive force of our social world” (62).22 This is so much so that a “new sense of being is 
imposed on the constitution of Empire by the creative movement of the multitude” (ibid). This 
creative movement of the multitude is both “latent and implicit in our social being” (2004: 221) 
and in it Hardt and Negri see the potential for revolution. So, as well as being ontological, the 
multitude is a political project, one aimed at bringing the democratic power of the multitude into 
being. Hardt and Negri‟s descriptions of Empire are also descriptions of the emergence of the 
cultural, legal, economic and political conditions for this (historical) multitude, which is “always-
already and not-yet” (221-222). The „project‟ begins with refusal and resistance to Empire, but 
this refusal is only the beginning (2001: 203-204).
23
 The creation of the democratic multitude is 
neither a spontaneous result nor is it organised through a type of traditional vanguardism. Rather, 
it emerges as the production of the common. That is, it is the creation of a new mode of life and 
community, “through the collaboration of singular social subjects … the formation of habits, or 
performivity or the development of languages” (2004: 222). These habits and performivities are 
ultimately described by Hardt and Negri in terms of a communistic militancy of the type 
demonstrated by some in the anti-capitalist globalisation movement that emerged in the late 
1990s.
24
 
 The mode of life of the multitude that Hardt and Negri envisage happens in a world 
system in which the State is in the process of withering away (or has already withered already). 
The traditional constitutions and institutions of the modern State remain, but not as apparatuses 
of sovereignty. The biopower of Empire now manages and transforms these institutions in its 
own interests (rather than those of the state). This characterisation follows the theoretical rubric 
of Foucault‟s governmentality, which Hardt and Negri apply to describe the global system of the 
twenty first century. Like Foucault‟s, I think this description is powerful and plausible. Hardt and 
Negri present our social and political world and its crises clearly and convincingly. I think that 
the picture they paint of the expansion of global capital, the disintegration of the law of nation-
states, and the role of war in the biopolitical maintenance of Empire is largely correct. However, 
because of the entwinement and mutual dependence of Empire and multitude it is difficult to see 
                                                 
22
 Here Hardt and Negri‟s description of this relation, between Empire and multitude, draws on Deleuze 
and Guattari‟s characterisation of the relation between the State-form and the nomadic form of the war 
machine, in which the State-form operates to „overcode‟ and homogenise all nomadic lines of flight (see 
Deleuze & Parnet, 1987: 124-130; Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 351-423). Todd May describes this relation 
as the State-form operating through a “parasitism and binding … that works on the creativity of the 
nomadic war-machine, channelling it along acceptable and well-regulated pathways” (May, 1994: 105). 
23
 This resistance can be generally understood to follow a Foucauldian figuring of resistance within power 
relations. 
24
 These include metropolitan and indigenous movements which often gathered in resistance to what Hardt 
and Negri would understand as the representative institutions of the imperial order of global capital. Such 
organisations include World Economic Forum (WEF), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) and World Bank. Other actions were organised around meetings to negotiate 
„free trade agreements‟ such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Multi-lateral 
Agreement on Investment (MAI) and the General Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade (GATT). For more 
detail about these movements see, for example, Paul Kingsnorth‟s One No, Many Yeses (2003). 
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their vision of politics as a politics without sovereignty or the State. One reason for this is that 
even though biopolitical function of traditional sovereignty has diminished, it has only been 
usurped by another, imperial sovereignty. In relation to this, I think that the claim that the rule of 
Empire and capital operates on a plane of immanence (rather than as a „transcendental apparatus), 
where it is as much subject to the desires of the multitude as the multitude is to imperial 
biopolitical management is untenable. 
 
 
Politics of the multitude, weight of Empire 
 
Said Naphta: … “You see, what perplexes the world is the disparity between the swiftness of 
spirit, and the immense unwieldiness, sluggishness, inertia, permanence of matter … apply my 
words to that humanistic free-thought which imagines itself to be still in a heroic attitude of 
resistance to authority and domination” (Mann, 1960 [1924]: 507). 
 
 The work of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri is expressed on many registers, from 
philosophy to agit-prop, and is clearly intended to operate as a provocation and a revolutionary 
call. Not surprisingly, this mode of expression has drawn more attention and comment from a 
broader sphere than is usual for a work of political philosophy. As such, their work has 
functioned as a rallying point for the development of new theories and critiques by those who 
could also be said to be responding to the „original inspiration‟.25 Many of these are relevant to 
the ideas that have been already discussed in this thesis and to the raw politics that I am trying to 
work towards. So, it is appropriate now to turn to some of these relevant and instructive critiques.  
 A particularly incisive criticism is directed against the claim that the reign of modern 
political sovereignty, imperialism and the nation-state has come to an end. Simon Critchley, for 
example, argues that these particular arguments were “refuted empirically” by the events of 
September the 11
th
 2001 (2007: 105). Chantal Mouffe expands on this theme in On the Political 
(2005b) and in so doing includes the wars led and waged by the United States (U.S.) in response 
to those events.
26
 In this context, Mouffe points out that in the light of the military and economic 
activity of the U.S. across the globe, there is a lack of support for the claim that there is no longer 
                                                 
25
 There is not the space to list and address all of these critiques here, but they range from arguments 
questioning the efficacy of Hardt and Negri‟s theorisation of revolutionary strategy and project (Callinicos, 
2010) to those taking issue with the claim that the nation-state and imperialism are no more (Mouffe, 
2005b; Critchley, 2007). For a broad sweep of responses to Empire, see Rethinking Marxism, Vol. 13 3 / 4, 
2001.  
26
 Obviously, the question of what kind of „response‟ this is, is the subject of continual debate. However, in 
the context of Hardt and Negri‟s work, and of Mouffe‟s critique, U.S. led wars following September 2001 
cannot be seen as acts of „self-defence‟. They are rather, respectively, activities produced by the 
imperatives of global governmentalist biopolitics (which are justified through moral universal 
symbologies) and/or of a traditional imperialist expansionism.  
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a centre of imperial power and, therefore, for the notion that the U.S. is not itself actually an 
imperialist power (2005b: 108). Thus, Mouffe finds that Hardt and Negri‟s conceptualisations of 
“empire and the creation by global capitalism of a unified world without any „outside‟” (109) are 
unfounded and, theoretically, nothing but a form of radical cosmopolitanism. From this, she 
argues that “instead of contributing to working towards an alternative to the current neo-liberal 
hegemony, Empire is … likely to produce the opposite effect” (108). Critchley is in some 
agreement with Mouffe in this respect when he discusses this new political subjectivity of the 
multitude, in which “both empire and multitude … both capitalism and the resistance to 
capitalism originate in the same ontological substance” (Critchley, 2007: 105). Apart from any 
empirical refutation of this theory, Critchley contends that no politics should (or can) be 
ontologically founded. I will turn to Critchley‟s broader arguments soon, but for now, it is 
appropriate to note that given the trajectory of this thesis, I would tend to agree with him. 
Before turning to Critchley‟s arguments, it is important to understand how Hardt and 
Negri see the passage of the multitude, within this single ontological substance, towards counter-
empire, democracy and freedom. Like Foucault and Castoriadis, Hardt and Negri begin their 
imagining of a liberatory mode of life with a refusal. For them, this refusal is embodied by the 
„actions‟ of Herman Melville‟s Bartleby.27 The authors of Empire see these actions as a “refusal 
of work and authority, or … the refusal of voluntary servitude” (Hardt & Negri, 2001: 204). 
However, Slavoj Žižek identifies problems with the theorisation of this passage from refusal to 
the democracy of the multitude. He describes the eventuation of this passage as “the moment of 
Decision when the movement of multitudes will be transubstantiated in the sudden birth of a new 
world” (Žižek, 2006: 264). Žižek points out the evocation, in Hardt and Negri‟s work, of both 
messianic and Hegelian conceptual structures (262-264). There are problems apart from those I 
have previously discussed with regard to any Hegelian teleological conception of politics. While 
Hardt and Negri go on to describe what follows refusal – that is, what happens with regard to the 
creation of a „counter-Empire‟ and the passage to the democracy of the multitude – this 
description is limited to a discussion of Augustine‟s “vision of a project to contest the decadent 
Roman Empire” (Hardt & Negri, 2001: 207) and this idea‟s affinity with the historical example 
of the Industrial Workers of the World (also known as the IWW and „the Wobblies‟) (ibid). Hardt 
and Negri argue that these examples are characterised by desertion, exodus, and nomadism and 
thus are invoked as modes of counter-imperial activity and the “will to be against” (210). Žižek 
finds this elucidation vague and theoretically inadequate.
28
 However, even if we reject Žižek‟s 
                                                 
27
 Hardt and Negri are not alone in producing political interpretations of Melville‟s story, „Bartleby‟ (1961 
[1856]). Others are Agamben (1998; 1999), Deleuze (1998), Žižek (2006) and Whyte (2009). I do not 
intend to add to this scholarship here except to say that Bartleby‟s refusal, no matter how it is figured, will 
not be used to elucidate a politics without the State. 
28
 Žižek writes that it is too much to ask that Hardt and Negri provide “a detailed empirical description … 
of the passage to globalized „absolute democracy‟, to the multitude that rules itself” (2006: 264). However, 
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criticism and accept Hardt and Negri‟s elaboration of the passage, problems remain. Hardt and 
Negri themselves recognise that the key modes of activity – nomadism, desertion, exodus – are 
likely to remain ineffectual without being given real substance as “regimes and practices of 
production” (Hardt & Negri, 2001: 217). In this regard, what is proposed can be said to appear as 
a multitude which engages in an „in-common‟ care of the self, made revolutionary by an 
immanent desire for freedom. This is problematic for this thesis for the reasons that have been 
discussed earlier with regard to Foucault. That is, how can this activity become something other 
than the multitude (subject) working on and turning on itself? 
In relation to the apparently resolvable confrontation between sovereign domination and 
the desire for freedom, Hardt and Negri are unable to satisfactorily address the question posed by 
Reich and further elaborated by Deleuze and Guattari. That is: Why do people – arguably more 
often than not – desire their own slavery and subjection instead of their freedom? (Hardt & Negri, 
2001: 210-211; Reich, 1970; Deleuze & Guattari, 1984: 29). Hardt and Negri offer no firm 
response to this question on the basis that the multitude is unable “to identify the enemy” (Hardt 
& Negri, 2001: 211) – that is, a singular source of enslaving domination within the decentred and 
deterritorialised biopolitical regime of Empire – to resist. But even this is an inadequate response, 
for the question is about the desire for freedom, rather than a need to struggle and resist. While I 
do not claim that Hardt and Negri have ignored or fobbed off this problem, it is one which is 
crucial to their broader arguments. The fact that it remains unresolved is problematic for their 
figurings around the possibilities for a democratic multitude. 
 In another reprise of this thesis‟ earlier critique of Foucault, a question must be asked. If 
it is now Empire (instead of sovereign states) that is „using‟ the governmental strategy of 
population management, how does this observation in itself lend weight to the possibility of 
either a politics of Hardt and Negri‟s imagination, or one of the kind figured in this thesis? 
Regardless of the different conceptualisations of sovereignty, governmentality and Empire, there 
still seems to be a king to decapitate – even if that „king‟ is nothing but a symbological 
replacement for the one now delegitimated and exposed as an ideological apparition. The 
sovereign‟s robes may be of a different cut and material, but they as purple as ever. In the end, 
there is very little difference between the legitimation of the exercise of sovereign power through 
ideology and its legitimation through symbology and universalised moral values. After all, it 
turns out that symbology functions just as efficiently as ideology in this regard. In fact, the 
symbologies that legitimate Empire are circulated with an unprecedented spectacular efficiency 
                                                                                                                                                 
he thinks that it is only fair to demand “a description of the notional structure … of the passage from the 
multitudes resisting the One of sovereign Power to the multitudes directly ruling themselves. Leaving the 
notional structure of this passage in a darkness elucidated only by vague analogies and examples from 
resistance movements cannot but arouse the anxious suspicion that the self-transparent direct rule of 
everyone over everyone, this democracy tout court, will coincide with its opposite” (ibid). 
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through the very communication technologies that are heralded by Hardt and Negri as harbingers 
of the democratic multitude.
29
  
In addition, I think that the claim that capital and its logic operates solely on the 
immanent plane is tenuous. Even though the movement of capital flows are inseparable from the 
movements of the multitude, there is a degree to which the logic of capital has appropriated and 
displaced the „transcendental‟ apparatus of modern sovereignty. Capital may have no significant 
need (or the same need) for the institutions of the nation-state, but its logic and imperatives have 
displaced traditional sovereignty in the „transcendent‟ realm.30 The values, imperatives and logic 
of capital cannot be said to be immanent in the multitude but are spectacularly set as values that 
are eternally and universally valid and thus „above‟ the immanent multitude of humanity. I think 
that Hardt and Negri‟s argument is confused in this respect. While they begin by describing the 
discovery of the immanent plane as the discovery of a material(ist) reality over a immaterial lie, 
and modern sovereignty‟s production of a „transcendental apparatus‟, they later seem to forget 
that the transcendental apparatus is actually a theoretical sleight of hand. Consequently, their 
descriptions of a symbologically legitimated imperial sovereignty, inseparable from the 
immanent multitude, do not follow. The symbologically legitimated logic of capitalist global 
empire are no more „real‟ or material(ist) than the founding concepts of modern sovereignty. To 
put it bluntly, Hardt and Negri seem to forget that traditional sovereignty was never actually 
transcendent, it just put itself there and thus imperial sovereignty becomes sovereign in the same 
way. Earlier, we noted Hardt and Negri‟s descriptions of the place of capitalist logic in the 
transcendental apparatus of modern sovereignty.
31
 In this context, Hardt and Negri describe how 
“capitalist development and the affirmation of the market as the foundation of the values of social 
reproduction” form the „content‟ of modern sovereignty (2001: 85). In relation to this, they also 
claim that without this content, “which is always implicit, always working inside the 
transcendental apparatus, the form of sovereignty would not have been able to survive … and 
European modernity would not have been able to achieve a hegemonic position on a world scale” 
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 As the „gathering‟ of political antagonists, „Retort‟, write in their Afflicted Powers (2006), this “same 
technology has also proved itself … the perfect instrumentation of „spectacular‟ dispersal, isolation, and 
derealization – the machinery of a self-administered dreamworld” (Retort, 2006: 4). The notion of the 
spectacular here is again drawn from Debord. 
30
 As Frederic Jameson notes, the logic of the late capitalist market has ascended to transcendent or, as he 
puts it, ideological status. He writes: “The surrender to the various forms of market ideology … has been 
imperceptible but alarmingly universal. Everyone is now willing to mumble … that no society can function 
efficiently without the market” (Jameson, 1991: 263). This situation is characterised by the transcendental 
– and, for Jameson, the unacceptably unchallenged – proposition that “The market is in human nature” 
(ibid). 
31
 See pages 186-188 for this discussion. I think however, that it is worth citing Hardt and Negri again here. 
They write: “What is needed is for the state … to make the well-being of private individuals coincide with 
the public interest, reducing all social functions and laboring activities to one measure of value … [and] … 
to give content to the mediation of interests and represent the axis of rationality of that mediation … [Thus] 
… Modern European sovereignty is capitalist sovereignty, a form of command that overdetermines the 
relationship between individuality and universality as a function of the development of capital” (2001: 86, 
87). 
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(85-86). It seems to me that when they argue that “all social functions and laboring activities … 
[are reduced to] … one measure of value” (86) – that is the values and imperatives of capital and 
the market – there is nothing about these values that would preclude them from also giving 
transcendent content to the sovereignty of Empire.
32
 Further, in response to the claim that while 
once capital required the State to propagate its modes of social production, it no longer has that 
need given the rupture of the inside-outside relation, I would argue that capital is as advantaged 
by the operations of State and supra-state institutions and practices to propagate its logic – as 
universal, common-sensical, inevitable and as „transcendent‟ – as it ever was. With capital and 
Empire „transcendent‟ in this way,33 it is not possible to claim that the king is dead. Rather, I 
think it is more apt to observe that if the aim is to mount a revolution, there is simply a new king 
to behead. 
 Without a stronger argument for the co-immanence of Empire, capital and the multitude, 
it is difficult to share Hardt and Negri‟s joyous optimism about the possibility of a new 
democracy. It also seems that no matter how hard they try to explain, describe, or imagine, the 
democratic multitude that follows refusal, they still seem to come up with modulations of that 
refusal. That is, a „No‟. In this way, the multitude seems stuck in a space that is familiar to us, 
that of knowing how to say „No‟, but not how to say „Yes!‟ Further, the passivity of their 
representative figure, Bartleby, appears far from demonstrating a mode of political refusal that 
Castoriadis, for example, gives a strong sense of. In fact, if we imagine a confrontation between 
Bartleby and Thomas Mann‟s nasty proto-fascist Leo Naphta,34 it is difficult in the extreme to 
envisage any new modes of life. Rather, I think that the totalitarian state of Naphta‟s imagination 
would annihilate Bartleby with far more efficiency than does the scrivener‟s own liberal 
humanist milieu.
35
 
 Hardt and Negri‟s conceptions of multitude and commonwealth, like Foucault‟s work, 
seem unable to say more than „No‟ to the State, or the imperial form it has now taken. Ultimately, 
the various practices of refusal, the „will to be against‟ and the multitude‟s desire for freedom, 
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 In this context I would comment that Weber did not talk about the „Spirit of Capitalism‟ for nothing 
(Weber, 1992: 47-78). 
33
 As Hardt and Negri themselves write, the “imperial machine … is a subject that produces its own image 
of authority. This is a form of legitimation that rests on nothing outside itself and is reproposed ceaselessy 
by developing its own languages of self-validation” (2001: 33). 
34
 Leo Naphta is a key character in Thomas Mann‟s The Magic Mountain (1960 [1924]). Naphta, a Jew 
turned Jesuit, is generally described both in the novel and in commentary on it, as Marxist, communist, 
revolutionary, terrorist and absolutist. See for example, Boshears (2008), Hatfield (1979) and Gaertner 
(1965). I would argue though that Naphta is an exemplary proto-fascist. His anti-democratic, authoritarian, 
and anti-humanist political positions are similar to those demonstrated by those in various pre-World War 
One movements which have come to be seen as precursors to the fascisms of the 1920s, 30s and 40s. For 
more on „pre-fascist‟ movements in the period 1880-1930, see Richard Griffiths‟ Fascism (2005: 11-28). 
35
 Interestingly, it is possible to imagine that under the humanist universalism advocated by Naphta‟s 
dialectical opponent, Settembrini, Bartleby would have met with the very same inefficient brutality 
assigned to him by Melville. That is, he is quite as likely to have been corralled into „The Tombs‟ to slowly 
die (Melville, 1961: 134-140).  
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seem rather impotent against the sheer force of totalised, global biopower. No matter how swift 
this spirit of the multitude is, it seems insufficient to overcome, (re)capture and then drive the 
material weight of Empire. Just as I think that it is more likely than not that Bartleby would be 
crushed by Naphta‟s proto-fascism, the democratic multitude is under threat from and vulnerable 
to the fascism of our day (or as Critchley would have it, the „crypto-Schmittianism‟36). Finally, in 
addition to all of the criticisms we have considered here, Hardt and Negri‟s main problem is their 
attempt to force a mode of agency onto the smooth, rhizomic and biopolitically produced 
multitude. I think that this is not in keeping with Deleuze‟s thought. No matter which way 
Deleuze‟s thought is conceived, there is no sense that it is possible to force an ontologically 
political subjectivity from a nomadic, rhizomic, „becoming whatever‟.37  
 With Empire, Multitude, and Commonwealth, Hardt and Negri have endeavoured to 
describe a politics that, if it is not beyond, or without, is after the State. From this they have tried 
to imagine the possibilities of revolution in such a milieu. For them, this milieu is the smooth 
spaces and rhizomic multiplicities elucidated by Deleuze and Guattari. But if a politics cannot be 
forced from this multiplicity – whether or not it is considered an ontological substance – where 
might an „unforced‟ politics happen? In order to answer this question it is necessary to spin 
around again, for the last time, to face the experience of the subject. Is a politics without the State 
hiding there, somewhere in the debris of an ungathered self? 
 
 
Ethics as non-state politics 
 
([A]fter going a few yards along the path, and turning several sharp corners), „but I suppose it will 
at last. But how curiously it twists! It‟s more like a corkscrew than a path!‟ (Carroll, [1896]: 156). 
 
 In the work of Hardt and Negri, and in that of Foucault and Castoriadis, we have become 
familiar with the idea that any politics that claims to be open, or liberatory, or revolutionary, must 
begin with a refusal and resistance. We have also encountered the difficulty of locating the 
„source‟ or „origin‟ of such refusal. For the reasons set out in Chapter Four, I have ruled out 
ethics as a basis for refusal or resistance. In short, I think that the ethical principles that have been 
traditionally associated with politics – particularly liberal politics – are too individualistic. That 
is, they are too centred on the passive activities of the individual‟s (supposedly) free and 
                                                 
36
 Critchley describes „crypto-Schmittianism‟ (in relation to the U.S. Bush administration under which 
perpetual war, rendition, torture and Guantanamo Bay became topics of everyday political discussion) as a 
political phenomenon in which “the concept of the political is based on the fantasy construction of the 
enemy, maintaining the economy of awe and terror that allows order to be secured in the so-called 
homeland” (Critchley, 2007: 138). 
37
 As Žižek writes, “Hardt and Negri‟s basic move … is totally foreign to their philosophical paradigm, 
Deleuze!” (2006: 261). 
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conscious thought, rather than on the physical material activity of groups of people within 
society. And then, we found that some attempts to ground politics on the activities of the group 
offer a sound critique of liberal individualism, but nonetheless fail with regard to the present task. 
For example, communitarian thought begins with a group rather than an individual, but its 
dependence on an integrally closed community which draws on (often oppressive) social 
conventions, histories, traditions and moral codes as a ground for the organisation of politics, 
cannot begin to break or refuse such closure, let alone happen as a raw and affirmative politics. 
Despite such problems, however, investigations into the prospect of a politics derived from 
ethical practice and activity which avoids such pitfalls continue. Two of these attempts also 
happen to invoke the name of anarchism in the process. So, before moving onto the final chapter 
of this thesis, I will briefly turn to the thoughts and analyses of Simon Critchley and Todd May. 
 
 
 Critchley’s ethics for an anarchic metapolitics 
 
 In his critique of Hardt and Negri, Critchley argues against the possibility of a 
revolutionary, liberatory politics derived from an ontological substance.
38
 He thinks that politics 
is rather a “disruption of the ontological domain” (2007: 105). He proposes an „ethics of 
commitment‟ as the motivation for a „politics of resistance‟. 
 In his Infinitely Demanding (2007), Critchley begins with the problem of political 
disappointment which he says characterises our present. This is “the sense of something lacking 
or failing [that] arises from the realization that we inhabit a violently unjust world” (3). In the 
face of this disappointment, Critchley describes the notions of passive and active nihilism. The 
passive nihilist, confronted with the brutal meaninglessness of our existence, “closes his [sic] 
eyes and makes himself into an island” (5). On the other hand, the active nihilist “tries to destroy 
this world and bring another into being” (ibid). Critchley describes the calm withdrawal of the 
passive nihilist as a „European (and American) Buddhism‟. Active nihilists are often enamoured 
with the “Promethean activism” of various radical utopian and messianic movements such as 
Bolshevism and Futurism (ibid), and the contemporary “quintessence of active nihilism is al-
Qaeda” (ibid). Critchley argues that despite the temptation to respond to despair by either 
withdrawing from or trying to destroy the world, we must “face up to the hard reality of the 
world” (6). In order to do this we need “an ethics that empowers subjects to political action” (8). 
Nearly all of the thinkers we have looked at so far have tried to give reasons for resistance and 
refusal. So far we have considered only those who reason around the rather strategic question of 
                                                 
38
 This critique and those of Mouffe and Žižek (which similarly find the coexistence of Empire and 
multitude on the immanent plane to be problematic for Hardt and Negri) are discussed above on pages 193-
197. 
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how a refusal can be brought about or can happen. Critchley, on the other hand, is intent on 
giving ethical reasons for why refusal and resistance must happen. As we know though, the easy 
part is to name refusal and resistance as the liberatory force of politics. It is far more difficult to 
theorise the „how‟ and „why‟ of such refusal. 
 For Critchley, the „why‟ of political resistance is the response of an ethical subject to the 
demand of the Other. This ethical subject is not conceived of in the usual terms, according to 
what Critchley calls the „autonomy orthodoxy‟. That is, this ethical subject is not an autonomous 
will deciding rationally but is always divided between the demand of the other and the experience 
of that demand as approval. For Critchley “ethical experience begins with the approval of a 
demand, a demand that demands approval. Ethical experience is virtuously circular” (39). 
Further, drawing on Badiou, Løgstrup and Levinas, Critchley understands this relation of 
demand-approval as asymmetrical. Specifically, ethical experience is of an exorbitant, excessive, 
unfulfillable demand for infinite responsibility (40).
39
 As such, the subject “shapes itself in 
relation to a demand that it can never meet, which divides and sunders the subject [in] the 
experience of … „hetero-affectivity‟, as opposed to the „auto-affection‟ of the autonomy 
orthodoxy” (ibid). This subject, then, is not the singular autonomous decider, but a „split subject‟, 
one that is “split between itself and a demand that it cannot meet” (62). However, this experience 
of splitting – which “is nothing other than conscience” (87) – is not endured lightly and actually 
causes trauma. Following Levinas, Critchley describes ethical experience as “obsessive … of a 
responsibility that persecutes me with its sheer weight” (60-61). Then, drawing on Freud and 
Lacan, Critchley outlines how the tortuous experience of being persecuted by infinite, 
unfulfillable ethical responsibility needs to be sublimated, and that this can be achieved through 
the experience of art.
40
 But instead of turning to the „tragic-heroic paradigm‟ of Lacan,41 
Critchley turns to humour. He argues that humour, as an everyday practice, is more appropriate 
than tragedy for the ethics he proposes. He writes: “Humour is a more minimal, less heroic form 
of sublimation that allows the subject to bear the excessive, indeed hyperbolic, burden of the 
                                                 
39
 From Badiou, Critchley takes “the idea of the subject committing itself in fidelity to the universality of a 
demand that opens in a singular situation but which exceeds that situation. From Knud Ejler Løgstrup, 
[Critchley takes] the idea of what [Løgstrup] calls „the ethical demand‟ and his emphasis on the radical, 
unfulfillable and one-sided character of that demand” (Critchley, 2007: 40). From Emmanuel Levinas, 
Critchley tries to show “how this moment of asymmetry that arises in the experience of the infinite demand 
of the other‟s face defines the ethical subject in terms of a split between itself and an exorbitant demand 
that it can never meet” (ibid). 
40
 Here Critchley, drawing on Lacan‟s The Ethics of Psychoanalysis (1992), describes ethics as “a relation 
to the real and what stands in the place of the real is the Thing” (2007: 63). Critchley explains how 
sublimation “produces a kind of aesthetic screen which allows the profile of the Thing to be projected 
whilst not being adequate to its representation. The aesthetic cuts across the trajectory of the ethical in a 
way that both places the subject in relation to the source of the ethical demand, but which protects the 
subject from the direct glare of the Thing” (2007: 73-74). 
41
 For Lacan, “tragedy is chosen as the aesthetic genre that can reconcile the freedom of the subject with 
the causal necessity of the natural world” (Critchley, 2007: 75).  
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ethical demand without that demand turning into obsessive self-hatred and cruelty” (78-79).42 At 
this point, Critchley has outlined his theory of ethical subjectivity and experience. The question 
he then moves to is that of how, in this experience, one responds to the responsibilities of 
politics, and particularly, an „anarchic‟ politics. 
 In the final chapter of Infinitely Demanding, Critchley endeavours to set out the passage 
from an ethics of commitment to a politics of resistance. He begins in partial agreement with 
Hardt and Negri, in that he sees the “accelerating, dislocatory powers of capitalism” (91) as 
leading to the decentreing and “multiplication of social actors defined in terms of locality, 
language, ethnicity [and] sexuality” (91). However, where Hardt and Negri see this dispersal of 
political struggles unified by the multitude‟s desire for freedom, Critchley sees it as calling for 
the invention and aggregation of political subjectivities out of “the various social struggles of the 
present … of naming a political subject and organizing politically around that name” (91). In this 
regard, Critchley takes particular interest in the indigenous struggles of Mexico and Australia, 
and the way these struggles arise “through the articulation of a new universal name – the 
indigenous” (ibid). These struggles, and others like the anti-capitalist globalisation movements 
that emerged in the late 1990s, create what Critchley calls an “interstitial distance within the state 
territory” (92). This interstitial distance is “an internal distance … opened from the inside” (113). 
So, unlike Hardt and Negri who speak in the unified name of the political subjectivity (i.e. 
„multitude‟), Critchley speaks of the “invention of situated names for that around which politics 
can hegemonize itself” (104).43 This then is not the hegemony and universality of an ontological 
or singular political subjectivity but is named and posited in specific situations (ibid). In practice, 
in relation to the indigenous struggles of Mexico,  
 
a new political subject is formed against the repressive actions of the state through the articulation 
of a new universal name – the indigenous. It is the strategic occupation of the universalistic terrain 
of international rights and international law that provides the leverage for a local political 
articulation that has had global effects (Critchley, 2007: 107). 
 
It is this kind of activity – the occupation of universal terrain and the creation of new political 
subjectivities as practices (and as the praxis) of political resistance – that Critchley understands as 
creating an interstitial distance within the state.  
                                                 
42
 Critchley writes that, “the split at the heart of the ethical subject is not some form of masochistic self-
flagellation, but rather the experience of an ever-divided humorous self-relation. In this way, I can bear the 
radicality of the ethical demand because I can laugh at myself. I find myself ridiculous, which is to say that 
I do not find my self, whatever that might mean, but rather see myself from outside and smile … Humour 
is, then, the experience of the essential lack of self-coincidence” (2007: 85-86). 
43
 Here, Critchley draws on Gramsci (1988) and Laclau‟s New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time 
(1990). 
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This politics is „anarchic‟ in two senses. Firstly, Critchley returns to the split subject and 
the ethics of Levinas. Given this figuring of subjectivity and ethical experience, there is no archè 
in subjectivity. Autarchy is simply a constituting principle of the „autonomy orthodoxy‟ (121). 
Secondly, the experience and actions of the split ethical subject are politically anarchic in that it 
negates, rather than affirms the notion of a new totality. It does not attempt to “mirror the archic 
sovereignty that it undermines” (122). The creation by such subjects of interstitial distance within 
the state is a “radical disturbance of the state, a disruption of the state‟s attempt to set itself up … 
into a whole” (ibid). Finally, Critchley argues that the spectacular, creative, theatrical, 
carnivalesque and comic nature of contemporary anarchist practice exercises subversive and 
“satirical pressure on the state in order to show that other forms of life are possible” (124).44 The 
comic nature of this practice also resonates with Critchley‟s thoughts on the role of humour in 
sublimation.
45
 The question now is to ascertain if this anarchic politics of resistance can be 
understood via the terms set out in this thesis, as a politics without the State. At first glance, the 
notion of an „interstitial distance within the state‟ seems to provide some insight into the idea of a 
gathering. However, the fact that Critchley draws on universal values, particularly rights, as a key 
element of a politics of resistance is a problem for the raw politics being figured here. This is also 
a problem if Hardt and Negri‟s critique of the symbological use of such values by Empire is 
sound. Further, despite the avoidance of „autonomy orthodoxy‟ in Critchley‟s conception of 
ethical subjectivity, politics remains primarily dependent on the experience and actions of an 
individual (no matter how split) rather than on the activity of people in groups. I will further 
discuss Critchley‟s thought shortly, after we take a final look at another attempt to figure an 
anarchist politics with an ethical heart – the „poststructuralist anarchism‟ of Todd May. 
 
 
May’s ethics for a poststructuralist anarchism 
 
Todd May‟s discussion of anarchist philosophy traces many of the paths I have followed 
here. In his book The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism (1994) he describes the 
reasons why people through modern history have wanted to live without the State, and the two 
                                                 
44
 In a similar vein to Retort‟s critique of Hardt and Negri‟s claims for the liberatory force of new 
communication technologies due to their spectacular appropriation by the proponents of a global order,  
Žižek is critical of any invocation of the carnivalesque as an exclusively positive tactic of resistance. 
Referring to Hardt and Negri‟s discussion, Žižek asks, “is not late capitalism already carnivalesque? 
Furthermore, is not „carnival‟ also the name for the obscene underside of power – from gang rapes to mass 
lynchings? Let us not forget that Bakhtin developed the notion of carnival in his book on Rabelais written 
in the 1930s, as a direct reply to the carnival of the Stalinist purges” (Žižek, 2006: 416). The book Žižek 
refers to is Bakhtin‟s Rabelais and His World (1968 [1965]).  
45
 In addition, Critchley writes, “it is the exposed, self-ridiculing and self-undermining character of these 
forms of protest that I find most compelling as opposed to the pious humorlessness of most forms of 
vanguardist active nihilism and some forms of contemporary protest” (Critchley, 2007: 124).  
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key responses to that desire – Marxism and anarchism. In his chapter „The Failure of Marxism‟ 
he covers many of the thinkers I have discussed here, including Marx and Engels themselves, 
Lenin, Althusser, Negri and Cornelius Castoriadis.
46
 As such, May provides similar explanations 
for that failure. May also identifies problems with traditional anarchism that were touched on 
earlier in this thesis. That is, anarchism‟s adherence to principles of liberal humanism – 
particularly in the positing of a morally good human essence – which are taken as a foundation 
for arguing and working towards the necessity of an anarchist society. May also elaborates on a 
problem that I have referred to implicitly, particularly during my discussions of Foucault. 
Traditional anarchism has taken power to be suppressive and centralised, and that all that is 
required is for that power to be removed in order for the essential good of humanity to flourish. 
In relation to this, May then notes those aspects of poststructuralist thought that he finds to be 
amenable to anarchist thought. These, in particular, are a rejection of liberal humanist thought, an 
understanding of power as dispersed and productive, and a strong suspicion and practical 
rejection of political representation.  
May begins by outlining two dominant approaches to political philosophy. They are, the 
formal and the strategic approaches (May, 1994: 4-11). Formal approaches are oriented by 
questions from either one or the other of two poles: i.e. „what ought to be?‟ and „what is?‟. 
Formal political philosophy generally tends more towards asking about what ought to be and as 
such is driven by the question: “What would be the nature, or at least the important 
characteristics, of a just society?” (4). From this, formal theory posits principles through which 
an ideal can be conceived of to inform action and possibly be aimed at (if not realised). However, 
formal approaches, as dependent on abstraction and thought experiments, tend to remain far from 
the world of political activity. That is, their consideration of what is – or the way things actually 
are – is either vague or non-existent. May nominates the work of John Rawls – which we 
discussed in Chapter Four and found to be unsuitable for our particular concerns – and Robert 
Nozick as examples of this formal approach.
47
 Strategic political philosophy, May writes, moves 
from “a reliance on one pole of political philosophy to an immersion into the tension between the 
two” (7). Here, the „is‟ of history and of social and material conditions are studied and analysed 
as a guide to the determination of “what concrete possibilities present themselves for 
intervention” (ibid). The strategic approach is readily recognised in the work of thinkers from 
                                                 
46
 In this chapter, May also discusses the work of Gramsci, Lukács and that of the Critical Theorists, 
Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse and Habermas. 
47
 May writes that “Rawls founds his philosophical procedure on the assumption that people are rationally 
self-interested beings. Thus he introduces a tension between what is and what ought to be, although his 
rendering of what is remains skeletal: restricted to an acknowledgement of rational self-interest rather than 
a full-blown description of our political situation” (May, 1994: 4). Nozick‟s theory, on the other hand “is 
removed from any consideration of the way things actually are in the world … [and is] … a prescription for 
a society that relies on no facts about the current composition of the world” (5). For more on these thinkers 
see Rawls‟ A Theory of Justice (1999) and Nozick‟s Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974). 
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Machiavelli to Marx and its rallying question is that famously posed by Lenin, „What is to be 
done?‟. However, the strategic approach “involves a unitary analysis that aims toward a single 
goal” (10). One possible result of this approach, as we know from our earlier discussion of 
Castoriadis and his critique of Marxist theory, is a reductive and deterministic analysis that calls 
for rational and bureaucratic political representation and vanguardism. While May acknowledges 
the need for political philosophy to be motivated by “the discordance between the world as it 
exists and the world as it is envisioned” (2)48 that is characteristic of a strategic approach, he also 
argues that the problems associated with that approach can be overcome by what he calls 
„tactical‟ political philosophy. With strategic political philosophy it is assumed that suppressive, 
oppressive or unjust power derives from a central place or problematic (such as socio-economic 
conditions). From this position, what needs to be done is to capture, transform or eliminate that 
central power. On the other hand, with tactical political philosophy,  
 
there is no center within which power is to be located. Otherwise put, power, and consequently 
politics, are irreducible. There are many different sites from which it arises, and there is an 
interplay among these various sites in the creation of the social world. This is not to deny that 
there are points of concentration of power … Power does not, however, originate at these points; 
rather, it conglomerates around them (May, 1994: 11). 
 
Clearly, the picture of the political milieu that May describes here is one that has at times been 
followed in this thesis, particularly in relation to the discussions of Foucault, Deleuze and, to 
some degree, of Castoriadis. May specifically attributes the theoretical „framework‟ of tactical 
political philosophy to the poststructuralist thought of Foucault, Deleuze and also Lyotard (3) and 
from this observation he argues that the philosophical tradition of anarchism “possesses the kinds 
of general political perspective and analysis that could charcterize it as a forerunner to current 
poststructuralist thought” (May, 1994: 13).  
 May notes that, traditionally, anarchist thought has tended to be strategic due to the fact 
that is has held similar assumptions to those of (for instance) Marxism. These assumptions 
include a view of power as suppressive and centralised (as contained within ramparts that are 
„stormable‟) and open to overthrow. Further, anarchist thought has taken the human subject to be 
essentially cooperative and good (63-66),
49
 such that the removal of suppressive power would 
allow such subjects to flourish. Activity is aimed at the abolition of power rather than its capture 
by an oppressed majority (47). As such, the tradition also rejects vanguardist representation and 
has favoured local organisation and situated struggles (47-49) over the strategic rational political 
organisation of the masses. These latter tendencies, May argues, are close to those of 
                                                 
48
 This sentiment is consonant with the „original inspiration‟ and with Badiou‟s definition of philosophy as 
set out in the Introduction. 
49
 We noted this tendency in Chapter One, particularly in the work of Kropotkin. 
 208 
poststructuralist thought. The task then for anarchism is for it to shake off both its view of power 
as suppressive, and its assumptions around essential human goodness. If this can be done then 
anarchism can be said to be more properly anarchist. May then draws on the work of Foucault, 
Deleuze and Lyotard in order to set out a „framework‟ for a tactical political philosophy of 
poststructuralist anarchism. May elucidates this conception of anarchism by naming some 
important characteristics. Firstly, the analyses embarked upon must not do so as a search for 
unitary principles or origins and as such should employ a genealogical method (117-118). The 
struggles engaged in must be understood as micropolitical, as productive and transformative 
within regimes of power. Practices are understood to “carve out spaces that allow the possibility 
of alternative practices” (116). The „freedom‟ eked out in these practices and in (Foucauldian) 
practices of the self is not understood as that of the liberal kind but as situational, multiplicitous 
and ungathered experience (115-117). Further, in all of these practices the anarchist 
acknowledges that it is not possible to know with any certainty what its result might be. So, this 
practice is experimental rather than teleological (112-115). Finally, the role of the intellectual in 
this milieu is to provide analyses and critiques, to function as a „toolbox‟ which can be used by 
those engaged in struggles – rather than as advisors or gurus issuing instructions from on high 
(118).
50
 
 In the final chapter of his book, May observes that “Two questions have stalked 
poststructuralist discourse … : Is it epistemically coherent? and Can it be ethically grounded?” 
(May, 1994: 121). May is in partial agreement with the criticisms of critical theorists who argue 
that in order to function as a plausible and effective political theory, poststructuralist thought 
must be “capable of an ethical defense” (122). May then sets himself the task of articulating how 
this ethical defence might be made. He begins by naming ethical principles that (despite the 
reticence of the key thinkers) he sees as implicit in poststructuralist thought. Firstly there is the 
claim that practices of representation of any sort should, as much as possible, be avoided. This 
claim is intertwined with the general poststructuralist reticence “toward promoting ethical 
principles” (130). This reticence, May argues, is itself ethically motivated (131). Another ethical 
principle is that of an “insistence upon difference” (133). May writes that according to this 
principle, “alternative practices, all things being equal, ought to be allowed to flourish and even 
to be promoted” (ibid). Apart from these two key principles, May notes that poststructuralist 
thinkers have not shied away from making ethical pronouncements or analyses that leave us in no 
doubt that an injustice is taking place.
51
 Further, while these principles may not be understood as 
                                                 
50
 This position is best described and exemplified in the conversation between Foucault and Deleuze,  
„Intellectuals and Power‟ (1972) and the interview with Foucault, „Revolutionary Action: “Until Now”‟ 
(1971). 
51
 For example, Foucault‟s analyses of penal systems, Deleuze‟s attitude to capitalism and Lyotard‟s 
ethical considerations of the evil of the Holocaust and Holocaust denial, are not politically or ethically 
neutral attitudes. This calls to mind the comment made by Agnes Heller which was cited earlier: “Foucault 
 209 
central or fundamental ethical claims within traditional ethical discourse, the work of Foucault, 
Deleuze and Lyotard tends to show that the effect of their marginalisation “is more damaging 
than has generally been thought” (137). 
 May then attempts to build upon the ethical commitments of poststructuralism that – in 
the two principles – undergird poststructuralist political analyses. May understands this ethics to 
be exemplified in the „practices of the self‟ outlined by Foucault and Deleuze‟s „affirmation of 
life‟.52 Thus, May elaborates a discursive ethical practice that does not posit universal principles 
but is able to analyse and make ethical judgements about the acceptability or not, of particular 
situations and practices. This ethics turns out to be a weak ethical relativism, or an ethics that is 
informed by the „modesty‟ to recognise and reflect on ethico-cultural difference rather than 
assume or assert a responsibility to totalising universal judgement.  As such, any judgement of a 
given practice is particular to that situation but can also be seen to bind every person involved in 
it.  
 In elaborating an ethics to undergird poststructuralist anarchism, May might be re-
committing an error made by thinkers of traditional anarchism. While the ethics he outlines
53
 
certainly takes into account the thrust of poststructuralist political analyses, individuals involved 
in the judging and reasoning required still would seem to need to be coherent, unitary subjects. 
Further, as I have argued earlier, as practices of the self, the activity of these subjects does not 
amount to a „Yes‟, or an affirmation of life. The main problem here though, is more general. And 
it is an ethical problem more than it is a political one. In this thesis we will continue to try to 
understand what politics without the state – or raw politics – might happen to be, without 
resorting to the positing of a foundation in either an ethical or non-ethical individual subject.   
  
 
Ethics and raw politics 
 
  
 To say that we should continue to try to understand raw politics without founding it on an 
ethical (or any other) subjectivity is not to argue that those involved in this politics are without 
ethical commitments or that ethics is not involved in politics. I largely agree with both Critchley 
and May when they argue that politics is not possible without ethical involvement (Critchley, 
                                                                                                                                                 
… has preserved an aloofness, a playful pretension of mere descriptive objectivity. But this is not the 
emotional or intellectual experience of the reader, who reading Foucault, forms an opinion of prisons, 
mental asylums, or the discourse of humankind or sexuality” (Heller, 1990: 24). 
52
 May here acknowledges that the „ethics‟ spoken of by Foucault is not of a kind that is ordinarily included 
in the kind of ethical discourse in which he is working. As we know, Foucault‟s practices of the self are 
more properly understood as ethos rather than ethics. On the other hand, Deleuze refers to the affirmation 
of life as a mode of being and becoming. In this case, Deleuze‟s conception, if it has anything at all to do 
with ethics (a claim I would not make myself) is also closer to ethos. 
53
 May elaborates his conceptualisation of poststructuralist ethics in The Moral Theory of Poststructuralism 
(1995). 
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2007: 130-132; May, 1994: 119). However, the reduction of politics to questions of ethical 
commitment, judgement and decision relegates the in-common experience of relations that are 
peculiar to the mode of life of groups of people „being together‟ to a secondary, almost incidental 
concern.
54
 
 In The Democratic Paradox (2000) Chantal Mouffe – whose aim is to rekindle the power 
of the Enlightenment‟s political project (mainly by distinguishing that project from the 
epistemological one) – agrees with those she calls „postmodern thinkers‟ with regard to the 
acknowledgement of differences “and on the impossibility of complete reabsorbtion of alterity” 
(129). She acknowledges that politics cannot be dissociated from ethical concerns but 
nevertheless takes issue with the tendency to envisage politics as an „endless conversation‟, a 
dialogical relation with the Other (ibid). On the other hand, she criticises deliberative political 
models for their “emphasis on impartiality and rational consensus” (ibid).55 For Mouffe, these 
two views represent an “opposition between moral-universalistic and ethical-particularistic 
approaches” to politics (ibid). She argues that these approaches fail to properly reflect on “the 
moment of „decision‟ which characterizes the field of politics” (130).  Such decisions take place 
in undecidable terrain and “entail an element of force and violence that can never be eliminated 
and cannot be adequately apprehended through the sole language of ethics or morality” (ibid). 
Politics is best understood through the problematisation of the moral and ethical positions on “the 
nature of human sociability which informs most modern democratic political thinking” (ibid). 
Without such problematisation, these positions are “unable to grasp the nature of „the political‟ in 
its dimension of hostility and antagonism” (132).  While I obviously disagree with any claim that 
the moment of decision is an essential characteristic of politics, I think that Mouffe makes some 
important points here, as both a critique of the tendency to try to found politics on ethical 
positions, and in relation to the possibilities of a politics without the State. For now though, I 
think it is important to take note of Mouffe‟s reminder that politics is a social phenomenon, rather 
than a subjective one. On its own, this is enough to at least make us wary of attempts to found 
politics on ethical principles.   
 During the course of this thesis I have found that conventional explanations of how a 
gathering develops to be inadequate. That is, I have consistently rejected theories of subjectivity 
as a way of understanding or grounding any understanding of how whatever happens, happens, or 
is made to happen by subjects or agents. For many reasons, I have come to the view that I cannot 
pick one or any theory of subjectivity. For this thesis, the idea is to come to some kind of 
understanding about what politics without the State looks like, and what it means in relation to 
                                                 
54
 As I explained in the Introduction, in this regard I concur with the views of Aristotle, who says in the 
Nichomachean Ethics that the questions of ethics are but one among many important aspects of the “master 
art … politics” (Aristotle, 1995: 1094a27).   
55
 See Chapter Four of this thesis. 
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the original inspiration and the ideas associated with the anarchist tradition. If pressed, I prefer a 
Nietzschean „subject‟, who can only „gather herself‟ to the degree that on occasion, she might be 
able to say, tenuously, fleetingly, „I‟. From such a subject I might prefer Critchley‟s split subject, 
the „dividual‟, insofar as whatever self is so tenuously gathered is stretched, and „undone‟ 
(Butler: 2004) by the ethical experience of approval and demand. But, I cannot posit a psychic 
core at the heart of that experience because any such positing is no more than assertion anyway. 
Insofar as an assertion, as a beginning, may be necessary in order to begin, I confine myself to 
statements about a politics of the many rather than an ethics or a subjectivity of the one – no 
matter how „ungathered‟ or divided that „one‟ is.  
 In addition to the problems around positing even an ungathered subjectivity in relation to 
politics, other questions make this approach even more problematic. Even if I thought it was 
possible to posit one – or more than one – kind of ethical subjectivity as a foundation, or a 
motivation, for political activity, it is difficult to imagine that those involved in a gathering of raw 
politics will share such a motivation. I would argue that, as with any political activity, those 
involved will never have the same reasons or sets of reasons for being there. Some will have the 
most superficial reasons, for example, because of a perception that being involved is cool, or 
because of loose social affiliations or close friendships, or because someone they have fallen in 
love with is there. All of these reasons might conceivably simultaneously involve (even the 
flimsiest) kinds of approval of an ethical demand, but this would not seem to have the kind of 
coherent unity ordinarily required by most (if not all) theoretical figurings of politics. In order to 
have an ethically founded gathering, there would have to be ethical agreement among 
participants. As such, proponents of the ethical approach might as well resort to the strategies of 
communicative action and discourse ethics put forward by Habermas. Further, I would argue that, 
in any political group, the more ethically committed – or (self) overdetermined – individuals 
there are, the less likely it is that the gathering will remain without the State, or „properly‟ 
anarchist. 
 
 
Where to? Whatever? 
 
 „Well this turn goes to the hill, I suppose – ‟ (Carroll, [1896]: 156). 
 
 In this chapter I have found that the political elaborations of neither Hardt and Negri nor 
Critchley nor May describe or approximate a politics without the State – a raw politics. Firstly, 
we found problems with Hardt and Negri‟s ontological thesis. That is, that the multitude and 
Empire coexist on an immanent plane and that, from this foundation, a figuring of a democratic 
and revolutionary multitude emerges from an initial refusal of the sovereign power of Empire on 
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that plane. I think that Hardt and Negri are mistaken when they argue that the rupturing logic of 
biopolitical capital – as having done with the need for the support of the transcendent apparatus 
of modern sovereignty and as operating effectively on immanent plane – has become a network 
that is available to appropriation by a revolutionary multitude. As Mouffe, Critchley and Žižek 
have argued, Hardt and Negri provide us with no reason to believe that the life of the multitude 
will become revolutionary or that life for political subjects will be different than that endured 
under traditional sovereign regimes. In relation to this, Hardt and Negri seem to overlook the 
ways in which the morally invoked symbological legitimation of imperial sovereignty operates to 
give it a transcendental character which functions just as well as law and ideology has in the past 
to legitimate traditional sovereignty. It is also difficult to accept the claim that imperial power 
and sovereignty is not strengthened and given a „weight advantage‟ by the (admittedly more 
diffuse and symbologically transcendent) apparatuses of global capital. Finally, as we found with 
the work of Foucault, the refusal described by Hardt and Negri seems to be insufficient to be 
considered a key aspect of a raw political gathering – that is, it seems to operate as a mere 
negation rather than as an affirmation.  
 As I argued in the previous section, I also think that the conceptualisations of ethical 
theory and practice that have been posited by Critchley and May respectively are, given their 
dependence on a gathered or ungathered subject, inappropriate as a means to understand the 
possibility of the happening of raw politics. Now, having made these arguments (and those 
against Hardt and Negri) and having rejected still more possible paths to an understanding of raw 
politics, we have come to an all too familiar juncture. So, what now? Where to now?  
 In Chapter Eight, I will begin by turning again to the work of Deleuze and Guattari. Can 
their work in any way inform the investigation being conducted here? Given the path of the 
inquiry in this chapter, turning to this work may be considered to be an unpromising strategy, for 
Hardt and Negri and May all draw on Deleuze and Guattari in the figuring of their own political 
theories. Here though, unlike Hardt and Negri, I will try to avoid making any claim which 
purports to turn any of Deleuze and Guattari‟s theory into a foundation for a new mode of 
politics. And, unlike May, I will not try to draw out any ethical implications of the strategic 
positions and statements of thinkers like Deleuze and Foucault. That is, I will not attempt to 
divine a notion of politics (or ethics) from their work – especially if that divination indicates a 
trajectory that runs toward totality, and which as such would seem to run counter to any possible 
politics or ethics that it may or may not be possible to imply or divine. I think the best way to 
draw on Deleuze and Guattari is to adopt Deleuze‟s approach to Nietzsche, that is, to avoid 
drawing anything from the work that could be said to be forced from it. Deleuze does not force 
Nietzsche to say anything. I will try to treat Deleuze in the same way. This approach is also in 
keeping with my approach to Foucault. That is, I think it is more important to listen to inflection 
than to attempt a kind of divination. 
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 It is unlikely however that this approach alone will provide us with the understanding we 
are seeking. Deleuze‟s politics is nimble and resistant to political capture. One difficult question 
in this regard is: Is the „whatever enemy‟ simply an aspect of a „whatever politics‟? Notions such 
as these would seem to be rather too „ungathered‟ for the purposes of this thesis. So, in the final 
chapter, the task will be to find a way to explain the reasons for a gathering being a gathering, 
and the manner in which a gathering of raw politics might happen. I think it is reasonably 
straight-forward to describe raw politics, and even to discuss how this might happen. The 
difficult questions are those of why raw politics might or would happen, to describe how, if it 
would happen, how I think it would happen, and to say that if it will happen, it will happen this 
way. The major difficulty here is to attempt this without resorting to teleological, ethical or 
subjective conceptualisations. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
RAW POLITICS 
Of purities … and the raw 
  
 
 Politics 
 
 The task of this thesis has been to conduct an inquiry as to whether or not it is possible 
for a politics without the State to happen. Given that I argue that the modern State has come to 
monopolise politics, any politics without the State could be considered – to use Castoriadis‟ 
phrase – a „new mode‟ of politics. In the Introduction, and at various points along the way, I have 
provided and worked with a stripped back definition of „politics‟: that is, a politics stripped of the 
concepts, theories and ideologies of the State, which furnish it with the lustre and weight of 
transcendence and which consequently bolster its intransigent presence. Without these concepts 
and theories, politics has been more simply described as „being together, discussing together and 
deciding together‟. Then, in Chapter Six the notion of, not „deciding together‟, but „joining-with‟ 
and „doing together‟ displaced the moment of decision that brings about political institution. It is 
important to remember, however, that this is not a politics that is stripped back to its essence. My 
figuring of raw politics has not been a process of distillation, a removal of impurity. I argue that 
there are no impurities to remove and that there is no such thing as a pure or unadulterated 
politics. The politics I am trying to figure out here is, like everything, adulterated.  
 So far, my figuring of a possible „new mode‟ of politics here has been prepared for by 
discussing and eliminating those aspects of political thought that are teleological, utopian and 
programmatic. Interestingly, those aspects and ideas of traditional politics that have been 
eliminated are those that load it with notions of totality, unity, identity and purity – the eugenics 
of politics. On the other hand, I have stated from the beginning that the kind of politics that will 
be discussed here will start from, will draw upon, will be adulterated by what Castoriadis calls 
the „original inspiration‟ that has deployed the political thought which we associate with the left. 
This includes Marxist revolutionary theory and practice (which has as its own clarion call, 
Marx‟s „Thesis XI‟), Castoriadis‟ project of autonomy, anarchist thought and activity, and finally, 
(the more ambiguous but nonetheless critical of the State) poststructuralist political thought. In 
this context, the „original inspiration‟ is an idea that is carried by those on the left. It might even 
be appropriate to describe it as a kind of radical imaginary. But this is an idea, or imaginary, that 
is not taken as an origin and is not understood as surging forth from a core or source such as a 
„psychic monad‟. So, on this matter I part ways with Castoriadis. Instead I understand this radical 
idea genealogically, as produced through the haphazardly repeated subjectivisation and 
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interpellation of subjects and groups over centuries. For some, this idea produces and means little 
or nothing. Obviously, to others, this idea continues to produce the kind of subjects and groups 
that call themselves „left‟ or revolutionary. I do not claim any mystical source for the continued 
existence of this tendency. It operates, for this thesis, on a pragmatic level.  
This pragmatism begins politically with the original inspiration. Philosophically it begins 
with “the discontent of thinking in its confrontation with the world as it is” (Badiou, 2004: 39-
40). As a kind of pragmatism, then, I am not trying to explain this discontent. Nor am I trying to 
explain why people struggle against injustice and oppression, join with the movements of the left 
or become revolutionary. I begin with the simple fact that they do and with another simple fact 
that people become left or revolutionary subjects for a multitude of reasons – from indoctrination 
to inexplicable desire, from guilt, from fashion, from passion and even, as Critchley puts it, from 
a sense of infinite responsibility born of an unfulfillable ethical demand. This, however, is not the 
kind of pragmatism elaborated by Richard Rorty (although in some ways his own recognition of 
the non-foundational character of politics inspires it too). That is, it is not a pragmatism that 
simply works on rearranging what exists. In Rorty‟s case, the political systems of liberal 
parliamentary democracy are what exist. Further, he argues that, as political systems, they have 
done very well. Thus, for Rorty, liberal parliamentary democracy is both all that can be worked 
upon and with, and all that is presently worth working on. In taking this stance, Rorty does more 
than work with the existing conditions. He explicitly endorses liberalism as the set of theories and 
practices best able to produce and maintain the political organisation of societies in such a way 
that it can be said that such societies are „as good as it gets‟. As I argued earlier, for this thesis, 
the claim that liberal democracy produces societies which are „as good as it gets‟ is problematic 
in general, and plainly insufficient with regard to the figuring of a politics without the State. 
Further, the actual idea that other political possibilities have been exhausted or are not worth 
exploring only bolsters the intransigence of the State. In this thesis, the same existing conditions 
are examined through the prism of the original inspiration and are thus seen as a milieu in which 
other modes of politics are possible and open to inquiry. Hence, this politics is not about 
continually working upon the existing set of given conditions but about people being called upon 
by an existing set of conditions in the knowledge that given conditions can and do change 
radically from time to time. This pragmatism is, thus, genealogically informed and can be said to 
work not with what exists, but with what and how things happen. This call, nonetheless, is not of 
a kind that posits an ideal or demands a utopian program. In this thesis, the pragmatism of the 
original inspiration is characterised by raw politics, by gathering and deployment. Not only is a 
gathering haphazardly interpellated – as a group of people who over time have happened to be 
subjects that can be called in such a way – but it is also interpellated by political situations as 
they „take hold‟ or bubble up (rather than by tradition, convention, moral codes or ideology). The 
pragmatism of raw politics is demonstrated through its activity, which happens in affirmation of 
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the contingency of what Althusser describes as an encounter (2006). This pragmatism is 
experimental. What happens may or may not have an effect. What happens may or may not 
change anything. Raw politics could fizzle out, crash and burn, or maybe be involved in 
something that we could call a new mode of politics. 
Before I move on to explore this possibility in more detail, it is important to note that the 
idea of an experimental politics that could come, for better or worse, to nothing or anything, is 
the kind of politics that Deleuze and Guattari wrote and thought much about.
1
 Their work on 
„nomad‟ existence and the „war machine‟ touches on many of the ideas and themes discussed in 
this thesis and it is appropriate now to examine it more closely. 
 
 
 War machine | Raw politics 
 
 At the end of Chapter Seven I found that, for various reasons, the work of Deleuze and 
Guattari needed to be investigated further in the context of the possibility of raw politics – or 
politics without the State. In many ways, Deleuze and Guattari‟s elaborations on the theme of 
nomadology intersect and converge with the themes of this thesis. The questions and problems 
raised in A Thousand Plateaus (1988) – particularly plateau 12, the „Treatise on Nomadology‟ – 
have often been repeated and reflected in those posed here.
2
 As we shall see, however, while 
important relations involving politics and the State are clarified through Deleuze and Guattari‟s 
discussion, the nomad and the war machine are not equivalent to a politics without the State. It is, 
therefore, appropriate now to make note of these intersections and convergences, and to draw out 
the important distinctions between the war machine and raw politics.  
The most important question posed by Deleuze and Guattari in relation to this thesis‟ 
concerns is: “Is there a way to extricate thought from the State model?” (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1988: 374). In this question we are confronted with the problems and questions that I have been 
trying to grapple with all along. Firstly, it is possible to take from Deleuze and Guattari‟s 
question an implication that the State (model) has a monopoly. In this case, however, the 
implication would be that such a monopoly is on „thought‟ (as well as on politics). Secondly, as 
Deleuze and Guattari identify some of the ways in which the State (to put it in this thesis‟ terms) 
gains such a monopoly, we recognise Althusser‟s discussions with regard to Rousseau‟s 
elaboration of the social contract, which through the exercise of thought and theoretical play, is 
transformed from a way of explaining political obligation into a means of transcendental 
                                                 
1
 “Politics is active experimentation, since we do not know in advance which way a line is going to turn” 
Deleuze & Parnet, 1987: 137). 
2
 In various ways these themes and ideas have also been critically discussed by, among others, Hume, 
Foucault, Althusser and Castoriadis. 
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sovereign legitimation in the „flight forward into ideology‟. On this set of relations Deleuze and 
Guattari write, “by developing in thought in this way the State-form gains something essential: a 
whole consensus. Only thought is capable of inventing the fiction of a State that is universal by 
right, of elevating the State to the level of de jure universality” (375). However, this is not a 
simple one-sided appropriation of thought by the State. „Thought‟ itself gains prestige and power 
through the association, attaining a “gravity it would never have on its own” (375). This prestige 
and gravity is ultimately reflected in the importance of the rational, thinking individual in modern 
philosophy and political theory.
3
 As Deleuze and Guattari have it,  
 
This image [of thought] has two heads, corresponding to the two poles of sovereignty: the 
imperium of true thinking operating by magical capture, seizure or binding, constituting the 
efficacy of a foundation (mythos); a republic of free spirits proceeding by pact or contract, 
constituting a legislative and juridical organization, carrying the sanction of a ground (logos) … 
[T]he modern State defines itself in principle as the „rational and reasonable organization of a 
community‟: the only remaining particularity a community has is interior or moral (the spirit of a 
people), at the same time as the community is funneled by its organization toward the harmony of 
a universal (absolute spirit). The State gives thought a form of interiority, and thought gives that 
interiority and form of universality (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 374-375). 
 
In the above passage, Deleuze and Guattari summarise – from Hobbes to Hegel – a large portion 
of the discussion and commentary of this thesis. Additionally, when they write of the place of the 
cogito and reason and the notion that “the more you obey, the more you will be master, for you 
will be obeying pure reason, in other words yourself” (376), Descartes and Kant are included in 
the mutually beneficial entanglement of thought and the State. And finally, to seal the 
relationship, Deleuze and Guattari nominate the sociologist and the psychoanalyst as the „image 
trainers‟ of the thought of the modern State (376). As such, thinkers discussed earlier (for 
example, Weber and Durkheim) are included. Above all, these thinkers, and their thought, 
contribute to the transcendent weight, the gravitas, of the State (371, 386). This gravitas – along 
with the physical weight imposed by the relative stability and permanence of the striated space of 
the State
4
 – is what makes it so seemingly immovable, intransigent and fearsome. Such 
                                                 
3
 The initial introduction of this notion of gravity takes place in the context of Deleuze and Guattari‟s 
discussion of nomad (or „minor‟) science and the „royal‟ science of the State. Here, nomad science is 
characterised in terms of movement and speed (Celeritas) and royal science as weighty and slow 
(Gravitas) (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 369-374). 
4
 The smooth space of the “nomadic trajectory may follow trails of customary routes [but] it does not fulfill 
the function of a sedentary road … to parcel out a closed space to people assigning each person a share and 
regulating the communication between shares. The nomadic trajectory does the opposite: it distributes 
people (or animals) in an open space, one that is indefinite and noncommunicating” (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1988: 380).  The sedentary space (of the State) “is striated, by walls, enclosures, and roads between 
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ideological gravitas and material weight is, after all, the most plausible explanation for why 
subjects desire their oppression over their freedom.
5
 As we have seen, this kind of explanation 
begins with Hume and Spinoza and is carried on by Foucault. 
 It is important here to take a step back, for Deleuze and Guattari do not actually argue 
that the State has a monopoly on politics. Their entire treatise on nomadology is a discussion of 
relations in which the nomadic war machine and the State-form (the State apparatus, the thought 
of the State) are coexistentially involved. The nomad and the war machine are, for Deleuze and 
Guattari, non-State forms of life which coexist with the State-form. Their relation to each other, 
according to Deleuze and Guattari, is one in which the war machine is always exterior to and 
against the State. They even describe nomad existence and the war machine as “a pure form of 
exteriority, whereas the State apparatus constitutes the form of interiority we habitually take as a 
model” (354). To say that the war machine is pure exteriority, however, is not to say that it does 
not sometimes become mixed and confused with the State-form. This relation is not seen as a 
binary opposition but as „lines‟ that intersect that become mingled and tangled, and which „make 
up‟ the life and becoming of individuals and groups. There are the overcoded lines of rigid 
segmentarity of the State-form (Deleuze, 1987: 124). There are lines on which happen 
“becomings and micro-becomings” (ibid) and which “trace out little modifications … [and] … 
detours” (ibid). Then there is “a third kind of line, which is … as if something carried us away, 
across our segments, but also across our thresholds, towards a destination which is unknown, not 
foreseeable and not pre-existent … This line appears to arise … afterwards, to become detached 
from the two others” (125). This „third line‟ is that on which nomad existence is understood to 
happen. And all together, these lines – and possible multitudes of other lines – are what life is 
„made of‟. These lines are not oppositional but coexistential. Nevertheless, there is an ongoing 
„struggle‟ between the nomad war machine and the State and this is a struggle in which the State 
tends to win out. This, however, is not a „win‟ as such, because the struggle is not over the prize 
of territory or over the one thing of becoming a State. It is just that the State stays and captures 
                                                                                                                                                 
enclosures, while nomad space is smooth, marked only by „traits‟ that are effaced and displaced with the 
trajectory” (381). 
5
 In the essay „Many Politics‟ Deleuze writes that “the powers which crush desire, or which subjugate it, 
themselves already form part of assemblages of desire: it is sufficient for desire to follow this particular 
line, for it to find itself caught, like a boat, under this particular wind. There is no desire for revolution, as 
there is no desire for power, desire to oppress, or to be oppressed; but revolution, oppression, power etc., 
are the actual component lines of a given assemblage” (Deleuze & Parnet, 1987: 133). Later he elaborates 
further: “[T]he segments which run through us and through which we pass are … marked by a rigidity 
which reassures us, while turning us into creatures which are the most fearful, but also the most pitiless and 
bitter … Even if we had the power to blow it up, could we succeed in doing so without destroying 
ourselves, since it is so much part of the conditions of life, including our organism and our very reason?” 
(138). Here, we are reminded of Foucault‟s description of Deleuze and Guattari‟s work as an attempt to 
grapple with this problem and of Anti-Oedipus as an “Introduction to the Non-Fascist Life” (Foucault, 
1984d: xiii).  
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space, territorialises it, makes smooth spaces striated, demands to be recognised and original. The 
nomad simply comes and goes.
6
 
Nomad existence seeps into the mode of life and thought of the State, and the war 
machine is adulterated by the State.
7
 As such, the State does not have a monopoly on politics or 
life in general but, for all of the reasons I (and many others before) have recounted (and even in 
the ontological sense of Deleuze and Guattari‟s discussion) it is fair to say that the State is largely 
predominant. As I argued above, this predominance, this transcendence of the State, is not simply 
explicable through adding up the material, imaginary and symbological devices in its arsenal. 
The State, whether it is in the form of Empire (as Hardt and Negri have it) or the modern State, 
has material force and weight as well as the non-material (and transcendental) gravitas of 
ideology, symbology and thought. Hence, from a pragmatic standpoint, the State has a functional 
or effective monopoly on politics. 
 Deleuze and Guattari elaborate on nomadology in terms of its relation and ongoing 
tensions with the State-form and I have mainly recounted their descriptions and understandings 
from this perspective. Before I move on to set out the important distinctions between nomad 
politics and raw politics, it is necessary to briefly focus more closely on some key characteristics 
of the nomad and the war machine. This mode of thought and existence was discussed in Chapter 
Six, particularly with regard to the notion of the rhizome. The rhizome is entangled in its own 
relation with the arborescent. Where the rhizome has no centre and spreads along lines of flight 
on the smooth space of the nomad, the arborescent puts down roots and its branches are traceable 
to a singular, central origin. The arborescent is a sedentary form whereas the rhizome is 
characterised by its movement, its uncontrollable and unpredictable spread (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1988: 3-25). 
In relation to the nomadic form of life and the war machine, Deleuze and Guattari 
describe a „minor‟ politics.8 This, according to Paul Patton, is a politics which “deviates from the 
majority or standard which is the bearer of the dominant social code” (Patton, 2000: 7). Further, 
                                                 
6
 Even this notion, of a binary difference between staying and going, is a thought of the State. Deleuze 
writes that “the nomad, the man [sic] of the earth, the man of deterritorialization … is also the one who 
does not move, who remains attached to the environment, desert or steppe” (Deleuze & Parnet, 1987: 134). 
7
 For example, Deleuze and Guattari see the military organisation of the State as an essentially nomadic 
form, as the war machine captured by the State apparatus. The war machine however, is never fully 
controlled by the State (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 351-356; Deleuze & Parnet, 1987: 141-142). 
8
 “The difference between minorities and majorities isn‟t their size. A minority may be bigger than a 
majority. What defines the majority is a model you have to conform to: the average European adult male 
city-dweller, for example … A minority, on the other hand, has no model, it‟s a becoming, a process. One 
might say the majority is nobody. Everybody‟s caught, one way or another, in a minority becoming that 
would lead them into unknown paths if they opted to follow it through. When a minority creates models for 
itself, it‟s because it wants to become a majority” (Deleuze, 1995: 173). 
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Patton argues that it is this “divergence from the norm” that harbours its political potential (ibid).9 
In this sense, the politics of Deleuze and Guattari is described in similar terms to that of 
Castoriadis and Foucault (and Laclau), in that the problem for politics is the relation of people to 
the material and social forces which make them, shape them and wield forms of authority over 
them. However, minor politics, the nomad and the war machine are not figured around the 
problematic of refusal. The ontological scheme of lines of flight on an immanent plane allows us 
to imagine a political existence as affirmation rather than mere negation. Particular lines of flight 
– along which the deterritorialisation of aspects of the major and the State is possible – are 
always available to be followed. These lines do not set up an oppositional confrontation between 
the State and revolutionaries, but describe the possibility of a transformation of the State, at least 
until the weight of the State-form reterritorialises the field. Deleuze describes this politics as a 
„becoming-minor‟ that ceases such becoming when it begins to adopt the models (or being) of the 
majority or state-form (Deleuze, 1995: 173). Now, while I think that „minor‟ politics and raw 
politics are quite similar that raw politics happens in what we could call a minor way, they are 
not the same. There is an important difference between the pragmatism of raw politics and the 
ontological nature of Deleuze and Guattari‟s figuring of minor politics, the nomad and the war 
machine. Specifically, this is a difference between a politics that is figured as interpellated by the 
original inspiration and the ideas of the left, and the flux of a „whatever‟ politics. From this 
comes a further distinction, between the metaphysical affirmation of the contingency of 
becoming and the pragmatic affirmation of the material contingency (and potential absurdity) of 
raw politics.  
By calling minor politics, or the politics of the nomad and the war machine, a „whatever‟ 
politics, I do not intend to imply that it is just another fuzzy relativism or nihilism. It is rather a 
reference to Deleuze and Guattari‟s discussion of the „whatever‟ (or „Unspecified‟) enemy, a kind 
of mutation of the war machine with the State-form, and with which the war machine is now also 
„at war‟ with.10 This elaboration of the relations in which the war machine is involved is, like all 
of the other elaborations, of a kind that is descriptive of what happens. Even though it is clear that 
Deleuze and Guattari see a revolutionary politics as running along the lines of the war machine 
and the minority, that they would like to consider their own work as part of such a line and that 
they would like to see revolutionary politics happening, they do not pretend to explain a 
                                                 
9
 Patton writes that it is “the process of becoming-minor, of widening the gap between oneself and the 
norm … [that] … provides an element capable of deterritorialising the dominant social codes” (Patton, 
2000: 7). 
10
 Deleuze and Guattari write that with the continual appropriation of the war machine by the State, a 
World or State war machine has emerged which “has set its sights on a new type of enemy, no longer 
another State, or even another regime, but the „unspecified enemy‟; we have seen it put its counterguerilla 
elements into place, so that it can be caught by surprise once, but not twice. Yet the very conditions that 
make the State or World war machine possible, in other words, constant capital … and human variable 
capital, continually recreate unexpected possibilities for counterattack, unforeseen initiatives determining 
revolutionary, popular, minority, mutant machines” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 422). 
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revolutionary strategy.
11
 The entanglements of the war machine and the State-form are variable, 
multiform, ever-present (or always-becoming). The war machine is not „uniformly defined‟. 
What may or may not occur is anybody‟s guess. The politics I am trying to describe is of a 
different kind. Importantly, I do not think of it ontologically, as always there or as „always-
becoming‟. Instead, it is pragmatic. I think that an understanding of the idea and possibility of 
what I have called raw politics, while not itself a revolutionary strategy, can be useful to any of 
those somehow interpellated and responsive to the original inspiration (including those who 
would call themselves revolutionary) and thus to the political situations which a politics, so 
called, will see as warranting a response.  
 Raw politics is different from the nomadic because it is not „against the State‟ or 
necessarily entangled in a „struggle‟ with the State-form. While raw politics is, like nomad 
existence, always adulterated by any other possible „form‟ of life or politics, it is not a „form‟ 
itself. While, like the politics that Deleuze and Guattari set out, raw politics is experimental, its 
mode of existence is not on or as a metaphysical current or flow, and is not something that is 
described as a field on which the struggles between the war machine and the State could result in 
triumph or defeat, sacking or a withdrawal to „regroup‟. I understand raw politics as happening 
and/or not happening. I do not think that there is an ideal or latent form of the organisation for the 
gathering of raw politics. While I do not claim that Deleuze and Guattari think of an ideal form of 
the war machine, I need to make an important distinction. Deleuze and Guattari write: 
 
The State-form, as a form of interiority, has a tendency to reproduce itself, remaining identical to 
itself across its variations and easily recognizable within the limits of its poles, always seeking 
public recognition (there is no masked State). But the war machine‟s form of exteriority is such 
that it exists only in its own metamorphoses; it exists … in all flows and currents that only 
secondarily allow themselves to be appropriated by the State (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 360). 
 
Here Deleuze and Guattari understand nomad existence and the war machine as always there, 
coexisting and competing “in a perpetual field of interaction … of exteriority and interiority, war 
machines of metamorphosis and State apparatuses of identity … The same field circumscribes its 
interiority in States, but describes its exteriority in what escapes States or stands against States” 
                                                 
11
 This aspect of Deleuze and Guattari‟s thought has been interpreted and criticised as anti-democratic or as 
a kind of aristocratic (or minoritarian) elitism. Paul Patton argues against this when he writes that “[s]uch a 
characterisation is difficult to reconcile with the history of Deleuze‟s intervention on matters of public 
debate” (Patton, 2005: 56). Patton then lays out the philosophical case against such interpretations. He 
writes that “part of Deleuze‟s definition of what it means to be on the left is his claim that this is a matter of 
becoming minoritarian as opposed to being majoritarian. It is a matter of knowing that the majority is an 
abstract and empty representation of an ideal identity that is linked to particular systems of power and 
control and of knowing that there are minoritarian becomings in which everyone can be engaged and which 
have the power to disrupt and transform those systems. It is for this reason that Deleuze says that being on 
the left is not a matter of government, indeed that there are no leftist governments” (Patton, 2005: 57).  
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(360-361). As a politico-metaphysical description of what happens, I think Deleuze and 
Guattari‟s is very convincing. More than that, I think their description is correct. However, I am 
interested in those sets of political situations that have been the focus of revolutionary and left 
politics since Marx. Further, my idea of raw politics is not that of a form of life, like that of the 
nomad. It is rather a mode of political organisation, a mode of political activity and doing. This 
doing, to borrow from Nietzsche, is an attempt to impose “upon becoming the character of 
being” (Nietzsche, 1969: 330).12 In this context, it is a mode of doing that not only pragmatically 
affirms the contingency of the situation, but also its absurdity. Just as Camus (for different 
reasons in a different context) concludes that life is worth living despite its absurd 
meaninglessness,
13
 a gathering of raw politics affirms the contingency – and absurdity – of any 
attempt to impose any kind of character on anything. 
 I think that raw politics happens within or amongst a „reality‟ like that described by 
Deleuze and Guattari, a reality that is rhizomic rather than arborescent, that occurs as flows of 
becoming along various lines. And while these ideas, the thought of nomad thought, can now 
also interpellate and be carried by those of the left as gatherings of raw politics occur, I do not 
think I can argue that raw politics is a mode of being, or a mode of life that has somehow, in one 
way or another, always been there. I do not want to argue that the ideas of Marx or of Castoriadis 
are representations or manifestations of this mode of life. These ideas happened (or 
metamorphosed) in their own way, in response to their own sets of material conditions, and they 
have been variously and manifestly warped, (mis)appropriated, aestheticised, and maybe even 
creatively transformed by encounters with the thoughts and actions of multitudes. Like all politics 
and political ideas, these are adulterated. And I am happily doing some adulteration of my own 
now. 
 So, raw politics is not a kind of nomad politics. I am wary of arguing that it is „minor‟, or 
of forcing raw politics from the minor. But I think the idea of the nomad, the war machine, the 
minor and the minority helps us in the figuring of raw politics. Firstly, as it is interpellated by the 
original inspiration raw politics does not immediately or necessarily tend toward a „majority 
model‟ or the State-form.  Secondly, Deleuze and Guattari, in successfully (I would argue) 
thinking thought as extricated from the State model (1988: 374), allow us to plausibly think, 
imagine and conceive of politics without the State. That they enable this thought is impressive 
given that in our contemporary situation, such thoughts are considered unthinkable, unimaginable 
and inconceivable. Still, as powerful as this thought is, raw politics remains a politics of the 
original inspiration (with all the potential pitfalls that go with that) and hence as a politics of 
activity and thought. Given this claim, it is necessary to try to explain in more detail, the 
character of raw politics. 
                                                 
12
 Emphasis added. 
13
 See Camus‟ The Myth of Sisyphus (1975). 
 223 
  
 Raw politics 
 
In Chapter Six I began to sketch out some aspects of politics without the State, or raw 
politics. I began with the now familiar general definition of politics borrowed from Castoriadis. 
Politics is an activity and a mode of organisation, of „being together‟, of „discussing together‟ and 
of „deciding together‟. From this, I discussed „being together‟ by drawing on Jean-Luc Nancy to 
describe a „being-in-common‟ that is not closed by an identity and which is characterised by 
exteriority and exposure. Nancy, however, elaborates this being-in-common along the lines of 
Heidegger‟s being-with (Mitsein) as a way of arguing that is a more primordial mode of being 
than Being-there (Dasein). On this point, we parted ways with Nancy because even though he 
argues for the importance of the „we‟ over the „I‟ in any understanding of being, his is 
nonetheless an argument about the being of subjects. Therefore, in order to understand the being-
in-common of the gathering I turned to Deleuze and Guattari‟s descriptions of rhizomic and 
nomadic multiplicity. These ideas were discussed in the context of David Hume‟s allusions to the 
Camp in order to figure what I have called a gathering. A description of a gathering, derived from 
the vagaries of what we recognise as a camp, is one thing. How though, does a gathering become 
in any way political? I addressed this question in relation to the political modes of discussing 
together and deciding together. 
With regard to the problem of the „discussing together‟ of a gathering, I introduced 
notions which have to do with the addressivity of everyday speech, those of sincerity and 
parrhesia. Through a discussion of these modes of speech activity, the idea of a non-
epistemological, practical truth was used to explain the ways in which particularly interpellated 
political subjects can respond in an in-common way to the call of a political situation. To put it 
another way, I tried to understand and explain how we might join-with a gathering of raw 
politics. Further, by drawing upon the pragmatism of C.S. Peirce, this sincere and parrhesiastic 
„practical truth‟ can also be deployed to explain the existence of a contingent milieu from which a 
gathering can begin – or be joined-with. Firstly, these ideas – around this kind of dynamic, 
polyphonous and sometimes cacophonous everyday speech – allow us to understand how we can 
“begin from wherever we are” (Derrida, 1976: 162). But this is more than simply beginning 
wherever we are. This notion of practical truth and sincerity allows those joined-with a gathering 
to continue to do with whatever and whoever they are with. In this sense, we have pre-empted the 
moment of decision that is commonly understood to be necessary for any political activity to 
happen. This makes sense in the context of this thesis, however, since from the beginning I have 
claimed that politics still happens before, or without the act of political institution that (among 
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other things) brings the State into being.
14
 At this point then, we were confronted with the mode 
of „deciding together‟ (or not) of raw politics. 
With regard to „deciding together‟, I elaborated on the interpellation, the doing together, 
the sending and the deployment of a gathering. As such, another aspect of our received notion of 
politics was stripped away – or at least displaced. The moment of decision was displaced because 
I do not think it is plausible to claim, as Laclau seems to, that without a decision, there is no 
politics. However, Laclau‟s discussion of the „undecidable‟ in relation to representation, 
subjectivity, hegemony and political institution helped in the description of a gathering that 
cannot be „as one‟, or even „as if one‟. In any gathering there is an interpellation and joining-with 
an activity that is already underway before the possibility of a call for a decision occurs. This 
call, however, can be confronted or responded to in a number of ways. Firstly, we could respond 
by entering into the (undecidable) moment of madness and (a la Laclau) decide anyway. The 
decision taken may be to politically institute an action or a group or movement around a 
hegemonic relation. Or a gathering may deploy itself in such a way that brings about a phasing 
out of its raw character. Finally, it may be possible to simply continue with the doing of the 
gathering, to continue for as long as possible in the mode of a response to the interpellation and 
the sending of the particular political situation. I think that this mode of raw politics is the most 
difficult to maintain, for it can only continue in this mode of rawness for as long as the situation 
calls for it. Ultimately, all situations change. The call ceases, or calls for something else. Further, 
maybe acts of decision do not have to be acts of institution as such. The decision does not have to 
be the beginning of a hegemonic relation or a closed community. Raw politics, even when it 
deploys (and ends) itself in a decision, is about carrying for as long as possible, the affirmation of 
the raw. In this sense we could be moving from situation to situation, sending to sending, 
deployment to deployment, rather than from situation, to decision, to institution, to State (or 
State-form). Even when the State-form begins to adulterate the raw, it is still worth deciding to 
prolong and extend the raw or rawness. Here, however, is a problem. I have just suggested that 
there are degrees of raw politics. Now, this suggestion could be taken to mean that there is a 
„pure‟ mode of raw politics, and modes of politics that are adulterated by the raw. This 
proposition contradicts a lot of what I have been arguing. There is an ambiguity here which I 
need to address. The notion of adulteration is at the heart of this ambiguity.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 As noted in the Introduction, this claim is in keeping with Deleuze and Guattari‟s contention that “before 
Being there is politics” (Deleuze & Parnet, 1987: 17) or that, as it is put in A Thousand Plateaus, “politics 
precedes being” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 203).  
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Raw politics: adulteration, maturity, desire 
 
Raw politics is not a „pure‟ politics. My descriptions of how a gathering of raw politics 
happens have been sketched with a view to avoid any essentialist idea. Raw politics itself is 
unavoidably adulterated by the ways in which people are interpellated into it. As such, I observed 
that in any gathering, people might be there because they have been called by an intense political 
commitment or, among other things, by a romantic infatuation. Also, those who are politically 
interpellated will themselves carry different ideas and desires about what kind of politics should 
happen. Further, when I discuss degrees of rawness, I imagine a spectrum along which rawness 
phases in and out. As such, the gathering of raw politics that I have spent so much time trying to 
describe is only „raw‟ inasmuch as it could be recognised as having the character – but not the 
nature or essence – of rawness. This rawness dissipates as a gathering sends, diffuses, deploys 
and decides, or when a situation no longer calls for it. Further, after a gathering has deployed or 
decided, a trace of rawness may remain to adulterate the instituted mode of politics. Democracy, 
with its resistance to totalising conceptualisation and institution, may be the most obvious 
example of this kind of (raw) adulteration. The affinity groups that have gathered and dispersed 
around protests and demonstrations against neoliberal capitalism could also be seen to be 
adulterated by the raw. On the other hand, I would argue that the various forms of fascism and 
totalitarianism are modes of politics in which rawness – and arguably politics – is practically 
eradicated. At this point I need to turn again to others, strange relations and metaphors to explain 
the various degrees of the character of raw politics.  
The first thread I will pull is that left behind by Kant and his 1784 essay „What is 
Enlightenment?‟ In it he famously describes the Enlightenment as an era in which people break 
free of tutelage and emerge into maturity, to „dare to know‟ (1980a: 3). This maturity is 
understood as being open to the world around and to the responsibility to exercise our own reason 
as we reflect upon that world and as we express ourselves in relation to those reflections. 
Maturity in this sense could be understood to be being open to adulteration. However, as we 
know, Kant closes off that openness. This mode of reason – as maturity and as autonomy – has an 
end and an end point. Kant obliges us to use only that reasoning that coincides with the laws of 
the Sovereign and with principles that can be derived from universal laws of reason. Our 
autonomy is our capacity to make laws for ourselves that coincide with the laws of reason and the 
State. This notion of maturity is frozen in time, is a summit to be reached and a purity to be 
achieved. On the other hand, for raw politics there is no summit and no purity. Insofar as maturity 
is involved in raw politics, it is understood in the everyday flow of time and becoming. This is 
where a relation between maturity and adulteration can be usefully introduced. 
If we think of a peach on a tree or in our fruit-bowl, we can begin to understand the 
transient character of raw politics. A peach is mature when it is ripe but, when is it ripe? When is 
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it over-ripe and when is it rotten? These questions simply illustrate the problematic character of 
the idea that to be or become mature is to reach an end point or a pinnacle. The maturity or the 
ripeness of a piece of fruit is only a phase. All through its phasing it is adulterated by the very 
things – the bacteria, the heat, the rain, the bugs, the situation – that will sooner or later see it 
decay and dissipate, or „phase out‟. So, like this, raw politics phases in and out. It is understood 
as a becoming but not as a „pure‟ becoming (or a becoming pure). The maturity of raw politics is 
the affirmation of this phasing, the openness to adulteration and whatever that adulteration 
brings. Of course, this mention of becoming brings other questions. 
With the help of Deleuze and Nietzsche I have described the character of raw politics in 
terms of an affirmation of chance and contingency of becoming. This is fine in itself, but I have 
also described the desire of a gathering for particular kinds of happening which are inseparable 
from the interpellation of those joined-with the gathering as leftist political subjectivities. That is, 
regardless of their affirmation of the contingent becoming of raw politics, those involved still 
want something to happen and consider that the involvement of their activity, will or desire might 
actually bring about what they want. That is, despite themselves, those involved in a gathering of 
raw politics toy with the possibility that they might “impose upon becoming the character of 
being” (Nietzsche, 1969: 330). This possibility is discussed in different ways by Deleuze and 
Guattari and, importantly, by Althusser. Deleuze and Guattari discuss assemblages, rhizomic 
bulbs and the intersections of lines of flight – including that of minor politics – along planes of 
becoming (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 7-9; Deleuze & Parnet, 1987: 124-147). We also followed 
Deleuze‟s reading of Nietzsche to the affirmation of life as becoming (2001a; 1986). Here 
however, I will draw on Althusser, and Italo Calvino to elucidate the absurd and frustrating 
tensions within the relations between the interpellation, desires and affirmations of a gathering of 
raw politics.   
Althusser‟s essay, „The Underground Current of the Materialism of the Encounter‟ (2006 
[1982]) confronts the key problem of any politics that draws on or from the original inspiration – 
that of how anyone or any group can change the world (rather than merely interpret it). He begins 
by discussing the concept of the clinamen in the thought of Epicurus and Lucretius.
15
 He writes: 
“Epicurus explains that, before the formation of the world, an infinity of atoms were falling 
parallel to each other in the void” (2006: 168). This situation is the simple materialism of existing 
conditions and the given situation of what is (167). The question this notion raises, however, is: 
How then does this state of affairs change? Althusser continues: 
 
Then the clinamen supervenes … The clinamen is the infinitesimal swerve, „as small as possible‟; 
„no one knows where, or when, or how‟ it occurs, or what causes an atom to swerve from its 
vertical fall in the void, and, breaking the parallelism in an almost negligible way at one point, 
                                                 
15
 See Epicurus‟ „Letter to Herodotus‟ (1994) and Lucretius‟ On the Nature of the Universe (1951). 
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induce an encounter with the atom next to it, and, from encounter to encounter, a pile-up and the 
birth of a world – that is to say, of the agglomeration of atoms induced, in a chain reaction, by the 
initial swerve and encounter (Althusser, 2006: 169). 
 
According to this description, the clinamen brings about an encounter that rather inexplicably 
changes a given situation and brings about a different state of affairs. If or when an encounter 
happens, a rearrangement of the elements of „what is‟ is set in train such that a different state of 
affairs may (or may not) „take hold‟ (191-192).16 Althusser goes on to discuss these ideas in 
relation to philosophy and the associated proposition that in politics it is “necessary to create the 
conditions for a swerve, and thus an encounter” (171). Althusser describes the introduction of the 
clinamen as the introduction of the notion and the ideology of human freedom which itself 
functions to „explain‟ what „makes‟ things happen and take hold. However, the clinamen in turn 
functions as a reappropriation of materialism by idealism. This tendency, Althusser continues, is 
most problematically performed by the self-proclaimed materialisms of “Marx, Engels and 
Lenin, which, like every other materialism in the rationalist tradition, is a materialism of 
necessity and teleology, that is to say, a transformed, disguised form of idealism” (167-168).17  
This tradition however, can only operate through taking observations of the 
„accomplished fact‟ (fait accompli) of „what is‟ and what happens and then deriving from them 
laws with which to describe and manipulate the world and principles to guide what should be 
done. In this tendency, we find the desire to force laws of necessity out of contingency and 
chance.
18
 However, the accomplished fact of any material situation or of any „reality‟ is 
something that we can only observe after an encounter has happened and after a state of affairs 
has „taken hold‟. We cannot infer, retrospectively, a non-contingent character of law and 
necessity onto such facts. While encounters happen and situations do take hold “no law presides 
                                                 
16
 Althusser writes that an encounter may or may not take place, and that if it does, a situation may or may 
not „take hold‟ or may not last as the result of an encounter. “[T]he encounter may not take place, just as it 
may take place. Nothing determines, no principle of decision determines this alternative in advance; it is of 
the order of a game of dice … Indeed! A successful encounter, one that is not brief, but lasts, never 
guarantees that it will continue to last tomorrow rather than come undone. Just as it might not have taken 
place, it may no longer take place” (Althusser, 2006: 174). Althusser also give examples of historical 
situations – such as Antiquity, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment – that can be said to 
have taken hold and lasted. “[T]he world of history … gels at certain felicitous moments, with the taking-
hold of elements combined in an encounter that is apt to trace such-and-such a figure: such-and-such a 
species, individual or people” (2006: 194). 
17
 As Todd May notes, this is a characteristic of strategic political philosophy (May, 1994: 7-10). Here we 
also remember Derrida‟s observations about the problematic character of any strategic approach. He 
writes: “Why do we still call strategic an operation that in the last analysis refuses to be governed by a 
teleological horizon? Up to what point is this refusal possible and how does it negotiate its effects? Why 
does strategy refer to the play of the stratagem rather than to the hierarchical organization of means and 
ends?” (Derrida, 2004: 60). 
18
 Castoriadis calls this tendency the “adoration of the fait accompli” (Castoriadis, 1991e: 8). 
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over the encounter in which things take hold” (194).19 What takes hold does so in an aleatory way 
and might just as easily not have happened. While we may be able to trace or study a course of 
events or a series of encounters in order to understand how a particular situation has come about 
and taken hold, such understanding cannot operate as a predictive or programmatic law.
20
 
Althusser‟s work here encapsulates the problem that haunts political thought and activity, 
particularly that of the original inspiration. For, such politics wants to change the world but is 
confronted by the absurdity of this desire. 
I think that this problem, in relation to Althusser‟s discussion of the clinamen and idea 
and activity of raw politics, can be addressed by turning to another writer and thinker, Italo 
Calvino. In „The Form of Space‟ (1993), Calvino tells the story of a woman and two men falling 
endlessly through the void of space along parallel lines. One of these characters (the narrator) is 
consumed by desire for the woman, Ursula H‟x, and by jealousy over the possibility that his 
rival, Lieutenant Fenimore will consummate his own desire with Ursula H‟x. The narrator thus 
fantasises, through eternity, over the various possible ways in which his fall could intersect with 
Ursula‟s. He tries to bring about the swerve that would lead to an encounter with her and thus the 
possibility that a relationship with her would „take hold‟. That is, he desires the clinamen, the 
swerve and contemplates ways in which he might “create the conditions for a swerve, and thus an 
encounter” (Althusser, 2006: 171). By the end of the tale (if not eternity) we find that the falls of 
the three characters never swerve from the parallel and never intersect. What we can glean from 
Calvino‟s story is that desire is experienced and that no matter how strongly felt, that desire and 
actions derived from it are not sufficient to bring about an encounter and any consequent state of 
affairs that would take hold. No matter how much we want to change the existing state of the 
world and no matter how ingenious we are in trying to come up with ways to bring a desired 
change about, we are stuck with the aleatory character of our given situation and possibly with an 
endless fall through the void. For raw politics, what is so interesting about this desire however, 
despite our awareness of its absurdity, is that it is sincere. That is, there is no invention of 
manners or conventions or laws in order that we feel able and justified in our efforts. A gathering 
wastes no time on describing or predicting accomplished facts before they (do or do not) happen, 
or on explaining how or why they are either philosophically or strategically necessary. 
There is a sincerity as well in Althusser‟s characterisation of the materialism of the 
encounter. There is no deceit, no saying one (materialist) thing before thinking an (idealist) other 
thing. There is a pragmatism in Althusser‟s picture of the world and the problems presented by 
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 Althusser writes that “no determination of the being which issues from the „taking-hold‟ of the encounter 
is prefigured, even in outline, in the being of the elements that converge in the encounter. Quite the 
contrary: no determination of these elements can be assigned except by working backwards from the result 
to its becoming” (Althusser, 2006: 193). 
20
 Althusser elucidates this aspect of his argument through a retelling of Marx‟s description of the rise of 
the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, which Althusser finds sound, against Marx‟s formulation of historical 
laws derived from his descriptions, which have been found to be unsound (Althusser, 2006: 196-203). 
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any state of affairs to those who would want to change them. I see this sincere, pragmatic, 
materialist picture of the aleatory character of any encounter as a key point of difference with the 
affirmation of chance and contingency in Deleuze. This difference is important in my figuring of 
raw politics. Where Deleuze‟s affirmation of chance in life (or life as chance), or in politics, of a 
becoming-minor, is a metaphysical one, the ideas expressed in Althusser‟s discussion of the 
encounter convey a sense of everyday politics. That is, Althusser thinks and discusses politics as 
a doing that happens in actual social conditions and situations. The inclusion of historical and 
political encounters and analyses in his discussion gives the resulting thought a stronger sense of 
involvement in the world. In this context then, I see raw politics as involving a pragmatic 
affirmation of the contingency and the aleatory character of the given (and interpellating) 
situation. A gathering sends itself as a gamble, a risk, a dice-throw in a more „real‟ sense than 
that proposed by Deleuze (via Nietzsche). Life can, by all means, be affirmed, in its becoming 
(and becoming-minor), its contingency, in chance, in the dance and in thought. This however is 
an ontological affirmation, one that may well address the milieu in which we live and thus 
politics in general. But a gathering of raw politics is affirmed with the particular situation, and the 
taking hold (or not) of the encounter. This affirmation does not call for anything in particular but 
excitedly and sincerely calls out: What will happen? 
In summary, to be involved in or joined-with raw politics (or to „go raw‟) is to act in 
sincerity to a situation. The imperative of „going raw‟ is that of the situation itself, whether it is 
the result of a desire to produce or do something or the perceived need to resist or prevent 
something from happening. A gathering of raw politics expresses or sends itself in sincerity, as a 
diffusion, before activity congeals into „manners‟ and before the various deceits of political 
organisation begin to form. There is no coherent unity to a gathering, just an experience of an in-
common doing. To think of a gathering as a coherent „we‟ is, at heart, a deception, but until that 
experience turns on itself, it is a sincere experience.
21
 After that, the deceit becomes patent. Then 
the ideas of identity, unity, obedience as freedom, as natural, of manners and convention, all 
introduce themselves as necessary for politics. As Deleuze and Guattari argue that politics 
precedes being, I contend that a gathering happens in sincerity in that it precedes deceit. 
A gathering comes together somewhat like a mob – that is, in response to the 
interpellation of a situation – but a gathering is not a mob. A mob has a teleology. It screeches, 
„Something must be done!‟ (Something specific, like a lynching.) Its unity is tight and insular. 
The mob assumes the State-form. The thought of the State rationalises and ideologises the 
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 This is similar to the deceit at the heart of the idea, or even of the experience, of the self. This, dare I say 
it, is a self-deceit. Even when we seem to produce that moment, or even when that moment happens, when 
we coherently gather ourselves, there is a deceit in operation. But the experience of it is sincere. It is only 
on (duplicitous) self-reflection that our coherent (self) gathering shows up as a deception. This is similar 
for the gathering of a raw politics. This is not an essential or necessary similarity, but simple metaphorical 
one. Additionally and interestingly, I would argue that a gathering of a diverse group of people is a more 
useful metaphorical means to understand a gathered or ungathered self, than vice versa. 
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interpellation of the mob (and the nation is the boor that gives the modern State its particular 
weight and character). On the other hand, a gathering of raw politics happens as a politics without 
the State, and asks: What will happen now? What will happen to us? What will happen with us. 
Watch what happens now! A gathering of politics without the State requires no ethical 
foundation, obligation or demand. The gathering is called in an encounter. This interpellation 
however does not necessarily take hold as a self-institution or subjectivisation of the gathering. 
Just as the hail of Althusser‟s policeman does not (alone or necessarily) make the hailed a 
criminal, the interpellation of the gathering does nothing other than open to happenstance, the 
possibility of politics without the State.  
Raw politics is not inside or outside of the monopoly of the State but without it. It 
happens, diffuses and dissipates, or deploys, or decides, or institutes. It phases in and out. If it 
deploys, decides or institutes what happens as a different political mode can no longer be 
characterised or described as raw.
22
 Some of these formations and modes may go on to develop 
and to become major, to be captured by the State-form. The major develops to snuff out the 
minor and the raw, on a trajectory towards purity, closure and totalisation. On the other hand, 
maybe, the more raw politics that goes on, the more imaginable the idea and actual activity of 
politics without the State, or an anarchist politics, or a meaningful democracy, becomes. The 
longer the raw can be gathered, the more frequent the gatherings deployed, the less there is of 
monopolised politics. This then is something of an interpellation of my own. It is a call to desire, 
in the face of the absurdity of that desire, for those also called by the original inspiration, to join-
with political situations in such a way as to keep them raw, and to carry into all modes of politics 
the notion of raw political activity, to adulterate politics with the raw as much as is possible or 
conceivable (even though we understand that it is almost impossible). In the final section of this 
thesis, I will try to explain and imagine the idea and scope of an adulterating raw politics. 
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 I must state here that I do not view raw politics as primordial politics. Raw politics is no foundation. 
What happens or takes hold after a gathering is as subject to chance as raw politics itself.  
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WHAT WILL HAPPEN? 
Some final remarks 
 
 
 
 I began this thesis by describing politics according to the thought of, among others, 
Cornelius Castoriadis and Michel Foucault. I also discussed the political projects of anarchism 
and Marxism, which I have claimed as a common starting point for thinking about a politics 
without the State. Throughout the thesis, I have drawn on the work of many thinkers in my 
(absurd) attempt to grapple with the problems associated with the political tendencies that purport 
to desire life and politics without the State and aim to bring that about. I will finish this thesis, for 
now, by discussing these ideas, movements and thinkers again, this time by arguing that, 
regardless of their own particular and singular teleologies and other conceptual entanglements, 
they nevertheless cannot, could not be what they purport to be without the adulteration of raw 
politics, or politics without the State. I will begin with Castoriadis and Foucault. 
 The notions of the refusal of closure and the refusal of what we are can, to some degree, 
be understood as having traces of the character of raw politics. The openness to adulteration and 
transgression in the thought of both Castoriadis and Foucault seems to me to evoke the sense of 
the raw I have elaborated on. Further, their observations about the haphazard nature of the 
passage of historical events, about the dangerousness of deriving laws for history from that which 
has already passed and about the fleeting character of periods or experiences and practices of 
autonomy or freedom are in keeping with the phasing in and out of a gathering. These, and other 
of their observations, have been crucial traces for me to follow during the course of this 
argument. Nevertheless, I have argued that both Castoriadis and Foucault close down the 
possibility of politics without the State (or raw politics) in their respective conceptions of 
autonomous society and subjectivity. Castoriadis‟ autonomous society requires a particular 
political identity and institutions to accompany that identity. Foucault‟s elucidation of the care of 
the self is a theory of autonomous subjectivity where an individual forges an identity largely 
through refusal. As an analysis of subjectivity, it is not sufficient to operate as a political theory 
which, I have argued, must begin with the many rather than the one. To a lesser extent, 
Castoriadis‟ reliance on a psychic monad as the source of autonomy causes problems for his own 
political project as well as for this thesis. Neither of these bodies of thought allows for the radical 
and aleatory openness that characterises raw politics. Now I would not dare to offer an analysis 
of Foucault‟s work in relation to raw politics. That is, I do not wish to force a raw political 
interpretation or intonation from it. However, I will make some remarks on Castoriadis‟ work. If 
I was required to recommend a political project, I think it would be something like Castoriadis‟. 
However, I would argue that his emphasis on the necessity of the creation of autonomous social 
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institutions drags weightily on his own desire to change the world rather than replicate it. Maybe 
his call to remain revolutionary, rather than Marxist (Castoriadis, 1987: 14) could be helped by 
maintaining a more radical openness to the raw and the possibility of politics without the State. 
 I have only just carried out an analysis of Deleuze and Guattari‟s work in relation to raw 
politics. Rather than repeat this in detail, I will simply remark that I understand that raw politics 
happens in a world of their understanding, that is, a world of becoming and chance. I also agree 
with their arguments around the affirmation of (as opposed to the tradition of negating) this 
becoming. However, while their work is intensely political, it is not intended and does not 
function as a political theory and I will try to not force one from it. Insofar as raw politics does or 
does not happen, I think it does or does not do so in a minor or nomadic milieu, but not that it is 
itself a minor politics. In order to describe raw politics within this milieu, I have drawn on 
Althusser‟s thought on the materialism of the encounter. This, to my reckoning, puts flesh onto 
the ideas and activity of raw politics. This is a flesh that, as I argued in Chapter Four, is sadly 
lacking in the tradition of political liberalism. 
I think that the politics of the State, with its nations, contracts, rights and liberties are all 
properties of the drive to the development of the pure – the distillation of the raw. But the idea of 
democracy remains aloof from this purification process. I do not claim that raw politics and the 
gathering are kinds of democracy. They are not. Nor do I claim that they are an origin for 
democracy. However, any politics that calls itself democratic is haunted by the raw and I think 
that democracy cannot be democratic without some such traces of the raw and of the gathering. 
Once such traces are boiled down and distilled, democracy loses something of its potency. 
Without a trace of the raw, democracy is reduced to process and procedure. Raw politics is not 
the democracy to come, but I contend that democracy cannot come without it. 
Raw politics is not a form of democracy, largely because it is not a politics of the 
decision or the rule. These are the characteristics that have a closer affinity to the philosophical 
tradition of anarchism. As we have seen however, attempts to develop anarchist theories run into 
particularly difficult problems. Additionally, the programs and utopian visions developed by so 
many variations of anarchist thought fall back on the need for a unified community and blatantly 
contradict the very idea of anarchism, which is to be „without rulers‟. While this particular trap 
seems to be one that is now avoided, another continues to haunt anarchist thought. This is the 
tendency to attempt to „found‟ anarchism in theories of subjectivity. In the past, freedom has 
often been invoked as the name in which anarchists struggle and that struggle inevitably takes on 
an individualist rather than a political tinge. In recent times the work of both Critchley and May 
has undoubtedly reinvigorated the anarchist conversation. However, they do not manage to avoid 
the call of either dividualist or individualist ethical subjectivity. Again, I contend that any 
political doing is best understood by looking to what happens in groups of people rather than 
what informs or demands an individual decision.  
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A politics without the State – or anarchism – cannot be an alternative to the State, or a 
counter-power or counter-hegemony. I would argue that we have learned – or certainly should 
have by now – that political theory developed in such a way simply functions to ground 
variations of the State-form. While I acknowledge that some variations of the State-form are 
better than others and concur, for example, with many aspects of the work of Laclau, Mouffe and 
Castoriadis, I do not think that these are adequate responses to the calls of Marx, Castoriadis and 
Foucault for other or new modes of politics. As I have argued here, I think that an adequate 
response to this call can be described through the notion of the interpellation of a gathering of 
raw politics. This politics, unlike politics of the State-form, is a politics of doing and thinking 
rather than simply thinking.  
Not every (or maybe any) situation calls for a politics with a big idea. I dare say that 
most need only a small one. Of course, in political philosophy, big ideas tend to reign. The 
figuring of raw politics here is not to be considered as an alternative to a Castoriadian project, or 
to Foucauldian or Deleuzian politics. I think rather that it is a small idea that a Castoriadian or a 
Foucauldian would do well to carry. This appeal to smallness may seem strange given the 
tendency in of philosophical and political thinkers to conceive of grand ideas and systems for our 
being together, discussing together and deciding together. And it may seem strange given the 
„bigness‟ of the problem I have taken on: that is, the monopoly of the State over politics and the 
possibility of politics without the State. As we reach the end of this thesis however, I want to 
argue that it is now time for small ideas. Our political toolbox has become cumbersome and 
overloaded. The main „tool‟ – the State (Empire) – has become overpowered to such an extent 
that at the limits of its power, it has begun to shake itself apart. That is, the physical and 
conceptual power that is now generated and exercised in order to hold the global community 
„together‟ is a force that it now struggles to endure. The work of Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri clearly describes this „stress-fracturing‟ of the global system but I do not think their new 
big idea is „the answer‟. The idea of raw politics is small. As an idea that can be carried, it 
„adulterates‟ particular political situations. Raw politics is itself a response to the address and 
interpellation of the original inspiration and a new pragmatic interpellation for everyday political 
activity. Raw politics is a day-to-day politics which affirms the sincere desire to change a 
political situation and which at the same time affirms the absurdity of such a desire in the face of 
the contingency of what happens. Raw politics knows and loves the aleatory character of any 
encounter and sends itself as a dice-throw, knowing that possibly or probably, something will 
happen, maybe even that which is desired. What the gathering loves the most is the trace and the 
scent of possibility involved in joining-with it. What will happen? 
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